

ART. XI – *The Paralysis of the Cumberland and Westmorland Army in the First Civil War c.1642-45.*

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THE aim of this paper is to cast some light on one of the most important aspects of the history of Civil War Cumberland and Westmorland: the paralysis of the army of the two counties during the first Civil War, and the crippling split among its gentry officers which occasioned that paralysis.¹ It will be suggested that the military orientation of the Cumberland and Westmorland army's senior officer corps in this period was directed largely towards the protection of county interests, prioritised over external military service in support of King Charles I. The friction which arose between Sir Philip Musgrave of Edenhall and Sir John Lowther of Lowther (the central figures in the army disputes) was not simply an insignificant local squabble over military organisation and command. The apex of the dispute occurred in 1643, when Musgrave, as commander-in-chief of the Cumberland and Westmorland forces, accused Lowther and several of his associates point-blank of trying, enviously, to undermine his authority. Rivalry between the families of Musgrave and Lowther predated the Civil Wars, having its origins in the late sixteenth century when both families came to significance following the erosion of Dacre and Clifford authority in the two counties. The geographical proximity of their main estates at Edenhall and Lowther, ties of kinship and the presence of Musgraves and Lowthers in public office, combined with the incompatibility of their ambitions to intensify a local rivalry which found clear expression in moments of national crisis such as the Civil Wars.

The unresolved controversy between the Musgraves, the Lowthers and their supporters over the employment of the Civil War forces of Cumberland and Westmorland, proved to be an important staging post in the breakdown in relations between the two families, and the political enmity which extended beyond the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. Thus in the Tory and Whig party divisions of that era in the two counties, there can be seen replicated local rivalries which became amplified during the first Civil War. The paralysis of the army also aptly illustrates how the Civil Wars, and the office-holding changes they brought, created new grounds upon which feuds between persons could be based and fought, be they feuds over authority, character, reputation or political principle. Given the uncertainty, danger and urgency of the issues at hand, it was not difficult for disputes such as these to arise. Disputes which, arising from the localist mentality displayed by several of the most influential commanders within the army, and the unresolved conflict of interests between the two powerful factions among these senior officers, were directly responsible for the confinement of the Cumberland and Westmorland forces within the county boundaries. My final aim is to contribute to the academic debate between such historians of the Civil Wars in the North as Colin Phillips, Peter Newman and David Scott, which began in the 1970s, by suggesting, in the light of more recent research, that the two counties were more royalist in sympathy than has been allowed for in the initial work on the subject.

The gentry of the two counties were already aware of the dangers of participation in national conflict prior to the outbreak of the Civil Wars. The outbreak of the Bishops' Wars in 1639, following attempts to impose the English Book of Common Prayer on the Scottish Kirk, made the threat of invasion by the Scots a real and tangible threat and heightened the importance of Carlisle Castle as a strategic military stronghold. Once any invading army from Scotland crossed the Tweed or the Solway Firth, the castle would become the first significant bulwark against such a force penetrating deeper into England. A fresh army on its first offensive strike could be capable of untold damage; this lesson had been learned from the scorched-earth experiences of medieval border warfare, and the possibility of a Scottish invasion engendered considerable hysteria, to which the gentry were not immune. Sir Christopher Lowther of Whitehaven wrote on 9 April 1639:

May it please you to take notice that the 6th instant I being with my Lord Clifford at Workington, and all of us rayzed out of our bedds with an Alarum that the Citye of Carlisle was burnt and the Irish souldiers all slaine by the Scotts . . . but God be prayed the Alarum being false . . .²

Ultimately it was the north-east of England, around Newcastle, that was invaded by the Scots, hence the Cumberland and Westmorland elements of the English army went untested. With the English crown forced to comply with the humiliating peace terms of the Pacification of Berwick, the threat of a Scottish invasion had for the time being passed from the two counties, but according to Gilbert Burton, the contemporary biographer of Sir Philip Musgrave, the rebellion

wch at the first rising seemed no bigger than a man's hand, in a short time made dark the whole Hemisphere of Great Britain, and ingendred a storm which ushered in such a deluge of civil war as the unpareld sad events to the Church and State in all the three kingdoms, will never be forgotten.³

Thus by the time the King's standard was raised at Nottingham on 22 August 1642 (seen as the formal beginning of the first Civil War), Cumberland and Westmorland already knew that they had much to lose if the ravages of military conflict descended upon them. This may in turn have had significant implications for the Civil War support base which Charles I received from the forces of the two counties and the gentry who commanded them. If the militias had been released outside Cumberland and Westmorland, then the two counties would have been left practically defenceless, and this grim possibility realised at the time of the Bishops' Wars can be seen reflected in Lake County Civil War localism.

Judging from the reticence displayed by many counties after the conflict began, England can hardly be said to have been suddenly engulfed in that "deluge" of Civil War referred to by Burton. The primary objective of many regions nation-wide was to retain control of their own militias and to keep out strangers, be they the forces of King or Parliament. Drawing on evidence from many counties, Professor Fletcher has described the outbreak of the first Civil War as untidy and confused.⁴ Furthermore, the ability to muster, train and equip rival armies on both sides was an essential precursor to the resolving of political deadlock by military conflict. Both sides thus initially focused their endeavours upon trying to gain control of the existing English military structure: the county peacetime militias. The organisation and training of the militias was the responsibility of the Lord Lieutenants, though the inefficiency of such forces was a nation-wide malady. In 1642 the Cornish militia

was “ineffective and undisciplined, its raw levies armed with unserviceable weapons and indifferent powder” and their musters, like those in Cumberland and Westmorland, also proved inadequate.⁵ It was the poor state of the county militias that led Fortescue to conclude that “the scramble [to control them] was supremely ridiculous, since it was all for a prize not worth the snatching . . . It was to the party that first made an army, not to that which preferred the sounder claim to regulate the militia that victory was to belong”.⁶ Despite their marked inefficiency, the militias remained the only means of defence in the counties, and hence deemed worthy of securing by both sides. In attempting to gain control of such forces, the King’s concern was to consolidate a loyal following from among the most influential gentry of each county who could then employ the local militias to put down any sign of rebellion. The Militia Ordinance, on the other hand, assumed the authority for Parliament of appointing Lord Lieutenants, for the purpose of suppressing “all rebellions, insurrections and invasions that may happen, according as they from time to time shall receive directions from . . . Parliament”.⁷ Between late May and mid-July 1642, Parliament’s Militia Ordinance was executed in fourteen counties, among which Cumberland and Westmorland were not included. This was because in July 1642, the two counties had responded to the growing state of emergency in their *Humble Petition and Representation* to Charles I. The 4,774 signatories declared themselves “ready, according to our Power, with our lives and fortunes, to defend Your Majestie’s Person, Honour, Crown and Dignity, the Religion and Laws established, against all Maligners of Your Majestie’s Royall Prerogative, and the peace and prosperity of the Kingdom”.⁸ A more emphatically royalist declaration one would perhaps be hard-pressed to find. Yet to judge by the subsequent reticence and divisions of opinion among the senior officers of the Cumberland and Westmorland forces, and those who supported either faction, this document appears to have been drawn up largely as a formality. Perhaps the signatories were, even at that particular stage, doubtful as to whether such a paper resolve would ever be put to the test, making its committal to print all the more easy. While the Militia Ordinance claimed its legal validity upon “transparently bogus precedents”,⁹ the King’s Commission of Array was itself of dubious legality. Dr Newman has argued that the Commission of Array was not responsible for partisan alignments within counties such as Cumberland and Westmorland, but rather the reverse; that the execution of the Array depended upon the presence of or the seeds of such alignments prior to its arrival.¹⁰ The Array, as will be seen, was not always as effective a motivation for martial preparation as the King would have preferred.

Charles I appointed William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, commander-in-chief of the northern royalist army on 10 June 1642, and in turn Newcastle made Sir Philip Musgrave commander-in-chief of the Cumberland and Westmorland forces within that army. Sir Philip Musgrave had already seen service on behalf of the King, as when the Scottish rebellion had broken out he had held the colonelcy of an infantry regiment.¹¹ In 1642 the county militias were the only military force within the two counties, however their efficiency at this time is justifiably questionable. The State Papers for the 1630s contain an assessment of the Cumberland and Westmorland militias as they stood in 1639,¹² as made by Captain Henry Waytes, a distant relative of the Clifford family. Writing in January and February of that year, Waytes revealed that both counties were deficient in terms of arms and logistics.

Much of what they already possessed were outdated leftovers from earlier periods. Burne and Young cite the example of Major Robert Philipson, whose helmet, lost together with his sword during a curious offensive in Kendal Church, proved to be an Elizabethan morion.¹³ Of the two counties, Westmorland alone possessed powder magazines (at Appleby and Kendal) though these were, according to Waytes, “well stored, the deputy-lieutenants having, three years ago, caused 100l. to be employed in powder and match, besides a supply of lead for bullets”. Although in 1625 the raising of 500 foot and 100 horse had been ordered for each of the two counties, Cumberland intended to muster only 250 foot and forty horse; Westmorland 200 foot and forty horse. The cavalrymen were instructed to be armed with head-pieces, back and breast plates, carbines hung in belts and a case of pistols, while the foot were to be comprised of pikemen and musketeers in equal numbers. The fulfilment of these orders was difficult from the outset. There was only one resident gunsmith in the county, with inadequate tools and an inability to provide muskets for under twenty-three shillings a piece, unlike Sussex, which at the time of the first Civil War had about twenty-seven furnaces, most of which manufactured guns and ammunition.¹⁴ At the same time the Deputy Lieutenants declared themselves so strained to maintain their current forces in 1639 that no increase in troops could be made, despite Waytes’ recommendation that they should make up their number into a complete regiment of at least 1,000 men.

In a communication to secretary Windebank, Captain Waytes reported on the results of display musters by the Cumberland forces at Cockermouth and Carlisle. At the former, only eighteen horsemen paraded, of whom two were without arms. The foot soldiers were not 100 in number, and similarly defective in arms. The Carlisle muster fared little better: seventeen horsemen appeared, of whom four had been supplied by Lord William Howard of Naworth, though in Waytes’ words these were “well compleat”. The one hundred foot soldiers there were again deficient in arms. Musters in Westmorland produced thirty horse (of poor quality but well-armed) and a comparatively impressive two hundred foot, half pikemen and half musketeers, all apparently enthusiastic men eager to learn to use their weapons. In terms of self-sufficiency, “for any provision of corn or victuals this county affords not enough for their own sustenance, but are served from other counties and neighbouring counties”.

Therefore at the outbreak of the first Civil War, the Cumberland and Westmorland militias, like their counterparts in other counties, were unsatisfactory. Captain Waytes declared that the problem lay with the absence of able officers, a matter which he directed to the Council of War. There were of course pre-existing commissioned militia officers prior to the Civil Wars who, as will be seen, subsequently received fresh commissions from the King for the command of new regiments in the newly formed army. However, they had seen precious little if any active service to test their prowess in the field. Dr Phillips blamed “laxity and indifference rather than principled opposition” on the part of the Deputy Lieutenants and the gentry, highlighting their parochialism and financial paucity.¹⁵ Dr Spence later added that the scattered communities of the two counties, frequently inclement weather and difficult, mountainous terrain (together with the resultant problem of poor communication), also obstructed the formation of military forces in Cumberland and Westmorland.¹⁶ Therefore, even if the subsequent

disputes within the ranks of the senior officers had not taken place, the potential value of any military defence the county militias may have mounted in the event of parliamentary incursion appears, at the outset, to have been very low indeed.

The extent of the uncertainty and disagreement among the leading gentry of Cumberland and Westmorland immediately prior to the army disputes is hinted at by the divisions over the Earl of Derby's proposal for a royalist association of the northern counties. Whilst nothing came of the idea, Sir Philip Musgrave was the chief proponent of a later attempt to persuade the gentry of Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire to join with those in Cumberland and Westmorland and form an alliance, calling for a meeting of select committees from Cumberland and Westmorland, Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire which, he hoped, would culminate in "a right understanding of oure royall interest to His Majestie".¹⁷ However, at the meeting organised at Richmond for the purpose of discussing this idea, no representatives from Durham or Northumberland attended, and this too came to nothing. Instances of the failure of proposed royalist county associations were not limited to the two counties alone. For example, Charles I attempted to join Nottinghamshire with her neighbouring counties in 1643, but this was without success, and the subsequent lack of authority of Colonel Henry Hastings over the royalist forces there is certainly reminiscent of Sir Philip Musgrave's predicament in Cumberland and Westmorland.¹⁸ The failures in the two counties suggest that no consensus had been reached over the pervading question of how far forces raised in the two counties should be involved in the Civil War, and where their real allegiance should lie. The problem in Cumberland and Westmorland was summed up by Sir Philip Musgrave in 1642. "If it were in my power with the hazard of my life and all I would put it to the Countrie to give you assistance", wrote Musgrave to the Earl of Cumberland, "but without my Countries consent 'tis little I am able to do".¹⁹ The ensuing army disputes, as will be seen, confirm that lack of consent.

To understand the nature of these disputes, it is essential to distinguish between the two main types of forces that were present in Cumberland and Westmorland during the first Civil War. The first was that discussed above, the county militias, whose peacetime duty was to protect their counties in the event of foreign invasion and to quell internal disturbances and riots. The evidence provided by Captain Waytes' assessment in the late 1630s points not to one militia serving both counties but to two: one for Cumberland and one for Westmorland. The second kind of force was the new regiments raised specifically in response to the outbreak of the Civil War and the Commission of Array. It is these entities which comprised what may be called the army of Cumberland and Westmorland, and which was placed by Newcastle under the command of Sir Philip Musgrave. The inefficiency of the county militias nation-wide has already been discussed. Side by side with this was a consistent reluctance on their behalf to serve far from home, and a vigorous dedication to preserving the welfare of their home counties. Such paralysis often stemmed from a more mercenary standpoint. When the Somerset militia prepared to face the Scots during the Bishops' Wars, widespread refusal to pay the coat-and-conduct money necessary to equip and pay them resulted in desertion and violence.²⁰ Charles I chose to employ the Commission of Array partly because it allowed him to command armies to serve outside the counties in which they were raised. However, the core of the army disputes in Cumberland and Westmorland

rested in the fact that the immediate concern of Sir Philip Musgrave's two most influential colonels, Sir Henry Fletcher of Hutton and Sir John Lowther, together with other, lower-ranking officers, was the safety of their own locality, as opposed to the fate of the wider nation. Musgrave himself and five other officers advocated an active military policy, the proposal that the new army should fight outside Cumberland and Westmorland. The fact that this dispute was never resolved and that the army remained within the county boundaries creates a certain confusion with regard to distinguishing between the militia and the newly-raised regiments, particularly as some officers held commissions in both.

Sir John Lowther and Sir Philip Musgrave had already been estranged since the beginning of the 1640s upon grounds of political jealousy, when Musgrave and Sir Henry Bellingham of Levens had been returned in county elections to the Long Parliament as Knights of the Shire despite strong opposition from Lowther and his colleagues. Musgrave's kinsmen, Sir Edward of Hayton and Sir William of Crookdake, were among his chief supporters in the dispute.²¹ In 1642 the heads of seven Musgrave families, including one external to Cumberland and Westmorland, had put their names to an indenture between themselves to co-operate in the approaching Civil War.

We whose names are subscribed kinsmen, namesmen and friends, having Apparently found by our own experiences or such writing and orders as From our ancestors are come to our knowledge; how much good to our country in general hath been occasioned, how many suits and controversies Amongst themselves avoided, and on the contrary how much amity and affection hath been nourished by observing and maintaining certain conventicles Amongst themselves subscribed by those of this name.²²

The Musgraves then agreed to follow the heads of their most senior families, including Sir Philip and Sir Edward Musgrave, who were both baronets. That these family figureheads later displayed an ardent (if frustrated) royalism in the army disputes would therefore explain the similar allegiance of others of that name. The Musgrave agreement is an interesting document, suggesting as it does a shared family loyalty, which overstepped other ties or the notion of localism.

Lowther meanwhile found common cause with the Westmorland freeholders, who joined in that ensuing refusal to serve outside the Lake Counties.²³ The allegiance of the freeholders to Lowther can be traced back to the 1620s, when, interestingly, they had returned him to Parliament despite his activity in collecting the forced loan, which had aroused some discontent in Cumberland and Westmorland.²⁴ Lowther was town recorder of Kendal, and it is likely that the corporation-men Gervase Benson and John Archer, two parliamentarians in a largely royalist-sympathetic body, were also allied to him.²⁵ In June 1643 Sir John Lowther received a colonel's commission from the Earl of Newcastle and with it authorisation to raise a new regiment of 1,000 men.²⁶ Gentry officers of other regiments, particularly Colonel Sir Henry Fletcher, were also behind Lowther. Fletcher declared soon after the outbreak of the first Civil War that "my desire is to have the assistance of such gentlemen . . . that have noe further desire but for the good and safety of our countrie"²⁷ though his later attitude suggests that he meant "county" in the first instance. Motives of self-interest and local defence also appear to be reflected in the attitude of Lowther's cousin, Sir Christopher Lowther of Whitehaven; given that he had been the prime mover in the formation of the town

harbour and those trading links it possessed at the time, the protection of this developing coastal port was undoubtedly high in priority.²⁸ Sir Christopher was commissioned in 1643 as colonel of the first brigade of horse and foot to be raised in Cumberland during the first Civil War, and later was appointed governor of Cockermouth Castle. There is no evidence of his troops ever being called to their colours.²⁹

It is however the correspondence between the Reverend Edmund Mauleverer of Crosby Garrett and Sir Philip Musgrave, which provides what are perhaps the clearest indications of the localism of Lowther and his allies. “The gentry seek their owne ends to fearing of themselves, and would draw all the forces to Appleby and then detain them” wrote Mauleverer after witnessing a meeting of the gentry at Kirkby. “They seem to be willing to maintain some force in these parts for the county’s safety . . . I fear mee you shall find many of the gentry false hearted”.³⁰ Mauleverer observed that the “coolness” of Sir John Lowther towards participation in the Civil War encouraged many of the “false hearted” gentry, who looked to Lowther for support. Sir John’s behaviour external to the two counties also gave the active royalists cause for concern at one time, if we are to trust Mauleverer’s reporting of his words. Lowther informed a Lancashire parliamentarian that “anie levying of armes heare and trayning was only to defend ourselves from the papistes, and not to offend them”.³¹ When Lowther, Fletcher and others complained, as they frequently did, of the difficulties in raising troops and paying them,³² Sir Philip Musgrave responded by assuring them that he had not encountered such difficulties as could not be overcome. “I have not found”, he declared, “that the commanders and soldiers [stationed at Kendal] do more than heertofore complaine of their charge, or attendance, though for 20 days together they have borne the burden without assistance from this part of Westmoreland until my own companye on Thursday last came to Kendale”.³³ On the other hand, when Musgrave had dispatched a force of approximately 2,000 horse and foot to Kendal, they were commanded by officers whose obedience and whose desire to fight outside Cumberland and Westmorland Sir Philip had reason to question.³⁴ Musgrave was also facing difficulties with the reticence of the common people when it came to recruiting soldiers. Upon the arrival of his warrant in one community some men promptly fled, causing the attending commissioner to request a new warrant for the arrest of the absentees.³⁵ The community around the village of Brough resisted the summons to appear for Charles I at Appleby and serve in the newly raised forces, afraid that in their absence their lands would be seized by self-interested gentlemen. Such reluctance led Sir Philip Musgrave to complain to the Mayor of Kendal that these people were “ill affected [and] intend opposition to all authorety”.³⁶ There is evidence, therefore, of two main strategies at work in Cumberland and Westmorland for the raising of men; the execution of the King’s Commission of Array and the vesting of recruiting power within individuals through the issuing of new colonel’s commissions. Neither, it appears, was consistently successful.

It was not long before Musgrave and Sir Henry Fletcher quarrelled over the command structure of the army, a quarrel which bears all the hallmarks not of political grievances but of wounded pride. Fletcher’s pride was evidently dented by Musgrave issuing orders to his men; so on the grounds that such commands were confusing his troops, Fletcher countermanded Musgrave’s order for a muster at

Penrith in December 1643. Musgrave had instructed the town constables to summon all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty to appear before him in the market place, together with what arms they might possess, but on the rear of the sheet is appended “contradicted by Sir H. F.”.³⁷ This breach was, according to Dr Phillips, eventually brought before a higher authority external to Cumberland and Westmorland. Determining exactly who or what this higher authority was has proven to be difficult, as Phillips provides no further information or references upon the subject in his thesis. As the commander-in-chief of the army of the northern counties, the Earl of Newcastle might well have been called upon to mediate the dispute. Musgrave certainly acquainted the Earl with the details of the quarrel, and in doing so openly accused Sir Henry Fletcher, Sir John Lowther and Sir Christopher Lowther of using underhand practices to blacken his name and moving others to join in signing a petition to the same effect. Such was the extent of the apathy towards external military service and opposition to Musgrave on the part of these officers, that Sir Philip feared he might lose his command.³⁸ Equally, as the royalist war council at Oxford sat in part as a disciplinary body, enforcing decisions and hearing disputes (in some cases law officers were co-opted to give advice),³⁹ it is also possible that the quarrel between Musgrave and Fletcher was carried there. In his letter to Newcastle, Sir Philip had also declared that if any investigation the Earl might wish to undertake found his conduct to that date wanting, “that I may suffer as a desperate delinquent: but if nothing of disloyalty to my King, malice or partiality towards any under my commaund can be fixed upon mee, I beg no more favour but that you will give me leave to attend his Majestie at Oxford . . . rather than his cause should suffer because I am envied for my power”. However, two days after the abortive Penrith muster, Musgrave was communicating with Sir Thomas Glemham about the matter. Glemham was later to assume control of the garrison at Carlisle, along with Sir Henry Stradling, during the siege of Carlisle by General Leslie in 1644 and 1645, but at the time of the Musgrave-Fletcher quarrel he had been colonel-general of Northumberland for a month, and second-in-command to the Earl of Cumberland.⁴⁰ In his letter, Musgrave stated that Fletcher had declared that men might appear at the muster at their peril, threatening punishment to those who would disobey him. “This is not the first time I have been disobeyed by this gentleman in miscomands”, wrote Musgrave, “and therefore feare the like may happen when it may prove of much greater disadvantage to his Majesties affaires”.⁴¹ In calling for a hearing of the matter before Glemham in a council of war, this letter suggests that Sir Thomas was that higher authority referred to by Dr Phillips. When several of the most influential Cumberland and Westmorland gentry who “had the greatest power to make their nerbours conformable” left the two counties to attend the King’s Oxford parliament, Musgrave was not among their number. He feared that the task of maintaining his authority would subsequently prove too much, not least because Fletcher, as one of the most senior men remaining, had publicly slighted his authority.⁴²

Before Glemham had the chance to reply, Musgrave and Fletcher had quarrelled over a troop of horse mustered by Fletcher on Alston Moor. Again, Fletcher had overstepped his authority, causing Musgrave to send the terse warning “I must desire . . . that you do forbear to raise anie horse in Auston Moor, for I have a Comission to raise horse there and putt under whose comand I thinke fitt”.⁴³ Sir

Philip also took the timely opportunity to remind Colonel Fletcher of his failure to address Musgrave's repeated requests for a list of the names of officers and soldiers in Fletcher's regiments, together with what arms they needed to purchase. When his reply arrived, Glemham informed Musgrave that "I cannot not as yett decide the difference", but promised that at the next meeting of the four northern counties he would put their quarrel on the agenda.⁴⁴ Sir John Lowther, Fletcher and other gentlemen had also sent representations to Glemham, and several days later he agreed to speak directly to both parties.⁴⁵ The dispute remained unresolved, according to Dr Phillips, to the time of Leslie's invasion in 1644.⁴⁶ The resultant paralysis rendered the Cumberland and Westmorland army confined to its home counties. This did have its benefits, however, for in April 1643 a rumour arose that the parliamentarian Richard Barwis, later M.P. for Carlisle, was planning to lead a Scottish invasion force, gathered from Edinburgh, into Cumberland, and while this evidently did not come about, Musgrave's army would have been present in the event of that invasion.⁴⁷ In addition, the turncoat Sir Wilfred Lawson of Isel, formerly a royalist lieutenant-colonel in Sir Patricius Curwen of Workington's regiment of infantry, massed a small force from south Allerdale and attempted to take Carlisle Castle for Parliament. Musgrave's men repulsed the attack, but the subsequent siege of Thurland Castle in north Lancashire (close to the border with Westmorland) by Parliamentary forces went observed but unaided by the Cumberland and Westmorland army, the only attempt at assistance coming from a privately-raised and funded tenant levy some 1,600 strong under Colonel Sir William Hudleston of Millom.

Thurland Castle had been taken by Parliament, practically without a shot being fired, in May 1643, and retaken by Sir John Girlington some time before August of that year, at which time it was one of only three royalist garrisons in Lancashire. The second siege, by parliamentary forces under Colonel Alexander Rigby, lasted seven weeks. Colonel Hudleston's royalist tenant levy, heading south through Lonsdale to menace Rigby, were intercepted by a detachment of the parliamentarian troops at Lindale, three miles from Cartmel. The subsequent skirmish, according to Mr. Broxap, lasted a mere quarter of an hour, in which Rigby's men put the fear of God into the inexperienced enemy to the point where they scattered and fled. Hudleston, three other officers and 400 men were captured, and hearing of his defeat, Sir Philip Musgrave made the negotiations for the surrender of Thurland Castle.⁴⁸ Private forces such as Hudleston's were able to operate beyond the county boundaries. The reason was that the gentry figures who raised them were not only undoubted royalists but also not normally associated with the command structure of the peacetime militias and the Civil War army of the two counties, in which the Musgrave-Lowther dispute was raging, and hence were not drawn into the stalemate by any allegiance to either faction they might otherwise have felt compelled to profess.

Sir John Lowther continued to display that reluctance which had two years earlier incensed Edmund Mauleverer, siding with Fletcher in the sub-dispute between him and Sir Philip Musgrave. In 1644 Lowther's indifference towards active royalism was re-emphasised, much to the exasperation of his commander-in-chief. On 25 May, Musgrave had presented a number of proposals to the Mayor, Aldermen and Recorder of Kendal (the latter office being held by Lowther himself) for the

financing of the war and the defence of the town, but was somewhat dissatisfied at the answer from the corporation.⁴⁹ They did not see any need to increase the town's defences, or to conduct a search for any "disaffected persons", both matters which Musgrave had evidently deemed of vital importance. In addition, the town officials had shown no willingness to advance the suggested loan of one hundred pounds or even a proportion of that sum, and when Sir Philip Musgrave and a number of other senior officers entered into a bond to raise money themselves for the King's service, Sir John Lowther refused. Lowther further complicated matters by refusing to subscribe his name to a number of military orders drawn up by a meeting of officers which Musgrave had termed a Council of War, "unless such a term were omitted, saying he would joyne as a Commissioner of Array, but did not understand the Counsell of Warre". Sir Philip was content to let others who evidently had first-hand knowledge of Kendal's attitude to his proposals judge the fairness of his report, and five signatures appear at the foot of the document, each agreeing to certain statements only. As regards Sir John Lowther's refusal of money and his obfuscation of the council of war terminology (the fifth and sixth of Musgrave's statements), all but two agreed to the former and all agreed with the latter. Pointedly, Christopher Philipson appended below his signature "To the 5th I acknowledge I knowe".

Aside from his duties as a Commissioner of Array and a regimental commander in the Cumberland and Westmorland army, Sir John Lowther also enjoyed a commission as the governor of Brougham Castle, where at his own expense Lowther had laid in a store of ammunition and provisions. In July 1644, Sir Philip Musgrave dispatched a sentry to keep watch on the castle, for reasons unknown and much to the affront of its custodian, who promptly petitioned the King's nephew Prince Rupert for redress. While Lowther may well have had grounds for resenting Musgrave's man standing sentinel over his every move, his declaration to the Prince that he had to that date "showne all loyalness and obedience to his Majestie and hath used all his endeavours in promoting his Majesties service" must be read with some caution given the established paucity of his involvement in that service.⁵⁰ Rupert was however sufficiently persuaded by Lowther's grievance, and replied with the assertion that Lowther should be left to govern the castle without any interference from Musgrave or others, and furthermore ordered "that convenient allowance be made for the support of the Garrison in the sayd Castle from tyme to tyme out of such estate as is belonging thereunto". Lowther was not however to remain at Brougham for much longer. When Lieutenant-General David Leslie at the head of the Scottish covenanting army invaded Cumberland and Westmorland in 1644, he chose to surrender straight away. Lowther was subsequently treated as a compounding royalist after his surrender, at which time he declared to the Committees for Compounding that he had never acted against Parliament, and had since taken the national covenant, besides advancing sums of money for their service and suffering the Scottish army to live at free quarter upon his estates, which were also heavily taxed.⁵¹ The parliamentary sequestration committees of Cumberland and Westmorland were inclined from the beginning to be lenient with Lowther, who in their eyes had "carry'd himselfe with great Moderation and respect to the same, and was never out of the Countye in any actual service against the Parliament . . . yett being sequestrable by the rules of the ordinance by the opinion of the Committee where he liveth, and findeing his desire first to apply himselfe to serve the Parliam't's

favour, we could not but humbly to certifie his carriage wch hath bene well known unto us".⁵² Such co-operation on Lowther's part led to his appointment, along with two of his fellow officers, as a Westmorland J.P. That he was considered for such an office can be seen as indicative of just how weak his support for the King had actually been.⁵³ Richard Barwis, a parliamentarian and M.P. for Carlisle, attempted in that same year to have Lowther appointed commander-in-chief of the parliamentary forces in Westmorland,⁵⁴ which, it may be argued, is an even greater indication of the weakness of Lowther's former royalism. After nine months of siege, the garrison at Carlisle surrendered with the honours of war in June 1645,⁵⁵ after which Sir Philip Musgrave formed a small troop of horse from among the county gentry which joined the royalist army fighting in the south. Among them was Sir Henry Fletcher, Lowther's co-disputant in the command struggle. He had taken shelter in the Carlisle garrison, and had, it might be argued, little option but to fight in its defence; however his decision to accompany Musgrave south appears to have been made by choice. Fletcher was among the 600 royalists slain at the battle of Rowton Heath on 24 September 1645, while Musgrave saw the end of the first Civil War as a prisoner of Parliament, captured along with 800 others at Chester in what Wedgwood describes as a "horrible rout".⁵⁶

In 1981, P. R. Newman took Dr Phillips to task for his neglect of the evidence offered by the Indigent Officers List. This included those officers who had claimed to serve in royalist armies and who, in the reign of Charles II, laid claim to part of the sixty thousand pounds offered by the King as compensation for their efforts in defending his vanquished father's throne.⁵⁷ Dr. Newman's argument is that the list reveals that "very few 'neutral' families did not have a foot in the royalist camp through the activities of a younger son or brother".⁵⁸ This being the case, then it may well be that Cumberland and Westmorland had more of a royalist leaning than Dr Phillips allowed for in his earlier work. Also, bearing in mind that only after the garrison at Carlisle surrendered to the Scots in June 1645 could any attempt be made by Parliament to exert an administrative grip on the two counties,⁵⁹ one may cast doubt on Professor Hughes' belief that "local loyalties were easier to harmonise with parliamentarianism rather than royalism", meaning royalism was less localistic in nature than parliamentarianism.⁶⁰ There still remains, however, the crucial difference between active and passive royalism, which is the crux of Dr Phillips' argument. Phillips is certainly justified in his claim that there are problems in defining a widespread clear-cut royalist allegiance in the Lake Counties during the early years of the Civil Wars, as support for the King, certainly among the bulk of the gentry, was largely inactive and not really put to the test thanks to the paralysis of the main army there. Also, as Professor Hutton explicitly states, no attempt was made by the regiments of Lowther, Fletcher and others to engage the Scottish army in September 1644.⁶¹ Phillips' conclusion therefore is that Cumberland and Westmorland were largely non-partisan counties in which military recruitment initiatives lay more with the King's side than with the Parliament's.

Newman's evidence from the Indigent Officers List, the activity of the few privately-raised royalist forces and the fact that the Commission of Array prevailed over the Militia Ordinance in the two counties, resulting in the formation of an inactive army raised in the name of the King, weakens the non-partisan equation. To take this one step further; that Tullie was able to suggest that Cumberland and

Westmorland raised up to 7,000 men for the King's service despite the inconsistency of efforts at recruitment experienced by Sir Philip Musgrave and others;⁶² that commanders such as Colonel Sir William Hudleston were able to raise private levies of up to 1,600 men at a time (if such figures are to be trusted); that a number of Carlisle citizens took themselves away on their own initiative and enlisted in a royalist East Midlands infantry regiment, without even stopping to obtain the consent of the city's mayor,⁶³ certainly seems to suggest that the people of the two counties were even more actively royalist than Dr Phillips has allowed for, given that his judgements are made from a focus upon the gentry alone. As regards the gentry, they certainly raised their forces in the name of royalism, but disagreed upon the extent to which that royalism should be applied. Attempts by Sir Philip Musgrave and a nucleus of active royalists to provide a body of armed support for King Charles I outside Cumberland and Westmorland were minority actions, impeded by localist disagreements and personal quarrels between the senior officers of the army of the two counties. In a period when honour and integrity constituted vital components of a man's reputation in local and national officeholding, of the way in which he was perceived and regarded by his peers, that reputation could become seriously damaged if it was found that an individual had overstepped his authority and the restrictions of the position which he enjoyed. The Civil Wars ushered in to both local and national arenas increasing opportunities for some men to control the actions of others. New fiscal policies required new officials to oversee the levying and collection of taxes; new military forces needed new command structures. The subsequent placing of certain individuals in further positions of authority over their peers naturally carried with it the potential for resentment and jealousy. As the commander-in-chief for Cumberland and Westmorland, Sir Philip Musgrave was precisely the kind of local figurehead which Charles I targeted to hold military office in the royalist army. Like so many royalist commanders throughout, as Dr. Newman has also argued, he owed his rank not to any extensive military experience but to social standing, family prestige and fortune. A professional officer of respectable gentry origin was "a second but minor element in royalist regimental command", reflective perhaps of insufficient personal income with which to exist as a civilian gentleman.⁶⁴ From the wealthy and socially prominent members of the county gentry with local and national political power, the King hoped to consolidate a loyal following which would quickly repulse any sign of rebellion.⁶⁵ That the younger Musgrave was made commander over older men may well have aroused some social resentment. In addition, local government tradition, in the Lake Counties as elsewhere, saw most decisions taken by the gentry as a group. Within this group, Sir Philip Musgrave and Sir John Lowther appear to have been the most influential, and the allegiance shown to both during the split confirms that either could command the respect of their peers. Therefore it may well be the case, Phillips further argues, that the majority of the Cumberland and Westmorland gentry remained inactive in the first Civil War as a result of coming down on either side of the unresolved struggle between the juntas of Musgrave and Lowther.⁶⁶ Professor Fletcher's evidence, that "a particular enmity often led to the division of a whole shire: feud was more than likely to turn into factionalism",⁶⁷ would appear to support this. The route to a more successful active royalism from the Lake Counties seems to have been to raise a private army (in the case of the gentry) and to either enlist in such an

army or leave the two counties and join the war elsewhere, in the case of the common people. Thus it becomes possible to draw an important distinction in terms of potential effectiveness between county armies on the one hand, and on the other privately-raised forces whose officers and men were not slaves to the potentially immobilising rifts that could, as this paper has shown, open up in county army command structures.

There is a certain difficulty in identifying a single entity as the Cumberland and Westmorland army, a difficulty which arises from the fact that the newly-raised regiments were at no time called into serving together either within or outside the two counties, leading to confusion between them and the pre-existing county militias. This confusion is exacerbated by a lack of surviving regimental personnel details. In addition, the dispute among the senior officers specifically concerned the precise way in which these new forces should be employed; as an army for external mobilisation, or as a local defence force and a mere addition to the pre-existing militia confined to Cumberland and Westmorland. The historian of the Civil War in the Lake Counties is denied a fuller understanding of Sir John Lowther and Sir Henry Fletcher's true motives during the quarrel, because no surviving statement of their intentions has thus far been discovered. The fact that the Musgrave-Lowther rivalry extended well beyond the Civil Wars and transcended different governments and successive family generations would, however, seem to suggest that there were, somewhere along the line, issues more than ambition, jealousy and wounded pride at stake, issues which certainly take their place in the Musgrave-Fletcher sub-dispute in the early 1640s.⁶⁸ Dr Hopkinson acknowledged in 1973 that the starting point of divisions both between parties in Cumberland and Westmorland and the alignments of their representatives in post-Restoration parliamentary factionalism (up to and beyond the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89) was the Musgrave-Lowther rivalry,⁶⁹ a rivalry which became intensified during the paralysis of the army of the two counties in the first Civil War. That paralysis, the virtual impotence of the military authority of Sir Philip Musgrave during the first Civil War, his failure (despite the influential status of his family and his role as commander-in-chief of the army) to persuade the vast bulk of his peers to venture beyond the county boundaries in support of the royalist cause, is, ultimately, an important caveat for those who would overestimate not only the power of the key county families in the face of significant and testing political crisis, but also the power of royalism itself. The King was not always sufficiently able to coerce counties into armed involvement on his behalf, rather relying heavily upon a continued process of argument, persuasion and propaganda, hoping that he would thus galvanise potential supporters not only into raising arms, men and supplies, but also into the active employment of those forces. The paralysis of the Cumberland and Westmorland army and the localism of Sir John Lowther and his supporters proves that Charles was only partly successful in such endeavours.

Notes and References

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and I am grateful to the school of History and Classics at Keele for inviting me to present my findings in a departmental seminar. Dates in this paper are given in old style. For the views expressed herein I alone am responsible.

- ² H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission] Thirteenth Report, Appendix, part VII. *The Manuscripts of the Earl of Lonsdale* (1893), 88.
- ³ Gilbert Burton, *The Life of Sir Philip Musgrave, Bart.* ed. S. Jefferson (1840), 6.
- ⁴ Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (1981), 347.
- ⁵ Mary Coate, *Cornwall in the Great Civil War and Interregnum 1642-1660* (1933), 33-35.
- ⁶ J. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* Vol. 1 (1889), 198-9, cited in Eugene A. Andriette, *Devon and Exeter in the Civil War* (1971), 197 (endnote to 55).
- ⁷ The Militia Ordinance is in C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (eds.), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660*, Vol. 1 (1911), 1-5.
- ⁸ Carlisle Public Library, Local History Collection, *The Humble Petition and Representation of the Gentry, Ministers and Others of the Counties of Cumberland and Westmerland to His Sacred Majesty: With His Majesties Answer thereunto* (1642), 3. I am grateful to Stephen White at the Library for drawing this pamphlet to my attention.
- ⁹ D. H. Pennington, "The County Community at War", in E. W. Ives (ed.), *The English Revolution 1600-60* (1968), 65.
- ¹⁰ P. R. Newman, *The Old Service: Royalist Regimental Colonels and the Civil War, 1642-46* (1993), 257.
- ¹¹ Musgrave's letters and papers provide the fullest account of the development of the war in Cumberland and Westmorland, and are held at the CRO(C), under D/Mus/5/5, box 89. I am particularly grateful to David Bowcock (Assistant County Archivist) and Barbara Clark at the office for their assistance with the Musgrave archive.
- ¹² *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1638-39*, 355, 397, 398, 468, 469.
- ¹³ Alfred Burne and Peter Young, *The Great Civil War: A Military History of the First Civil War 1642-46* (1998 edition), 8. The incident at Kendal involving "Robin the Devil" and his sacrilegious incursion into the church can be followed in CRO(C) Manuscripts of the Dean and Chapter of Carlisle, Machell MSS (bound), Vol. II (1676-92), 342, and T. G. Fahy, "The Philipson family: Part II. Philipson of Crook Hall", *CW2*, lxxiii, 226-281. I am grateful to Richard Hall at the Cumbria Record Office, Kendal, for this reference.
- ¹⁴ Charles Thomas-Stanford, *Sussex in the Great Civil War and the Interregnum 1642-1660* (1910), 9.
- ¹⁵ C. B. Phillips, *The Gentry in Cumberland and Westmorland 1600-55*, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Lancaster, 1973), 285.
- ¹⁶ R. T. Spence, "Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639", *Northern History*, Vol. XXXI (1995), 140.
- ¹⁷ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 19 Sept. 1642: Sir Philip Musgrave to Sir William Darcie and the gentlemen of the county of Durham. Musgrave states that Sir Patricius Curwen of Workington had at the same time written a letter of similar content to Sir William Withrington and the Northumberland gentry.
- ¹⁸ Alfred C. Wood, *Nottinghamshire in the Civil War* (1971), 122.
- ¹⁹ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 Undated (1642): Sir Philip Musgrave to the Earl of Cumberland.
- ²⁰ David Underdown, *Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum* (1973), 24.
- ²¹ For Sir Edward Musgrave see for example Joseph Nicolson and Richard Burn, *The History and Antiquities of the counties of Westmoreland and Cumberland* Vol. II (1771), 153-155. Sir William Musgrave was an active Commissioner of Array; by 1651 he was 78 years old, infirm and unable to raise his fine for delinquency. He was dead by 24 February 1654. M. A. E. Green (ed.) *Calendar of the Proceedings of the] C[ommittee for] C[ompounding, 1643-1660]* Vol. III (1892), continuous pagination, 1556-1557.
- ²² CRO(C) D/Ha/3/16: Indenture of the Family of Musgrave. This is an eighteenth-century copy of the original document.
- ²³ Anthony Fletcher, "The Coming of War", in John Morrill (ed.), *Reactions to the English Civil War* (1982), 45.
- ²⁴ Richard Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-28* (1987), 314-315.
- ²⁵ C. B. Phillips, "Colonel Gervase Benson, Captain John Archer and the Corporation of Kendal, c.1644-51", in Ian Gentles, John Morrill and Blair Worden (eds.), *Soldiers, Writers and Statesmen of the English Revolution* (1998), 183.

- ²⁶ CRO(C) Earl of Lonsdale's MSS, D/Lons/L13/1/6. 15 June 1643: Commission of the Earl of Newcastle to Sir John Lowther. I am grateful to the Earl of Lonsdale for permission to cite material from this archive.
- ²⁷ CRO(K), WD/Ry/HMC/185. 17 January 1642/3: Sir Henry Fletcher to Christopher Dudley. I am grateful to Richard Hall, Kath Strickland and Alexandra Chatburn (now at Muncaster Castle) at the office for their assistance.
- ²⁸ Hugh Owen, *The Lowther Family* (1990), 237-238. For the continuing economic and commercial development of Whitehaven in the seventeenth century see also D. R. Hainsworth, *The Correspondence of Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven 1693-1698: A Provincial Community in Wartime* (1983), and Christine Churches, *Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven 1642-1706: The relations of a Landlord with his Estate* (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1990).
- ²⁹ CRO(C) D/Lons/L13. Unlisted Civil War commissions and appointments.
- ³⁰ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 19 Oct. 1642: Edmund Mauleverer to Sir Philip Musgrave. Mauleverer was the rector of Crosby Garrett in Westmorland, and suffered for his close allegiance with Musgrave and the royalist cause. In 1645 he was ejected from his living, but in June 1660 he petitioned the House of Lords for restitution. His petition was supported by Sir Philip Musgrave, who stated "I can Testifie the truth of this petition for the petitioner was presented by mee and forcibly ejected for his Loyalty to his Majestie and a conscientious worthy Devine". A. G. Matthews, *Walker Revised* (1948), 368; B. Nightingale, *The Ejected of 1662 in Cumberland and Westmorland*, Vol. 11 (1911), 1093, 1096-1098.
- ³¹ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 Undated (almost certainly 1642 or 1643): Edmund Mauleverer to Sir Philip Musgrave.
- ³² CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 23 Sept. 1643: Henry Fletcher, Thomas Sandford, John Lowther, John Dalston, Richard Crackanthorp, Christopher Dudley, Thomas Wibergh and William Carleton to Sir Philip Musgrave.
- ³³ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 25 Sept. 1643: Sir Philip Musgrave to Fletcher *et al.*
- ³⁴ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 25 Sept. (probably 1643): Sir Philip Musgrave to Joseph Hughes. It is not clear whether this letter and that concerning the mood of the soldiers stationed in Kendal refer to the same force. If they do, then Musgrave's assurances to Lowther and his fellow officers reflect nothing more than a desire to save face, possibly an unwillingness to admit that Lowther may have held the edge in the dispute.
- ³⁵ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 Undated (Feb. 1643/4): Sydney Syleteton to Sir Philip Musgrave.
- ³⁶ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 30 Nov. 1643: Sir Philip Musgrave to the Mayor of Kendal.
- ³⁷ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 16 Dec. 1643: Order of Sir Philip Musgrave to the Penrith Constables.
- ³⁸ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 11 Feb. (probably 1643/44): Sir Philip Musgrave to the Earl of Newcastle.
- ³⁹ For this role of the council and for its organisation and activity in the Civil War see Ian Roy, "The Royalist Council of War 1642-46", *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, Vol. XXXV (1962), 150-168.
- ⁴⁰ P. R. Newman, *Royalist Officers in England and Wales 1642-60: A Biographical Dictionary* (1981), 158.
- ⁴¹ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 18 Dec. 1643: Sir Philip Musgrave to Sir Thomas Glemham.
- ⁴² CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 Undated (probably 1643/44): Sir Philip Musgrave to Sir Thomas Glemham.
- ⁴³ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 19 Dec. 1643: Sir Philip Musgrave to Sir Henry Fletcher; Alastair Robertson, *A History of Alston Moor* (1999), 24.
- ⁴⁴ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 26 Dec. 1643: Sir Thomas Glemham to Sir Philip Musgrave.
- ⁴⁵ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 7 Jan. 1643/4: Sir Thomas Glemham to Sir Philip Musgrave.
- ⁴⁶ Phillips, thesis, 292
- ⁴⁷ CRO(C) Dean and Chapter of Carlisle MSS, Nithsdale Papers (bound), A2. 16 April 1643: the Earl of Nithsdale to ? Macbrare. I am grateful to the Revd. Canon David Weston, Canon Warden and Canon Librarian of Carlisle Cathedral, for permission to cite material from this archive.
- ⁴⁸ Ernest Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire 1642-51* (1910), 93-94.
- ⁴⁹ CRO(C), D/Mus/5/5, box 89 Undated (certainly after 25 May 1644): Sir Philip Musgrave's list of the answers made by the Kendal officials to his earlier proposals.
- ⁵⁰ CRO(C) D/Lons/L1/1/7. 20 July 1644: Sir John Lowther to Prince Rupert, with Rupert's reply (signed as "the Duke of Cumberland").
- ⁵¹ C.C.C. Vol. II, continuous pagination, 1024-1025.

- ⁵² CRO(C) D/Lons/L13/1/9. William Dawson, Francis Dacre, William Brisco and Thomas Lamplugh, “*The Humble Certificate of the Comittee for the Countie of Cumberland*”.
- ⁵³ C. B. Phillips, “The Royalist North: The Cumberland and Westmorland Gentry 1642-60”, in R. C. Richardson (ed.), *The English Civil Wars: Local Aspects* (1997), 241.
- ⁵⁴ David Scott, “The Barwis Affair: Political Allegiance and the Scots during the British Civil Wars”, *English Historical Review*, Vol. CXV (Sept. 2000), 485. Scott reveals that Barwis’ proposal of Lowther formed part of that later accusation by the London-based Scottish commissioners that the Carlisle M.P. had been deliberately withholding maintenance from their army in Cumberland, instead favouring the interests of delinquents.
- ⁵⁵ Isaac Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle in 1644 and 1645* ed. S. Jefferson (1840), 48. The campaign in the north prior to the siege of Carlisle can be followed in Austin Woolrych, *Battles of the English Civil War* (1969 edition), 60-84. For the conditions of the surrender see Carlisle Public Library, Local History Collection, *A True Copy of the Articles whereupon Carlisle was Delivered* (1645). I am again grateful to Stephen White at the Library for drawing this pamphlet to my attention. The promises of the covenanting army as regards the safety of Carlisle Cathedral were not honoured. See R. S. Ferguson, *A Diocesan History of Carlisle* (1889), 93.
- ⁵⁶ C. V. Wedgwood, *The King’s War 1641-47* (1975 edition), 464.
- ⁵⁷ This list is now published as Stuart Reid, *Officers and Regiments of the Royal Army* 5 Vols. (1999), which offers a guide to the make-up, and in some cases the inactivity of the Cumberland and Westmorland regiments in the first Civil War. In an article elsewhere, Newman states that the *List*, published in 1663, was intended to allow the general public an opportunity to inform against any officers whom they knew to have taken up a commission in the Kings army for the sole and mercenary purpose of financial reward, thus disqualifying them from any compensation. See Newman, “Catholic Royalists of Northern England 1642-45”, *Northern History*, Vol. XV (1979), 89.
- ⁵⁸ P. R. Newman, “The Royalist North: A Rejoinder”, *Northern History*, Vol. XVII (1981), 254.
- ⁵⁹ C. B. Phillips, “County Committees and Local Government in Cumberland and Westmorland, 1642-60”, *Northern History*, Vol. V (1970), 38-39.
- ⁶⁰ Ann Hughes, “The King, the Parliament and the Localities during the English Civil War”, in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds.), *The English Civil War* (1997), 268.
- ⁶¹ Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort* (1999 edition), 149.
- ⁶² Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, 1.
- ⁶³ CRO(C) Carlisle Corporation MSS, Ca/2/1/1. Minute Book of the Corporation of Carlisle, unfoliated.
- ⁶⁴ Newman, *The Old Service*, 69. For a comparison with the nobility, see Newman, “The Royalist Party in Arms: The Peerage and Army Command, 1642-46”, in Colin Jones, Malyn Newitt and Stephen Roberts (eds.), *Politics and People in Revolutionary England* (1986), which further states that “royalist army commanders were, on the whole, a part of the established social order” (p. 93).
- ⁶⁵ Fletcher, *Outbreak of the English Civil War*, 347.
- ⁶⁶ Phillips, thesis, 303.
- ⁶⁷ A. J. Fletcher, “Honour, Reputation and Local Officeholding in Elizabethan and Stuart England”, in Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson (eds.), *Order and Disorder in Early Modern England* (1985).
- ⁶⁸ A fuller exploration of the post-Restoration political relationship between the Musgraves and the Lowthers will be found in my M.Phil. thesis, “Sir Christopher Musgrave of Cumberland and Westmorland 1631/2-1704: A Northern Gentry Statesman and his Political Worlds”, to be submitted to the University of Keele in September 2001.
- ⁶⁹ Robert Hopkinson, *Elections in Cumberland and Westmorland 1695-1723* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1973).