

Fig. 1: Boudicca's route based on archaeological and literary evidence.

Boudicca re-visited

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THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS to look with a fresh eye at the part played by the London area in the Boudiccan revolt, and to offer an alternative to the usually accepted course of events.

Background

The will of Prasutagus, the Client King of the Iceni, who died in A.D. 60 (or possibly in the year before), named his two daughters and the Emperor as his co-heirs. Nero decided however to annex the whole kingdom, a decision perhaps motivated by the need to finance his free-spending¹.

At the same time as Decianus Catus, the Provincial Procurator, began brutally to take over the kingdom, Seneca, the philosopher and joint-chief minister to Nero, was attempting to recover his own private loans of 40 million sesterces². In the ensuing operations Boudicca, the widow of Prasutagus, and her daughter were outraged, while the Icenian nobles were despoiled of their wealth³.

As a result, the Iceni rose in revolt and incited the Trinovantes on whose land the *colonia* at Camulodunum (Colchester) has been established by force, to do likewise. With other tribes joining in, Boudicca was initially able to muster an army of 120,000⁴.

Destruction of Camulodunum

Meanwhile with the realisation of the gathering storm and in the absence of Suetonius Paulinus, the Governor, who was campaigning in North Wales, an appeal for help was made by the defenceless *colonia* to Catus who was probably in Londinium. He sent under 200 men "without proper arms" (*sine iustis armis*) to reinforce the "handful" (*modica manus*) of soldiers already at Camulodunum⁵. As the former are not referred to as '*milites*' and Tacitus goes out of his way to underline their state of equipment, these men were probably volunteers armed with whatever weapons were available, while the latter

1. Tacitus *Annals* 14.31.1-2.
 2. Dio *Histories* 62.2.1.
 3. Tacitus *Annals* 14.31.3.

4. *Ibid* 14.31.4-7; Dio 62.2.3.
 5. Tacitus *Annals* 14.32.

may have been a small garrison at the *colonia* or escorts to the tax collectors operating in the area. If the 200 men were indeed despatched from Londinium, this reference would indicate that there was no regular garrison at the town at this date and therefore that there was no fort either.

It would seem reasonable to assume that Catus also sent an immediate message to Paulinus informing him of the situation — one suspects that he did not have the power to order southwards the nearest legion, which was the 9th under the command of Petillius Cerialis and which appears to have been split into three vexillations: at Longthorpe near Peterborough, at Newton on Trent and at Lincoln or somewhere near Northampton⁶. At the first of these sites the archaeological evidence suggests that it may have housed three legionary cohorts including the First (which would indicate that Cerialis himself was stationed there) as well as some 2,000 auxiliaries, some of whom were probably cavalry⁷.

At Camulodunum there were a senate house, a theatre and houses as well as a temple in the course of construction and it is possible that some make-shift defences were constructed (despite Tacitus' reference to the contrary). In the event the rebels overran everything in the first onrush except for the temple whose defenders held out for two days⁸.

Cerialis with a portion of his legion (presumably only those troops immediately available to him) marched to the relief of Camulodunum but the victorious Britons met him en route, wiping out his infantry. He and his cavalry were able to escape back to their camp (?Longthorpe)⁹. With this incident too it would be reasonable to assume that Cerialis sent messengers to Paulinus both before and after the engagement.

Longthorpe is only 77 miles (124 km) from Camulodunum and Cerialis should have been able to cover the distance in three days. As he was met by the "victorious Britons" before he reached the *colonia*, it would appear that he was only alerted as the rebel attack developed, perhaps by a direct messenger from the settlers.

Paulinus was in Anglesey when news of the revolt reached him — having captured the island he was in the process of installing a garrison and cutting down the sacred groves¹⁰. He immediately took ship, perhaps to Chester¹¹. Unfortunately it is not known at

what point despatches reached him with the news of the fall of Camulodunum and the rout of Cerialis; it is possible that there was some earlier news, such as the assumed message from Catus, which initiated the return of Paulinus, who may, for example, have moved to Chester as a precautionary step to await further despatches.

The March to Londinium

For the next episodes most commentators suggest that Paulinus swiftly rode the 180 miles (288 km) from Chester (or 250 miles/400 km from Anglesey) to Londinium with a cavalry escort, and with the rashness of Cerialis in mind decided that the troops available were too few in number and that the town could not be held. He therefore retired back up Watling Street with those of its inhabitants who could keep up with him and linked up again with his slower moving infantry. Later, he defeated the rebels somewhere along Watling Street¹², perhaps as far away as Mancetter¹³ (100 miles/160km from Londinium).

There is however no literary evidence for the cavalry dash to Londinium, the return and the final battle being fought along Watling Street. Indeed, I would suggest the evidence available clearly indicates that this scenario is quite wrong:

(a) **The character of Paulinus** was not of that of the impetuous soldier who makes a good cavalry leader. Rather, he preferred a "cautious, well-considered plan to the luck of the gambler"¹⁴. At the engagement at Castores during the Civil War of A.D. 69 Paulinus had ditches filled and his line of battle extended before committing his troops to a counter-ambush, "thinking that it would be soon enough to start winning when precautions had been taken against defeat"; in the event the delay allowed the Vitellians time to retire to some strong points¹⁵. Later, he ensured that his troops did not over-reach themselves in pursuit. Tacitus calls him "Paulinus the prudent"¹⁶. Certainly, the successful conquest of the Atlas and Welsh mountains was not achieved by a rash commander, not the sort of man, one might think, to make a gambler's dash to Londinium with only a cavalry escort "through the middle of the enemy"¹⁷.

(b) **A grave tactical error** would have been committed if Paulinus had indeed separated himself from his infantry because there was no certainty that he

6. S.S. Frere and J.K.St.Joseph 'The Roman Fortress at Longthorpe' *Britannia* 5 (1974) 38.

7. *Ibid* 34/5.

8. Tacitus *Annals* 14.32.

9. *Ibid*.

10. *Ibid* 14.30.

11. Dio 62.8.1.

12. E.g. Frere, Morris, Scullard and Webster; Salway to a lesser extent.

13. G. Webster *Boudica* (1978) 97-8, 111-2.

14. Tacitus *Histories* 2.25.

15. *Ibid*.

16. *Ibid* 2.37.

17. Tacitus *Annals* 14.33.1.

would be able to make contact again. Further, there would be the effect on morale if the Governor was seen galloping off into the distance — after all Catus had fled to Gaul¹⁸.

(c) **The identity of the rebels** quite probably included a large element of the Catuvellauni who occupied the territory to the north and north-west of London, among the 'other tribes' who joined the revolt¹⁹ because Tacitus states that Paulinus "with extraordinary steadfastness proceeded to Londinium through the midst of the enemy"²⁰ (but makes no mention of his return through the enemy). Paulinus probably expected to have to battle his way through for he was undoubtedly aware that it was 114 years since Caesar's second invasion had been determinedly disputed by Cassivellaunus whose kingdom was probably that of the Catuvellauni²¹; 17 years since the Claudian invasion when the resistance was led by the same tribe under Caratacus and Togodumnus²²; and only 9 years since Caratacus had been finally defeated in Wales and subsequently betrayed, to live out his life as a pensioned prisoner in Rome²³. In this light it is tempting to assign the destruction of the Catuvellaunian *municipium* of Verulamium (St Albans)²⁴ to local insurgents who, if nothing else, saw the revolt as a cover for looting the property of some of their pro-Roman nobles.

(d) **The lack of defences at Londinium** and the number of troops in the south-east of the province were facts obviously known to Paulinus who had been Governor for over two years — he did not need to ride all that distance to remind himself of the state of affairs in that part of the country. The reference to the fewness of troops and the inability to hold Londinium surely relates to the unexpected non-arrival of the 2nd Legion from the west²⁵.

(e) **Few refugees from Londinium** could keep up with the pace of a cavalry force (and, I suggest, fewer still who could have made the long march up Watling Street — 100 miles/160 km to Mancetter!)

I would postulate a very different model for these episodes: the prudent Paulinus having left behind a suitable force to hold the newly-won areas in North Wales (say, something of the order of half of the 20th Legion together with auxiliaries), marched down Watling Street with a compact force consisting of the 14th Legion, the remainder of the 20th Legion

and a number of auxiliary cohorts²⁶, perhaps picking up more of the last on his way. At the same time a messenger was sent to the 2nd Legion at Exeter²⁷ to rendezvous at Londinium. At this time Londinium was neither a *colonia* like Camulodunum nor a *municipium* like Verulamium, but it did contain "many merchants and supplies"²⁸ and obviously had commercial and political importance.

The location from which Paulinus set out is unknown, but as the Roman Army's normal rate of marching appears to have been 20 Roman miles a day²⁹, 13 days to cover the 250 miles (400 km) from Anglesey seems reasonable; perhaps it might have been only 9 days or less if he set out from Chester (180 miles/290 km). Paulinus arrived in Londinium before the rebels, perhaps only just before, to find that the 2nd Legion had not arrived³⁰.

From the description of the final battle scene the rebels travelled with a large number of carts and women³¹. If the Roman Army's marching rate was indeed 20 Roman miles a day, then it must be supposed that the rebel's rate was very much less, particularly as they would be slowed down along the way by the need to forage and the desire to loot. The 61 miles (98 km) from Camulodunum could easily have taken at least ten days, especially as there may have been delays waiting for the victors of Cerialis to straggle back and for the arrival of more tribal envoys to pledge support — in passing, it is interesting to note that in Marlborough's time a daily average marching distance of between eight and ten miles was considered good³².

At Londinium, Paulinus with a force of about four times the size of the ill-fated one led by Cerialis, had to decide what to do next. By leaving a sizeable proportion of his troops on the Welsh Marches he had already indicated that his intention was to stay in the Province. Somewhere to the west the 2nd Legion (and probably auxiliaries as well) should have been marching to join him. After the rout of the 9th Legion it was obviously prudent not to risk battle too soon³³. By marching westwards Paulinus would not only be hastening the link-up with the reinforcement of the 2nd Legion, but also would be moving towards the territory of the friendly Client King of the Atrebatas (of which more below) who should at the very least be able to provide

18. *Ibid* 32.

19. *Ibid* 31.4.

20. *Ibid* 33.1.

21. Caesar *Gallie War* 5.11, 18-22.

22. Dio 60.20 and 21.

23. Tacitus *Annals* 12.35-6.

24. *Op cit* 14.33.4.

25. *Ibid* 33.2.

26. *Ibid* 34.1.

27. P.T. Bidwell *Roman Exeter: Fortress and Town* (1980) 16.

28. Tacitus *Annals* 14.33.1.

29. Vegetius *De Re Militari* 1.9.4 and 1.27.2.

30. Tacitus *Annals* 14.37.6.

31. *Ibid* 34.4.

32. D.C. Chandler 'The Logistics of Military History' *History Today* Feb (1981) 48.

33. Tacitus *Annals* 33.2.

some assistance in the form of food. By abandoning Londinium to the rebel looters, time might be bought and the Province saved, even if this course of action meant the slaughter of the physically feeble, the old and those who did not want to leave the town³⁴.

The Final Battle

How far west Paulinus marched is a moot point. A mounted messenger sent to locate the 2nd Legion should have been able to reach Exeter and return within three days, only to report that the unit was still stuck in its fortress 172 miles (275 km) away. There was also the factor that if Paulinus marched too far west, he would expose the friendly Atrebatas to the fury of the rebels which might force them to change sides. Further, I am inclined to the view that he moved away from Londinium at only 10 miles (16 km) a day in order to allow the refugees to keep up, particularly as numbers of them were citizens, and also to allow some relief to his troops who had been on the march between 8 and 13 days. Dio mentions that as Paulinus "grew short of food (perhaps because of the difficulties of feeding the refugees) and the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him, he was compelled, contrary to his judgement, to engage them"³⁵. This passage again underlines the cautious character of Paulinus — presumably he had still been hoping for the 2nd Legion to arrive but on hearing that it had not even started out, he realised that he must give battle and set about finding a favourable site.

Turning now to the archaeological evidence, the City of London has produced the well-known fire layer of this period on more than a dozen sites³⁶. Marsden has noted that "from the slight indications . . . it seems clear that most people left with much of their furniture and belongings"³⁷, an observation which militates against the theory that the refugees kept up with a swift body of cavalry through the midst of the enemy all the way to Mancetter, or wherever. Across the Thames in Southwark the evidence for the Boudiccan destruction is much less certain³⁸. Elsewhere in the London area possible evidence occurs at three sites which form a rough line running out to the west (Fig. 1): at Putney a pit full of burnt daub contained pottery whose parallel at Colchester is pre-Boudiccan³⁹; at Brentford the settlement alongside the early road appears to have

been established (or perhaps re-established) only after the revolt although the contemporary road does cover a ditch with pre-Flavian pottery⁴⁰; and at Staines there is a large timber building destroyed by fire in the pre-Flavian period⁴¹, a ditch with burnt daub and ashes, also pre-Flavian⁴² and military equipment of an early date including a cheekpiece from a cavalry helmet dated to c. A.D. 60⁴³.

In south and west London the only other sites which have had sustained excavation, are Ewell and Keston where the evidence indicates a continuity of occupation in the 1st century A.D. uninterrupted by any Boudiccan destruction⁴⁴. Although this negative evidence cannot be considered to be conclusive, it may however be compared with that from Staines which town, it is interesting to note, is further afield from Londinium (18 miles/30 km) than are Ewell and Keston (both c. 12 miles/20 km).

Thus the archaeological evidence does strengthen the hypothesis that the current of conflict flowed in a stream westwards. Building upon this theory the site of the final battle may be sought to the west of Staines.

Paulinus chose his position which was "approached by a narrow defile and secured in the rear by a wood" with an open plain in front; as cautious as ever he first satisfied himself that "there was no trace of enemy except in his front and that the plain there was devoid of cover and allowed no suspicion of an ambushade". In the defile the legionaries were deployed in multiple ranks with the auxiliaries on their flank and beyond them the cavalry⁴⁵.

One such site does exist but two miles (3 km) to the south-west of Staines at the small town of Virginia Water. It not only has the conditions of physical geography listed by Tacitus, but also it satisfies the time criteria mentioned above: Day 1 Paulinus arrives at Londinium and a messenger is sent out to locate the 2nd Legion, Day 2 he moves out from Londinium at 10 miles (16 km) a day, end of Day 3 he arrives at Staines to meet up with the returning messenger from Exeter, whose news brings about the battle at a position favourable to the Romans. Also the site is on the edge of Atrebatian territory, Silchester (a tribal capital, 8 miles/13 km south-east of Reading) being only 20 miles (32 km) away; a few Atrebatian coins have been found further east including a possible hoard at Brentford⁴⁶.

34. *Ibid* 33.3.

35. Dio 62.8.1.

36. P. Marsden *Roman London* (1980) 32.

37. *Ibid* 31.

38. S.L.A.E.C. *Southwark Excavations (1972-74) Pt. 1* (1978) 28.

39. N. Farrant 'The Romano-British Settlement at Putney' *London Archaeol* 1, no. 16 (1972) 368-9.

40. A. Parum and J. Cotton 'Recent work in Brentford: *London Archaeol* 4, no 12 (1983) 318-25.

41. K. Crouch 'New Thoughts on Roman Staines' *London Archaeol* 3, no. 7 (1978) 184.

42. Personal communication from K. Crouch.

43. K. Crouch 'The Archaeology of Staines and the Excavation at Elmsleigh House' *Trans London and Middlesex Archaeol Soc* 27 (1976) 76.

44. *Pers comm*, S. Nelson and B. Philp respectively.

45. Tacitus *Annals* 14.34.2-3.

46. A. Robinson letter *London Archaeol* 3, no. 7 (1978) 195.




Fig. 2: The Final Battle — the postulated site fulfils Tacitus' description of the Roman position being approached by a narrow defile with a wood behind and a plain in front. Margary advocated the northern route for the Roman road from Staines to Silchester (20 miles/32km), but the suggested southern route not only incorporates a sighting of a Roman road made in 1850, but also circumvents the very steep gradient to the north of Callow Hill.

The site is in a valley on or near the Staines-Silchester Roman road⁴⁷ (see Fig. 2). To the north between Callow Hill and Cooper's Hill (and beyond) the hillside is very steep with the upper slopes being heavily wooded today; the southern flank is not so well protected. A battle line could be drawn up in the valley between Callow Hill and Knowlehill, approximately where Virginia Water station is today. Behind the postulated line lies Shrubs Hill which is well wooded. Maps and other evidence suggest that the plain between the hillside and the River Thames has been meadow for many centuries⁴⁸.

A line drawn between Callow Hill and Knowlehill (see Fig. 2) measures some 6,000 feet (c. 1,830 m). As a Roman soldier required a 6R foot frontage⁴⁹, the block of legionaries eight deep could have been deployed here, say, 7,000 men. This would leave Paulinus' remaining 3,000 troops for the flanks but there must be doubt as to whether these would be enough to prevent penetration. A solution may possibly be found in Barrett's cogent argument that Cogidubnus, the Client King of the Atrebatas, received Tacitus' accolade of "he remained most loyal"⁵⁰ as a result of the part he played in the Boudiccan revolt⁵¹. Barrett was unable to take his theory further forward but the placing of the final battle at Virginia Water would however present the opportunity for Cogidubnus to demonstrate a singular display of loyalty only 20 miles (32 km) from Silchester (Calleva Atrebatum) by committing his tribal levies to the Roman cause — and to their own for that matter, because if, as suggested above, the rebels included an element of the Catuvellauni, then there would still be many Atrebatas who would remember how they had been subjugated by the former prior to the Claudian invasion.

Although neither Tacitus nor Dio refer to Atrebatas assistance, arguably there is some room in their accounts for this role: the former states that the legionaries were arrayed in multiple ranks, while the 'light-armed troops' (rather than 'auxiliaries') were posted at either side⁵². Dio however in his somewhat longer account of the battle stresses the role played by the 'Roman archers'⁵³, some of whom may just have been Atrebatas allies — Caesar mentions that there was a very large number of archers to be found in Gaul from where the Atrebatas dynasty originated⁵⁴.

Dio states that the Romans were arrayed in "three self-contained divisions" which might either refer to the central block of legionaries and the two flanking blocks of auxiliaries, or tactically, to the main portion of troops in the defile and the two groups posted on the side ridges to give enfilading fire and to prevent any penetration of the flanks.

The large infantry and cavalry forces (Dio: 230,000 men⁵⁵) of the Britons had brought along their womenfolk and wagons which were arranged at the rear of the plain⁵⁶. In the ensuing battle the rebels were heavily defeated. The ancient historians give somewhat different accounts of the battle and its immediate aftermath. Tacitus explains that the Romans held their position until they had exhausted their missiles, and then charged, carrying all before them; the flight of the Britons was impeded by their wagons and no quarter was given, not even to women and baggage animals. British casualties were nearly 80,000 against 400 Roman dead and a slightly larger number wounded, while Boudicca poisoned herself. The acting commander of the 2nd Legion committed suicide because of the disgrace he had brought upon himself by not marching to join up with Paulinus⁵⁷.

On the other hand Dio states that both armies advanced at the same time and paints the battle as being a more protracted and bitter affair. Many Britons were slain and many captured while not a few escaped. When Boudicca fell sick and died, the rebels scattered to their homes⁵⁸.

The Immediate Aftermath

After the battle the rebels were harried and reinforcements were received from Germany⁵⁹. Possible evidence of the harassment may be found at Southwark⁶⁰ where a number of items of military equipment of the pre-Flavian period have been found, and at Putney. At the latter there is a ditch which has a 'V'-shaped profile and which runs straight for about 10m (c. 11 yards) before curving round in a 'playing card' corner; its total length is c. 30m (c. 33 yards). Two military bronzes and two possible *pilum* (javelin) heads were found in close proximity to the ditch which appears to date to the 3rd quarter of the 1st century AD⁶¹. One interpretation of the possible fort and these finds (to which may be added the mid-1st century A.D. 'Fulham sword' found near-

47. I.D. Margary *Roman Roads in Britain* (1967) 85-6.

48. Personal communication from D. Barker.

49. Polybius *Histories* 18.30; see also D. Taylor and F. Tusa 'The Roman Tactical Frontage' *Exercitus* 1, no. 4 (1982) 37-39.

50. Tacitus *Agricola* 14.

51. A.A. Barrett 'The Career of Tiberius Claudius Cogidubnus' *Britannia* 10, (1979) 241-2.

52. Tacitus *Annals* 14.34.3.

53. Dio 62.12.3-4.

54. Caesar *Gallia War* 7.31.3.

55. Dio 62.8.2.

56. Tacitus *Annals* 14.34.4.

57. *Ibid* 37.

58. Dio 62.12.

59. Tacitus *Annals* 14.38-9.

60. S.L.A.E.C. *op cit* 28; further items have been found subsequently.

61. N. Farrant 'Felsham Road Excavation — an Interim Report' *Wandsworth Hist* no. 26 (1980) 4.

by in the Thames⁶²) is that a number of gendarmerie posts were established to control river crossing places in the immediate aftermath of the revolt.

Some Observations

The site of the battle and the role played by Cogidubnus are probably the most contentious theories raised in this article. If in particular the evidence of destruction at Staines is Boudiccan, then looking for a battle to the west does seem realistic. There is however no other site along the Roman road to Silchester which can equal the natural strength of Virginia Water.

At Silchester itself excavations in 1982 have produced evidence of a substantial wooden building beneath the stone basilica. The most likely interpretation is that it was a forum-basilica (the first of its kind to be recognised) but two other possibilities have been put forward: given the size and date of the building, it may have been erected as the headquarters of a client king of the Atrebatas, or it may originally have formed part of a Roman fort located at Silchester as part of the redistribution of forces in the aftermath of the revolt⁶³.

62. British Museum *Guide to the Antiquities of Roman Britain* (1958) 70-1.

63. M. Fulford *Silchester: Fresh Light on a Roman Town* (1983).

The next town up Watling Street from Verulamium is Towcester where excavations have revealed pre-Flavian ditches. Although there are no indications of destruction between these ditches and the overlying Flavian and later buildings,⁶⁴ this evidence is perhaps to be best regarded as being inconclusive in the consideration of how far the Boudiccan revolt spread up Watling Street.

In conclusion, the pivotal point is whether Paulinus marched south with only a cavalry escort or with his whole task force. If the argument on this point can be sustained, then the rest of the hypothesis may be seen as a logical development.

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64. G. Lamrick 'Excavations in Park Street, Towcester' *Northamptonshire Archaeol* 15 (1980) 35-118; A. E. Brown and J. Alexander 'Excavations at Towcester 1954 — Grammar School Site' *Northamptonshire Archaeol* 17 (1982) 24-59.

Excavations & post-excavation work

City, by Museum of London, Department of Urban Archaeology. A series of long term excavations. Enquiries to DUA, Museum of London, London Wall, E.C.2. (01-600 3699).

Brentford, by West London Archaeological Field Group, Excavation and processing. Enquiries to 273A Brentford High Street, Brentford, Middlesex. (01-560 3880).

Croydon & District. Processing and cataloguing of excavated and museum collections every Tuesday throughout the year. Archaeological reference collections of fabric types, domestic animal bones, clay tobacco pipes and glass ware also available for comparative work. Hon. Curator, Croydon Natural History & Scientific Society Ltd., Museum Building, Croydon Biology Centre, Chipstead Valley Road, Coulsdon, Surrey. (01-660 3841 or 22 43727).

Hammersmith & Fulham, by Fulham Archaeological Rescue Group.

Processing of material from Sandford Manor and Fulham High Street. Tuesdays, 7.45 p.m.-10 p.m. at Fulham Palace, Bishops Avenue, Fulham Palace Road S.W.6. Contact Keith Whitehouse, 86 Clancarty Road, S.W.6. (01-731 0338).

Inner London Boroughs, by the Inner London Unit. Several rescue sites in various areas. (01-242 6620).

Kingston, by Kingston-upon-Thames Archaeological Society. Rescue sites in the town centre. Enquiries to Marion Hinton, Kingston Heritage Centre, Fairfield Road, Kingston (01-546 5386).

North-East Greater London, by Passmore Edwards Museum. Enquiries to Pat Wilkinson, Passmore Edwards Museum, Romford Road, E.15. (01-534 4545).

South West London Boroughs, by the South West London Unit, excavations and processing. Enquiries to Scott McCracken, St. Luke's House, Sandycroft Road, Kew (01-940 5989).

Southwark, by Southwark and Lambeth Archaeological Excavation Committee. Several sites from the Roman period onwards. Enquiries to Harvey Sheldon, S.L.A.E.C., Port Medical Centre, English Grounds, Morgan's Lane, SE1 2HT. (01-407 1989).

Surrey, by Surrey Archaeological Unit. Enquiries to David Bird, County Archaeological Officer, Planning Department, County Hall, Kingston, Surrey. (01-546 1050 x 3665).

Vauxhall Pottery, by Southwark and Lambeth Archaeological Society. Processing of excavated material continues three nights a week. All enquiries to S.L.A.S. c/o Cuming Museum, 155 Walworth Road, S.E.17 (01-703 3324).

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