Chapter Two

Constructions of Europe and Common 'Heritage'.

Introduction.

The previous chapter considered the cultural role of the landscape, as a place vested with meanings, some of which evoke a sense of nation. This chapter takes the same principle regarding landscape but also suggests that metaphors and meanings in the landscape may evoke Europe. This specifically looks for constructions of Europe that have a bearing on objective two of the introduction on page five. Work on Europe and the landscape has not been undertaken in the same manner as that on nationalism. There are no studies like that of Kenny (1995), who related nationalism and the landscape that do the same for symbolism of Europe. As a result of this dearth, this chapter takes an alternative approach by examining various social constructions of Europe that might be flagged in the landscape. The chapter is divided into six parts:

1. Constructing 'Origin Myths'.
2. Classical Europe: Threats from the East and Superiority over the Barbarian.
3. Medieval Europe: Christendom (the Cross) Opposed to Islam (the Crescent).
4. Modern Europe: Nations and Imperialism.
5. 'Cold War' Europe and Constructions of Contemporary Europe.
6. Constructing a European 'Heritage'.

The first part of the chapter discusses attempts that have been made by historians, archaeologists and 'heritage' managers to construct a sense of a homogenous Europe, through 'origin myths', that legitimise the present. These rarely have recognisable reference points in the 'real' landscape and require expert interpretation by historians and archaeologists. They are however, presented to the public in 'partial' landscapes in the form of museum displays and 'heritage' presentations and find a place in our 'imagined landscapes' or the 'minds eye'.

The second part of the chapter briefly examines the earliest constructions of Europe that stem from the classical world. These constructions raise twin themes of threat from the east and a sense of superiority over others who are uncivilised and barbaric. These themes are recurrent throughout most constructions of Europe. Although contemporary constructions of Europe bear no resemblance to the classical divisions, the sense of Europe as a territory also still persists.

The third part of the chapter looks at the opposition between Christendom and a perceived threat from the east in Islam. Remains of the medieval cultural landscape persist in contemporary landscapes in the form of buildings like cathedrals or castles. These monumental features of the landscape reflect the two

most powerful influences in medieval society. The church and the ruling elite in medieval society had a symbiotic relationship through which both wielded power. This power was not simply expressed in the landscape by cathedrals, monasteries or castles, it was also reflected in the settlement pattern of towns and villages. Many of the meanings symbolised in the medieval landscape reflected the profound influence of religion on medieval culture and have since been lost or diluted. The contemporary opposition between Orientalism and Globalism (Said 1978, Turner 1994) however, still remains and has its roots in the medieval conflict between Christendom and Islam.

The fourth part of the chapter is concerned with constructions of Europe formed during and after the renaissance and the enlightenment, culminating in modernity. This period from the sixteenth to the twentieth century saw the birth of nationalism as we understand it, and which may be found flagged in the landscape as the previous chapter suggested. A new construction of Europe is observed during this period (formed under the influence of modernity and nationalism), which can be termed a modern Europe of nations and imperialism. The architecture of modern landscapes drew on classical and medieval influences to legitimise nations and their empires. Landscapes became more contained after the renaissance. Painting idealised, as picturesque and sublime images and structured, through geometry and perspective how landscapes were viewed. Natural sciences categorised landscapes; their flora, fauna and geomorphology, cartographers mapped them accurately, new laws of land-ownership allowed for clearances and enclosures and industrial cities began to grow. The modern sense of Europe as a collection of nation states persists in contemporary culture but has been challenged in the period since the Second World War.

The fifth part of this chapter considers Europe as a 'Cold War' construction and then reviews how this construction has changed since the 'Cold War' ended. Contemporary constructions of Europe still hold dear much of modernity, a commitment to science and technology and culture in the form of art and music, protected by 'Fortress Europe'. The post 'Cold War' construction of Europe also evokes influences such as globalisation and nostalgia for representing the past as a unifying 'heritage'.

The final part of this chapter considers the role that sites and monuments may play in the landscape to evoke some or all of these constructions of Europe. The chapter considers the 'heritage' content of alternative landscape representations of Europe and outlines Ashworth's (1998) contention that the process of local urban planning and conservation has already defined a 'European Heritage'.

1. Constructing 'Origin Myths'.

Since the creation of an institution at the heart of 'Cold War' Europe (the European Union and its forerunners) attempts have been made to use the past to symbolise the homogeneity of Europe and to legitimise the institution with an 'origin myth'. 'Origin myths' mirror the way that the national institutions legitimise themselves. These legitimation attempts have been made through the work of

historians, archaeologists and 'heritage' managers supported by national state departments responsible for 'the national heritage' or by the European Union. Historical searches for a European 'origin myth' have looked to periods for which written evidence exists. This lead to an interest in the classical understanding of Europe and the role of Christendom as a defining feature of Europe in the Middle Ages, which are reviewed in sections two and three below. Other European 'origin myths' stretch deeper into the prehistoric past, to the 'Neolithic Revolution' when hunter gatherer cultures gave way to farmers, the Bronze Age, described as the 'golden age of Europe', and the 'Celtic' Iron Age used in constructions of an 'origin myth' on both national and European levels.

Prehistoric Europeans: farmers our ancestors.

Marek Zvelebil has suggested that the change (described by archaeologists and anthropologists as the 'Neolithic revolution'), from hunter gatherer cultures to farming cultures has been used, by those who wish to evoke a homogenous Europe, as a defining moment in European civilisation (Zvelebil 1996, 145). Zvelebil looked at the theme of 'farmers as our ancestors' and concluded that Western or European society 'holds up' the first farmers as natural originators of civilised living because we understand the 'pastoral idyll' as a feature of civilised society. This construction of the past is closely related to a sense of European superiority over uncivilised barbarians (the 'hunter-gatherers). Influential archaeological works by Gordon Childe (writing in the 1920s) and Sir Mortimer Wheeler (writing in the 1950s) reflect this version of the past. Childe (1925, 1928) explained that 'farming societies in Europe arose as a result of the dispersal of farming communities from the Near East. These people brought with them apparently advanced and superior culture and colonised Europe and replacing the impoverished hunter-gatherers of the Mesolithic. Wheeler (1954) described the Mesolithic hunter-gatherers who used a site that he excavated at Starr Carr in Yorkshire as, 'as squalid a huddle of march-ridden food gatherers as the imagination could well encompass' (Wheeler 1954, 231). Childe modified his views on the spread of agriculture later in his life but he remained convinced that the hunter gatherers of the Mesolithic were incapable of contributing to the 'Neolithic Revolution' that brought about widespread farming practices (Trigger 1980). Zvelebil stressed that this view still pervaded in the work of archaeologists (e.g. Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza 1984, Clark 1966, Hodder 1990, Piggott 1965) and he supposed the public at large (Zvelebil 1996).

Zvelebil stressed three contextual reasons for this advancement of the farming community as the 'origin myth' of civilisation and consequently a homogenous Europe. The first of these contexts was the contact between Europeans, engaged in trade and exploration, and 'foraging communities' during the great period of European expansion between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such a climate of prejudice was generated against these supposedly barbaric peoples that widespread persecution and genocide was perpetrated against them. The second context that Zvelebil suggested elevated the farmer as the first civilised and homogenous European in prehistory, was the reification of the 'pastoral idyll' in artistic and literary traditions (e.g. Constable or Hardy in Britain) at a time of industrialisation and urban growth. The third of Zvelebil's contexts for the raising of the first farmers to 'origin myth' status

was the influence of nationalism. In many nationalist constructions (e.g. in Poland or Ireland) 'peasant farmers have been upheld as harbingers of true national culture and character, a repository of language and traditions at the time of foreign oppression' (Zvelebil 1996, 147).

Zvelebil's paper illustrated the divisive nature of European identity, setting itself up as the paragon of civilised living as opposed to barbarity. The 'Neolithic revolution' and its role as 'origin myth' was fertile ground for those European institutions that wished to evoke a homogenous contemporary Europe. These evocations of homogeneity miss the subsequent divisiveness, illustrated by the supposed barbarity of the hunter-gatherer.

The bronze age: a golden age of Europe.
A second example of sites and monuments being used to evoke a European 'origin myth' comes from representations of the Bronze Age. Both Rowlands (1987) and Kristiansen (1996) have argued that the Bronze Age has been constructed as the period when a distinctive European society emerged. The idea of a distinctly European society stems again, from the work of Childe who proposed that 'in prehistoric times barbarian societies in Europe behaved in a distinctly European way' (Childe 1928, 9). This distinct way of life revolved around the production of Bronze, a process that required international trade to gather raw material and spawned an independent group of craft workers. This evocation of the Bronze Age suggested a distinctive Europe that was capitalist and individualist (Jones and Graves-Brown 1996). Jones and Graves-Brown suggested that it was this view of the Bronze Age that underlay the selection of that period as the 'first Golden Age of Europe' in a Council of Europe initiative:

> "There is every justification for describing the Bronze Age as the 'Golden Age' of Europe. There was a network of trade routes connecting even the remotest areas with major cultural centres and with one another. This can be observed in technical achievements as well as in art music and even literature".

> (Trotzig, 1993, 3)

Jones and Graves-Brown supposed that the Bronze Age was chosen to represent Europe rather than the 'Celtic' Iron Age because it was neutral, untainted by the nationalistic chauvinism often associated with the latter (Jones and Graves-Brown 1996).

Celtic Europe: a pan European Celtic Empire.
The 'Celtic' Iron Age has been a hotly debated candidate for the creation of a sense of European unity. John Collis argued that the Celts have been used both as a symbol of national and European unity in different contexts (Collis 1996). The cultural evocation of the Celts was a powerful symbol and was particularly so on the western fringes of Europe. Historian Peter Beresford-Ellis suggested both national Celtic origins and a sense of a greater European past when he said that:

"This is the story of a people, now divided into six small nations, who constitute an ancient civilisation; a bright thread in the tapestry of European development; a people who fell before conquerors who ruthlessly imposed their will and, more importantly, their languages and cultures upon them. It is a story of how, after centuries of oppressive colonialism, in which Celtic culture has all but perished, this people still has not gone down into the abyss and is struggling to survive in the modern world and carve for themselves a valid role for the future."

(Beresford-Ellis 1985, 9).

Beresford-Ellis used the idea of the Celtic peoples in both nationalist and European terms when he defined 'six small nations' (the Welsh, Cornish, Breton, Irish, Manx and Scots) but also suggested a former pan-European culture. This idea of a united Celtic Europe was the subject of the *I Celti* exhibition in Venice, which John Collis claimed 'is meant to symbolise the common cultural roots of an area from Eire to Turkey, from Portugal to Poland' (Collis 1996, 172). Collis also commented on the archaeological excavation of the hill fort on Mont Beuvray. He highlighted the use of multinational European teams to carry out the work that was displayed for the public at the 'Centre Archéologique Européen' (Collis 1996). Collis suggested that the Celts had become acceptable because they are presumed to have lived all over Europe rather than being particular tribes like the Gauls. In Spain archaeologist Almagro Gorbea sums up those who suggest that the Celts constitute a symbol of European unity:

'The Celts are significant not only because of their importance in the ethnic formation of the (Iberian) Peninsula, but also because they linked it to a wider Celtic world, now a factor of great importance insofar as it constitutes one of the cultural roots of Europe'

(Almagro Gorbea 1991, 12)

Jones and Graves-Brown joined John Collis in criticising homogenising of contemporary constructions of cultures in prehistory because that very process created 'others' and was essentially divisive. They believed that the process was both inhibiting to the study of the past and commented that 'the idea of Europe, its culture and identity, has been deeply implicated in the establishment and legitimisation of relations of inequality on a world scale' (Jones and Graves-Brown 1996, 20). This is an important issue because it reflects the particularly ethnic and racial constructions of Europe that may have been suggested by these representations of the past.

If prehistoric 'origin myths' require interpretation and presentation in 'partial' landscapes then other constructions of Europe may be more readily available in 'real' landscapes. These constructions are dealt with in historical order beginning with the Hellenistic and Roman ideas of Europe as territory.

2. Classical Europe: Threats from the East and Superiority over the Barbarian.

Greek constructions of Europe.

The word Europe was first found in Greek mythology. In some myths Europa was a Phoenician Princess who was seduced by Zeus in the form of a white bull. Europa abandoned her homeland in present day Lebanon and moved to Crete where she later married the King. In many of the myths Europa was the half sister to Asia and Libya (the Greek name for Africa). In other myths Homer Europa was the daughter of Phoenix. The varieties of mythical characters called Europa suggest that the concept was not highly differentiated. The origins of the name however, are Phoenician or perhaps even Semitic rather than Greek (Sattler 1971). Bernal suggested that the origins of Europe as a pure, classical Greek concept can be traced through to the point of formation of the modern Greek nation in the nineteenth century. During this period historical connections between Greece and the Orient were obliterated (Bernal 1987).

Hobsbawm identified the original concept of Europe in a double confrontation; the military defence of the Greeks against the advance of an eastern empire in the Persian wars, and the Greek encounters with a 'barbarian' people, the Scythians, who lived on the steppes of South Russia (Hobsbawm 1997, 290). Both of these themes of differentiation, threat (perceived and real) from the east and a sense of superiority over 'uncivilised' peoples have been recurrent in constructions of Europe.

Authors of antiquity only rarely used the word Europe, when they did so it was as a Geographical term (Hay 1957). Europe was used to describe certain regions to the north and outside Greece. The Greek world was simply represented by a duality that Hobsbawm noted in their relations with the Scythians; there was Greece and the rest of the 'barbarian' world. The term Asia was used in association with Persia, the threat to the east and the bitter enemy of the Greeks, but like Europe the term Asia was geographic whilst Persia was cultural and political.

In the fourth century, historian Isocrates associated Europe with Greece, and Asia with Persia (Hay 1957, 3). This construction of Europe shows that on some occasions the Greeks did consider themselves Europeans and may have been the beginnings of the opposition between European and Asian. The idea of Europe took firmer root in the period of decline for the Greek city-states and the eventual rise of Alexander to the north in Macedonia. Delanty suggested that the idea of Europe served as a geographical entity to bind the many territories that Alexander conquered (Delanty 1995). The opposition between Europe and Asia was cemented in this period as Alexander pushed eastwards. Delanty suggested that under Alexander Greece came to be part of Europe. 'The idea of Greek superiority against the 'barbarians' of Europe (which probably included Macedonia) diminished and a broader concept of Europe emerged and came to refer to what is essentially Asia Minor and included

Greece, but with Asia still being the focal point of otherness' (Delanty 1995, 19). During the period of Macedonian expansion Europe pushed Asia back east beyond the conquered Persian Empire.

Roman constructions of Europe.

The Macedonian empire was defeated militarily by the expanding Roman Empire in 197 BC. Roman society like the Greeks did not have any strong affiliation to the idea of Europe. The Roman Empire spread right around the Mediterranean and north to the Atlantic isles, it included a great diversity of peoples: Celts, Germans, Romans, Iberians, Berbers, Illyrians and Libyans. The Roman Empire was as much Oriental and African as it was Hellenistic. The Roman Empire did however use the term Europe. Like the Greeks, they used the idea as a geographical one comprising most of present day continental Europe but excluding Scandinavia, the Atlantic isles and the Iberian Peninsula (Delanty 1995).

Delanty emphasised that 'there is little congruity between the modern notion of Europe as the West and the ancient idea of Europe' (Delanty 1995, 21). The ancient classical meaning for Europe was geographical and did not constitute a cultural idea, much less a cultural unity, for 'barbarians' inhabited much of the region called Europe.

Roman identity was centred round the origins and power of Rome rather than any sense of identity with geographical regions like Europe. People from all parts of the empire became Roman citizens and rose to positions of power. Even in 395 AD when the empire was split in two, the eastern arm focused itself on the capital Constantinople rather than on a geographical territory. The focus of Roman power shifted to the east after 395 AD as the western empire fell to 'barbarian' invaders. Constantinople became far more oriental and Greek than the empire focused on Rome had been.

Hobsbawm made the point that it is really not possible to delineate Europe as a geographic entity because 'as everyone knows, it has no eastern borders, and the continent therefore exists *exclusively* as an intellectual construct' (Hobsbawm 1997, 289). The construction of a territory called Europe by the classical 'civilisations' was not then so much a matter of drawing precise boundaries but the definition of the idea that they were superior to their barbarian neighbours. During the domination of the lands around the Mediterranean Sea by Roman culture, a new idea came into being that would shape the construction of Europe, in the form of Christendom.

Early Christian Europe.

In both the eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) and the remains of the western empire, Christianity had grown to take a key role in both cultures. The Byzantine Empire laid claim to the Roman imperial tradition yet it was very Oriental in its nature. The shattered remnants of the western empire came to rest in Latin Christianity and became synonymous with terms such as Europe, Occident and Christendom. It was the idea of Christendom more than anything else that was to define the ideology of the ensuing medieval period. It was through the idea of Christendom, and the defeat of Byzantium by

the Islamic peoples, that the geographical Europe began to take on a sense of cultural unity under the symbolism of the cross.

Delanty rightly cautions against overemphasising the place of Europe in classical culture and overstating the divisions between east and west at these times. The classical period was a seafaring age and movement east and west was easier than north and south. The sea united peoples rather than divided them. The Alps were more likely to represent a cultural division by preventing the easy movement of people than the Mediterranean (Delanty 1995). This north south divide should not be ignored when considering contemporary understandings of the meaning of Europe.

3. Medieval Europe: Christendom (the Cross) Opposed to Islam (the Crescent).

Through their partnership with the increasingly powerful kingdoms the churches played a central role in the development of medieval culture. The most influential of these kingdoms in the west were the Frankish and Carolingian and to the east the Byzantine (the remains of the Roman Empire).

Medieval Christianity in the landscape.

Religion and ultimately the fate of one's soul influenced all aspects of life in medieval society both public and private (Daniell 1997). This primacy of religion in medieval culture allowed Christians to build larger and grander churches and cathedrals in the landscape. This activity was only possible because of the relationship with the princely kingdoms that grew hand in hand with the Christian church (Lynch 1992). The princes themselves built increasingly large palaces and castles, and began to organise the landscape to meet the needs of the feudal system of agricultural production. The nucleation of settlements into villages was an aspect of the landscape that has continued into contemporary landscapes (Roberts 1987). Much of the original meaning of the medieval landscape has been lost to contemporary culture, the feudal system is gone but the vestiges of the aristocracy remain. The castle may still be understood as a symbol of power in the landscape in the right context. It is the influence of Christianity on the medieval landscape that may however, have a more lasting evocation of Europe. This was the result of Christendom coming to be constructed as an opposition to Islam and also coming to evoke Europe in opposition to the Orient.

Christian conflict with Islam.

The influence of Islam spread from Arabia after the death of the prophet Mohammed. Muslim influence spread rapidly to conquer the Persian Empire and the lands of Iraq, Syria and Palestine. By spreading into these fertile regions Islam pushed right up to the Orthodox (eastern) Christian or Byzantine Empire. The influence of Islam was based on religious belief and wide spread trading networks. Once power was secured in the east, the Umayyad dynasty of Islamic leaders pushed into northern Africa and across to take Spain, they then pushed up against the southern borders of the Frankish empire and Latin (western) Christianity. A military and ideological opposition had been

created between Islam and Christianity; Islam was only stopped by military action in southern France and at the gates of Constantinople to the east.

Christendom becomes an identity.

The military action that brought a halt to the advance of Islam in the west was the battle at Tours in 732. One of the earliest references to a medieval idea of Europe was made in the description of Charles Martel's army at the Battle of Tours. Martel's Frankish army was described as an army of Europeans (Hay 1957).

Leyser (1992) commented on the siege position that Christendom found itself in. In the ninth century Vikings pressed down from the south, Magyars from the east and Muslims from the south. It was in this siege mentality that Leyser suggested the idea of Europe 'gained currency'. Under such siege the northern tribes slowly turned to Christianity, taking on board its powerful authoritarian codes of hierarchy and obedience to legitimise the power of growing kingships. A new territorial border emerged, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Following the creation of a border a greater division between east (Orient) and west (Occident) took place with the character of a moral-religious divide. For the westerners the Occident signified civilisation and goodness and the Orient barbarity and evil. The identity of Europe was constructed out of a sense of spiritual superiority in the disavowal of its very origin in the Orient. Without the image of hostility afforded by Islam, the Christian west would have been unable to attain a single and high culture capable of unifying the diverse elements of European society (Leyser 1992).

As the boundaries between Christendom and Islam settled throughout the rest of the early medieval period the Christian church busied itself with entrenching a sense of cultural superiority whilst portraying the non-Christian world as uncivilised and barbaric. The church during this time organised itself along imperial lines with a powerful hierarchy based in Rome and for some time Avignion. This sense of universal imperialism became a feature of both the church and the identity of Europe (Delanty 1995).

Wallace-Hadrill and Hobsbawm have insightfully pointed out that these constructions of Christendom and Europe were unlikely to be at the forefront of people's everyday understanding of the world (Wallace-Hadrill 1985, Hobsbawm 1997). Wallace-Hadrill contended that although it was possible to find examples of the link between the idea of Europe and Christendom and its conflict with Islam, that conflict had little to do with everyday life. The conflict between cross and crescent did however, set the stage for the consolidation of the idea of Europe and more importantly the change from an idea to an identity.

Despite Wallace-Hadrill's (1985) minimising of the influence of the idea of Europe on early medieval culture, we still have many landscape referents available to us from that period such as monumental

cathedrals and churches, which it may be argued were built to inspire awe in the local population. If the Christian church took upon itself an identity that opposed Islam, this self-identification might be found, like an echo of the past, in the social meaning of buildings like cathedrals in the medieval landscape. This does not of course mean that the medieval idea of Europe was associated with Christendom by the everyday person but equally that does not stop the association being taken up by contemporary society. If this echo of past conflict were still to be found in the symbolism of Christian architecture then it might have unfortunate consequences for symbolising a contemporary Europe free of such conflicts.

In a contemporary society that now has visual access to the landscape of Islam as well as Christendom, the medieval construction of a cultural Europe is perhaps more readily identifiable than it was at the time Christendom came into being. The observer might compare churches in the landscape to Mosques, towers to minarets, which might appear in the same view. Other similarities are also clear. Castles are actually very similar in many parts of Christendom and Islam because the Christian crusaders borrowed from Islamic military technology. As noted above landscape features from the medieval world may emphasise European homogeneity, like cathedrals, and are likely to have a role to play as visual evocations of Europe in the contemporary world

Towards the end of the medieval period the association between Christendom and Europe became clearer in written sources. In 1453 Constantinople fell to the Muslims, who were by then dominated by the Ottoman or Turkish faction. Constantinople became Istanbul and the capital of Ottoman Empire. According to Hay there was a significant increase in the use of the word Europe in connection to the Turkish advance (Hay 1957). Although the term Christendom still predominated, Pope Pius II frequently used the word Europe when referring to the Turkish expansion and the fall of Constantinople. When Pope Pius II first heard of the fall of Constantinople he declared 'now we have really been struck in Europe, that is, at home' (Burke 1980). When Erasmus exhorted the Christian kingdoms to put aside their conflicts with each other, he called upon the 'nations of Europe' to crusade against the Turks (Coles 1968). It was at the end of the medieval period and amongst the beginnings of modernity that we find the first real origins for a European identity. It took time for the term Europeans to be used to describe peoples rather than territories, but by the time Francis Bacon used the phrase 'We Europeans' in 1623, it seems clear who these people were (Delanty 1995). These new Europeans were a cultural collective, grounded in Christendom and on adversity, a result of the perceived threat from the east. Christendom was a heterogeneous identity construction that was to 'provide the receptacle for a racial notion of European identity in the age of imperialism' (Delanty 1995, 47).

4. Modern Europe: Nations and Imperialism.

The end of the medieval period was defined by considerable change. Christianity was challenged by other philosophies, artistic movements, the renaissance and later the enlightenment. With this shift

towards modernity, the meaning of Europe took on a cultural sense. Delanty called this the 'Westernisation of Europe' (Delanty 1995, 30-47). This westernised Europe was part of a 'value system' that was bound to other aspects of modernity, chiefly; nationalism, racial superiority and imperialism.

Early constructions of Europe along nationalist lines.

The new meaning of Europe can be detected in the retaking of Spain by Christian forces from the Muslims. The re-conquest of Spain was completed in 1492. It was followed by a pogrom of expulsion of Spanish Jews and forced conversion of Muslims. This was the first sign of a 'doctrine of purity of blood' that found its place in nationalism (Ignatieff 1994) and was to become a core part of the racist meaning of Europe (Delanty 1995). A hundred and fifty years later the 'ethnic cleansing' was completed by the expulsion of all the Christianised Muslims, the Morescos, from Spain.

The repression of 'others', non-Christians, had been a feature of medieval culture, focusing on Jews and heretics at different times and with varied brutality. Delanty suggested that such persecution was carried through into modernising Europe. As Islam was forced out in the west and contained again to the east the new Europeans turned inwards upon non-Christians demonstrating that 'European unity was often the result of violent homogenisation' (Delanty 1995, 47).

Much of the territory that medieval Christendom had occupied to the east was taken by the Ottoman Empire during the period of renaissance and enlightenment. The newly formed kingdoms to the west however, began to look to the west to expand. A period described by Indian diplomat and historian Sardar Panikkar as 'The Age of Vasco Da Gama' and which, according to Panikkar only ended in the twentieth century (Hobsbawm 1997). Spain legitimised its existence through declaring itself a universal Catholic monarchy, denying its Muslim past and looking to a revived imperialist Roman Catholicism. With the rapid growth of Spain, the west and Europe took on the same meaning. The kingdom of Portugal had already led the way in expanding its influence through its seafaring traditions and when Spain joined it the 'age of discovery' was truly begun (Delanty 1995).

The 'age of discovery', the end of a defensive Europe.

The 'age of discovery' revived the idea of crusading in a new direction, sailing south along the shore of Africa and west to the Americas. The large kingdoms in the west, away from the Ottoman Empire such as Spain, Portugal, England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands and France, entered into the new age. The preoccupation with the Turks to the east was replaced by overseas conquest that was often seen as the only means of saving Europe (Gollwitzer 1964). Gollwitzer suggested that the old polarity between Christendom and Islam was replaced at this time by Europe and 'overseas' (Gollwitzer 1964).

Wintle (1999) considered the role that mapping the landscape played in constructing the idea of Europe during the renaissance. An early effect of the renaissance was a renewed interest in the making of maps to geometric rules. As the age of exploration developed so did new projection techniques to map the new discoveries and conquests. After early projections reduced the size of Europe in relation to the rest of the world later versions of maps increased the relative size of Europe and shifted the boundaries eastwards. Maps of Europe became 'triumphalist' emphasising European superiority over the rest of the world. Wintle also notes the iconography that accompanied renaissance maps, 'personifying the continents as young women, and making Europe the noblest and most regal of them' (Wintle 1999, 1). This early renaissance characterisation of Europe was diluted however, as the influence of nationalism and modernity had their effect.

The change from a defensive identification, opposing the Turks to the east, to a westward expansion after the discovery of the Americas led to a change in the meaning of Europe. Europe began to loose its old Christian sense; the term barbarian (taken from classical constructions) replaced infidel to describe the 'other'. The theme of Christianity was not lost, but transferred to the imperial crusade of discovery in Africa and the Americas to 'civilise' the barbarian, the idea of civilising those who dwelled overseas found a resonance with the renaissance tendency to look to the classical past 'civilisations' for inspiration.

The enlightenment, nationalism and a modern construction of Europe.
Despite historians' recognition of the use of the term Europe before the seventeenth century Hobsbawm re-emphasised the point that 'in those centuries nobody outside a tiny circle of classically educated clergymen thought in terms of 'Europe' (Hobsbawm 1997). Hobsbawm suggested that 'not before the seventeenth century did Europeans recognise themselves as a continent rather than a faith'. By the time they were able to challenge the eastern empires 'the conversion of unbelievers to the true faith could no longer compete ideologically with double-entry book-keeping'. He identified the growth in economic and military superiority of the nations forming this new and modern construction of Europe that reinforced the belief that 'Europeans were superior to all others, not as carriers of a civilisation of modernity, but collectively as a human type' (Hobsbawm 1997, 292).

The thinkers of the Enlightenment saw the spirit of the age as secular and dynamic. The concept of nationalism was consolidated at this time. Many long established kingdoms such as Spain or England took on the trappings of nation state whilst others defined new forms of nation state by revolution (France) or winning independence from imperialist powers (United States).

Unlike Hobsbawm, Delanty did not play down the role of the Christian church in this new construction of Europe. Delanty contended that the Christian church developed alongside these changes taking on the role of state religion (either Catholic or Protestant). The adaptability of the church was such that while science, formal law and art underwent their own independent logic of development, the Christian

worldview remained as the dominant cultural motif by which European civilisation could identify itself (Delanty 1995).

Many Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, Voltaire and Kant believed that Europe could become a utopian federation of free states (Delanty 1995, 71). This view was probably only held by an intellectual few and the notion of Europe as an alternative to the nation state had little meaning for contemporaries who were more likely to be swept up in the new fervour for the nation state (Delanty 1995). The clearest categorisation concerning the various constructions of Europe that emerged in the seventeenth century was made by Hobsbawm who identified three forms of Europe; the international state system, a community of scholars and an urban model of education, culture and ideology (Hobsbawm 1997, 298).

Europe as an international state system.

Nationalism was a key feature of modernity (Hutchinson and Smith 1994) and was a powerful idea that fragmented any sense of Europe into a particular meaning for each nation state. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the new nation states developed a system of state foreign policies that determined permanent 'interests', which were for the first time aloof from religious faith (Hobsbawm 1997). It was through the interaction of these policies and interests, sometimes negotiated and sometimes fought over, that the modern cartographic definition of Europe was formed. The same interaction of states saw the development of 'great powers' (Britain, France, Spain, The Netherlands and later Germany), which came to be the architects of the modern construction of Europe.

Delanty also recognised that the construction of Europe was as a set of political units, drawing directly from the national ideal. The idea of a nation state became established through the Enlightenment and these same ideals have since shaped the idea of European unity. Both ideological and political constructions of modern Europe have parallels with nationalist ideals but are nevertheless separate constructions in their own right. Delanty suggested that the idea of modern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was anchored in and derived from the idea of the nation state (Delanty 1995). This was a very different construction from the medieval opposition of Christendom and Islam. For Delanty, Christianity was still part of the modernist construction of Europe but it was joined by ideas of reason, progress and science.

The seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century construction of Europe as an ideological or political unit was often subsumed by its close relationship to nationalism and the influence of the 'great powers'. The idea of Europe was most often associated with the particular interests of one nation. For example, despite ideological and political similarities with Europe, Britain preferred relations with its colonies rather than 'the continent'. The Germans rejected any idea of a European order as one of the heresies of the age; Bismarck associated any construction of Europe with the aspirations of France (Schieder 1962).

Europe as a community of scholars.

The first construction of Europe in the modern sense was grounded in the movement from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. This was a Christian and humanist ideal, the belief in a universal value system based on reason, progress and science. Hobsbawm commented on this ideological construction of Europe as the result of freedom amongst scholars to engage across borders, languages, state loyalties, obligations or personal faiths in 'the construction of a collective edifice' (1997, 298). This edifice was the concept of 'Science'.

Delanty stated that these ideals lie at the core of European identity and modernity (Delanty 1995). They were common to all nations in the first bloom of modernity irrespective of their origins, thus nations with quite different understandings of the nation state (Britain and France for example) still had their ideological grounding in the same value system. As Hobsbawm put it, 'Science' 'emerged in the region of European culture and, until the beginning of the twentieth century, remained virtually confined to the area between Kazan and Dublin' (Hobsbawm 1997, 298).

Europe as an urban model of education, culture and ideology.

Hobsbawm's third 'form' of Europe in the period between the seventeenth century and the Second World War, but most notably in the nineteenth century, was an urban model. This urban model embodied education, culture and ideology and was represented in the landscape by institutional buildings like universities, opera houses, museums, libraries, and civic buildings and sports stadiums. The urban model was also exportable and was taken around the world by the imperialist 'great powers'.

The urban construction of Europe raises again one of the twin demarcations of Europe, the sense of superiority as defined by those who see themselves as better. This can be detected in the imperialist nature of the 'great powers' that dominated Europe, but also within those nations. As Hobsbawm (1997) indicated, the border between civilisation and barbarism also 'ran between the rich and poor, that is to say between those with access to luxuries, education and the world outside, and the rest. Consequently the most obvious division of this sort ran across and not between societies, that is primarily between city and countryside' (Hobsbawm 1997, 295).

Symbols of Europe in a modern landscape.

Despite the subordination of the idea of Europe to that of the nation state we may expect to find some aspects of the landscape that act as symbols for Europe as a Christian, humanist ideal or a political form of governance. Delanty discussed two visual referents to define the universal symbols of Europe. These are the crucifix, with its origins set in medieval Christendom but reinvented in a second phase of church building, and the patriotic victory column, grounded in modern nationalism and drawing on the architecture of the classical world for its symbol of civilisation. Both of these symbols may serve to

homogenise the construction of Europe as a place of Christian humanism but there was also a divisive nature to the identification of Europe through the cross and the victory column. The symbols suggested by Delanty also highlight the heterogeneous construction of Europe as an opposition to others who are non-Christian heathens (who must be converted) and uncivilised barbarians who can be conquered by superior modern technology.

Fascism and a Europe constructed about nationalism and imperialism.

The divisive nature of modernist, heterogeneous constructions of Europe is illustrated by the twentieth century fascist myth of Europe. The fascist idea of unity in Europe was focused to the idea of a racially homogenous Europe. This also caused a focus on a heterogeneous Europe that excluded many peoples (e.g. Jews, Slavs or Gypsies) and social groups (e.g. homosexuals).

Italian and Nazi fascism were understood as supra-national ideals, taking nationalism and applying the idea to a new European civilisation. Trevor-Roper has commented that Hitler's speeches were full of appeals to the spirit of Europe suggesting that the One-Thousand-Year Reich was intended to be a European Order and that the annihilation of the Jews was to be a cleansing from Europe of an 'Asiatic race' (Trevor-Roper 1953). Arno Mayer has argued that the German offensive against Russia during the second war was based on the ideal of the medieval crusades, pushing east against the ungodly Bolshevik (Mayer 1988).

During the pre war years members of the Nazi regime in Germany took a close interest in the activity of archaeologists who Himmler expected to provide proof of the homogeneity of Germanic peoples throughout northern Europe. The Nazis took a particular interest in the work of Gustav Kossina who had proposed that artefacts from the past could be grouped together to tie specific ethnic groups to particular territories. Certain ethnic groups were then grouped together and identified as the original German peoples or *Volk*, providing a convenient 'origin myth'. (Arnold and Hassmann 1995).

In their paper on the effects of fascist use of archaeological theories Arnold and Hassmann cite a particular example of the work of archaeologist and documentary filmmaker Lothar Zoltz. Zoltz's films have been used as examples of Nazi propaganda in post war years, particularly an extract where a prehistoric vessel was excavated and found to have a swastika on its base. The swastika on the pot then fades to a flag waving at the Nuremberg rally (Arnold and Hassmann 1995, 71). In this instance the archaeological evidence in the form of a pot clearly demonstrated the connection between the Nazi state and the original German *Volk*.

It was the prehistoric period that particularly interested those constructing an Aryan Europe in the past. As Delanty pointed out, the Nazis rarely made direct reference to religion although they sought to co-opt the Christian idea of the redemption of Europe from the infidel (Delanty 1995). The Nazi's did not actually seek to use the Christian church to legitimise their power but constructed their own religion

drawing on prehistoric archaeological evidence and Germanic myth. At Sachsenhain a mixture of stone avenues and circles was built on the orders of Himmler in 1935 using forced and slave labour. The site was used to conduct massive solstice ceremonies. The Nazis built the monument on the site of a massacre of pagan Saxons carried out by Charlemagne in AD 782. This suggests that Himmler was reclaiming the site for the Germanic, Saxon people (Bahn 1997).

The example of fascist constructions of Europe and the first and second world wars demonstrate in appalling detail to contemporary society the divisive and racist implications of constructions of Europe that are heterogeneous in nature putting their emphasis on those who are not part of the 'in group'.

5. 'Cold War' Europe and Constructions of Contemporary Europe.

With the end of the Second World War a new construction of Europe emerged. This new Europe was no longer so closely bound to the idea of Christendom but continued to reify the nation state. There are three key features of constructions of 'Cold War' Europe that developed following the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945:

a) The definition of Europe by the United States, now secure as new super power in place of the European 'great powers', as the eastern frontier.
b) The institutionalisation of Europe as an economic market
c) A continued relationship with the nation state which influenced the new institutional Europe's attempts to create an identity for itself.

a) 'Cold War' Europe and America.

Lowenthal (1985) identified a pre Second World War American construction of Europe as one of the 'old country' or 'old world', which still has contemporary resonance. This balanced a romanticised set of 'origin myths' with a sense of antipathy towards the 'old country' that stemmed from the context of religious intolerance that led to many people emigrating in the first place. Lowenthal later suggested that American nostalgia for the 'old world' represented a process of self-identification with an ancient civilisation over which they themselves had triumphed (Lowenthal 1997). The ancient civilisation construction of Europe was, according to Delanty, supplemented by a construction of Europe evoking oppression and inequality. This 'evil empire' could then be compared to America as the 'land of the free' symbolised by the limitless frontier of the 'old west'. Indeed this construction of Europe, and England in particular, is currently strong in Hollywood filmmaking. Delanty also pointed out that despite negative constructions of Europe the nineteenth century, a construction of Europeans as racially superior was still available to Americans when it came to taking the 'old west' from its former inhabitants. The American construction of a romantic Europe and of the west as 'the land of the free' had a profound effect on the construction of Western Europe during the 'Cold War'.

Hobsbawm (1997) described the American construction of Europe after the Second World War as 'the eastern frontier of what came to be called "western civilisation"'. Europe stopped at the borders of the region controlled by the USSR, and was defined by the non-communism, or anti-communism, of its governments' (Hobsbawm 1997, 293). Once again Europe was defined by a perceived threat from the east.

After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, a new conflict between east and west remained that once again raised the spectre of threat from the east. On this occasion the ideological conflict was between liberal democracy of the United States and her allies, and the Communist ideology of the USSR. Since the end of the conflict between Christendom and Islam both east and west had been kept apart by the national powers of central Europe in a state of delicate balance. When Germany expanded east into Russia during the Second World War and was then forced to retreat again, east and west were brought into direct confrontation once more. Walter Lippmann described this ideological and military stand off as the 'Cold War', bounded by what Churchill later termed the 'Iron Curtain'. This new division of east and west was clearly ideological rather than geographical as nations such as Israel and Japan were also included in the definition of the 'free' west.

A new construction of Europe emerged from the 'Cold War' east - west division. Europe came to be defined as two parts of a global conflict. This heralded what Delanty has called the 'American age' in Western Europe. As the United States expanded its influence throughout the 'western world' global institutions were formed to legitimate the global role of liberal democracy (e.g. the World Bank) (Delanty 1995). The expansion of the influence of the United States added another dimension to the 'Cold War' construction of Europe: Europe as an 'other' to the dominant super power in the west, the United States.

b) 'Cold War' Europe: Institution and Market Place.

Just as the supranational ideal of global liberal democracy was legitimised by institutions like the World Bank, so Western Europe formed the European Economic Community as a legitimising institution. This was the first institutional self-identification of Europe and was deliberately defined in economic terms to avoid undermining national interests. The post-war Europe had become a materialist one legitimised by capitalist modernity and consumption (Patocka 1983). This construction of Europe was bolstered by a centralised bureaucracy based in Brussels and a set of political organisations under the wing of the EEC, which was finally formed in 1958. A sense of Europe as a set of western states supported by the United States and committed to a common consumerism was built on the east- west conflict of the 'Cold War', which changed rapidly after 1989 when the 'Cold War' came to an end.

c) 'Cold War' Europe and the Nation State.

'Cold War' Europe was constructed in the image of the nation states that continued to stand at its core. A new institutionalised administration was formed to deal, at first, with the joint economic interests of the European nations. The European community used the tools of nationalism in an attempt to fashion a European identity; the flag, anthem (Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), passport, group name, a sense of common history suggested by the 'origin myths' discussed above and legitimation through a sense of 'high culture' exemplified in the choice of anthem and its dedication to 'cities of culture'.

Tzanidaki (2000) identified three phases to the 'Cold War' European institutions and their approach to the 'heritage' (architectural and environmental). These phases reflect the nature of the 'Cold War' construction of Europe and the role that 'heritage' had to play in the institutional aspects of that particular construction. These features were; the economic face of 'heritage' (1969-1980); the political face of 'heritage' (1981-1985) and the popular face of 'heritage' (1986-1992). These phases saw a progressive confidence in the EC to take greater interest in cultural policy, which it shied away from initially for fear of upsetting national sensibilities. As the EC expanded issues like tourism became more important (Greece, Spain and Portugal joined) and the commission looked more confidently towards political union. 'Heritage' at this time was considered as a symbol of unity and as a commercial support to tourism. The popularity of 'heritage' as a symbol of culture and a source of income remained until the EU took control of cultural issues after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.

Europe after the 'Cold War'.

The end of the 'Cold War' has made the construction of a contemporary Europe problematic. Gillis has stated in the *American Historical Association Newsletter* that the world is no longer Eurocentric and 'Europe has lost its spatial and temporal centrality' (Gillis 1996, 5). With the end of the 'Cold War' there has been a reunification of Germany and a rediscovery of central Europe (states like Poland are now potentially part of our construction of Europe) making the east-west antagonism much less clear, especially as the former eastern bloc states have struggled to accept the transition from communism to capitalism and liberal democracy. Delanty suggested that this state of flux in the construction of Europe finds itself between a sense of greater unity in a 'Fortress Europe', and a rise in nationalism amongst stateless peoples such as the Scots or Basque. Delanty warned that the new construction of Europe runs the risk of becoming dominated by white bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the Muslim and third world. This, he says, was the result of a lack of national traditions to unite the continent, which leads to a tendency to find a point of unity against which to define itself outside Europe.

Hobsbawm (1997) was sceptical about the search for a 'single programmatic 'Europe'' after the 'Cold War', which he said led to an insoluble debate about how to extend the European Union. The struggle was 'how to turn a continent that has been, throughout its history, economically, politically and culturally heterogeneous into a single more or less homogenous entity. There has never been a *single* Europe. Difference cannot be eliminated from our history. This has always been so, even when

ideology preferred to dress 'Europe' in religious rather than geographic costume' (Hobsbawm 1997, 293).

Attempts to form a culturally unified Europe, rejected by Hobsbawm, reflect the post 'Cold War' construction of Europe with cultural policy in the remit of the EU. The present study will address the possibility that 'heritage' features in the landscape might evoke these new more confident constructions of Europe; certainly post Maastricht and possibly reflecting 'Fortress Europe'.

In recent years there have been attempts by some historians, archaeologists, 'heritage' managers and the European Union itself, to use artefacts and landscape features to evoke a unified Europe (note the use of images of bridges on the new ECU). These attempts to create a sense of European solidarity through associations with 'origin myths' (discussed earlier in this chapter) in a supposed homogenous past like that of the Iron Age Celts reflect the EU confidence in taking responsibility for cultural policy following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

European institutional recognition of the economic and symbolic roles of sites and monuments.
Since the EU came into being after the Maastricht Treaty was signed contemporary European institutions have shown interest in cultural policy and 'heritage' including the conservation of sites and monuments in the landscape. The 1992 Valletta Convention of the Council of Europe defined European heritage as a collection of sites and monuments, by making a list of physical remains representing the past; structures, constructions, groups of buildings, developed sites, moveable objects and monuments of other kinds. These physical remains were to be protected as archaeological heritage as the source of European collective memory and as an instrument for scientific study.

Once the Maastricht Treaty had taken cultural policy away from national governments a definition of cultural 'heritage' was finally formulated. The European Commission defined a 'common European heritage' as the 'interface between our differences and our similarities, finding expression in moveable and non-movable forms' (Commission of the European Communities: Communication 1995, 25). Tzanidaki (2000) points out that the EU statements on 'heritage' after 1995 only referred to 'cultural heritage of importance to Europe', presumably leaving anything else to the particular nations.

The continued commitment of the EU towards funding 'heritage' conservation projects with relevance to promoting a unified Europe or for economic tourism reflect a new post 'Cold War' sense of 'Fortress Europe'. Tzanidaki (2000) was very aware of the divisive effects that such a construction of Europe might have:

> "This paper endeavoured to raise awareness of the fact that the variety of heritages in
> Europe should not be devalued for the sake of creating a politically united Europe or
> even overvalued so as the latter can be based on the 'common features this diversity

exhibits'. They should be appreciated, respected and treated accordingly. Multicultural communities can integrate politically even if their differences persist."

(Tzanidaki 2000, 28)

6. Constructing a European 'Heritage'.

The discussion above has identified a number of constructions of Europe that may be evoked by features of the landscape. Others have probably superseded classical constructions of Europe, but the concept of territory itself may still be expressed, especially in terms of perceived threat to a territory or as an expression of supposed superiority, to those who exist outside that particular territory. The sense of threat from the east has recurred in different forms through time (Christendom threatened by Islam and western liberal democracy threatened by communism) that for example might be symbolised by Christian monuments like cathedrals, which are clearly evident in contemporary landscapes. The construction of Europe as evoked by a sense of superiority over a barbarian other was also a recurring theme, begun in the Greek relationship with the Scythians but also found in modernity and carried along with constructions of nationalism. Constructions of Europe and nationalism may be difficult to unpick and identify as a separate but some attempts to suggest European unity through sites and monuments might be understood as an attempt to treat Europe as a nation state itself.

This chapter has reviewed a variety of constructions of Europe, drawing on early classical perceptions of territory, medieval constructions of Christendom, enlightenment associations with modernity and nationalism, 'Cold War' opposition between east and west and the institutionalisation of the European Union, and finally as an institution seeking greater unity, possibly creating a 'Fortress Europe'.

This chapter raises a particular question regarding the relationship between Europe and its sites and monuments, its 'heritage'. What is the content of European 'heritage' likely to be if the European Union continues to look for unifying symbols in the landscape? Thus far we have only considered 'origin myths' for Europe, Ashworth (1998) has suggested some alternatives.

Content of European 'Heritage'.
Ashworth (1998) has suggested four potential sources from which to construct a common European Heritage:

- The European idea itself.
- A 'heritage' of European ideas.
- A 'heritage' of European conflicts.
- A ready-made 'heritage' of the 'historic European city'.

Ashworth proposed that the EU might continue the 'European city of culture' theme invoked by the 'Cold War' construction of Europe to highlight European capitals in contrast to national capitals. This would focus on cities like Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg City and the 'sacrelised places and buildings' within these cities. These places could then be supplemented by marking various events in these cities.

There are two severe drawbacks to this idea however, as Ashworth pointed out, nationalist 'heritage' throughout Europe would swamp the small contribution of these cities vested with a supranational identity. Secondly the selection of particular places and artefacts to represent this aspect of Europe would require an ''Orwellian' rewriting of the past' to deal with the artefacts and places that do not fit this particular representation of European 'heritage' (Ashworth 1998, 125). Despite Ashworth's dismissal of this construction of 'heritage', the images that it suggests are still available to evoke Europe in any everyday landscape that looks a little like Brussels or in celebrating a festival in European style.

Ashworth's second proposal for a construction of European 'heritage' was the through the evocation of European ideas. This would, he says, encompass general artistic, philosophical, political, economic and social themes that were European rather than nation bound. It would certainly find expression in any number of landscapes and would be readily available for the formation of place-identities. Again though, Ashworth identified problems with this approach. The renaissance and the enlightenment resulted in so many ideas in Europe, that there would be an embarrassment of riches to work with. If however, only the positive facets of European ideas were celebrated we might end up with a 'European heritage based on the acceptable complacency of cathedrals (if you ignore the conflict between Christendom and Islam), Eisteddfods and folk dances' (Ashworth 1998, 125). It would be difficult to accommodate representations of European ideas like ghettos, concentration camps and battlefields into this construction of Europe.

Once again this evocation is already in the landscape all around us, representations of the enlightenment for example, relics of the industrial revolution, folk museums dedicated to industrial archaeology or even the urban architecture of industrial cities. These all have the potential to evoke a Europe of ideas, given that they are viewed in the right context.

A third suggestion for a construction of European 'heritage' was one evoking European conflict. The other ideas he used, reviewed above, were undermined -like so many attempts to characterise a European collective 'heritage'- on the dissonant nature of European historical narrative. Ashworth contended that it was possible to represent a European 'heritage' with conflict as its structuring theme. This approach has the merit of being inclusive but would be difficult to marry to the needs for 'heritage' to be fun as well as serious. This approach too was seriously flawed.

Reminders of the Holocaust or at Battlefield memorials Ashworth concedes, already represent the 'heritage' of conflict. Just because these would not serve as a central part of a European 'heritage', it does not take away from their significance for the evocation of Europe, again viewed in the right context.

In the first three suggestions around which to construct a unifying European 'heritage' discussed by Ashworth (1998), he used as 'straw men' in his discourse, set up to be dismissed and replaced by his most important suggestion. The significance of the previous three concepts of a European 'heritage' should not be dismissed however, by the present study when looking at evocation of Europe in the landscape.

Ashworth's (1998) fourth and most important contention was that a European 'heritage' has already been defined, not from the European Commission on high but by local planners implementing essentially local schemes of 'heritage' presentation. 'Heritage', he argues, has become a fundamentally European idea itself and has resulted in the shaping of a European built environment that is distinctive to European cities. Ashworth's contention is supported by the work of Montès (2000) who identified a common 'technocratic structure' to planning, building and conservation leading to a reshaping of the European city and territory.

This construction of Europe as a 'heritage' landscape was influenced by two factors. The first was a concern for all things old and their conservation. All European nations have rafts of legislation and governmental guidance to ensure the conservation of 'heritage' sites and monuments. As a result Europe cities are conserved urban forms that have their own European place-identity. Second was the tradition begun in Europe and developed after the Second World War for a professionalised and institutionalised urban planning system.

Although it was possible to argue that there are national styles of planning and approaches to urban landscape, or that there are global styles to the planning of the city, there still remains a particular European style of urban planning (Ashworth 1998, Montès 2000). Ashworth concluded that: 'If pressed to define the content of what was typically European as opposed to appertaining to some other continent, then many Europeans would articulate this through the 'Europe of the cities', the environment in which most Europeans live, work and recreate, and specifically through the 'Europe of the historic cities'' (Ashworth 1998, 129).

Conclusion.

Ashworth's concept of a 'Europe of the historic cities' has a resonance with Delanty's attempts to find a construction for Europe that avoids the divisiveness of 'Fortress Europe'. Delanty proposes that a sub-national Europe based around its great cities, offering a sense of citizenship free of nationalist

overtones, might allow for a more pluralist society. Ashworth's construction of a particular European 'heritage' can be seen today whilst Delanty's remains a vision for the future. Whether or not the 'European historic city' is the future centre for European pluralist citizenship or not, this construction of Europe as a place 'with heritage', conserved and built around by its urban planners may also be an evocation of Europe recognised by people in the landscape around them. The varied constructions of Europe discussed in this chapter may all be evoked in the landscape. It was the purpose of the present study to seek ways in which people may be understanding these evocations as constructions of Europe.

The next chapter moves from the supra national to the local by considering place-identity in detail, and suggesting ways that people interact with 'heritage' in their landscape at a local level.