

Photo. by Mr. J. E. Morris.

BROUGHAM CASTLE.

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ART. XIX.—*Cumberland and Westmorland Military Levies in the time of Edward I. and Edward II.* By J. E. MORRIS, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.

Read at Penrith, August 28th, 1902.

THE fascination of history is most powerfully felt when we enter into detail; such detail can only be got from the public records. Mr. Bain did splendid work in his four volumes of *Documents relating to Scottish History*. Whatever I have here to bring before you is simply due to a wish to supplement his work. I have found that it has been useful to study at more length certain documents which he calendared somewhat shortly; and, moreover, the new catalogue in the Record Office is so well arranged that I have been able to examine documents which he could not find. It remains that Mr. Bain is the father of true research concerning Scotland and the Border.

The documents fall under the following heads:—(a) the pay-rolls of various campaigns, contained in the Exchequer Accounts, wherein are minutely given the payments to horse and foot; (b) horse-lists—*i.e.*, registers of the mounts of every mailed cavalryman in the King's pay, so that, if a horse was killed on the King's service, the value might be made good to the owner, such value being inserted together with the colour and points of each; (c) contracts made by lords or bannerets to serve the King for a stated time for stated wages; (d) official lists of the letters of protection—which were passports, so to speak—issued in the King's name to landowners who were proceeding to war, and proclaiming that the men who had such letters were under the King's protection up to a certain date: these are found in the *Rotuli Scotia* year by year, the official rolls on which are entered matters

relating specially to Scotland; (*e*) writs of summons to war, the marshal's registers of feudal service, and similar records. Besides Mr. Bain's calendar, there are the big volumes of Rymer's *Fœdera*, the Parliamentary Writs, the calendars of Patent and Close Rolls, and the Scotch Rolls which have been printed by the Records Commission. The documents which I have consulted independently I have indicated in notes. Special works are Mr. Gough's *Falkirk Roll* and Sir Harris Nicolas' *Siege of Caerlaverock*. It must always be remembered that the documents are not complete—sometimes we have the horse inventory of a campaign, sometimes the infantry pay roll, and such an important year as 1314 is entirely blank except for the lists of letters of protection. Thus we have to piece out our information as best we can from year to year.

I begin by offering some preliminary remarks on a typical Edwardian army. The feudal system gave to the King the unpaid service of heavy cavalry for forty days. But the feudal lords did not bring the whole number of horsemen, on consideration for whose service William I. had originally granted the lands. Edward I. accepted a quota in place of the whole—*e.g.*, an earl brought 30 to 50 lances all told, and the cavalry total amounted to 1,000 or 2,000 lances. Individual lords might serve before and after the forty days without pay; but, as a rule, the King paid for all non-feudal service. This was much more satisfactory, for the paid cavalry could be brigaded and disciplined more easily than the feudal, but was very expensive. By the reign of Edward III. feudal service practically disappeared. Of course, both the feudal lord and the captain of paid cavalry could recruit his men wheresoever he chose. On the contrary, the etiquette of the period as regards foot was fairly strict—the county militia was a defensive force, and if called outside the county was invariably paid, and those counties only were called upon to send foot which were nearest to the scene of war. Thus the brunt of the fighting in Wales fell on

the men of Lancashire, Cheshire, Salop, Herefordshire, Gloucestershire, and the Welsh marches; but on important occasions these counties did provide foot for war in Scotland to strengthen the levies of the northern shires. The regular wages of the period were 4/- a day for a banneret, 2/- for a knight, 1/- for a trooper, and 2d. for an infantryman whether archer or foot spearman.

To come now to detail. In 1282, the year of the fiercest war in Wales, Alexander de Lindsay, baron of Kendal, served for pay with 10 horse and 80 Westmorland foot in the army which occupied Anglesey, this being a unique instance of northern foot brought to Wales; Roger de Clifford, husband of Isabella, who was the heiress of Brougham and Appleby, served with five lances. This army, probably 100 horse and 2,000 foot in all, crossed the Menai Straits by a bridge of boats, and was annihilated by Llewelyn somewhere near Aber. Both Lindsay and Clifford were slain.

In 1296 Edward I. invaded Scotland for the first time. Here we are introduced to a man who will figure largely in all expeditions up to his death at Bannockburn. Robert de Clifford, son of the Roger slain in Wales, began his career in arms in bringing to the English army a troop of fourteen lances, himself as banneret, two knights, and eleven troopers—a very fair average strength at that date. Robert l'Engleys was the millenar (or colonel) of Westmorland foot in the same army, though I cannot find whether he had as many as 1,000 men. Neither do I know whether Clifford and l'Engleys actually fought at Dunbar.*

After Wallace's victory at Stirling Bridge (September, 1297) the Westmorland men were busy in defending their own homes against the raiding Scots. At this moment the King was in Flanders. In the February of 1298 the Earl of Surrey commanded 700 horse and 21,000 foot in

* Exchequer Accounts, 5/23.

Northumberland, to which army Robert l'Engleys brought 1,400 foot. Hardly anything was done except that Berwick and Roxburgh, then held by the English, were relieved. Surrey's men seem to have been an inexperienced rabble and were disbanded, nor did Edward I. ever again summon so large a force of foot.*

In the summer of 1298 a wholly different army was led to victory at Falkirk by the King in person. The foot mustered 12,500 strong (that is to say, if all the men summoned actually appeared), and came from Wales and counties bordering on Wales. They were the men already disciplined by many wars, who had fought both against England and for England, whereas the northern foot were not summoned to this campaign, and had seen very little fighting hitherto. The heavy mailed cavalry I calculate (subject to correction) at 2,400 lances, paid and unpaid. Robert de Clifford now had a strong troop of 35 lances, himself, eight knights, and 26 troopers.† The knights were Simon de Clifford, John de Cromwelle, Robert de Haustede, Richard de Kirkebride, Roger de Kirkepatrik, James de Torthorald, Thomas de Hellebek, and Robert l'Engleys. It is interesting to note that two of these were Scots, and l'Engleys was no longer serving as millenar of foot. The troopers—I ought to add that these were indifferently styled *valetti* and *scutiferi*, both the young aspirants to knighthood and the plebeian troopers who never rose higher, drawing alike the regular 1/- a day—included John, Adam, and Thomas de Mounteny, Walter de Kirkebrid, Robert de Whiterigg, John l'Engleys, Nicholas de Vispont (Vipont or Veteripont), William de Hertcla, and John de Teysedale (Teesdale). Two of these knights and six of the troopers had their horses killed in the battle of Falkirk—the record does not say whether the men were also killed. Two other knights and two troopers also lost their mounts later in the campaign. Clifford's

* *Ibid.*, 7/2.

† *Ibid.*, 6/40; see also Mr. Gough's *Falkirk Roll*.

own charger, or *dextrarius*—the *dextrarii* were powerful heavy animals usually imported from abroad, and were the ancestors of our shire horses or similar animals—cost £30; Simon rode an iron-grey valued at £20, l'Engleys a bay valued at £8. The troopers' mounts were *runcini* or rounseys, the lighter horses with which Chaucer has made us familiar—varying in price from £5 to £20, but the latter sum is quite exceptional for a rounsey. Meanwhile, independently of Clifford's troop, there were six Westmorland men in the army mounted on very cheap horses.

Strangely enough the Falkirk campaign was a failure in spite of the victory in pitched battle. The Earls of Hereford and Norfolk and their partisans haggled about the "confirmation of the charters," and Edward was unable to keep the field through summer and winter alike until the Scots were beaten. In Wales he had been always able to fight to a finish. War in Scotland was evidently unpopular—plenty of blows, short rations, and little plunder. Desertion was very common. In 1299 there was not even a summer campaign; in 1300 and in 1301 there was a bare two months' outing. At the siege of Caerlaverock, Clifford is said to have served; but the horse inventory of the year assigns to him only one knight and two troopers. Two thousand foot were summoned from Cumberland, but only 940 served; 1,000 from Westmorland, but only 732 served, and almost all the men returned home after a few days. This is hardly to be wondered at, for they wanted to protect their homes against the retaliating marauders. The foot of Yorkshire deserted in a body; no Welsh foot were requisitioned in these years.*

In 1303, the year of "the true conquest of Scotland," as Professor Tout calls it—for Edward kept the field continuously through that year and the next—the foot served as follows:—

* Exchequer Accounts, 8/20, 8/23; and, of course, compare Sir Harris Nicolas' edition of the poem on the siege.

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	May 17, at Roxburgh.		June 25, at Perth.
Yorkshire	2712	2195
Cumberland	695	552
Westmorland.....	679	618
Lancashire.....	629	629
Northumberland	95	496
Derby and Notts	734	766*

In 1307 we have a record of a few horse in pay with Edward II. very shortly after his father's death. Robert de Clifford had a troop of 17 lances; five knights, viz., William de Stopham, Bartholemew (*sic*), William le Latimer, William le Latimer of Bouthard, and Thomas le Latimer; eleven troopers, and amongst them John de Penrith. Also Henry de Appleby, knight, served with two troopers.†


There are no records of the next few years. Edward II. made his first effort in 1310. Robert de Clifford was superseded as warden of the march by John de Segrave, and was commissioned to raise a strong force of cavalry for offensive warfare. We find that he raised eight barons or bannerets and 26 knights, giving a total of some 150 lances at least. The following were his bannerets:—John de St. John, Robert de Monthaut (Chester), Thomas de Multon of Egremont, Thomas de Multon of Gilsland, Ingelram de Umfraville, Henry fitz Hugh (Richmondshire), Robert Hastang, John de Castre (who was frequently sheriff and commissioner of array—*i.e.*, was ordered to levy infantry—in Cumberland). Knights:—Nicholas de Vipont, John de Wigton, Adam de Swynburn, William de Rye, Nich. de Leyburn, Robert de Leyburn, William de Bayeux, Robert Haunsard, William de Penington, Robert de Hetolesal, Walter de Stirkland, Ralph de Albo Monasterio, Philip de Lindsay, John de Kirkby, John l'Engleys, William de Sheffield, Henry de Stanton, John Mauleverer, Henry Thorlgeld, John de

* Exchequer Accounts, 11/15.

† *Ibid*, 14/15.

Penrith, Richard de Kirkebrid, Richard de Quitfield, Richard de Musgrave, Thomas de Balliol, Thomas de Mounteny, John de Mounteny.*

It will be seen that many men who had previously served Clifford as troopers were now knights. The list is very interesting, and the names of Nicholas de Vipont and Nicholas and Robert de Leyburn pique one's curiosity. Were they relations of their commander? I hope that I shall not appear presumptuous in putting in the following pedigree for the sake of clearness :—



This force, then, was raised by Robert de Clifford in July, 1310; and was probably employed in engaging the Scots until the feudal host was ready the next September, when it would be merged in the latter. Many years later Robert's heir was pronounced quit of scutage for this year—*i.e.*, he had not to pay the sum which would have been owed to the Crown in case of his failure to serve. The King and army reached as far as Renfrew and Linlithgow, but the invasion was fruitless. John de Crumbwell (Cromwell, Idonea's second husband) served with five knights, including Andrew de Harcla, and eight troopers. Henry de Appleby also served.†

In 1311 Edward II. in vain tried to raise another army of invasion, for his barons were more intent on persecuting

* List of letters of protection in *Scotch Roll*, 4 Edward II.

† Feudal register in *Parliamentary Writs*, vol. ii.

Piers de Gaveston than on fighting Bruce. So he called upon Clifford and others to raise horse to defend the borders, and we find once more extant the list of Clifford's knights—viz., Thomas de Mounteny, John de Clif, Nicholas de Vipont, Nicholas de Leyburn, Thomas de Pickering, Mathew Redmayne, John Mauleverer, Thomas de Hellebek, Rob. Hansard, Ralph de Albo Monasterio, James de Ros, Thomas de Sheffield, John de Penrith, Robert de Askeby; and amongst the troopers, Thomas de Balliol, Richard de Musgrave, John de Boys, John l'Engleys, William de Vipont, Richard Gernet, John Redmayne, Roger de Stirkland.

I cannot at all understand why three of these were entered as knights in 1310 and as troopers in 1311, nor in which document the error arose. The whole force was exactly 50 lances. The horses were inventoried November 3rd, and ten knights and ten troopers lost their mounts in a fight "*apud* Faringley" or Farenley,* which is just across the border in Scotland.

Clifford now returned to Carlisle as his headquarters. Gilbert de Bromley, who had with him a small independent troop of two knights (Thomas de Torthorald and William de la Beche) and a few troopers, was paymaster and agent for the commissariat. He paid Clifford sometimes in coin, sometimes in victuals—a banneret who took the King's pay had to find his own victuals if he was paid in full, and if victuals were served out to him the cost was deducted from his pay—recompensed the soldiers whose horses died or were killed on service, brought up stores from Drogheda and Waterford, and forwarded convoys to the English garrisons in the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben in Scotland. A few more heavy cavalry, half-a-dozen light hobelars, and 100 archers were in garrison over and above Clifford's fifty. I think it is clear that Bruce had grown so powerful at this date that,

* Exchequer Accounts, 14/15; see Bain, vol. iii., No. 278.

far from being the desperate fugitive of 1307, he was beginning to overawe and raid the northern counties of England. This is the first year when so large a defensive force had to be maintained at Carlisle.

A very notable man now comes on the scene—Andrew de Harcla. We saw a minute ago that he served as Cromwell's knight in the feudal army of 1310, and he was sent to Parliament in 1312 as knight of the shire for Cumberland. In November, 1312, he was commissioned to take Clifford's place as *custos* of the town of Carlisle, and the next April of the castle. He held his post without intermission for ten years, and for three of these years he was also sheriff of Cumberland. Gilbert de Bromley was still paymaster, and the work which fell to Andrew to perform was to defend the two counties against Bruce's raiders, and also to victual and help the English garrisons in the south of Scotland. But the castle of Dumfries was surrendered to Bruce, February 7th, 1313, by "Duugal M'Douville." One John atte Grave with twenty archers managed to escape, and was at once taken into pay in the garrison of Carlisle. Andrew, though placed in a responsible position, was only a knight bachelor at this date. John de Lancaster de Holgill and Ralph de Bulmer were his knights and lieutenants, and amongst his troopers are to be found the following new names:—Richard Champneys, Elie le Couherde, Robert de Lowther, William and Robert de Rosegill, Nicholas de Brome, and Owen de Penrith. The garrison averaged 30 men-at-arms, 12 hobelars, and 120 archers.*

An interesting point is now presented to us—what share did Idonea take in maintaining the defence of Westmorland? Up to 1310 she had held the position of joint hereditary sheriff of Westmorland, but was of less authority than her sister Isabella or (after Isabella's death) of her nephew Robert. It is well known that Isabella or Robert

* *Ibid.*, 14/15 and 14/22.

appointed a deputy-sheriff, and Idonea assented. But from 1310 onwards Robert is sole sheriff.* Moreover, Andrew de Harcla held the castle of Pendragon, which belonged to Idonea, at a nominal rent paid to Robert, and when the latter died at Bannockburn the inquisition on his lands after his death mentioned Pendragon as his. I fancy we can work up the sequence of events as follows:—Idonea was acknowledged as joint sheriff as long as her second husband John de Cromwell lived, or was capable of manfully defending her castles. Then the Crown saw that these castles must be garrisoned by some strong man, and an arrangement was made by which Robert de Clifford, the nephew, was responsible for their defence as if they were his own, and he put Andrew de Harcla, who had been Cromwell's knight and whose own land of Hartley was very close, to be custodian of Pendragon. The time was critical, and a woman could not organise armies against the Scots.

Thus we come to the fatal year of 1314. We are quite in ignorance of the number of the English army at Bannockburn, merely having the writs of summons of 21,500 foot, and it is far from certain that all this force answered to the summons. According to the *Scotch Roll*, 7 Edward II., Robert de Clifford had letters of protection for twelve followers—apparently all of them knights—and thus had a full retinue of some 50 lances in all. Their names are:—Nicholas de Leyburn, Miles de Stapleton, William Tailleboys, Robert de Leyburn, Thomas de Mounteny, John Nowel, Richard de Huddleston, William de Penington, Robert de Styneton, John de Mauleverer, William de Sturneton, and Mathew Redmayne. His comrade-in-arms, Henry de Beaumont, had protections for some thirty followers.

Andrew de Harcla had not marched with the army to Bannockburn, and on him fell the task of defending the

* See these *Transactions*, vol. iv., pp. 291, &c.

two counties after the rout. He certainly did all that man could do, and saved Carlisle when besieged by Bruce. In July he commanded a force of about 100 men-at-arms of all ranks, 46 hobelars, and 326 archers. Sixteen of the hobelars and 30 archers were Irish. His knights were:—Thomas de Torthorald, Patrick de Colewenn (Curwen), Robert de Bampton, Henry de Malton, John de Lancaster, and Robert Tillol. Meanwhile Thomas de Richmond held Cockermouth with 20 men-at-arms, 10 crossbowmen, and 80 archers.

Sallying from Carlisle early in August, Andrew met the Scots in the pass below Stainmoor, and lost 25 horses in a fight near "le Redecros." In the autumn he was slightly reinforced by the arrival of Thomas de Huwys and John de Lamplough with a few retainers. Another fight occurred in November at Penresax, and 11 horses were killed. Where is Penresax? Can Pendragon be meant? Thomas de Torthorald was present at both of these cavalry engagements and lost his horse each time, and amongst the troopers who were unhorsed were Gilbert de Colewenn (Curwen) and Richard de Thurlewal (Thirlwall). On another occasion Andrew must have made a counter-raid into Scotland with some success, for he carried off 65 bulls and 35 cows, which he sold to Gilbert de Bromley for £40 8s. 2d. The cost of holding Carlisle for five months after Bannockburn came to £1,775, not counting the victuals served out to the men in lieu of pay. Next year (1315) the numbers were slightly reduced—three knights, 60 troopers, 45 hobelars, and 280 archers. But for one month, the Scots evidently being over the Border on one of their usual raids, the force was raised to 83 men-at-arms, the same 45 hobelars, and 395 archers. In the summer of 1316 we have four knights, 32 troopers, 27 hobelars, 13 crossbowmen, and 60 archers.* The leader of one company of archers was Gilbert de Bourgh

* *Ibid.*, 14/15, 14/31, 14/32; Bain, vol. iii., No. 403.

Dnō Thom̄ de Thorthorald militi p̄ restaur' uni^o dextr^a fui albi pomele (&c. as above) x li.

R̄cept de Dñō Andrew de Harcla pro lxx quart frī p't' quart' viij s̄, xxviij li; iij dol flor p't' dol l s̄, vij li x s̄; xxvij dol vini p't' dol iiij li, cviiij li; cc quart auenae p't' quart' iij s̄, xxx li; eidem vend sup vad fuis tam hoīm suoꝝ ad arma q^m peditū clxxiii li x s̄.

De Gilbto de Borugh & focis fuis pedit' p̄ xvi q^r frī & xx dol' vini $\frac{xx}{iiij}$. vj li, xij s̄.

Some of these entries have been calendered by Mr. Bain.

(TRANSLATION.)

Paid to Andrew de Harcla, knight, and to his three comrades, knights, 50 men-at-arms, 30 hobelars, and 100 archers, whose names appear in a slip attached to this account, posted in garrison at Carlisle from July 8 in the 8th year (of Edward II.) up to September 28, each day included, for 83 days, each knight receiving two shillings a day, each man-at-arms one shilling, each hobelar sixpence, and each archer twopence for their wages; £372-2-4.

Money paid for horses lost in the King's service in the retinue of Sir Andrew de Harcla in his cavalry expedition against the Scots near the Redecross on Stainmoor, August 4 in this present 8th year (1314);

viz, to Henry de Bromley for his iron-grey (literally "dappled") horse valued for him and lost in the King's service then in that expedition £10-13-4;

to Sir Thomas de Torthorald for his black charger with one front foot white (&c as above), 20 marcs.

Also owed to the undermentioned men of the garrison of Carlisle in recompense for horses lost in the King's service in an expedition at Penresax in the month of November in the present 8th year,

viz to Sir Thomas de Torthorald for his white-grey charger (&c), £10.

Received from Sir Andrew de Harcla for 70 quarters of wheat at 8/- per quarter, £28; for 3 barrels of flour at 50/- per barrel, £7-10/-; for 27 casks of wine at £4 per cask, £108: for 200 quarters of oats at 3/- per quarter, £30; sold to the same and charged to the wages of both his men-at-arms and his foot . . . £173.

From Gilbert de Brough and his comrades, foot soldiers, for 16 quarters of wheat and 20 casks of wine . . . £86-12-0.

I take it that since the death of Robert de Clifford at Bannockburn, his heir being only 15 years old, his castles of Appleby and Brougham were held in the King's name by Andrew de Harcla. My next document refers to the castle of Brough which, like Pendragon, was part of the inheritance of Idonea. Doubtless the King's advisers felt that an important fortress ought to be guarded by more powerful hands, for it will be remembered that the Scots had once penetrated as far as the "Redecros" in the Stainmoor Pass, and Brough ought to dominate the Westmorland mouth of that pass. Accordingly the castle was entrusted to Robert de Welle, knight—*a qui le dit chastel est et qui ad la garde du meisme cal*, namely, *Burgh soutz Esteynesmore*. It may be that he was a knight in the service of Idonea, and that he had already been in command; but the document tells us that he entered in his own name into a contract with the royal officials *pour le sauue et sure garde du dit chastel et du pays enuirom*. He was to maintain 15 men-at-arms and 20 hobelars, of whom 10 men-at-arms and 10 hobelars were to be in the King's pay, and the remainder were to be at his own charge. This looks as if he were drawing whatever revenue could be raised from the lands, either for himself or for Idonea. It is a very interesting point, and I cannot say that I know any other case where the Crown paid the wages of more than half the garrison of a private castle. Only in cases of minority or of lands confiscated for treason did the Crown thus interfere, and I presume that, as in the previous case of Pendragon, owing to extreme urgency—Bruce being at the height of his power and causing a reign of terror along the Border, and Idonea being weak—the Crown had to see that a competent soldier held Brough. The contract was sealed by Robert de Welle in November, 1316, for one year, and was doubtless renewed periodically. The contracting party on the King's behalf was John de Castre, whom we have mentioned above as a banneret serving under Robert de

Clifford, and who was at various periods sheriff and commissioner of array for Cumberland. The pay was issued by Stephen le Blount, keeper of the King's stores at Newcastle—at least up to February, 1318. Therefore the garrison was clearly independent of Andrew de Harcla. The following is the muster of the men-at-arms in the King's pay:—Robert de Welle, knight; Thomas de Hellebek, knight; Roger and John de Burnolheued (Burnishead or Burneside), Henry de Redmayne, John de Astenthwait, Richard de Bromley, William Couenale, Robert Russel, John Theobald le Marechal; and amongst the men maintained at the captain's own charge were John l'Engleys and Edmund de Hellebek. Twice occurred a skirmish—one at Loghm, where five horses were killed; the other at Dalblayn, where one horse was killed. I should identify the former with Lochmaben, and it would seem that Robert de Welle and his men, probably co-operating with Andrew de Harcla, made some retaliatory expeditions into Scotland. I append the contract in its original Norman-French.

Ibid $\frac{1}{2}$. Six separate slips of parchment are filed together. m 1 is a memorandum.

m 2. Ce sount les Chyuaus q̄ monf Robt de Well ad pdu en le Suisse le Roy entre le premier Iour de March & le v iour de Iun laun de Regne nr^o Seign^r le Roy dyme.

m 3. Appreciatio equorum hominum morantium in comitiva Dm Robti de Welle d̄m castri de Burgo subtus Staynesmore in munitione eiusdem castri ad vadia d̄m Regis.

m 4. A note to say that 5 men-at-arms being at Robert's own cost their horses are not valued.

m 6. Fut aremembre q̄ come ordeynez foit q̄en le Chastel de Burgh soutz Esteynesmor p^r la sauve & sure garde du dit Chastel & du pays enuirom deyuent demorer xv homes darmes & xx hobelours, monf Robt de Welle a qui le dit

Y

Chastel est & qui ad la garde du meisme cal ad empris de trouer tottes les dites gentz du p̄mier iour de Decembr̄ p̄fchein auenir tantqa la Natiuite de Saint Iohan le Baptifstre ou par vn an entier si mestier soit, des quieux v homes darmes & x hobelours serront a ses custages demefne p̄ la garde de meifme le chastel, & p̄ le remenant cest asauoir x homes darmes & x hobelours p̄ndra il de n̄re seign̄r le Roy gages acufromez cest asauoir p̄ home darmes xij d & p̄ hobelour iiiiij d le iour, des quieux gages yl serra paieiz le xv iour de Decembr̄ a Eūwyk p̄^{or} vn q̄rt del an & eusi de q̄rt en q̄rt tant come les dites gentz y demorront, & est asauoir q̄ les cheuaux des auantditz x homes darmes serront p̄fez par les ministres nre^o seign̄r le Roy & aueront restor de ceux q̄ se p̄ront en le seruice le Roy par le temps auantdit. En tesmoignante de quieu chose est faite ceste endente^r sealee du p̄ue seal n̄re seign̄r le Roy & du seal le dit Monf Robt entrechangeablement. (Nov. 16, 1316.)

Whenever we find a man-at-arms mentioned it is to be understood that a mailed warrior mounted on a "covered" war horse is meant. Knights were undoubtedly completely mailed, and their horses were "covered" with iron. Esquires and troopers probably wore less armour, and substituted boiled leather for iron both for themselves and their mounts. As soon as ever a horse was unable to carry its own armour and its armoured rider the wage of a shilling a day was lowered. Such horses were valued by the inventories as mentioned. We have just had occasional mention of hobelars. These were light riders on light ponies or hobbies. I will now sketch briefly the genesis of light cavalry on the Border.

In all the wars of Edward I. heavy cavalry of the kind just described were used—any rare light horsemen in his armies were Welsh or Irish auxiliaries—and the first use of the word hobelar, as far as my knowledge goes, is in connection with special Irish scouts brought over to Cumberland in the days of Wallace. Bruce improved on

Wallace's methods of war. He had his solid schiltrome or phalanx of spearmen for pitched battle, and his pony-mounted raiders for avoiding battle and harrying the English. Who has not heard of Bruce's terror-spreading raids in Durham and Yorkshire, of his light horsemen with their bags of oatmeal and girdles, immortalised by Jehan le Bel, the chronicler from Hainault, who came over with Queen Philippa and saw the campaign in the first year of Edward III., and from whom the then unborn Froissart drew his account? Yet, just as Thomas de Grey defended Norham against all odds in Northumberland, so Andrew de Harcla and Robert de Welle were doing their best on this side. I think we can go even further, and say that Andrew was definitely and systematically organising a force of English pony-mounted hobelars to match the Scots at their own game. Edward II. did little or nothing to help his subjects. He allowed Berwick to fall for want of provisions, and obstinately "preferred infantry" when he took the field. In 1319 an army was raised to recapture Berwick, and in the September of that year there were in arms 6,152 foot (including 1,400 Yorkshiremen and 2,400 Welsh), 53 crossbow-men, and 831 hobelars. To this muster Andrew de Harcla brought 980 foot and 381 hobelars; Robert de Welle, 20 archers and 40 hobelars; Hugh de Lowther, 28 archers and 25 hobelars. Thus Cumberland and Westmorland supplied one-sixth of the foot, and just over one-half of the light cavalry.* It is clear that these men had their wits about them, and were organising well for the defence of the march. Edward III. afterwards organised the horse archers (an ideal mounted infantry, who in course of time redeemed England's military honour), but before his reign is the age of the hobelars—light lancers mounted on fell ponies, encumbered with no body armour, and drawing 4d. or 6d. a day as their

* *Ibid.*, 15/27.

pay. Until they were superseded by the horse archers they were the most useful soldiers of any English army, and Andrew de Harcla appears to have done most to utilise them.

Andrew was at the height of his fame when, in 1322, he outmanœuvred and completely broke the power of Earl Thomas of Lancaster at Boroughbridge in Yorkshire. Though cousin to the King, Thomas had been the most serious opponent of the Crown. With him fought and was taken prisoner Roger de Clifford, son and heir of Robert. May we not fairly trace cause and effect here? Jealous of Andrew, sore that he was not recognised as sheriff of Westmorland (for since Robert's death the duty of the sheriffwick had been discharged by deputy—Hugh de Lowther, Walter de Strickland, Patrick de Curwen, Henry de Threlkeld, or Henry de Warcop in turn), perhaps disgusted that castles which were his by inheritance were garrisoned by others, Roger joined the rebels. He was condemned to death, but was respited. Now at least, even if I am wrong in my conjecture that it had been the case earlier, the castles of Appleby and Brougham, as well as Pendragon, were definitely held by Andrew de Harcla as the result of Clifford's rebellion. The victor was made Earl of Carlisle. Not often has a simple and obscure knight risen by sheer force of military talent to so high a rank.

Profiting by the extirpation of the English rebels, Edward II. raised an army to invade Scotland in 1322. I have neither time nor space for details. Suffice it to say that he openly "preferred infantry," and even went so far as to prefer heavy armour-clad foot spearmen to archers. For the very first time in history these footmen were drawn from every county of England, as well as from Wales and the Welsh marches, and they mustered 15,000 strong. Bruce refused to fight a second Bannockburn. He simply allowed the English to starve on the dreary moorlands, and a mere fraction of the miserable

host returned over the Border. Following up smartly with his pony-mounted raiders he all but captured Edward in Yorkshire. Panic spread all over the northern counties. It is painful to read of the fate of Andrew de Harcla. The faithful warden of Cumberland and Westmorland doubtless felt that he could no longer serve a King who was so utterly incompetent as a warrior. Edward was simply ruining England. Therefore the north-country lords must look after their own interests themselves. So he offered to make terms with Bruce, but he miscalculated his power. His own comrade-in-arms, Antony de Lucy, was ordered to arrest him; and arrest him he did, quietly and without recourse to arms. Andrew was degraded with all the marks of ignominy—hung and quartered.

So I come to my most interesting document*, which gives the strength of the garrisons, whether in the royal castles or in Clifford's, when Antony de Lucy seized them in the King's name after Andrew's arrest. There are two fragments, separated by some accident, but obviously parts of one whole. The ink is very faint, yet I am sure of my names and figures. The heading runs thus:—"Particulars of Sir Antony de Lucy both of the garrisons of the castles and peels of the King in his custody within the march of Carlisle after the capture of Sir Andrew de Harcla in the month of February of the 16th year (1323), and of the expenses of various horses of the King which were with the aforesaid Andrew in the same year." Antony himself drew a banneret's wage of 4/- a day, and money as below for men—viz.,

	Knights.	Men-at-arms.	Hobelars.	Foot.			
Carlisle	5	...	34	...	40	...	40
Naworth.....	0	...	1	...	0	...	12
Cockermouth	0	...	2	...	3	...	4
Egremont	0	...	1	...	(?)	...	3

* *Ibid.*, 16/9 and 16/13.

	Knights.	Men-at-arms.	Hobelars.	Foot.			
Appleby	0	...	10	...	30	...	0
Brough	1	...	11	...	10	...	16
Mallustang.....	0	...	1	...	2	...	2
(Pendragon)							or 11 (?)
Heyheued	0	...	4	...	6	...	6
(Highhead)							
Total ...	6	...	64	...	91	...	83
					(plus ?)		or 92 (?)

Brough was still in all probability garrisoned independently by Robert de Welle.

The following is a transcript of the original, and includes Lucy's claim for payment of expenses :—

Ibid ¹⁶/₉: back. *Pticle dñm Antonii de Lucy tam de munitoibz castroz & peloz B in custodia suo exñtiũ infra marchiam Carlfe post captõem dñm Andr' de Harcla mens' ffebr' anno xvj^o qm de expñ dui'forz equorz B qui fuerũ dti Andr' anno eodem.*

Idem Anton custos castri Karfli petit p vadiis suis quⁿq3 militũ, xxxiiij scutiferoz, xl hobol' & xl pedit' morant' secũ in munitiõn dti castri de Karfli int' xxv diem ffebr' anno xvi^o quo die capt' fuit Andreas de Harcla et xxix diem Maii quo die firmata fuit treuga anno eodem utroq3 die comput' p ^{xx}iiij . xiiij dies ipso banereto picipiente p diem iiij s̄ quolt milite ij s̄, quolt scutifero xij d, quolt hobel' vi d, quolt peditte ii d p vadiis suis p idem temp⁹

cccl li. xviiij s̄ & viij d.

Iñ idem Antoni⁹ petit p expens' xxxiiij equoz qui fuerũt Andr' de Harcla a xxv^{to} die ffebr' anno rr' E. xvi^o usq3 xxx^m Iunii anno eodm

cxliij li. xs̄. iiij d.

Idm Antoni⁹ petit liij li. vi s̄ viij d, quos lib dño Iohi de Louthr' custodi victual dñm B in ptibz Karli p tram ipũs Reg' & indenturã int' dñm Antoniu & dtm dum Iohm de Louthr'.

Peace was at last made with Bruce on May 29th, 1323. The garrisons were at once largely reduced, and Patrick de Curwen as deputy-sheriff took over Appleby. The wretched reign came to an end in a manner yet more wretched, and the upstart Mortimer ruled England. But he was overthrown, and on Bruce's death came the dawn of better things. The lands of rebels were restored to their heirs, and Robert de Clifford entered into possession when Roger, his elder brother and the rebel at Borough-bridge, died unmarried in 1327. Here let us leave the wars of the Borders in expectation of better days, when Halidon Hill and Neville's Cross will amply restore England's military prestige.
