CHAPTER 3

Landscape, Embodiment, Identity and Agency; and Human and Non-human Personhood

In this chapter, I discuss critical theoretical approaches to concepts of landscape, identity and embodiment, in order to develop a theory of relational agency that explores the interconnections between people, places, plants, animals and things. This undermines traditional functional and economic approaches to Iron Age and Romano-British farming, and brings us closer to understanding how the lives of people and animals in these small-scale communities were intertwined.

Cartographic anxiety

Aerial photographic mapping is essential to recording field systems, but landscapes are always more than objective *spaces* to be measured and quantified, and can also be understood as a series of subjective *places*, given meaning by human activities, experiences and beliefs (Buttimer 1980; Cosgrove 1989; Eyles 1985; Pred 1984, 1990; Sayer 1985; Tuan 1977). These notions might be termed 'cartographic anxiety' (Gregory 1994 Ch. 2). There may be multiple experiences of landscape based on notions of gender, class and status, affiliations, biographies and histories, and feelings of longing, belonging or not belonging (see the many discussions of such topics in Bender 1993b; Casey 1996; Crang and Thrift 2000; Evans 1985; Feld and Basso 1996; Hirsch and O'Hanlon 1995; Holloway and Hubbard 2001; Mitchell 2000; Tilley 1994). The relevance of such approaches to landscape archaeology has been summarised elsewhere (Bender 1993a; Chadwick 2004b; Johnston 1998; Tilley 1994), although some aspects have been criticised (e.g. Bender 2001; Brück 1998; Fleming 1999, 2005). Andrew Fleming is especially indignant about recent landscape archaeologies that have experimented with alternative ways of presenting the past (Fleming 2006: 268). Whilst accepting many of the criticisms of the use of phenomenology within archaeology, I strongly disagree that all theoretically-influenced landscape studies have 'freed themselves from traditional concerns with

verification' (Fleming 2006: 268). Empirical analyses must always be the basis for interpretative studies, but it should be recognised that landscapes are never static or neutral. Landscapes may be better imagined as tapestries or fabrics (Bender 1998: 8; Chadwick 2004b: 5; Giles 2000: 208; Ingold 2000: 346-348), where complex physical and social relationships are intertwined.

The 'duplicity of landscape', where land is at the centre of conflicts between different social groups. **Figure 3.01. (top left).** *Dani men and women outside an Indonesian-owned shop in West Papua, which has been illegally occupied by Indonesia since 1975. Most West Papuans have no economic or political power.* **Fig. 3.02 (top right).** *The Indonesian colonial occupation is enforced through heavily armed police and military units.* **Fig. 3.03. (middle left).** *Multi-national mining companies operate extensive interests in West Papua, despite criticism from human rights and environmental groups. (Sources: www.freewestpapua.org).* **Fig. 3.04. (middle right)** *and* **3.05. (bottom left).** *Israeli army units demolishing Palestinian houses.* **Fig. 3.06. (bottom right).** *Palestinian olive groves burnt and destroyed by the Israeli army. These illegal operations are reprisals for attacks against Israeli troops and civilians in the occupied West Bank of Palestine. (Sources: www.electronicintafada.net).*

Landscapes may be at the centre of tensions, disputes and conflicts between groups divided by class, gender, politics or perceived ethnicity (Harvey 2001; Hirsch 1995; Inglis 1977; Olwig 1996) (Figs. 3.01-3.06), and they have a significant role in the constitution of notions of identity (Berger 1972; Cosgrove 1984; Daniels 1989; Darby 2000; Rose 1993; Schama 1995; Williams 1963). Landscapes may be mapped and measured, bought and sold or manipulated and controlled. Such processes can involve hegemony by one group over another, especially in colonial contexts. The Western map-making tradition has often been used as an instrument of power, propaganda and colonial oppression (Harley 1988), and has often been at odds with many indigenous people's understandings of landscape (Belyea 1996; Duncan 1993; Gow 1995: 56-58; Ingold 1997, 2000: 232-234; Sparke 1998: 318-320; Strang 2000: 277-279). During the early years of Roman Britain map-makers, military surveyors and engineers were deployed across the countryside (K. Clarke 2001; R. Evans 2003; Hingley 2006b), bringing cartographic order to the new territories as a form of dominating imperial appropriation. Their ways of seeing and engaging with the landscape were probably radically different from native people who inhabited a series of places imbued with local histories and meanings and complex networks of lineage, tenure and movement.

Landscapes of inhabitation, memory and identity

Archaeologies of inhabitation explore such diverse and dynamic experiences through contextual approaches to material culture and place, and considerations of embodiment, memory and cosmology (Barrett 1997b, 1999, 2001; Giles 1997, 2000; Meskell 1996; Shanks 1992). They focus on the embodied day-to-day lives of people in the past, their social practices and material conditions (Chadwick 2004b: 9). In contrast to traditional landscape considerations of themes such as settlement patterns, this thesis explores people's habitual movements and routines around settlements and the landscape, their encounters with one another along trackways or in fields, and their tending and harvesting of animals and plants. Landscape histories are never simple, static 'sedimented layers of meaning' (*contra* Tilley 1994: 27). Older buildings, monuments and other traces of past human activities might remain, but may also be more elusive presences (q.v. M.M. Bell 1997) which through memories and

stories merge into people's everyday experiences. Such features are not simply mnemonics for maintaining these histories, but are more actively implicated in processes of memory and forgetting (q.v. Küchler 1993, 1999). Landscapes are places where different temporalities merge, where people build up their own biographies, reflect on the past, and act on those experiences for the future (Chadwick 2004b: 20).

Some people may have deep emotional and spiritual attachments to particular places, but other individuals may be displaced, living through diasporas, feelings of loss, alienation and rootlessness (Bender 2001, Bender and Winer 2001; Brah 1996; Cambridge Women and Homelessness Group 2004; Sibley 1995; Tuan 1979; Valentine 1989). Familiar places and intimate experiences of them are always surrounded by unfamiliar areas and more attenuated relationships. Nevertheless, there is often a close and recursive relationship between *where* an individual is, and *who* she or he sees themselves as being, experiences mediated through the human body. But is this body young or old, high or low status? Is it male or female? Should archaeologists use such 'common-sense' dichotomies at all? And how is Self-identity and group identity constituted? How might these concepts have differed in the past? It is really only within the last decade that issues of embodiment have been explicitly discussed within archaeology (e.g. Chadwick 2004b; Fowler 2004; Hamilakis, Pluciennik and Tarlow 2002; Meskell 1996; Yates 1993). Identity and acts of embodied practice are not unproblematic, and need to be considered in more detail.

Changing historical ideas of the body and Self

Modern Western ideas about the body, gender and identity are historically and culturally situated. In medieval medicine and philosophy women were seen as imperfect versions of men and as a different gender, but not as a separate biological sex – their genitalia were merely inversions of men's (Cadden 1993: 170-202; Crawford 1981: 51; Fletcher 1995: 44-45). During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the notion of a mind : body duality was proposed by René Descartes and Immanuel Kant. Along with advances in agriculture, mathematics and science

(Merchant 1980; Thomas 1983), this exacerbated a growing nature : culture dualism within post-Enlightenment Western European thought. The body was physical and animal, but the mind was rational and transcendental. Science increasingly based the differences between men and women upon physical biology and sexuality (Jordanova 1989: 25-26; Laqueur 1987: 19-20, 1990: 135; Shilling 1993), and was used as the basis for claims that women were socially and intellectually inferior to men.



Figure 3.07. *Changing scientific perceptions of the female body from 1494 (left), 1574 (middle) and 1717 (right) – the female body increasingly labelled and objectified. (Source: Historical Anatomies on the Web http:// www.metafilter.com).*

The modern body and phenomenology

The mind : body dualism was criticised by many twentieth century philosophers (e.g. Heidegger 1962; Husserl 1931; Merleau-Ponty 1962; Sartre 1954; Scheler 1973), who argued that human consciousness is based on sensual experiences mediated through the human body, without a disembodied Cartesian ego. Husserl proposed that subjective human practices were part of the lifeworld or *Lebenswelt*, the realm of immediate experience and sociality (Casey 1997: 218; Husserl 1970: 127-128; Moran and Mooney 2002: 60-61). Merleau-Ponty argued that all human experiences are mediated by interpretation – the 'body is our general medium for having a world' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 23). Humans experience their lifeworld through their bodies'

senses, movements and emotions. Heidegger called this *Dasein* or Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962: 26-27). For Heidegger, people usually dwell *within* the world, rather than dwelling *on* the significance of the world and its events, although there are moments when these are brought into focus (Moran 2000: 220). Lefebvre expanded these ideas and proposed a contingent 'spatial architectonics', whereby inhabited places appear through embodied *and* cognitive processes (Lefebvre 1991: 24).



Figure 3.08. *A diagram representing Lefebvre's spatial architectonics – the 'eye of power', mostly applicable to late capitalist states (Source: Gregory 1994: 401).*

Postmodern bodies

In the later twentieth century there were further deconstructions of naturalistic notions of the body and identity. Michel Foucault showed the effects of power on the body, arguing that following the Reformation, religions and states became increasingly concerned with people's individual thoughts (1979, 1981). Governments tried to control people's corporeal and sexual habits through the construction of prisons, barracks, hospitals, schools and factories (Foucault 1981: 25). Foucault viewed bodies as social products subject to stimulation, surveillance and control, and some feminist writers have used aspects of these arguments. Critics have argued, however, that Foucault's bodies are generalised and ahistorical, not fleshy, experiencing entities –

merely abstract, inert masses controlled by external discourses (McNay 1991; Schilling 1993: 70-71; B.S. Turner 1984: 250; T. Turner 1994). There is little sense of the body resisting or reacting to these discourses.

Lacan argued that Self-identity is a 'project' begun during infancy when children become aware of their mirror images and the differences between themselves, others, and the world around them (Lacan 1977: 4-7). Physical existence becomes partially alienated from the ego through a process of 'mirroring' (Bonner 1999: 238-239). Lacan was also interested in 'the gaze', the illusion of seeing oneself, and the desire and domination implicit in subject and object, Self and Other (Lacan 1953: 12-15). Gaze also implies a disembodied, appropriating surveillance implicit in patriarchal authority and the scopophiliac, objectifying gaze of men's pleasure[1]. Postmodern critiques have deconstructed bodies and identities as fixed forms, emphasising fluidity and flux in ideologies, gender and sexuality and power relations (see discussions in Bigwood 1991; Leder 1990; McNay 1991; Vernant 1989; Weedon 1987). Influenced by third-wave feminism[2] and queer theory, these ideas stress that there are many different expressions of masculinities and femininities linked to sexualities, ethnicities and class (q.v. Butler 1990; Diamond and Quinby 1988; Sawicki 1991).

In her dense, often difficult writing, Judith Butler argued that gender and sex are culturally constructed categories created through a series of lived, repetitive performances that take on meaning from their social context (Butler 1990: 32-35), through mundane bodily movements. Self-identity is often illusionary, inconsistent, contradictory and mutable. This ignores the physical materiality of the body, however, as Butler later admitted (1993: 29), almost as if the body is a blank surface onto which social meanings and identities are inscribed (Moore 1994: 18). Butler later addressed this to some extent, arguing not for gender *construction*, whereby social agency or discourse acts upon the body; but rather for gender *materialisation* (Butler 1993: 5), with identity as a continuously reiterative practice within historically constituted ideas of sex and sexuality. Elizabeth Grosz developed the idea of 'difference' used by Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous to acknowledge that identities and assumptions may be inscribed *onto* people's bodies by others (Grosz 1986: 140-142, 1994: 83). The body provides the basis for sexual difference, yet may also be structured internally and

externally by social and sexual norms. Her radical, decentred reconsideration of bodies saw bodies as not just 'being', but a more dynamic 'becoming' (Grosz 1995: 34-36). Using Deleuze's idea of a 'desiring machine' (Deleuze 1994, 1997), she stressed that the body dissolves into its environment as a series of changing, transformative flows. People's capacity to act may not be actually perceived or understood by them, as agency often operates below self-awareness altogether.

For Elspeth Probyn, existence and (be)longing are dynamic processes. Identity is contingent, hard to grasp, and full of anxieties (Probyn 1993: 97-99, 168-171, 1996). She has recently considered the body as an 'alimentary assemblage', where food, objects and people are 'ingested', then 'spat' out again (Probyn 2000: 31-32). People are assemblages of visceral, sensual acts, with the openings and closings of our bodies linked to Self-performances, social relationships and spatial practices. This is the 'grinding over' of the natural into the social, the elemental into the alimentary, and the individual into the commensal (Probyn 2000: 31, 146). Susan Bordo also rejects the idea of a 'natural' body or sex, but feels that there is a potential loss of locatedness if everything is open to discursive flows of meaning. Some material and political discourses define, inscribe and proscribe gender and identity more than others (Bordo 1990: 142, 1993: 295). Bodies are partly culturally constructed, yet there is still a materiality to them, subject to discourses of power, inclusion or exclusion, but still capable of pleasure and pain, longing and loathing (Bigwood 1991: 58). Self-identity and embodiment are mediated through the identities and bodies of others, the power and gender constructions of society, and physical experiences of the lived-in world.

Relational ethics and personhood

The postmodern, Western concept of a private citizen with individual rights and responsibilities does not allow for the many differences in people's lives based on class, race and experience, and fails to acknowledge that women, the poor and others may be disadvantaged because of their race or status and have less social agency (Anderson 1992; Baker 1997; Berggren 2000; Fowler 2004; Hekman 1995; Moore

1994; Pateman 1989; Weiss 1999; Whatmore 2002). What are needed are alternative 'epistemologies of provenance' (Kruks 1995: 4). Such approaches to identity must undermine and deconstruct simplistic, 'common-sense' notions of humans as individual agents, and must examine the communal and corporeal relations between people. In order to consider how people inhabit and experience their landscapes, it is necessary to consider how social practice and a sense of group belonging *outside* of the body also inform identity. Understanding this is important, as it is often difficult for archaeology to approach the past at the scale of individuals, although there has been considerable debate over this (see Barrett 2000; Gardner 2002, 2006; Gero 2000; Hodder 2000; M.H. Johnson 1989; Spector 1991; cf. Sherratt 1995).



Growing up through the habitus. **Figure 3.09. (top left).** *Turkana girl cleansing a pot with a hot brand, Kenya. (Source: Dyson-Hudson 1973: 107).* **Fig. 3.10. (top right).** *Tsatang girl leading reindeer, Mongolia. (Source: Kling 2003: 23).* **Fig. 3.11. (left).** *Girl watching her mother pluck poultry, Black Mountains, Wales. (Source: Porter 2000: 136).* **Fig. 3.12.** *Nenet boy practising lassoing reindeer, Siberia. (Source: Alexander and Alexander 1996: 181).*

Such co-operative social participation has been called 'existential space' (Tilley 1994: 16-17). Cognition and identity are not internalised, but are constituted through relations with other people and the landscape (Lave 1988). People share 'vocabularies of body idiom' (Goffman 1963: 35) or 'techniques of collective practical reason' (Mauss 1973: 73) in their posture, movements and emotional expressions. Everyday routine tasks involving specific tasks, postures and tool use furnish people with their bearings in the world (Bourdieu 1977: 87). People learn how to follow 'corporeal rules' governing social situations, many of which are culturally specific (Goffman 1963, 1969; Young 1980, 1990). Some performances are conscious acts that attract sociability or censure from others, but others are subconscious avoidances that develop from birth through inculcation within the habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 210-214, 1992: 54-56; Mauss 1973). There are times when we express our individual Self-identities, but we may also suppress this and blend into the social group. Habitus is habituated dispositions, constituted through people's routine social practices and shared cultural and spiritual beliefs, where people acquire much of their knowledge about the world and its social rules unconsciously, through growing up and watching the reactions of other people around them (Bourdieu 1992: 54-58).

Such values form the 'structures' of society (q.v. Giddens 1984), and are thus based not only upon routine, repeated actions through time, but also on the consequences of previous decisions. Human identities may also be based upon differences from other people, however. Through different skin colour, languages, ways of speaking and embodied idioms, we classify people into 'us' and 'other' (Goffman 1963; Sørenson 1997; Weiss 1999). It is partly how others see us that we see ourselves. People may also be 'labelled' by others, however, against their own wishes. Gender, sexuality, ethnicity and class may be appropriated, used to control or oppress others; or may cause feelings of disassociation, unhappiness or alienation. For some people, their bodies, identities, genders and sexualities are much more problematic, and these might be fragmented, continuously reworked or destroyed (see discussions in Butler 1993; Gupta 1993; Probyn 1996; Prosser 1998).

Anthropology and ethnography; and Self-identity and agency

Marcel Mauss argued that the body is the tool with which humans shape their world (Mauss 1950: 104). Ethnographic studies have demonstrated that cardinal directions framed by our bodies form the basis for many cross-cultural beliefs (Gell 1985; Lowenthal 1975), including ideas of orientation, methods of location, perceptions of shapes and colours, and territoriality. There may also be shared symbolic schema based on the body too. Up and down often represent good and evil in many cultures, heaven and hell, or high and base instincts (Short 2002; Tuan 1977; Turner 1993). Yet beliefs concerning the body can also differ enormously among cultures (see examples in Ahmed and Stacey 2001; Fowler 2004; Geertz 1983; Meskell 1996; Moore 1994; Morris 1994). Class, status, age, gender and other aspects of social identity also inform this (e.g. Young 1980, 1990). The 'narrative of the Self' is thus culturally and historically diverse, and may be experienced through a 'contingent poetics' which is part of wider social discourses (J. Thomas 1991a: 123). Some writers suggest that across human cultures conceptions of Self-identity vary as to how relationships between Self and non-Self are conceptualised, the degree to which mind is recognised as separate to the body, and the ways in which agency, motivation and knowledge are regarded (Fowler 2004: 34-35; Moore 1994: 31).



Figure 3.13. (left). *How the physicality of the human body may frame some of the complex symbolic ideas concerning the world. (Source: Tuan 1977: 17).* **Fig. 3.14. (right).** *The phenomenological projection of the human body into the lived-in world. (Source: Holloway and Hubbard 2001: 41).*

The Hausa of Niger believe that humans consist of a body (*jiki*) and a soul (*kurwa*). The soul can be captured and itself killed, and the body cannot live long once this happens, but will sicken and eventually die too. 'Soul-eaters' can capture souls by touching victims' shadows (Schmoll 1993: 199). The source of soul-eaters' powers are stones in their bellies that have a gender and a will of their own, and enable soul-eaters to see, capture and eat living souls. For the Canaque of New Caledonia the body was merely a temporary locus of being (Csordas 1999: 175; Leenhardt 1979), and the Native American Penobscot believed that each person comprised a body and a personal spirit, but the latter could roam around and interact with other beings (Speck 1920: 260-268). Many human groups around the world believe that they can 'clothe' themselves with the bodies of different animals (Århem 1996: 192-198; Guenther 1988: 196; Hallowell 1960: 32-42; Howell 1996: 131; Ingold 2000: 93-95; Viveiros de Castro 1998: 482).

For Warlpiri women in the Central Desert of Australia, their skin is not a boundary between them and the world but rather a medium through which they can become the landscape or other species (Biddle 2001: 186-189; Munn 1970: 152-155). Bodily decorations or *kuruwarri* link ancestral bodies and presences to Warlpiri people in the present. Kin relations are also defined by parts of the body, which are touched during conversations to signify the links (Kendon 1988). In Samoa, tattooed skin designs may signify a person's genealogy, moral qualities and virtues (Paulo 1994: 77-78). The body is not an inert surface onto which these meanings are (quite literally) inscribed, but a domain of intersubjectivity and agency, where meanings are constructed *through* the person's bodily relations with others. For the Turkana in Kenya, beads and bowls are 'embodied artefacts' – material manifestations of kinship, age and gender relations (Broch-Due 1993: 61). Life is a series of transformative processes. Breath is thought, thoughts are words, and words are edible entities. The world is experienced by actively taking it *into* the permeable body (q.v. Probyn 2000).

In some societies, group identity and relations with other human and non-human beings may be as or even more important than individual Selfhood (Dieterlen 1941; Jackson and Carp 1990; Lienhardt 1985). Mutual dependence, compliance or even subordination of individual will at times to that of kin and community can take

precedence over personal identity (Hsu 1977). This has caused considerable debate within anthropology (see discussions in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes 1985; Csordas 1990, 1994; Harris 1989; La Fontaine 1985; LiPuma 1998; Poole 1994; Whittaker 1992). To what extent can people who do not consider themselves as separate persons be conceived of as individuals? They are still very much capable of agency and intention, contradicting some psychological studies that cannot account for this apparent discrepancy (Moore 1994: 32-33). This debate is important for archaeologies of inhabitation, in order so that we may understand how identity, structure and agency (q.v. Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984) were constituted in Iron Age and Romano-British rural communities. Perhaps the traditional social structures of communal identity (family, clan or tribe) were sometimes more important than individually constituted agency (cf. Parker Pearson 1999). Was a degree of individuality still possible, or did this itself depend on age, gender and social status? And how did these discourses change after the Roman conquest?

Active social agents are able to recognise and evaluate the conditions under which they live, and to sometimes act upon them intelligently and knowingly (Giddens 1984). However, although agency includes knowledgeable individual actions, it includes the practices of human social groups extending beyond individual bodies and lifespans (q.v. Barrett 2001: 148-149; M.H. Johnson 1989). Social changes take place through structures, and structures have to be reproduced through human agency and the actions of daily life (Barrett 1997a). There are clearly complex relationships between Self-identity and communal identity, individual agency and communal structures, but despite some challenges (Spiro 1993), the idea that persons might in fact be divisible, partible and unbounded has gained increasing acceptance. This is clearly a controversial issue with considerable social, ethical and political implications (q.v. Said 1978, 1993), particularly with regard to current conflicts.

Past societies also cannot be classified in such essentialist terms, ignoring differences of age, class, gender, experience and agency (Poole 1994: 844). *Individuality* is not the same as *individualism*, and there are collectivistic and individualistic ideas in any society. Personhood may emerge out of the tensions between these (Fowler 2004: 34; LiPuma 1998: 57). Self-awareness, knowledge of one's development through time,

and distinguishing between our own actions and those of others are universal human attributes, but this is *not* the same as ontological ideas of the Self, which in many cultures do not correspond to Western conceptions (Moore 1994: 34). This concurs with the notion of the open subject, which "…refuses to limit issues of subjectivity to the skin-bound individual, or…resists writing 'society' as if it were such a corporate entity…" (Battaglia 1999: 118). Like feminist and queer theories, many ethnographic and anthropological discussions have stressed that although the body has an innate materiality, identity is also shaped by social interaction and social expectation, and by sexualities and desire (Csordas 1994; de Valle 1996; Moore 1986, 1994; Ortner and Whitehead 1981). Femininities and masculinities are contextual qualities that can be acquired by individuals or groups through social practices; or which may be projected onto others (e.g. Busby 2000; McCullum 2001; Strathern 1988).

In parts of Melanesia, people are seen as having a series of masculine and feminine traits, some more predominant in different social contexts than others (Shore 1981; Strathern 1988: 15-18, 90-92; cf. LiPuma 1998). Children acquire masculine or feminine attributes from bodily substances (blood, semen and breast milk), food and artefacts. The Sambia, Gebusi and Marind of Papua New Guinea believe that children develop gendered identities through life. Boys shed female essence (blood) and ingest male essence (semen) in order to achieve adult male status (Herdt 1984: 170-181, 1987; Knauft 1989: 218-221). With the Nuer of East Africa, a childless married woman may return to her family as a 'man', build up a herd of cattle and even pay the bride price for several 'brides' (Heritier-Auge 1989b: 294-295). She can hire a male servant who may perform sexual services for her and/or for her wives. The older woman is regarded as the 'father' of the resulting children. This demonstrates the importance of age in social constructions of gender and identity (Fowler 2004: 44-45).

Notable examples of so-called 'third genders' include the *muškobanje* or Sworn Virgins of the Balkans (Grémaux 1994; Young 2000); the *hijra* of Pakistan and India (Nanda 1994, 1998), Polynesian *mahu* of Polynesia (Bolin 1996), and Native American *berdache* (Blackwood 1984; Fulton and Anderson 1992; Hollimon 1997; Roscoe 1994). Sex and gender are thus dynamic and contingent ways of Being constructed through different cultural notions of masculinities and femininities,

sexuality, chastity and virility, and are not simply derived from differences in biology, hormones or brain chemistry alone (Gilchrist 1999: 77). Gender thus partly comes from *within* the Self, but is also derived from relationships with lovers, husbands and wives, families and communities. Masculinities and femininities are reproduced and/or rebelled against through the practices and relations of everyday life (Massey 1996: 109). Nevertheless, as Moore cogently comments:

> The boundary between sex and gender may be unstable, but that does not mean that they can be collapsed into each other…we should not confuse the instability of sexual signifiers with the imminent disappearance of women and men themselves, as we know them physically, symbolically and socially. Bodies are the site where subjects are morphologically and socially constructed, they mark the intersection of the social and the symbolic; each subject's relation with his or her own body is both material and imaginary... Sex, gender and sexuality are the product of a set of interactions with material and symbolic conditions mediated through language and representation (Moore 1999: 168).

I am *not* suggesting here that Iron Age or Romano-British people necessarily recognised multiple or third-genders, or had specifically animist ideas of mutable personhood. Nevertheless, Roman soldiers and bureaucrats (from many different parts of the Empire), settlers and traders, indigenous people of higher or low status, slaves and freedmen would have all had dissimilar notions of identity and gender, masculinities and femininities, and individuality versus communality. They might not only have viewed their landscapes and other humans, animals and plants in very different ways to one another, but would also have had diverse potentials, experiences and capabilities of acting upon their world (q.v. Gardner 2003: 8; James 2001: 206). Their agency and senses of Self-identity would likewise have varied tremendously.

Actor-networks and hybrid geographies

Until recently, the only agents thought to act purposefully *upon* their environment were humans. Harvey (1996) proposed that as physical, biological and social

processes work together, however, non-human organisms should also be regarded as active subjects. As 'nature' is understood and mediated *through* culture, it cannot be considered separate to it (Macnaghten and Urry 1998: 30). Based upon work by Bruno Latour (1993), Actor Network Theory has proposed that humans are enmeshed within webs or networks of relational agency, in which agency is the outcome of relationships between people and the living and material worlds (see discussions in Harvey 1996; Law and Hassard 1999; Murdoch 1997; Thrift 1996). People give form to non-humans, but are acted upon and given shape by non-humans (Latour 1993: 137). The growth or behaviour of plants and animals impact upon their environments *and* people, and although usually less purposive than human agency, this constitutes agency nevertheless. Agency is the outcome of these relations between people, plants and animals and the material world. Trees too change places through their colonisation and growth, and affect human experiences of landscapes through their changing qualities over time (Jones and Cloke 2002). Material culture can also be a medium for agency, and at times may be imbued with it (Gell 1998, cf. Ingold 2007). In certain contexts, objects may become substitutes for people. Material culture is the outcome or consequence of social practices and processes constituted through agency. The forms and properties of things are contingent and relational (Brück 2004; Ingold 2007), continually emerging from their relationships with people and landscapes as part of transformative flows and assemblages (q.v. Deleuze 1997; Grosz 1995; Haraway 1991; Probyn 2000).

For Tim Ingold, Actor Network Theory is merely a way of 'making a rhetorical point' (Ingold and Jones 2002: 10), useful in deconstructing the culture : nature dichotomy, but not for explaining *how* relational links between beings and the material world are constituted, and for obviating the epistemological differences between social sciences (Ingold 2001). Instead, such 'hybrid geographies' (q.v. Whatmore 2002) open up the world to alternative conceptions of reality where boundaries become porous, surfaces open and subject to flux and change, and identities are entwined with the lives of other living beings. The complex, meaningful and interlinked relationships between Self-identity, the human body, non-human agencies and the material world can instead become the focus for enquiry. The intertwining of human, animal and plant bodies, touch, surface, vision and the material world, experiences of emotion and

memory, are all part of the 'the messy heterogeneity of being-in-the-world' (Whatmore 2002: 147). Through such reconfiguration of our engagements with the landscape's living and non-living components, we can shed some of the constraints of post-Enlightenment Western thinking which might interfere with our understanding the embodied lives of people and other beings in the past. We can move closer to a unifying theory of practice which allows us to explore the many diverse ways in which Self-identity and embodiment is constructed, maintained and experienced.

Non-human relational personhood

In anthropology too, dichotomies between culture : nature, human : animal and mind : body have been criticised (see critiques in Descola and Pálsson 1996; Ingold 1986b, 2000; MacCormack and Strathern 1980; Noske 1989; Sökefeld 1999; Strathern 1988). The Western idea of fixed bodily states and stable material substances is culturally and historically specific. People who have close relationships with plants and animals often consider these in terms of mutualism and interdependence, not domination or exploitation, acknowledging an underlying ontological equivalence between human and non-human beings (Ingold 1996b, 2000), with shared relationships between humans, animals and plants as fellow participants in the *same* world, not separated as 'culture' and 'nature'. Relational personhood conceives of each human not as a unique and indivisible *person*, but as an entity in continuous connectivity with multiple selves in multiple contexts, in reciprocal relations with other *persons* (Battaglia 1990; Bird-David 1999; Ingold 2000; Strathern 1988).

There is much ethnographic literature regarding relational epistemologies (e.g. Bird-David 1990; Brody 2001; Ingold 1996b, 2000; Kayano 1994; Strauss 1982). Identity is unstable, and people can become animals, ghosts or spirits, just as animals can sometimes be embodied as humans (Guenther 1988, 1999; Hallowell 1960; Vitebsky 1995). Landscapes are shared by humans, animal and plant beings; and people may be possessed by spirits, or pass through different worlds. In parts of Melanesia, some stones are believed to move around the landscape, and have names and biographies

derived from spirits or ancestors within them (Kahn 1990: 55; Leenhardt 1930: 241; Munn 1986: 81; Roe and Taki 1999). They signify tenure, temporality and identity. For the Ainu of northern Japan, spirits or gods (*kamuy*) were animals and plants, items of material culture, landscape features such as rocks and rivers, and manifestations of weather such as thunderstorms (Fujimura 1999: 273). At sacred sites and hunting, fishing and farming locations, offerings were made to *kamuy* to ensure success (Watanabe 1972, 1999). Animal and plant spirits were honoured in this way, but also the spirits of tools or implements belonging to the dead (Kayano 1994; Oda 1998; Utagawa 1999). After their owners had died, these implements were broken and buried with their bodies for use in the next world.

Amongst agricultural groups, many people do not see themselves as *making* plants and animals, but rather as providing assistance for their growth. For Q'eqchi' farmers in Guatemala the land is a deity, *Tzuultak'á*, from whom permission must be sought before any clearance, ploughing and sowing or tree cutting takes place (Gonzalo 1999). If the prescribed rituals are not followed, harvests may fail. The Achuar of Amazonia believe that women have two sets of offspring – human children, and the plants women grow in gardens, and both may actively compete for nurturance (Descola 1994: 206). In Boyacá in Columbia, the earth is a repository of strength which is drawn upon by plants, animals and humans (Gudeman and Rivera 1990: 18). People are in service *to* the land, and with their assistance it produces crops and young animals. In Algeria, for the Kabyle Berber ploughing is not an onerous activity and cannot be delegated to others as the land bestows bounty only on those who actively care for it and provide labour as a tribute (Bourdieu 1977: 175). In areas of Turkey, women and land were symbolically linked as sustainers of life (Delaney 1991: 267), and men and women were characterised in terms of seed and field (*tohum ve tarla*). Patriarchal dominance meant that fields and women had to be 'enclosed' (with the walls of fields or the houses), and 'covered' (with crops or modest clothing).

In parts of New Guinea and Melanesia, domestic animals and crops are incorporated into kinship relations, like human children. Yams are regarded as sentient beings that need nurture, tranquillity, and respectful offerings, and there are often strict prescriptions for clearance and cultivation (Battaglia 1990: 18; Bowden 1983: 53;

Roe and Taki 1999: 416; Seaglion 1999: 214; Sillitoe 1983: 161, 1999: 349). The growing cycles of yams are closely bound up with people's understandings of time and ancestry. The Swahili of East Africa believe their fields have protective guardian spirits, and they plant 'medicine' in the ground to ensure the land's productivity (Caplan 1997: 71-72). Offerings to spirits are made at specific points in the cultivation cycle. For the Gawa of Papua New Guinea, if boundary stones containing ancestral spirits are moved, 'the soil is angered' and will not produce yields (Munn 1986: 81), whilst for the Southern Paiute, plants needed to feel a human presence when people talked and tended to them (Fowler 1999: 422).

Pastoralists and their relationships with animals

Ingold once suggested that pastoralism or herding involves the domination of animals by people who impose their will upon them (Ingold 1986b: 273, 1996a: 18-20), though he has elaborated on this earlier assertion (Ingold 2000: 72-73). The realities are often much more complex (Campbell 2005; Faye 1996; Porcher 1998). Increasingly mechanistic agricultural practices since the end of the nineteenth century and the growth of urban areas have alienated most Western people from everyday relationships with animals who are either pampered pets, or shapeless lumps of processed flesh bought in supermarkets, although Muslims, Hindus and Jews still preserve a sacred aspect to killing animals and eating meat (Ingold 2005: 111). Nevertheless, the raising and slaughtering of animals for food and other products is now an experience limited to a few. In many small-scale societies throughout the world, more intimate engagements still persist. Herders may regard their animals in a benevolent and attentive manner, and guard and care for them, albeit in an ultimately hegemonic fashion. Importantly, many pastoral peoples do not see their relationship with animals in terms of domination, but in close and affectionate terms that go far beyond utilitarian demands. It is worth exploring ethnographies of these, due to the archaeological evidence that livestock husbandry was of great importance to Iron Age and Romano-British communities in the study region (see Chapters 5 and 6 and Appendices D and E). This was unlikely to have been a purely economic relationship.

Cattle are often held in high regard due to their value as 'wealth on the hoof', and because individual animals and herds may be embodiments of networks of obligations

between people and lineages within a community, or between different communities (Campbell 2005; Crandall 1998; Parker Pearson 2000). Relationships between people and animals provide the basis for human words, metaphors, songs and stories, and myths and legends (see many examples in Ingold 1988; Porcher 1998; Serpell 1985, 1986; Tambiah 1969; Willis 1990). People may distinguish themselves through differences based on attributes of their livestock, and the names of owners' families and descent groups and descriptive terms of animals may be interlinked and interchangeable. The Maasai of Kenya have matrilineal descent groups, and the structure of their human lineages and clans is based upon that of the cattle they herd, where younger cattle are descended from highly regarded and valued older bovine matriarchs (Galaty 1989).

Pig love. **Figure 3.15. (left).** *A Tifalmin man cradling a piglet inside a Papua New Guinea house. (Source: Wheatcroft 1973: 82).* **Fig. 3.16. (top right).** *A Huli woman taking pigs out to the fields. (Source: www.elisasjourneys.com).* **Fig. 3.17. (bottom right).** *A Dani woman in occupied West Papua, suckling her infant and an orphaned piglet. (Source: www.janesoceania.com).* **Fig. 3.18. (bottom far right).** *A Dani man with his favourite pig. (Source: www.lostworldarts.com).*

In many herding societies close attention is paid to the colour and patterning of cattle, horse and reindeer skins (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Coote 1992; Galaty 1989; Giles 2007; Parker Pearson 2000), or the shapes of cattle and reindeer horns. People may recognise the identity and idiosyncrasies of individual animals, and animals come to know and trust certain humans. Animals may be named, and respond to the call (Campbell 2005; Faye 1996). This should not be confused with sentimentality. In parts of New Guinea, piglets are raised within the house, and are accorded affection and respect (Dwyer and Minnegal 2005; Gillison 2002; Rappaport 1984). Human women may even suckle piglets, and they follow their mistresses attentively around settlements and gardens. Yet the same pigs are killed and eaten when fully grown, although these can be emotive occasions. Many herding peoples care for orphaned, sick or injured beasts, yet may also quickly dispatch animals when they are perceived to be a potential burden or to have transgressed (e.g. Campbell 2005: 90).

For the Eveny of Siberia, each herder has his or her own *kujjai*, a reindeer consecrated to protect its owner from harm, even to die in their place (Vitebsky 2005: 278-279). For the Turkana of Kenya cattle are the cornerstone of their world, and after they kill human enemies men may notch the ears of their cattle 'to make them glad' too (Dyson-Hudson 1973: 94). The Samburu sing to their cattle, and paint favoured animals with designs of mud and ochre (Pavitt 1991), whilst the Dinka decorate cattle with tassels or with ash, especially during rituals. The Nuer of Sudan have over 400 words for the colours, patterns and sheen of cattle hides, and the shape of their horns and bodies; similar to other cattle-herding peoples in north-eastern Africa (Coote 1992: 250-251).

Such aesthetics extend throughout these societies. Forked-branch shrines, pottery and gourd designs and even some patterns scarified on human skin amongst the Aga Dinka are based on cattle horns (Coote 1992: 259). Many dance movements amongst the Nuer, Dinka, Atuaot and Turkana are based upon cattle horns, or the behaviour of cows and bulls (Burton 1982; Dyson-Hudson 1973; Evans-Pritchard 1940). Human bodies and animal bodies, human lives and animal lives, are thus linked materially and symbolically through performed practices and decorative schemes.



Figure 3.16. (top and bottom left). *A Turkana man (above) mimics in dance movements the shape of a favourite cow's horns (below). Note also the notched ears on the beast, celebrating the killing of enemies by its human owner. (Source: Dyson-Hudson 1973: 94).* **Fig. 3.17. (top right).** *Cattle at Aubrac near the French Pyrénées, decorated for a transhumance festival. (Source: www.loustal-de-louis.fr).* **Fig. 3.18. (bottom right).** *Samburu herders decorating one of their favoured cattle with geometrical designs of mud. (Source: Pavitt 1991: 46).*

In an evocative exploration of reindeer herding in the Scottish Cairngorms, Hayden Lorimer examined the relations between herders and herd. In their regular movements around landscapes, both herders and animals come to share intimate experiences of particular places, whilst memories of paths and favourable areas for shelter, shade, water and food form part of a phenomenology of the herd (Lorimer 2004: 9). Relations between human herders and particular lead animals become very close and trusting. When animals and people move together, authority does not lie solely with the herders. Herd leaders are important – favoured animals who in return for affection and respect, act as intermediaries during drives or round-ups (Lorimer 2004, 2006). Herders trust these beasts to lead the way at times, to make the decisions as to where to ford rivers or scramble up steep hillsides. Sometimes it is the animals that show people the best paths to take (Gray 1999: 452). When herding sheep or cattle, people

often employ dogs, and here too, people place a measure of trust in their trained companions. In these movements between fields, through droveways or up into areas of highland pasture, agency resides in the reciprocal relations between human and herd, in their collective will. We cannot study past human rural communities without also examining how people's understandings and inhabitation of their landscapes were inextricably bound up with the lives, routines and movements of their livestock. We need archaeologies of animals as well as people.

Sometimes links between human and animal transcend implicit relational links and become active social relationships, which can tell us much about how differently animals are perceived by other societies. Lorimer details the story of Sarek, a lead reindeer for fifteen years with the Cairngorm herd who, close to the point of death, descended from the mountains so that he could die close to the trusted hands of his human herder Mikel Nils Persson Utsi (Lorimer 2004: 9, 2006).





Relational agency between animals and humans – the sentient geography of the herd. **Figure 3.19. (left).** *Moving cattle around the French Alps. (Source: Berger and Mohr 1982: 19).* **Fig. 3.20. (top right).** *Shepherd family with animals in the Ecuadorian Andes. (Source: Kling 2003: 168).* **Fig. 3.21. (bottom right).** *Bringing ewes to lambing pens, Dorset during the 1930s. (Source: Ward 1991: 70).*

Keith Basso narrates how Dudley Patterson, an elderly Apache cowhand, had long-running difficulties with a particular maverick bull, who always broke out of corrals and quite literally led the other animals astray. Although most other animals were subsequently rounded up, the bull was smart and difficult to catch, and would only rejoin the herd when 'it suited him' (Basso 1996: 82). The antagonism between them was nevertheless seen in terms of grudging but mutual respect by Dudley Patterson, and by other people in his community. The responses of animals to phenomena such as snowfalls and thunderstorms are also noteworthy. Such experiences are part of an animated, lived culture of the herd, 'a sentient geography of impermanent points, forces, flows and energies that confounds any representational cartography' (Lorimer 2004: 8). Movement through landscapes thus enculturates people *and* animals.

Non-human agencies

Non-human and relational agency is therefore not just a trend of recent academic enquiry, or a means of merely (re)presenting the world that reflects postmodern ideas of blurred boundaries and multiple perspectives. For many people around the globe, the world is not constituted in terms of subsistence techniques, but through 'the relative scope of human involvement in establishing the conditions for growth' (Ingold 1996a: 21), in wider networks of obligations and connections. Ingold has described these relational links as a rhizomic model of the world (Ingold 2000: 140-142), based partly on the work of Deleuze (1993). Within such a model, fields of relationships between beings and the landscape continually emerge as a series of tangled, progenerative encounters, a 'reticulate maze' of criss-crossing paths of being and movement (Ingold 2000: 142). Routine embodied movements and practices, significant moments such as births and deaths, relations with plants and animals and spirits, and memories of these and the places in the landscape where they occurred, take place *within* this movement, as part of dynamic and meaningful engagements with the materiality of the lived-in world. Animals, plants and other beings may be drawn into human social life, and through their agency affect people. People are likewise drawn into webs of active relationships with non-human persons, and their Self-identities are partly composed through these.

We should therefore not consider Iron Age and Romano-British farming in purely functionalist and economic terms, for this misses the social and symbolic meanings such practices probably had for those people. 'Rational', capitalist attitudes are unlikely to have existed in many such small-scale communities, where life itself depended on successful harvests and healthy livestock, and understandings of identity, status and wealth, tenure and history might have been closely bound up with the land, the soil and the seasons. This is not to say that changes in attitudes to animals, plants and the land did not occur during the Iron Age, and during the Romano-British period. Particularly following the Roman conquest, some people might have begun to think of the land, crops and animals in terms more redolent of modern capitalism. This might have been true of those individuals or families who managed to control larger areas of land, or maintain the largest herds and flocks. Nevertheless, even the most prosaic daily agricultural practices would still have imbedded in meaningful social beliefs and cosmological schemes. Plants and animals were not just good to eat or good to think with, but were part of the very fabric of people's lives. In this thesis I will thus examine how these complex connections were played out within Iron Age and Romano-British landscapes, fields, trackways and settlements.

Towards an embodied phenomenology and a relational agency of the lived-in world

To summarise, the human body defines our spatial experiences of the world, but is not simply an impenetrable surface around a disengaged Cartesian Self. Rather, it is a porous membrane that opens up to external stimuli and other beings, taking these within the body and our Selves, as well as projecting outwards to other beings and the material world (Probyn 2000). Bodily movement helps reproduce our sense of identity and experiences of landscapes (Connerton 1989; Lefebvre 1991), but are also intelligent, proactive processes that also open up cognitive spaces encompassing emotions, reflections, dreams, myths and madness (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Seamon 1980). For the most part the lived-in world is experienced inattentively with little explicit thought, articulated through manual acts and repetitive movements where muscular and cognitive memories are entwined, much like the lives of people, plants

and animals themselves. Thought is 'embodied and enacted' (Lave 1988: 171), as everyday embodied practices or 'muscular consciousness' (Bachelard 1969: 11). Different ground surfaces underfoot, textures of wood, stone or fur, warm sunlight, frosty air or the pressure of wind on the skin are phenomenological experiences that often recede into the unconscious. Yet such 'haptic geographies' (Rodaway 1994: 41-42) are nonetheless crucial to our understandings of why walking through woodland is qualitatively different from walking along a cliff edge, or why winters are different from summers. Soundscapes and smellscapes of wind, water and vegetation, birds and animals, growth and decay are all part of these experiences.

As part of our relational links with other beings in the lived-in world, we construct our Selves and bodies through recursive performances that are never fully finished (Butler 1993; Moore 1994). The body may be subject to surveillance, control or oppression by others, and identities may be contested and subverted. Rather than reified categories such as 'women' or 'men', there are a multiplicity of femininities and masculinities, sometimes conflicting or contradictory. Our Self-projects of embodiment have a fleshy physicality of form – materialisations of sexuality, desires, hopes and fears, yet are also anchored to our corporeal bodies. Such feelings arise from *within* our fleshed Selves, not from a distanced centre of intellect. Absurd crushes, unlikely liaisons and unconsummated longings result. We may experience alienation, loss and loneliness precisely because our physical bodies and our viscerally-felt emotions do not always entwine smoothly with our cognitive Selves.

The lived body is not wholly an 'apparatus' (Lyotard 1988), régime (Foucault 1979, 1981), desiring machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1988), cyborg (Haraway 1991), performance (Butler 1991, 1993), open subject (Battaglia 1999) or assemblage (Probyn 2000) – there are problems with all of these metaphors. The body is a place of meeting and interdigitation between biology and culture, the physical and the social, the social and the symbolic (Battaglia 1999; Bergson 1959; Casey 1998), of attentive and inattentive engagements with the landscape and with the lives of plants and animals, with objects and the material world, as part of dense, dynamic and cross-cutting networks of agents and agencies, flows and energies. People (as knowledgeable social agents); animals and plants (as transformative agents); material

culture and other objects in the material world (imbued with agency); and the landscapes which foreground these – all come into being in relation to one another. Human attempts to make sense of the world lie in these connections, an on-going process of immersion within the warp and weft of the fabric of life. We anticipate and *project* ourselves into a future as yet unknown, as a continually recursive and reflexive movement of *becoming* (Grosz 1986: 140-142; Ingold 1993: 164, 1996c: 117; McNay 1999: 102). Our identities and life histories *unfold* through this messy tangle of relations.

Some concluding thoughts

My intention has been to critically examine how humans experience their bodies and dwell within their landscapes, and how they relate to the plants and animals with whom they share the world. I have only summarised some key elements of these discussions, and other contributions such as those from developmental psychology I have avoided for reasons of brevity. Nevertheless, I have developed a notion of relational agency that allows us to consider how aspects of human Self-identity including gender are partly derived through our biological bodies, but also our relations with other beings and with the material world. This theory of practice allows me to consider the possibility of different notions of Selfhood and identity in the past, and relational networks of relations with plants, animals and other beings, and to think through such different ways of being-in-the-world without some of the cumulative cognitive constraints of historically-constituted Western modes of philosophical thought and cultural practice.

Where do these ideas take us in understanding the lives and everyday experiences of people in the past? Firstly, we need to deconstruct 'the body' as the basis of sexual difference, but at the same time need to acknowledge these differences in order to understand the embodied experiences of individuals. We must consider the fleshy phenomenological experiences of being-in-the-world and *imagine* how past landscapes, architecture and material culture influenced and were themselves

influenced by the dispositions of people's bodies, but must also question 'common-sense' notions of bodies and Selves. Unlike postmodern Western individuals, in the past human agency may have been constituted as much through the family, clan or community as often as on individual ideas and needs. We need to consider how people's identities were also comprised through their skills at particular tasks, their material culture and depositional practices, and the spatial and temporal variation of these everyday activities in and around settlements and landscapes.

Furthermore, the theory of relational agency is an epistemological tool, allowing me to tack back and forth and make connections between the different forms of archaeological evidence from the study region – gender and other aspects of people's identities had to be constructed and performed in particular social contexts, through material engagements inside dwellings and around enclosures, along trackways and within fields. I can explore the relationships people had with plants and animals within these small-scale farming communities, their shared daily routines and spatial experiences, and what energies and agencies people, animals and plants *together* brought to these landscapes. There are some archaeological indications that animals in particular were not viewed in the same way as in the modern West (see Chapter 11 and Appendix F), and that people might have had ideas of more fluid and shifting boundaries between human and non-human realms of Being. People were *different* in the past (q.v. Knight 2002), with correspondingly different beliefs and values, and it is important that as archaeologists we are able to recognise and to write about these differences. I will return to these ideas concerning identity, animality and landscape at several key points within this thesis.

Notes

1. Anne Salmond and Gillian Rose have both claimed that the history of geography and Western exploration has involved the abstract processes of Cartesian geometry, and the objectifying, reifying gaze of the cartographer, map maker and surveyor, or the landscape painter. This draws upon the work of Jacques Lacan and others on the difference between *look* and *gaze* (e.g. Deutsche 1991; Edholm 1993; Grosz 1990; Lacan 1977; Rose 1986; Salmond 1992; Silverman 1991). In many allegorical nineteenth century landscape paintings, nude female figures codify

the landscape as something feminine, to be gazed at and appropriated. As Rose has stated, 'the sensual topography of land and skin is mapped by a gaze which is eroticised as masculine and heterosexual' (Rose 1993: 97). However, there have been critiques of Rose's position. Catherine Nash has suggested that although visual pleasure in research, writing or looking at the landscape is unavoidably political as a practice, it is not necessarily masculinist (Nash 1996). Nash does not of course deny that such associations between nature, landscape and female exist today, or have existed in the past, but rather she feels that what matters is *how* they are constructed in historically and culturally specific ways.

2. I prefer the term postmodern or post-structuralist feminism to that of post-feminism (*contra* Brooks 1987), as I believe that this latter term implies theory *after* feminism, or even *beyond* feminism. There is a real danger here of suggesting this means the feminist project has now succeeded, whereas this is not the case. Many of the basic goals of first and second wave feminists – equal education, pay and employment rights, equality under the law, less masculinist attitudes in society and the popular media, better childcare provision – have still not yet been achieved in many Western countries (certainly not in Britain or the United States), let alone in the so-called 'developing world'. And the many real, welcome advances that have been made by women in many areas of society have nevertheless served to conceal some of the deeper underlying differences and problems that still exist, and with new opportunities have come new inequalities (q.v. Faludi 1993; Walby 1997).