

ART. III – *The Roman Conquest of the North-West*

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
This paper is respectfully dedicated to the memory of my friend, Professor Barri Jones, who made a considerable and lasting impact upon our understanding of the Roman conquest and occupation of North-west England.

OVER the last two or three decades, our understanding of the topography and chronology of the Roman conquest has changed considerably; few topics or locations have escaped re-examination and consequential reappraisal – from the earliest incursions into the north-west to the establishment of frontier installations. It is the purpose of the present paper to examine the north-west as a whole to see how close we now are to an understanding of its conquest and development from the mid-first century A.D. to the building of Hadrian's Wall.

It is well appreciated that, whilst Roman writers provide us with some information on which to base an understanding, they are notoriously imprecise over matters of strategy, tactics, locations and chronology. Whilst such “failings” are not likely to have been due to the authors' ignorance, they undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that that type of information was less easily communicated and presumably also of less interest to the intended audience than the “deeds of men”, particularly men of the writer's own class, who were mainly of the senatorial order. As Cornelius Tacitus wrote in his *Annals*,¹ “I believe it to be a principal purpose in the writing of history to ensure that the noble achievements of men are not forgotten, and that their infamous deeds and words should be placed before the judgement-seat of posterity”. In any case, the communication of the kinds of information that we require would have proved a very difficult task without recourse to maps and diagrams. Further, we would do well to remember that our principal source, Tacitus' eulogistic biography of his father-in-law, Gnaeus Julius Agricola, was not intended as a work of history, and that the portion of the author's *Histories* which would have contained his “historical” account of these same events is now lost.

Claudius' motives in his invasion of Britain in A.D. 43 have undergone considerable scrutiny; for the present purpose, it is assumed that an immediate objective was the restoration of a tribal equilibrium in the south-east, which had become increasingly disturbed following the death of Cunobelinus. A wider “dream”, probably entertained by the emperor, was that he, the “overarching proconsul”, should emulate the achievements of the great proconsuls of the past, especially Julius Caesar; such a dream would have gained fulfilment in the addition of the whole of Britain to the Roman empire. Although the chief thrust of Claudius' conquest was obviously and understandably military in nature, it was accompanied by “diplomatic initiatives”.

The principle of “divide-and-rule” had, of course, been operating in south-east Britain since before the Claudian conquest; it was a tactic initiated in Britain by Julius Caesar, and by it Rome supported (and presumably subsidised) certain British

FIG. 1. Find-spots of pre-Neronian *aes* coins.

leaders. Once the conquest had started, such a policy could be pursued with greater vigour; both Cogidubnus (of the *Atrebatēs*) and Prasutagus (of the *Icenī*) were given privileged status, with the objective of leaving Rome free to pursue its enemies, notably Cunobelinus' son, Caratacus.

Further, it would appear that, although the extant text of Tacitus' *Annals*² does not explicitly state it, there was a treaty between Rome and the Brigantian leaders, Venutius and Cartimandua, which remained tolerably firm until Cartimandua's "betrayal" of Caratacus in A.D. 51.³ Such an arrangement obviously had the objectives of keeping Brigantian factionalism under control and of protecting the northern flank of the Roman advance through the north-west midlands and into Wales; indeed, the marriage of the two leaders may have been insisted upon by Rome as a condition of granting a "treaty". It is likely that Venutius was a Brigantian, whilst Cartimandua – to judge from the *-mandu-* element in her name – was an intrusive leader, perhaps from a Trinovantian dynasty of which Caesar's contemporary, Mandubracius, had been a member.

Pertinent questions, upon which much has been written, concern the stage at which and the means by which Roman arms became involved in the politics and territory of the *Brigantes*.⁴ Whilst it was once conventional to see this as largely the work of Agricola (governor, A.D. 77-83),⁵ it was observed long ago that "Agricolan" was an overused adjective.⁶ In more recent times, the role envisaged for the first Flavian governor, Quintus Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus,⁷ has been extended, and his proximity to the Flavian dynasty (as Vespasian's son-in-law) recognised.⁸ It should be pointed out that Tacitus, generally critical of Cerialis' performance, nonetheless observes that Cerialis had conquered, or at least fought over, most of Brigantian territory – though not failing to point out the costliness of Cerialis' operations.⁹ Richmond surmised that Cerialis reached Carlisle, but not much further;¹⁰ more recently, it has become usual to extend Cerialis' work well into Scotland.¹¹

The debate has now extended to an investigation into how far direct Roman contact with the *Brigantes* and their territory may have been developing in the pre-Flavian period;¹² central to the discussion has lain the question of the commencement of a Roman military presence at Chester – the so-called "pre-fortress" phase.¹³

The Roman attack on Wales commenced under the second governor, Ostorius Scapula (A.D. 47-52),¹⁴ and was not completed until Agricola's surprise assault on the *Ordovices* at the end of the campaigning season of A.D. 77. To facilitate operations against the Welsh tribes, it seems that by about A.D. 50 a line of vexillation-fortresses was in place through Mancetter, Wall, Kinvaston and Leighton, with an auxiliary fort at Wroxeter.¹⁵ Beyond this, campaign-camps at Whittington and Penrhos point to operations in the territory of the *Ordovices* and the *Deceangli*. It has been argued that a crucial battle in the Welsh campaign was fought at Llanymynech mountain on the Wales/Shropshire border, which saw the final military defeat of Caratacus.¹⁶ It was after this defeat that Caratacus vainly sought sanctuary with Cartimandua; the fact that he approached *her* perhaps confirms her own "southern origins". It needs to be stressed that Caratacus' request put Cartimandua in a difficult position; refusal meant unpopularity at home, though acquiescence would surely have brought Roman reprisals and the risk of an alliance

against her of Venutius and Caratacus.

Although Tacitus mentions disputes within the Brigantian leadership prior to Cartimandua's "betrayal" of Caratacus,¹⁷ it is likely that these were exacerbated by Cartimandua's action, particularly if, as seems likely, Venutius had connections in Wales; the earliest recorded of the disputes (in A.D. 50) caused a temporary interruption of Roman progress in Wales. However, during the governorship of Didius Gallus (A.D. 52-57), Roman troops were called upon to act in support of Cartimandua, and evidently to intervene to prevent the liaison between Venutius and "allies" whom he had called in, possibly from north Wales. It is also clear that the Brigantian "royal couple" were by now divorced, perhaps because of the "Caratacus-incident". Tacitus gives few details of the military encounter, except that it was "fierce" and involved both auxiliaries and a legion under one, Caesius Nasica, who may have been a relative of Cerialis. In view of Cerialis' own later command of legion IX, it seems likely that the legion commanded by Caesius Nasica was also the *Ninth*.¹⁸ As I have argued elsewhere, the territorial scope of these early Roman operations against the *Brigantes* may be indicated by the findspots of pre-Neronian *aes*-coins.¹⁹

We have no clear indication of how much territory was gained by Rome during these operations;²⁰ that the "front line" was advanced to a line of forts from Littlechester to Trent Vale, Whitchurch and a vexillation-fortress at Rhyn Park (Oswestry) seems reasonable, as does the "promotion" of the fort at Wroxeter to a legionary fortress. It is equally possible that another line ran northwards from Littlechester, skirting the western Pennines, to Chesterfield, Templeborough,²¹ and a




FIG. 2. Early Roman advances into North-west England.

vexillation-fortress at Rossington Bridge; it is suggested that the latter site would have placed Roman troops within striking distance of the hillfort at Barwick-in-Elmet (Leeds), which has been canvassed as a possible centre for Cartimandua.²² Finds of pre-Neronian *aes*-coins suggest the possible existence of another line from Littlechester,²³ established on “King Street” through Astbury (?) and Middlewich, crossing the Mersey at (or near) Wilderspool,²⁴ the Ribble at Walton-le-Dale, and probably reaching the Lune at Lancaster.²⁵ Indeed, there is some evidence that coastal operations may have continued as far north as the Solway, and the Ribble-estuary would have provided alternative access to Barwick-in Elmet, via the Ribble/Aire “corridor”.

Such movements were evidently conceived to protect Cartimandua and to control and curb Venutius, though whether these new sites were established as forts at this stage or have preliminary phases as campaign camps is less clear. However, whilst some territory may have been gained by Didius Gallus and his successor, Q. Veranius, it seems reasonable to characterise the work as essentially “search-and-destroy” missions, followed by a return to bases further south.

The artefactual evidence is not strongly supportive of so early a site at Chester; the volume of neither pre-Flavian pottery nor provenanced pre-Neronian *aes*-coinage would encourage us to propose the establishment of a fort at Chester before A.D. 60 at the earliest.²⁶ Indeed, the fact that the road northwards from Whitchurch did not initially head for Chester, but for a crossing of the Dee at Farndon/Holt²⁷ argues strongly against it. The indication is given by this that the site at Chester was not seen as having a great relevance to operations either in north Wales or in north-west England; geographically, Chester is not well-positioned with relation to access to north-west England, whilst passage between it and north Wales was interrupted by marshy terrain.

Tacitus strongly suggests that the decade of the 60s was not a period of major military activity;²⁸ this is entirely reasonable given the traumatic and debilitating events of the governorship of Suetonius Paullinus (A.D. 59-61), and the consolidatory policy initiated in its wake. Although, as we have seen, a certain amount of control was by this time being exercised over the *Brigantes*, it is hard to say how successful this was; particularly frustrating is our inability to know whether the reference in Calgacus’ oration before *Mons Graupius* to a connection between the *Brigantes* and Boudica’s rebellion is to be trusted, or is an error (presumably on Tacitus’ part).²⁹ However, even if the *Brigantes* did not merit major military action by the Romans during the 60s, Roman governors may have continued to insist on a high level of preparedness.

It is into this context that we may place the establishment of a fort at Chester – although it may continue to be argued that a date after A.D. 69 would be more suitable. The artefactual evidence is equivocal: there is a little ceramic evidence,³⁰ though the bulk of the potentially diagnostic pre-Neronian *aes*-coinage derives from unprovenanced antiquarian collections and cannot, therefore, be regarded as totally reliable. Only two such coins have come from excavations. As we have seen, Chester’s connections by land with north Wales and north-west England may have been tenuous; the site’s importance probably had much more to do with its position on the estuary of the river Dee, which gave it its own “unique” connection with north Wales and north-west England, both of which have coastlines deeply

penetrated by river estuaries. In this way, an early fort at Chester could have provided the opportunity to by-pass and thus enhance overland-routes. It should, however, be said that at the moment, whilst the artefactual evidence points to the likely existence of such a fort, no physical trace of its structures has been located; it may, therefore, occupy a different site in the city from the legionary fortress.

In this connection, we should recall the fear struck by Agricola's armies into the hearts of the Caledonians by the tactic of having sea-borne troops and troops who had marched overland converge simultaneously on to the same location.³¹ There is no reason to believe that tactically Agricola was an original thinker; indeed, his most recent biographer has described him as a "modest achiever".³² In any case, transportation of men and supplies by sea will obviously have been a safer option in the case of unsecured territory. It is worth in this connection bearing in mind the complex sequence of development recently elucidated at Kirkham on the estuary of the Ribble, which research has shown was considerably closer to the coast in Roman times than it is now.³³ At Kirkham, a succession of military structures was revealed – a campaign-camp, a watchtower and finally a multi-phased auxiliary fort. There is no reason not to believe that the campaign-camp could have been an early Flavian, or even a late Neronian, construction.

The civil war that precipitated and followed Nero's death in A.D. 68 was a damaging affair in which the legionaries and auxiliaries became embroiled in rivalries which distracted them from their proper functions.³⁴ It is hardly surprising that this provided Rome's enemies with an opportunity too good to be missed. In Britain, Venutius tried once again – this time successfully – to embarrass his former wife; as Tacitus succinctly put it, "Venutius won a kingdom, whilst we got a war".³⁵ Cartimandua was rescued – to disappear from the historical record. The fighting was evidently bitter, and the Flavian poet, Papinius Statius, reminds the son of the then governor, Vettius Bolanus, of his father's successes in battle.³⁶ Tacitus has little positive to say about Bolanus,³⁷ and in the record he is totally in the shadows of his successors. But the rescuing of Cartimandua cannot have been easy, and it is conceivable that "combined operations" were again employed; if the seat of her power was indeed Barwick-in-Elmet, then the rescue could have been effected along the Ribble/Aire corridor.

Bolanus remained in office until A.D. 71, with dissension amongst the legions over the outcome of the civil war a further problem. Agricola was sent out in A.D. 70 by Licinius Mucianus to "sort out" the loyalty of Legion XX *Valeria Victrix*; according to Tacitus, he "reined in" his natural desire for vigorous action to avoid offending the governor;³⁸ in reality, Bolanus and Agricola were probably both under orders to make stability their priority and to avoid unnecessary hostile action. After all, *Brigantia* was now hostile territory, and the *Brigantes* could presumably have inflicted considerable damage on Roman interests. For his part, Venutius probably made it his priority to be ready for the onslaught which would inevitably come; work at the *oppidum* at Stanwick (Scotch Corner) probably reflects this, although the interpretation of the significance of that work is not straightforward.³⁹ It might be that, although Cerialis presumably took the site during his governorship (A.D. 71-74), there is room in the chronology for an attack on the *oppidum* by Vettius Bolanus, as Statius seems to imply.⁴⁰ In contrast to Tacitus, who says that Bolanus was too mild a man for a *ferox provincia*, Statius implies that Bolanus' response to

the immediate crisis in the north was vigorous and, for the moment at least, adequate.

Vespasian became emperor in the last days of A.D. 69, though he did not personally reach Rome until the following summer. It is likely that early on he decided that the situation in Britain required a new initiative; further, he had probably also decided that it was to be a “prestige-operation”, reserving for it as the new governor his son-in-law, Petillius Cerialis, and a new legion, II *Adiutrix*. For the moment, Cerialis was “tied up”, first in the campaign to unseat Vitellius at the end of A.D. 69, and then with the quashing of the Gallo-German rising on the Rhine, which was not completed until A.D. 70. It appears that in neither of these encounters was Cerialis’ achievement unequivocally “glorious”. The new legion was especially connected with Vespasian, having been raised from members of the Ravenna-fleet which, at a crucial moment in A.D. 69, had defected from Vitellius to Vespasian. It has been argued⁴¹ that its closeness to Vespasian was demonstrated by the awarding to it of a Pegasus as its emblem; this emblem was shared with another British legion, II *Augusta*, which had been commanded by Vespasian at the time of the conquest in A.D. 43. II *Adiutrix* enjoyed the added privilege of the titles, *pia fidelis* in its *cognomen*; both pointed to the importance to the new emperor of its loyalty and service.

Cerialis “inherited” Agricola as his senior legionary commander; the two men had served together in Britain before under Suetonius Paullinus at the time of Boudica’s revolt, when Agricola was *tribunus militum* and Cerialis *legatus* of legion IX *Hispana*.⁴² The nature of their earlier relationship is nowhere disclosed, though since legion IX under Cerialis found itself in great difficulty during the revolt, and since Agricola was enjoying a position on Paullinus’ staff, the two men may have found themselves on opposite sides of a recriminatory debate that took place in the aftermath. Such episodes as this, together with subsequent unimpressive performances by Cerialis, may help to explain the historian’s hostility to him. From Vespasian’s point of view, however, the “joint-ticket” of Cerialis and Agricola indicates the high profile status of a “new deal”; that “new deal” was evidently total conquest.

As a result of Tacitus’ natural emphasis on the achievements of his father-in-law, those of other Flavian governors are rather over-shadowed. We have now seen that, even in pre-Flavian times, there had been a not inconsiderable penetration into Brigantian territory; we need, therefore, to bring Agricola from the “glorious isolation” in which Tacitus has placed him, into a broader Flavian context in Britain. Although it is true that Tacitus does acknowledge Cerialis’ work amongst the *Brigantes*, the brevity of the reference and its lack of any detail seem to act to minimise the scale of Cerialis’ achievement: this may have been the historian’s intention, and the reference to some of the work as “costly” (*non incruenta*) may represent a further example of Tacitus’ critical attitude towards Cerialis.⁴³ Nor is any mention made of something which appears to have the confirming support of archaeological evidence, namely that Cerialis penetrated southern Scotland, presumably to establish good relations with such grain-growing tribes as the *Votadini* and perhaps even the *Venicones* (of Fifeshire).

One clue, however, Tacitus does provide: Cerialis split command of the advance between himself and Agricola. Presumably, Cerialis operated out of Lincoln with his old legion, IX *Hispana*, whilst Agricola was based at Wroxeter with XX *Valeria*

Victrix. It is conceivable that a vexillation (at least) of II *Adiutrix* had been placed at Chester in a fort that may have been constructed there either in late Neronian times or early in the Flavian period under Cerialis. Little detail is given; the historian makes no mention of a new fortress at York, nor of the taking of the Brigantian *oppidum* at Stanwick, which presumably saw Venutius' preparations for his last stand. Nor is there anything to indicate that Cerialis performed the politically-important act of separating the *Parisi* from the *Brigantes* in eastern Yorkshire.

There is similarly little detail to help us understand the scope of Agricola's work west of the Pennines, though the use of "combined operations" seems likely, with the soldiers of II *Adiutrix* being disembarked in the estuaries of the Mersey, Ribble, Lune and Kent, and proceeding thence around the coast to Solway and Carlisle. The river-valleys were presumably utilised to penetrate the Brigantian heartland, and troops must have been marched overland from such bases as Wroxeter and Littlechester. The extent of these penetrations, however, can hardly be gauged in view of the lack of dating-evidence from the majority of relevant sites.⁴⁴ There may have been a fort on the Mersey crossing at (or near) Wilderspool, whilst an early fort postulated at Walton-le-Dale probably remained in use into Cerialis' governorship, though probably not beyond. A presence at Kirkham seems likely at this stage, and one at Ribchester is virtually "guaranteed" by the coin-evidence.⁴⁵ The fort at Lancaster also can probably be described as pre-Agricolan on the basis of the coin-evidence, and Lancaster opened up a route through the Lune and Eden valleys to Carlisle, skirting the eastern flank of the Lake District. It is worth emphasising the point that most of these sites are not only now regarded as pre-Agricolan, but some of them are canvassed even as pre-Flavian.

It is reasonable to suppose that Cerialis and Agricola joined forces at the western end of Stainmore for a combined "assault" upon Carlisle. Whilst Roman sites over Stainmore – particularly those of a temporary nature – are short on dating-evidence, there is some reason to see Bowes, and perhaps Brough, as dating from this period, together with (probably) the major campaign-camps at Rey Cross and Crackenthorpe.

In contrast, the dating-evidence for Carlisle is unequivocal; dates acquired from the timbers of the fort's south gateway indicate the period of Cerialis' governorship (A.D. 72), and the volume of Flavian coinage points in the same direction.⁴⁶ Whilst a full discussion of the large coin-sample from the Annetwell Street sites will be reserved for the site-monographs, it is worth pointing out that Flavian coins occupy almost 20% of the sample of 714 coins, and that coins of Vespasian – especially early ones – make up a significant element of that group; the group also includes three Neronian *aes*-issues, but no *aes* of earlier date.⁴⁷ Whilst the presence of Neronian *aes* would not on its own prove occupation during Cerialis' governorship, it does act to support other indicators:

TABLE 1
Carlisle, Annetwell Street, Issue-dates of coins of Vespasian

A.D. 69/70	5
71	23
72-73	25
74	–
75	1
76	3
77-78	30
79	–

Thus, of the 87 coins of Vespasian's reign which can be precisely dated, 53 are issues of the period, A.D. 70-73. Whilst some of these are undoubtedly residual in circulation later in the Flavian period, the presence of so many (61%) of A.D. 70-73 points to activity during that period. Whether or not the garrison contained a legionary element remains open; the "value" of the Flavian coins expressed as the "as-value" of each coin is low (2.98); further, writing-tablets found at Carlisle appear to indicate that the garrison at some stage of the Flavian period was a quingenary cavalry-unit, the *Ala Sebosiana*.⁴⁸

It is less clear whether so early a date can be assigned to the Red House site at Corbridge;⁴⁹ the coin-evidence was disappointingly slight, and whilst the Samian pottery did contain material from the early 70s (or even earlier), it was suggested that the group as a whole pointed to establishment in the mid-70s. However, the imprecise nature of the evidence would not preclude a date of establishment during the governorship of Petillius Cerialis. If Cerialis' presence is recognised at both Carlisle and Corbridge, then the significance of his contribution to the conquest of the *Brigantes* is surely established. Not only that, but it might give cause to wonder whether such sites as Carlisle and Corbridge would have been left "exposed" on the "front line" or whether, like earlier lines, it would have been covered by subsequent advance.

One further mark of Cerialis' activity may be seen in north-west England: we have noted his involvement in local politics in his separation in Yorkshire of the *Parisi* from the *Brigantes*. We may see a similar move in the line drawn from Carlisle to Maryport (or Beckfoot) through Blennerhasset, and possibly Papcastle. Field-walking at the former site has produced some characteristically early pottery, which may cause us to wonder whether Cerialis decided to separate the evidently-prosperous Carvetian farmers of Solway from the Brigantian hill-farmers.⁵⁰ Such shrewdness in handling local political problems significantly emerges in an oration to the *Treveri* of Germany put by Tacitus into Cerialis' mouth during the Gallo-German rising of A.D. 70.⁵¹

The question of whether (or how far) Cerialis campaigned beyond the Tyne/Solway line is hard to resolve. In terms of coin-finds, there is no conclusive way of establishing the existence of sites which may have been inaugurated by Petillius Cerialis; *aes*-coins of Nero are generally rare in Flavian deposits on northern

sites, because of the much-improved mint-organisation under Vespasian, which came closer than before to matching supply and demand. It would not, however, be too surprising to find them in very early Flavian deposits. A number of pre-Flavian *aes*-issues have been found on the line of the road northwards from Carlisle to Longtown;⁵² in addition, *aes*-coins from Augustus to Galba have been recorded from a dozen Roman fort-sites in Scotland:⁵³

Birrens	Caligula
Camelon	Tiberius; Galba
Carzield	Claudius
Castlecary	Nero
Castledykes	Caligula
Cramond	Augustus; Claudius (2); Nero
Kirkintilloch	Galba
Mumrills	Nero
Newstead	Nero (2)
Strageath	Nero

Had these arisen from Agricolan deposits, then we should have expected a better representation of them north of the Forth/Clyde line.

There are in addition many pre-Flavian *denarii* from Scottish sites, although because of their greater resilience in circulation, these are regarded as less reliable pointers to pre-Flavian activity, or activity in the earliest years of the Flavian period.⁵⁴ On the basis of this evidence, it would not be unreasonable to postulate Cerialian campaigning as far as the Forth/Clyde line. Further, the Elder Pliny says in his *Natural History* (IV. 102) that Roman arms had reached as far as the “Caledonian Forest”. Although there is not unanimity amongst classical authors as to the precise location of this, it appears generally to refer to an area north of the Forth/Clyde line. The *Natural History* was “published” in A.D. 77, two years before the author’s death in the great eruption of Vesuvius; however, the compilation and writing of this very large work will have occupied a considerable period prior to “publication”. This statement of achievement in Britain covers a period of “nearly thirty years”, bringing it to the period of Cerialis’ governorship; it might be thought particularly suitable to celebrate the achievement of Vespasian’s son-in-law in a work which was to be presented to the emperor’s eldest son.

The fort at Cramond presents an interesting dilemma; excavations have over the years suggested forts there of Antonine and Severan dates,⁵⁵ although Flavian activity has from time to time been suggested on the basis of the artefact-assemblage.⁵⁶ More recently, a ditch has been located which does not evidently relate to the known forts.⁵⁷ The known coins from Cramond are well spread chronologically, though with particular strength in the Antonine and Severan periods; there are, however, a number of Flavian coins (four of Vespasian, two of Titus, and five of Domitian), which might be thought to relate to Agricolan activity. As we have seen, however, these Flavian coins are preceded by a significant group of pre-Flavian issues, which prompts the suggestion that putative Flavian activity may, in fact, have commenced with Cerialis. In fairness, however, it should be noted that these early *aes*-coins, though reportedly from Cramond, are not securely provenanced. Nonetheless, a line

northwards from Corbridge, through Newstead, to Cramond would conveniently separate the *Votadini* from the rest of their southern Scottish neighbours.

Further, the presence – albeit with limited evidence – of Camelon and Strageath in this group of forts might prompt the suggestion that Cerialis worked in similar fashion to protect and separate the *Venicones* – an aim that was realised in either the early or later 70s with the construction of the Gask Ridge *limes*, of which Strageath was the pivotal point. It may be noted that, whilst dating-evidence is slight from the sites of the Gask Ridge, two periods of occupation are noted at a number of them⁵⁸ which may point to work by Cerialis and Agricola. If Cerialis did indeed win territory in southern Scotland, this will have made it relatively safe to leave troops to over-winter in Carlisle and Corbridge.

Cerialis returned to Rome to a second consulship in A.D. 74; the amount of ground that he had covered meant that, for the moment at least, the north was under control, and the immediate threat posed by Venutius' victory of A.D. 69 lifted. Cerialis had played upon divisions between and within tribes to restore an equilibrium to the area. Under his successor, Julius Frontinus, attention could return to unfinished business in Wales; it is unclear how far Cerialis' new dispositions were kept up. Traditionally, this period of the mid-70s saw the commencement of work on the legionary fortress at Chester. However, one feature of coin-loss at Chester raises a question over this;⁵⁹ two criteria may be proposed for measuring "wealth" on a Roman site – the calculation of each lost coin in terms of its value in *asses*, and the proportion of the sample for particular periods occupied by *denarii*. On both of these criteria, Chester emerges as one of the "poorer" sites in north-west England during the Flavian period. This might persuade us that the full-scale legionary fortress and the full deployment of a legion at Chester came later in the Flavian period, perhaps even coinciding with the withdrawal from Scotland in the later 80s. It has been shown that on coin-evidence the abandonment of Wroxeter as a legionary fortress should probably not be placed earlier than A.D. 86-7.⁶⁰

This re-appraisal of Cerialis' work puts that of Agricola into a new light. Certainly, the strike against the *Ordovices* on his arrival late in the campaigning-season of A.D. 77 marked Agricola out for his vigour; an act of "genocide" on his part against the *Ordovices* served to bring to an end thirty years of intermittent campaigning in Wales. According to Tacitus, the following two years were spent in fighting over ground which had evidently already been covered by Cerialis: a campaign in A.D. 78 over Brigantian territory was followed in A.D. 79 by one in southern Scotland in which it is stated that Agricola reached as far north as the river Tay. Presumably, therefore, he either inaugurated or developed the Gask Ridge *limes* for the protection and separation of the grain-growing land of the *Venicones* (of Fifeshire).

The campaign in Brigantian territory is portrayed by Tacitus as a triumph for Agricola's vision, leadership and diplomacy.⁶¹ Yet the achievements are expressed in vague and generalised terms, and Tacitus' allusion to Cerialis' campaign in the area – brief and grudging though it is – would seem to suggest that little room had been left for major new achievement. Indeed, the most substantial area of territory "by-passed" by Cerialis – the Lake District – appears to have been "by-passed" by Agricola also.⁶² There may, of course, have been some smaller areas that were previously untouched, and Agricola may have developed some of Cerialis' political




FIG. 3. Possible lines of penetration during the governorship of Q. Petillius Cerialis (A.D. 71-4).

arrangements. Not least, he may have enhanced the network of fortification and, with the “front line” now so far forward, he perhaps refurbished or “re-invented” some forts for which new roles were appropriate as the emphasis moved from conquest to occupation. Probably, the most significant development was the creation of a new road from Chester to Northwich and Manchester, splitting there with one route proceeding over the Pennines to York through Castleshaw,⁶³ and the other running north to Ribchester, and joining the original northward route at Burrow-in-Lonsdale.

There was probably more left to be done in southern Scotland, particularly if Cerialis had concentrated on the eastern portion of this territory. In particular, the advance northwards to the Tay was clearly a development of military and diplomatic initiatives of a type already instituted by Cerialis.

If we accept the earlier chronology (A.D. 77-83) for Agricola’s governorship, the end of the third campaign probably marked a significant point in his tenure, for it coincided with the death of Vespasian in A.D. 79. We may safely assume that a new accession provided an opportunity for a “policy-review”; there is evidence that Titus took advantage of the opportunity. Detachments were taken from the British legions for service on the Continent;⁶⁴ the reason may have been bound up with developing difficulties along the Danube. Agricola’s forward-progress was halted, and the fourth and fifth campaigns (A.D. 80-1) were evidently concerned respectively with fortifying the Forth/Clyde line and with handling tribes previously unknown. Tacitus’ reference to Ireland in this campaign makes it very likely that Dumfries and Galloway (an area later to prove difficult) provided the location.⁶⁵ The logic is obvious: either the need to withdraw troops would preclude further northward advance, or territories already covered would have to be made very secure before further advance could take place. It is evident that the “policy-discussion” generated some acrimony; Tacitus talks of the “valour of the army” precluding a permanent halt on the Forth/Clyde line, and those who advocated it are dubbed by the historian as “cowards”. Ultimately, the deciding factor may have been pressure brought on to the new “frontier” by tribes to the north of it.⁶⁶

Titus’ death in A.D. 81 and the accession of his younger brother, Domitian, appear to have precipitated a further review. That the new emperor sanctioned further northward progress is obvious, though his intention may not have been “open-ended”. Even if Tacitus and Agricola believed that “total conquest” was back on the agenda, Domitian and his advisers (who probably included his brother-in-law, Petillius Cerialis who, after all, knew this terrain well) may have been looking to the defeat of the northern tribes as part of an objective for the present of “keeping all options open”.

The disposition of forts over territory covered presumably in the sixth campaign suggests that the chief objective was to force the Caledonians to battle by making life as difficult as possible for them – shutting them off from the fertile coastal regions and controlling the glens to hamper ease of movement both for themselves and for their stock which will have required access to fresh pasture. It is also clear that the “going” was becoming increasingly difficult for Agricola and his army – the narrow escape from disaster of legion IX and the “hint” in Calgacus’ oration that Agricola was having to rely on British recruits to keep his units up to strength.⁶⁷ The special entrance-ways provided on campaign-camps – (the “Stracathro-type”) – are

probably another indication of increasing difficulty for the Romans.

The objective – and, if we accept Tacitus’ account, the result – of the battle at *Mons Graupius* was slaughter;⁶⁸ the removal of a generation of fighting-men would buy time – as was probably the intention of Septimius Severus also when fighting over this same ground in the early third century. This would permit the question of ultimate objectives in northern Britain to be considered more coolly and under less pressure. Unfortunately, the vagueness of Tacitus’ language – not for the first time – does not allow us to be certain how far north Agricola proceeded, though it could have been as far as Inverness. In any case, he must surely have secured control of the coastal lowlands up to and along the shores of the Moray Firth, especially as the fleet remained an integral part of his force. Control of these lowlands would have proved a bonus to Roman supplies as well as a serious impediment to Caledonian recovery.⁶⁹

At this point – A.D. 83 on the revised chronology – Agricola was recalled; the precise reasoning may now be beyond recovery, but the decision was plainly made at the highest level, and after an informed discussion between Domitian and his advisers. In that year, the emperor shared the consulship with Quintus Petillius Rufus, who is possibly to be identified with the emperor’s brother-in-law, Petillius Cerialis.⁷⁰ Such an involvement on Cerialis’ part in Agricola’s recall from Britain may help to explain Tacitus’ coolness towards him. In fact, we surely need look no further than the length of Agricola’s tenure, and the fact that his decisive victory at *Mons Graupius* led naturally on to a new phase in Roman policy; this new phase required a new governor. Not only this, but it is clear from contemporary activity against the *Chatti* in Germany, which Tacitus gratuitously derided in his *Germania*,⁷¹ that once again the emperor could not afford to look at Britain in isolation.

There was not in the immediate aftermath of Agricola’s departure a decision to relinquish Scotland; if the new legionary fortress at Inchtuthil was abandoned in A.D. 87, still unfinished, then work on it can hardly have been begun by Agricola. Evidence from Carlisle⁷² suggests the rebuilding of parts of that fort in A.D. 83, which points to its use, alongside Newstead, as winter-quarters for soldiers of legion XX after *Mons Graupius*. Indeed, one writing-tablet indicates the presence of such soldiers at Carlisle by early November of A.D. 83. Nonetheless, a fortress in northern Scotland presupposes the continued presence in Britain of four legions, and obviously the retention of the area within the province.

However, even allowing for the eventual loss of northern Scotland, Tacitus’ famous judgement⁷³ – that “Britain was totally conquered, and then immediately sold out” – is woefully inadequate. We cannot be certain of the precise circumstances, but it is evident that events must have taken the turn for which the Domitianic campaigning in northern Scotland had provided a contingency-plan. In or around A.D. 87, the construction of the Inchtuthill fortress was halted, and Legion II *Adiutrix* transferred to the Continent – it was certainly on the Danube by A.D. 92. It is reasonable to assume that the problems on the north bank of the river, which had first come to notice in A.D. 69 as Licinius Mucianus was marching to Italy in support of Vespasian’s bid for power, had become more pressing. Inevitably, it had to be recognised that Britain, so greatly enlarged as a province under the Flavians, could not be fully maintained with just three legions; at least, however, the necessary withdrawal could be undertaken without fear of consequential disaster in




FIG. 4. Agricola and later Flavian/Trajanic consolidation in North-west England.

northern Scotland, whilst the “diplomatic initiatives” in southern Scotland had probably proceeded far enough to guarantee continued stability there.

Numismatic evidence⁷⁴ makes it clear that Scotland was evacuated in *c.* A.D. 87 down to the line of the Tyne/Solway and a new *limes* was based upon the road between Corbridge and Carlisle, known since medieval times as the *Stanegate*.⁷⁵ It is possible that the forts on the Stanegate were under active preparation prior to the withdrawal, as all of them were in their first phases large establishments, evidently of sufficient size to house the large numbers of returning troops; *Vindolanda* certainly housed two units, although a “strength-report” indicates⁷⁶ that a considerable number of the troops were temporarily elsewhere (for example, at *Corio* – probably Corbridge). Preparatory work also appears to have included the closure of the legionary fortress at Wroxeter, and perhaps the building, at this stage, of a full replacement at Chester. In support of this we may cite the dating-evidence for the “depot” – phase at Holt, which appears to have been organised in *c.* A.D. 90.⁷⁷

Thus Tacitus, for reasons which require little elaboration, concentrated upon the negative aspects of Domitian’s policy in Britain following Agricola’s recall – withdrawal, loss of territory, surrender of pride and honour. The archaeological record, however, presents a very different picture: building continued in northern Scotland between A.D. 84 and 87, the Stanegate-*limes* was inaugurated, modified and elaborated over the ensuing thirty years. Not only this, but Roman sites in north-west England are similarly “eloquent” in the cause of positive activity: the early fort at Carlisle underwent major refits in the mid-80s, and again in the mid-90s; Corbridge, too, was moved and rebuilt. The only other site in the north-west to have seen extensive excavation in recent years – Ribchester – appears to have been the subject of refurbishing and remodelling on a similar scale. It has long been recognised, too, that a number of forts, built originally of turf and timber, were remodelled – at least, partly – in stone.⁷⁸ The Lake District, which we have seen was “by-passed” by both Cerialis and Agricola, was brought progressively within the policing-network in the thirty years which separated the inauguration of the Stanegate-*limes* and the building of Hadrian’s Wall.⁷⁹

The organisation within the area was developed also – not just the legionary fortress at Chester, but the indication on a writing-tablet from *Vindolanda*⁸⁰ that Carlisle was the headquarters of an important official – a *centurio regionarius* (a kind of “District Commissioner”) – who must have had to oversee political and economic, as well as military, developments. Indications are certainly at hand of a developing infrastructure – settlements of manufacturers and traders outside forts, the creation of industrial complexes near forts, such as Scalesceugh (Carlisle), Brampton (Old Church), Holt (Chester), and Quernmore (Lancaster)⁸¹ and the development of what appear to have been “dedicated” industrial sites, such as Walton-le-Dale, Heronbridge and Wilderspool.⁸² It is possible, too, that an anchorage and depot were established at Kirkbride to service the frontier-zone.

Far from depression and negativism, the north-west seems to exhibit strong signs of growth and stability in the years following Agricola’s departure. The archaeological evidence would suggest strongly that, in north-west England at least, Domitian and his policy-advisers had little or nothing of which to be ashamed. Indeed, subsequent events appear to have vindicated the decisions so strongly derided by Tacitus.

Work on the Stanegate-*limes* over the last two decades has shown development there too: at some stage after the initial establishment, the forts appear to have been approximately halved in size and intermediate structures established.⁸³ Extensions were evidently constructed – perhaps as far as South Shields in the east, and in the west as far as the coast at Kirkbride. Examination has shown that this “western extension” had a complex development – from a road, running-ditch and palisade with watchtowers at intervals, to a sequence of forts with intermediate structures – similar to near-contemporary developments on the Rhine. That this work was virtually contemporaneous with the “central section” of the Stanegate appears to be confirmed by the fact that the fort near Burgh-by-Sands (“Burgh I”) was a large structure subsequently reduced in size by approximately one half.⁸⁴

Clearly, in the first two decades of the second century, the empire’s military focus shifted – first, to central Europe, and then to the east. Explicitly, we have little evidence for the effects of this on events in Britain, with the exception of the cryptic observation in the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*⁸⁵ that when Hadrian became emperor in A.D. 117, “the Britons could no longer be held under Roman control”. Coins of A.D. 119 signal victory;⁸⁶ presumably, the last Trajanic governor, Quintus Pompeius Falco, had succeeded in bringing the trouble under control. More importantly, the episode prompted in Hadrian’s mind a radical solution.

The troubles themselves prompt two immediate questions: Why did they happen? Where were they located? Trajan’s eastern campaigns ended disastrously – the more so perhaps because they do not appear to have been necessary. Indeed, they probably had more to do with Trajan’s “image” than with genuine eastern imperatives, although this made it the more crucial that they should be successfully concluded.⁸⁷ It is not at all unlikely that considerable numbers of troops were committed which will have had to come from other “theatres”. Did Britain suffer from unspecified troop-losses at this time? If it did, then it must have rendered an uncertain situation more dangerous.

As was to be the case later with Hadrian’s Wall, the Stanegate-*limes* will have interrupted long-established patterns of social and economic movement, leaving a portion of the *Brigantes* “detached” to the north of it. Although no context is specified, the satiric poet, Juvenal, refers to hostilities involving a British chieftain, named Arviragus, in a satire concerning Domitian’s court in the later years of the reign (that is, in the 90s);⁸⁸ it is worth noting that one tablet from *Vindolanda* indicates at least that no great opinion was held at this time of the British in the frontier-zone.⁸⁹ It is also worth bearing in mind that in Antonine operations in southern Scotland, one area that received especial attention was evidently the northern side of Solway, against which both the “western Stanegate” and the coastal extension of Hadrian’s Wall must have been principally directed.⁹⁰ It may be, therefore, that the chief difficulties in the northern frontier-zone, which may have been exacerbated by Trajanic troop withdrawals, lay in the west.

That the war at the beginning of Hadrian’s reign was serious is not to be doubted; its appearance on Hadrian’s coinage in the form of a “dejected” *Britannia* makes this clear, as does the tombstone of a centurion, recently discovered at *Vindolanda* which provides a date of A.D. 118.⁹¹ There is perhaps a further clue which points to the location of difficulties at this time: there has always been a problem in explaining convincingly why Hadrian’s Wall was originally built of turf west of the Irthing-

crossing. Traditional explanations have, to say the least, appeared “lame” and inadequate. It is clear that the building of the stone wall *from the east* was associated with Hadrian’s visit to Britain;⁹² however, orders for the commencement of the construction of a wall had probably come earlier from Rome – when the war was over. Local commanders would have experienced two initial reactions – to start building where the trouble was located (that is, in the west), and to utilise conventional materials (that is, turf).

Why Hadrian chose to visit Britain so early in his reign is uncertain; was there, for example, a renewed threat of the kind of trouble with which Falco had recently had to deal? Or was it, perhaps, that Hadrian, astute politician that he was, felt that a province so recently troubled needed the especial impetus that an imperial visit would give? In this case, it may be that Hadrian, an emperor who obviously understood the political “dimension” of building-projects, saw this as a chance to build in stone a wall that would impress and that would provide a monument to its originator; this would be his particular contribution to “warring down the proud”. He no doubt also saw the practical benefits; the Wall provided the opportunity to police movement and to collect the appropriate taxes on goods that passed through its eighty gates. “Separating the Romans from the barbarians” may sound like the age old policy of “divide and rule”; in reality, a complex and innovative emperor was trying to use his own vision and ingenuity to solve a problem that had exercised emperors and governors alike for half a century and more.

Note:

Since the completion of this paper, reports have been received of the recovery of a hoard of Celtic gold coins from a location near Silsden in Yorkshire (*Keighley News*, 18 December 1998). The coins, which include issues of Cunobelinus, will not have been used for commercial transactions, but will have more likely been connected with “political persuasion”; in this case, this may represent intervention attempted by southern warlords to dissuade Cartmandua from entering into her compact with the Romans, or it may have been connected with efforts to destabilise her. Alternatively, it could have been a bribe to persuade her in A.D. 50 to offer sanctuary to the defeated Caratacus. Such “persuasion” may have been particularly sensitive if, as is suggested above (on p. 35), Cartimandua was herself of “Trinovantian extraction”.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Peter Lee for the original production of the maps which appear as Figs 1, 3 and 4.

Notes and References

¹ *Annals* III. 65, 1.

² *Annals* XII. 40, 3; the passage contains a reference to an earlier (and now lost) portion of the *Annals*, in which presumably a treaty was discussed.

³ *Annals* XII. 36, 1.

- ⁴ See, for example, W. S. Hanson and D. B. Campbell, "The Brigantes: from Clientage to Conquest", *Britannia*, XVII (1986), 73-89; D. C. A. Shotton, "Rome and the Brigantes: Early Hostilities", *CWZ*, xciv, 21-34.
- ⁵ A. R. Birley, "The Date of Mons Graupius", *Liv. Class. Monthly* I (1976), 11-14.
- ⁶ G. D. B. Jones. "The Romans in the North-West", *Northern History* III (1968), 1-26 (esp. p.6).
- ⁷ For the full nomenclature, see *CIL* XVI. 20; A. R. Birley, "Petillius Cerialis and the Conquest of Brigantia", *Britannia*, IV (1973), 179-190.
- ⁸ G. B. Townend, "Some Flavian Connections", *JRS* LI (1961), 54-61 (esp. p.58).
- ⁹ *Life of Agricola*, 17.
- ¹⁰ R. M. Ogilvie and I. A. Richmond, *Cornelii Taciti De Vita Agricolae* (Oxford, 1967), 206.
- ¹¹ D. J. Breeze, *Roman Scotland* (London, 1996), 34.
- ¹² See note 4, and P. Carrington, "The Roman Advance into the North Western Midlands before A.D. 71", *CAJ* lxviii (1985), 5-22.
- ¹³ See J. C. McPeake, "The First Century A.D.", in T. J. Strickland and P. J. Davey (eds.), *New Evidence for Roman Chester* (Liverpool, 1978), 9-16.
- ¹⁴ G. Webster, "The Military Situations in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71", *Britannia*, I (1970), 179-197.
- ¹⁵ P. Carrington, *op. cit.*, 7-10.
- ¹⁶ Tacitus *Annals* XII, 34-35.
- ¹⁷ *Annals* XII, 32-3.
- ¹⁸ *Annals* XII. 40, 2-7; for the possible connection of Caesius Nasica and Petillius Cerialis, see A. R. Birley in *Britannia*, IV (1973), 181.
- ¹⁹ See my paper, cited in note 4.
- ²⁰ Tacitus *Life of Agricola*, 14.
- ²¹ G. D. B. Jones in *Northern History* III (1968), 2-4; G. Webster in *Britannia*, I (1970), 191; G. Webster, *Rome against Caratacus: the Roman Campaigns in Britain, A.D. 48-58* (London, 1981), 90-93.
- ²² P. Carrington *op. cit.*, 10; it is worth remembering that other areas have been proposed, such as York (I. A. Richmond, "Queen Cartimandua", *JRS* XLIV (1954), 43-52).
- ²³ For the coins from Littlechester, see D. C. A. Shotton, *Roman Coins from North-west England: Second Supplement* (Lancaster, 2000) (forthcoming). For the dating of the site, see G. Webster, "An Excavation at Little Chester, Derby, 1960", *Derby Arch. Journal* LXXXI (1961), 85-110 (esp. p. 108 f.).
- ²⁴ T. J. Strickland, *The Romans at Wilderspool* (Warrington, 1995), 10-11; for Astbury, see G. D. B. Jones in *Northern History* III (1968), 3 and 26.
- ²⁵ D. C. A. Shotton, *Romans and Britons in North-west England*² (Lancaster, 1997), 10-11.
- ²⁶ See D. C. A. Shotton, *Roman Coins from North-west England: Second Supplement* (Lancaster, 2000) (forthcoming). It is thought by some that Tacitus' reference to ship-building in Paullinus' governorship (*Annals* XIV. 29) points to Chester as the location.
- ²⁷ See *Britannia*, XI (1980), 365; G. D. B. Jones, *Roman Manchester* (Altrincham, 1974), 4 and "Farndon: An Archaeological Opportunity", *Manch. Arch. Bull.* VI (1991), 75-77.
- ²⁸ *Life of Agricola*, 16.
- ²⁹ *Life of Agricola*, 31; the reference is normally assumed to represent an error on Tacitus' part.
- ³⁰ P. Carrington, *op. cit.*, 18.
- ³¹ *Life of Agricola*, 25.
- ³² W. S. Hanson, *Agricola and the Conquest of the North* (London, 1987), 174 ff; the long tradition of "combined operations" is discussed on p. 175.
- ³³ C. L. E. Howard-Davis and K. M. Buxton, *Roman Forts in the Fylde: Dowbridge, Kirkham, 1994* (Lancaster, 2000).
- ³⁴ For accounts, see D. C. A. Shotton, "A Timetable for the 'Bellum Neronis'", *Historia* XXIV (1975), 59-74; K. Wellesley, *The Long Year, A.D. 69* (London, 1975).
- ³⁵ *Histories* III. 45.
- ³⁶ *Silvae* V. 2, 31-47; 142-19.
- ³⁷ *Life of Agricola*, 16.
- ³⁸ *Life of Agricola*, 8.
- ³⁹ A. R. Birley, *op. cit.*, 188-19.

- ⁴⁰ Statius *Silvae* V. 2, 146; note the comment on this by E. B. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1953), 13: Birley believes that Statius could not have been totally inaccurate in his observations regarding Bolanus.
- ⁴¹ H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), 105 f.
- ⁴² *Life of Agricola*, 5 and 14-16; *Annals* XIV. 29-39.
- ⁴³ *Life of Agricola*, 17.
- ⁴⁴ D. C. A. Shotter, *Romans and Britons in North-west England*² (Lancaster, 1997), 7ff.
- ⁴⁵ B. J. N. Edwards and P. V. Webster, *Ribchester Excavations, Part I* (Cardiff, 1985), 86-93.
- ⁴⁶ The publication of the “Annetwell Street”, “Tullie House” and “BBC Radio Cumbria” sites is in active preparation by I. D. Caruana.
- ⁴⁷ D. C. A. Shotter, *Roman coins from North-west England: First Supplement* (Lancaster, 1995), 31-2.
- ⁴⁸ *Tab. Luguval*, 44; this document also mentions Agricola presumably as governor; see R. S. O. Tomlin, “Roman Manuscripts from Carlisle: the ink-written Tablets”, *Britannia*, XXIX (1998), 31-84 (esp. p. 74 f).
- ⁴⁹ W. S. Hanson, C. M. Daniels, J. N. Dore and J. P. Gillam, “The Agricolan Supply-Base at Red House, Corbridge”, *AA5* VII (1979), 1-98 (esp. pp. 77-85).
- ⁵⁰ For Blennerhasset, see J. Evans and C. Scull, “Fieldwork on the Roman Fort Site at Blennerhasset”, *CW2*, xc, 127-138; for Papcastle, see D. C. A. Shotter, *Roman Coins from North-west England* (Lancaster, 1990), 94.
- ⁵¹ *Histories* IV. 73-74.
- ⁵² D. C. A. Shotter, *Roman Coins from North-west England* (Lancaster, 1990), 234; and *Roman Coins from North-west England: First Supplement* (Lancaster, 1995), 75.
- ⁵³ A. S. Robertson, “Roman coins found in Scotland, 1971-82”, *PSAS* CXIII (1983), 405-448. For Strageath and Camelon, see W. S. Hanson, *Agricola and the Conquest of the North* (London, 1987), 112 and 121; S. S. Frere, “The Flavian Frontier in Scotland”, *Scottish Arch. Forum* XII (1980), 95; S. S. Frere and J. J. Wilkes, *Strageath: Excavations within the Roman Fort, 1973-86* (London, 1989); V. A. Maxfield, “The Flavian Fort at Camelon”, *Scottish Arch. Forum* XII (1980), 77.
- ⁵⁴ R. Reece, “Numerical Aspects of Roman Coin-Hoards in Britain”, in R. Reece and P. J. Casey (eds.), *Coins and the Archaeologist* (Oxford, 1974) (BAR 4) 78-94; see especially p. 84.
- ⁵⁵ A. and V. Rae, “The Roman Fort at Cramond, Edinburgh: Excavations 1954-66”, *Britannia*, V (1974), 163-224; for a full list, see J. D. Bateson, “Roman Coins found in Scotland to 1987”, *PSAS* CXIX (1989), 165-188 (esp. p. 167).
- ⁵⁶ See, for example, A. S. Robertson’s comment on the coins (p. 193 of the excavation report of A. and V. Rae, cited in note 55); also G. MacDonald in *PSAS* LII (1917/18), 213ff.
- ⁵⁷ See *Britannia*, XXVII (1996), 402.
- ⁵⁸ For example, Greenloaning (*Britannia*, XXVII (1996), 396), and Shielhill South (*Britannia*, XXVII (1997), 406).
- ⁵⁹ See D. C. A. Shotter, *Roman Coins from North-west England: Second Supplement* (Lancaster, 2000) (forthcoming).
- ⁶⁰ A. S. Hobley, “The Numismatic Evidence for the Post-Agricolan Abandonment of the Roman Frontier in Northern Scotland”, *Britannia*, XX (1989), 69-74 (esp. p. 71).
- ⁶¹ *Life of Agricola* 20.
- ⁶² See B. R. Hartley, “Some Problems of the Roman Military Occupation of Northern England”, *Northern History* I (1966), 7-10; T. W. Potter, *The Romans in North-west England* (Kendal, 1979), 351-366. For the supporting coin-evidence, see D. C. A. Shotter, “Coin-loss and the Roman Occupation of North-west England”, *Brit. Num. Journ.* LXIII (1993), 1-19.
- ⁶³ See J. Walker, *Castleshaw: The Archaeology of a Roman Fortlet* (Manchester, 1989).
- ⁶⁴ *ILS* 1025 and 9200: see W. S. Hanson, *Agricola and the Conquest of the North* (London, 1987), 135.
- ⁶⁵ *Life of Agricola*, 24.
- ⁶⁶ *Life of Agricola*, 25.
- ⁶⁷ *Life of Agricola*, 32, where Calgacus remonstrates against those British who – “to their shame” – had joined Gauls and Germans in helping the Roman war-effort.
- ⁶⁸ *Life of Agricola*, 37-38; see G. S. Maxwell, *A Battle lost: Romans and Caledonians at Mons Graupius* (Edinburgh, 1990).
- ⁶⁹ A summary of work done in this area, including aerial photography and excavation at Thornshill and Cawdor, is to be found in *Popular Archaeology*, Vol. 7, no. 3 (April 1986), in articles by I. Keillar, C. M. Daniels and G. D. B. Jones (pp. 1-16).

- ⁷⁰ A. R. Birley *op. cit.* 186-7.
- ⁷¹ *Germania*, 30 ff.
- ⁷² I. D. Caruana, "Carlisle: Excavation of a Section of the Annexe Ditch of the first Flavian Fort, 1990", *Britannia*, XXIII (1992), 45-109; R. S. O. Tomlin, "The Twentieth Legion at Wroxeter and Carlisle", *Britannia*, XXIII (1992), 141-158.
- ⁷³ *Histories*, I. 2.
- ⁷⁴ A. S. Hopley, *op. cit.*
- ⁷⁵ G. D. B. Jones, "The Emergence of the Tyne-Solway Frontier", in V. A. Maxfield and M. J. Dobson (eds.), *Roman Frontier Studies, 1989* (Exeter, 1990), 98-107.
- ⁷⁶ A. K. Bowman and J. D. Thomas, "A Military Strength-Report from Vindolanda", *JRS* LXXXI (1991), 62-73; see also E. B. Birley, R. Birley and A. R. Birley, *Vindolanda Research Reports II* (Hexham, 1993) (esp. p. 23).
- ⁷⁷ See D. C. A. Shotter, *Roman Coins from North-west England: Second Supplement* (Lancaster, 2000) (forthcoming); see also M. Ward, "A Collection of Samian from the legionary works-depot at Holt", in J. Bird (ed.), *Form and Fabric: Studies in Rome's material past in honour of B. R. Hartley* (Oxford, 1998), 133-143.
- ⁷⁸ Lancaster, for example (see *RIB* 604; also D. C. A. Shotter and A. J. White, *The Roman Fort and Town of Lancaster* (Lancaster, 1990).
- ⁷⁹ D. C. A. Shotter, *Romans and Britons in North-west England?* (Lancaster, 1997) (esp. pp. 29-42); also references cited in note 61.
- ⁸⁰ *Tab. Vindol.* II. 250.
- ⁸¹ For Brampton, see R. Hogg, "Excavation of the Roman Auxiliary Tillery, Brampton", *CW2*, lxxv, 133-168; for Holt, see W. F. Grimes, "Holt, Denbighshire: The Works Depot of the Twentieth Legion at Castle Lyons", *Y Cymmrodor* XLI (1930); for Quernmore, see G. M. Leather and P. V. Webster, "The Quernmore Kilns", in G. D. B. Jones and D. C. A. Shotter (eds.), *Roman Lancaster* (Manchester, 1988), 85-93.
- ⁸² The site at Walton-le-Dale awaits full publication; for Heronbridge and Wilderspool, see F. H. Thompson, *Roman Cheshire* (Chester, 1965), 60-87.
- ⁸³ G. D. B. Jones, as cited in note 75.
- ⁸⁴ G. D. B. Jones, "The Solway Frontier: Interim Report, 1976-81", *Britannia*, XIII (1982), 284-297; G. D. B. Jones, "Farnhill: Excavations on the Solway Frontier", *Manch. Arch. Bull.* IX (1994/95), 23-27.
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- ⁸⁶ P. V. Hill, *The Dating and Arrangement of the Undated Coins of Rome, A.D. 98-148* (London, 1970) ("Hadrian", nos. 141 and 145).
- ⁸⁷ J. Bennett, *Trajan: Optimus Princeps* (London, 1997) (esp. pp. 183-204).
- ⁸⁸ *Satires* IV, 127.
- ⁸⁹ E. B. Birley, R. Birley and A. R. Birley, *op. cit.*, 37; A. K. Bowman and J. D. Thomas, "New Texts from Vindolanda", *Britannia*, XVIII (1987), 125-142 (esp. pp. 135-7).
- ⁹⁰ D. C. A. Shotter, *The Roman Frontier in Britain* (Preston, 1996) (esp. pp. 46-48; 72-81; 85-6).
- ⁹¹ *RIC* II (Hadrian), 577.
- ⁹² *RIB* 1051 (now at Jarrow).

