The Relationship between History and Archaeology: Elements of the Present Debate

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A EUROPEAN perspective to the current debate on the nature of archaeology and its relationship with history is given. Whilst some of the concepts are complex, it is important that medieval archaeology recognizes its importance as a field of research likely to yield valuable insights into the nature of archaeological data, the ways in which inferences about the past can be drawn, and the similarities and differences between archaeology, anthropology and history.

Historical cognition is situated between that which is material — tangible objects — and that which is non-material — traditions, texts. The relationships between the disciplines of archaeology, history, and both social and cultural anthropology are therefore crucial. New elements in these relationships are now appearing which have an influence on the manner of understanding and approach to this problem. This article is concerned with the discussion of some of these.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ARCHAEOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY

The relationship between these three disciplines is constantly undergoing change, being a function of their historical development and changing research aims. These formally distinct scientific disciplines, each possessing autonomous academic status, are however characterized by a high degree of overlap and a mutual dependence not often sufficiently appreciated. In reality, as Marc Bloch wrote, there is only one 'science of man', 'of men in time'. It would be more correct to discuss here different methods of historical research within the various co-operating disciplines, all of which study the human past.

The mutual relationships between archaeology and history can be considered on the basis of the links between each of them and anthropology. This seems to be a realistic criterion of the distance or closeness of the cognitive perspectives of archaeology and history.
Lewis Binford’s postulate ‘archaeology as anthropology’ is only slightly reflected in the practice of archaeology in the European tradition. Archaeology here has not generally considered the need to make the dramatic choice between the tradition of history as a study of events, and anthropology. Indeed, M. Godelier has suggested that we are in the final stages of the mutual separation and opposition between anthropology and history. However, anthropology, perhaps more than any other science of Man, involves the study and analysis of the processes and mechanisms of social development and these interests are also visible in transformations now taking place in the historical disciplines.

‘La nouvelle histoire’, writes Jacques Le Goff, ‘having become sociological, has tendencies to become ethnological’. This statement applies not only to France, but the French example seems particularly interesting. The history of behaviour, attitudes and customs (which in the 18th century was known as ‘l’histoire des moeurs’) seems, in the opinion of A. Burguière, closely related to what we would today term historical anthropology. In opposition to the history of events (that is a history of that which is individual and unrepeatable), the history of customs is the history of those elements (such as gestures, thoughts, ritual activities) which by their nature are not individual. Likewise, the history of institutions and political history can be contrasted with standards of collective attitudes and behaviour. The question arises whether this involves a broadening of the object of historical research or a change in the approach to past reality.

As recently emphasized by A. Burguière, we are witnessing a new stage in the development of the historical thought. For nearly a century it has been seeking inspiration and methods useful for its own renovation from other sciences of Man. After geography, sociology, economy, and demography, attention has now turned to anthropology. Anthropology is here considered in broad terms, both a science of physical variability in Man, and a science of society and culture. As a result, we see it as the investigation of a wide spectrum of phenomena, examples of which include the relationship between biology and cultural behaviour, incorporating extra-economic values in the sphere of economic behaviour; medieval consanguinity; or political and cultural anthropology.

The influence of the anthropological approach is particularly visible in all these cases — the objects of study become symbols, senses and meanings detectable in various attributes of material culture. This anthropological approach is not a distinct and individual field of investigation; it can be found in many disciplines, not only archaeology but also history, anthropology, history of art.

A very significant analysis of the relationships between history and ethnology has been made by C. Levi-Strauss:

Nous nous proposons que la différence fondamentale entre les deux n’est ni d’object, ni de but, ni de méthode; mais qu’ayant le même object, qui est la vie sociale; le même but, qui est une meilleure intelligence de l’homme; et une méthode ou varie seulement le dosage des procédés de recherche, elles se distinguent surtout par le choix de perspectives complémentaires: l’histoire organisant ses données par rapport aux expressions conscientes, l’ethnologie par rapport aux conditions inconscientes, de la vie sociale.
Even though in broadly conceived archaeology there are components of both approaches, it is prehistoric archaeology, well described as 'le sumnum de l’ethnologie', which is especially close to social and cultural anthropology. Classical archaeology, on the other hand, because of its close links with ancient history, philology, and history of art, is closer to history. Medieval archaeology appears to constitute an area of the mutual influence and overlap between both these approaches. While on one hand archaeological data is complemented by written evidence, on the other we see strong links with ethnographic investigation. There also occur together here (to a greater extent than in other branches of archaeology) investigation of both idiographic components (usually considered as proper to historical approach) and nomothetic ones, to which contemporary cultural anthropology aspires. Social and cultural anthropology can constitute a practical system of reference at various levels of the investigative process — from analysis through interpretation to explanation and synthesis. A second such system is constituted by historiography and in particular by information derived from written sources.

'MONUMENTS' AND 'DOCUMENTS': TOWARDS AN INTEGRATION OF HISTORICAL SOURCES

Archaeological sources provide as a rule information about certain relations, states and situations (historische Zustände) formed during the historical process: written sources also and first of all provide information about events (historische Vorgänge). In this sense documents such as acts and chronicles reflect aspects of reality essentially different from those which we re-create on the basis of excavated evidence. The first, to use the terminology of Levi-Strauss, inform us about unconscious conditions; the second about conscious manifestations of social life.

The formation of the archaeological sources (continuous, although not at a constant rate in time and space) is a process of cumulative deposition of things which man creates, transforms, accumulates, and leaves behind. The preserved part of these material correlates of human presence and activity become, upon their progressive discovery, a source of information about the social past.

The creation of the written record, on the other hand (discontinuous and evidently intermittent in time and space), is a process of making permanent information with the intention of its transmission to contemporaries and/or descendants. Thus in this manner the written record, where it is present, partially overlaps with the potentially enormous and continuously generated mass of archaeological material.

The complementarity of both of these types of sources appears especially clearly in the framework of the archaeology of literate societies. An evident example of this is in investigations of the origin and development of medieval European towns. In certain areas, as for example in central Europe, the decisive role is played by archaeological sources, on the basis of which we can not only 'prolong history backwards', but also recover new qualitative data which enrich the vision of the subsequent stages of historical development. Archaeological sources allow us to go
beyond the frontier of ‘the world with history’. They allow us to ‘recognise the structure and course of the creators of history, and of those to whom history was not given’. This does not refer only to those societies where the ‘world without history’ was until quite recently not just an abstract assumption of investigators, but a real component of reality. The same applies to our vision of the European medieval period, as a past which is close to us and indeed which, to a great degree, shapes our present. Students of the Middle Ages are becoming more and more aware of the multiple aspects of social and cultural life; it is a period of coexistence of the ‘world with history’ alongside the broad social area with ‘insufficient’ or even a ‘lack of history’. The only available witnesses of their existence and role are the material remains, those sometimes apparently insignificant ‘lavori senza gloria’, without which the imposing monuments and urban complexes of the medieval European landscape would not have been possible. Access to the significant information contained in this buried and excavated material is in many cases especially difficult.

More archaeologists are now prepared to substitute the previously dominating substantial approach with a structural one, using a semiotic description of cultural reality. This has given the impetus to new ways of conceptualizing archaeological evidence. In historiography, the change of perspective is expressed most suggestively by M. Foucault dealing with notions of ‘document’ and ‘monument’, and the relationship between them both. The traditional understanding of the document, as Le Goff (commenting on Foucault) underlines, contains the concept ‘docere’, the deliberate making permanent of information with the purpose of transmitting it to someone else. The document is conceived as something which informs us of that which concerns he who made it. In reality a document is de facto always a monument. It is something which shapes, and not what informs with a purpose ‘impressionare’. The interpretation of Le Goff allows us to understand more clearly the meaning of Foucault when he writes that history today is that which transforms ‘documents’ into ‘monuments’ and that which uncovers (where traces left by people are being read) an ensemble of elements which should be distinguished, divided into groups, evaluated, linked together, joined into entities. He also states that whilst archaeology gains sense only by reproduction of historical discourse, so now history is tending towards archaeology — towards the intrinsic description of the monument.

As a result of this ‘transformation of documents into monuments’ the historian more often reaches for the ‘informative structure of symptomatic character’ by which a superficial source information becomes an indicator of other deeper hidden information. On the other hand, we observe attempts especially by the adherents of the school of symbolic-structural archaeology to demonstrate the previously not fully observed richness and complexity of ‘sign information structures’, the vehicle of which can also be objects of everyday use, a theme previously examined by semiotic studies in art history. In conclusion, just as the historian transforms ‘documents’ into ‘monuments’, the archaeologist does the opposite — ‘monuments’ appear to him as ‘documents’. So the scholars meet halfway, crossing the demarcation which until recently in the consciousness of many researchers sharply divided archaeological and written
sources. This makes possible a more objective confrontation, not of the types of the sources themselves, but of the information contained in them.

BACK TO THE CONCEPT OF ‘MATERIAL CULTURE’

The shift to structuralist theoretical positions raises the questions how this may influence the present view of the bipartite (or tripartite) division of culture. Here we are interested in whether it is justifiable to separate material culture from the broad notion of culture.

Those things made by man, and the activities connected with his material existence, are the objects of analysis in archaeological research. It is precisely here, however, that doubts can arise. The separation of material culture from spiritual culture is based on an arbitrary division of products and human activities, invoking either materialist criteria or an assumption that the evidence of both kinds of phenomena can be ‘spatially’ divisible and so can be assigned to separable spheres of human activity. Beyond the researcher’s view are, however, the constant multiplicity of structural interactions and interdependences which link elements of material culture, and may create each time a specific configuration, often individually unrepeatable. It is perhaps no accident that successful attempts to incorporate material culture in the model of an entire society have only been successfully achieved by those whose competence and interests go far beyond the confines of a narrowly defined history of material culture.

The division of culture into ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’, is thus shown to be debatable. Moreover, the theoretical and practical implications of such a division in some countries can legitimize the official structure of science as a specialist enclave with an unsatisfactorily defined investigative profile. This division has already provoked a negative reaction in Poland, where various scholars have produced critiques. Stefan Czarnowski writes:

the interlocking of an action, i.e. a material and mental phenomenon, is in social life more strong than in any other domain . . . [and] this separation of material from spirit is a methodologically useful abstraction, the result of which however requires a correction. An entire concrete fact is a complete entity, it is a material-spiritual one.

This is amplified by J. Szczepanski: ‘there is no basic divide between the most abstract ideas and the work of art and object of everyday use.’ A. Kloskowska also opts for the inseparability of material and spiritual culture, avoiding terminology which separates the material from the abstract except where it is justified by assumptions consciously approved by the authors. The question arises whether in the realization of the postulates formulated in historiography, to emphasize more the material instrumentarium and conditions of social existence, the process has not gone too far, bringing them from the sphere of methodology (where they arose) into the ontological sphere. Has this not in some cases led to a excessive isolation of the problems of material culture from other aspects of social life? An example is the creation in Poland of a separate research institute and university specializations, having the combined aims of educating archaeologists, ethnographers, and historians for investigations in the study of material culture. This idea is now being
abandoned. We should remember here however, that until the end of the 1940s 'substantial' classifications of empirical material predominated in anthropology. These were easier to apply to the increasing amounts of evidence. The beginnings of change were introduced only with the works of P. Sorokin, who proposed a more developed system of classification of the components of culture, introducing into it the previously unobserved dimension of 'integral sociology'.

The basis of the traditional division of culture into material and spiritual will no doubt long be a subject of discussion. The framework of this debate seems to be defined by two different cognitive perspectives, and in consequence, two diametrically opposed points of view.

The first of these, the positivist approach, assumes that reality (sometimes with certain reservations) can be perceived, and that certain divisions of that reality are obvious. Culture can be divided into relatively autonomous domains: materials, spiritual and social. To each of the defined spheres of human activity it is possible to attribute a corresponding group of evidence, materially differentiated, and spatially divisible. Attention is concentrated on the superficial, directly observable, level of past reality, with a tendency to 'dissect culture into elements isolable by abstraction', and to investigate isolated elements so that their development in time and distribution in space can be reconstructed. Less interest is shown, however, in the differences of meaning attributed to these elements in various cultural contexts. There is a distaste for any integration into a wider whole incorporating different categories of phenomena. This tendency blocks attempts at deeper functional interpretations of the examined phenomena.

The second point of view is based on the assumption that analysis of cultural phenomena cannot be based only on the materially segregated and separately analysed elements. An important quality of the investigated objects depends not so much on the attributes of the material of which they are constituted, 'but from the manner of ordering of the elements (internal structure) and the place they occupy in the broader entities (external structure)'.

It is important to pay due attention to this second perspective. The development of social sciences has frequently been retarded by a misunderstanding of the relationship between that which is 'real' and that which is 'concrete'. The development of sociological theory was only possible after the abandonment of atomistic and narrowly conceived postivistic schemes, and the admission that social entities constitute an organizational level different from an individual one, and it is from this that they derive their characteristics and specific regularities. Most representatives of the pure and humanistic sciences now agree that relationships are just as 'real' as the things which were previously investigated for their own sake. Every modern investigator of culture change is obliged to admit that 'forms may persist while content changes, or that content remains relatively unaltered, but is organised into new structures'.

In a structuralist perspective each culture is a complex of relationships — interactions, feedbacks which define the type of organization of elements ordered according to the pattern common to a given social community and forming a certain entity. 'Parts do not cause a whole but they comprise a whole, not necessarily in the
sense of being perfectly integrated, but in the sense of being separable only by abstraction'.

Several issues concerning the nature of archaeological evidence and the references to be drawn from it come out of this debate. The discovery of the material dimensions of culture is undoubtedly related to archaeological finds. The question arises whether these reserves of fossil evidence of human activity are a constitutive component of culture, as is often assumed but without the necessary justification, or rather form the material correlates of culture without being themselves a constitutive part of culture itself, which is above all a 'mental reality'. These correlates supply priceless information about culture, not only concerning content but also temporal and spatial dimensions of culture. Archaeological correlates might also be used to suggest ethnic and language shift.

Modern archaeology is able to recover and, due to the development of absolute dating methods, more precisely date material remains of the past. This allows the broadening of contemporary observations of primitive and complex societies and the examination of history as a process joining within itself a multiplicity of times — from the rapidly changing superficial level of events, through conjunctural cycles to long-term processes. History, wrote F. Braudel, 'becomes a science selecting the long time as a natural framework of understanding the past'. But access to the really significant information potentially contained in archaeological material is often particularly difficult; we cannot resolve the dilemmas posed by dichotomies such as social norms vs. individual behaviour, structure vs. process, mental reality vs. material reality, subject vs. object. This basic inability to perceive the meaningful content of ‘material culture’ makes impossible the full recognition of the mutual relations which unify human behaviour and material culture in one coherent system. The current accent on cognitive anthropology and archaeology seeks to reconstruct the grammar of culture, patterns of thinking by members of a determined group. This would allow entry into the deeper meaning of things which constitute the material equipment of a culture.

It follows that archaeological material cannot be treated as a scientific type of fossil; the alternative to the ‘palaeontological’ treatment becomes the ‘textual’ model. This model treats the excavated evidence as ‘meaningfully constituted’, and thus in its structure comparable in many ways to texts. This allows the use of analyses in archaeology, as in ethnology, similar to those employed in linguistics. Each individual artefact, everyday object or building, etc. has in all cultures an ‘additional meaning’; the utilitarian and symbolic functions are indivisible. Thus the consideration of the problem of the so-called ‘functional-signs’ must form an integral part of all investigations of material culture if they are not to be artificially isolated from the mainstream of development of the science of man. The investigative process in many cases already fulfils to a certain degree this postulate, but there is also a need for a conscious reflection to accompany this practice.

**INDICATORS, INDICATA AND PROBLEMS OF INFERENCE**

Applied first in statistics and then in the empirical studies of concrete social phenomena, the concept of indicators rapidly seems to be finding adherents among
representatives of the historical sciences. In history, the concept of indicators seems to have a primary importance, particularly in justifying historical hypotheses. In archaeology it was also realized that the problem which sociologists and anthropologists face are in certain aspects similar to those appearing in historical and archaeological studies, despite all the differences in research situations. This applies especially to the so-called ‘non-addressed sources’, sources which are not meant to provide (address) information. The search for the ‘indicative power’ of non-addressed sources has eventually become one of the principal tendencies of contemporary historical science, and this has been of particular interest to archaeologists in Poland and Italy.

The [indicator] is each event (phenomenon, object, property, feature, behaviour) which is empirical and which has a regular relationship with other events. Taking this relationship, on the basis of the occurrence of an indicative event ‘A’, an inference is made about the occurrence of the indicated event ‘B’, which is usually called an [indicatum]. Although there are complex problems affecting the selection of indicators, discussion will here be confined to assessment of the criteria used to divide indicators into groups.

Indicators are usually divided into two basic categories. To the first belong indicators which by definition are linked with the indicatum by a relationship of conceptual identity — the indicator is itself the phenomenon we want to examine, and its characteristic features are what the corresponding concept consists of. Such indicators only define our concepts better, or set them to a greater degree in an observable reality, and are inferential indicators. To the second category belong indicators which are related to the phenomenon (or property) they show not by means of terminological convention, but in actuality. Such a relationship may be directly or indirectly verified, and are termed empirical indicators.

Archaeological records may assume either of the two functions: inferential or empirical indicators. With the latter both the indicator and the indicatum are observable and the relationship between them is empirically verifiable. For example the number of (contemporary) hearths in a settlement may be an indicator of the number of households, or the qualitative and quantitative differences between assemblages of bone waste found in a castle compared with that in its suburb may reflect the differences of meat consumption of social groups making up the population of the examined medieval town.

In contrast inferential indicators are defined on the basis of identified, perceived, attributes alone, while the indicatum belongs to the class of inferred ‘intangibles’, *illata*, and cannot be confirmed by direct observation. So, for example, the number of differentiated artefact types in a culture system can be conceptualized as a rough indicator of its regulatory or insulatory capacity in relation to changes in the environment — in other words its capacity to preserve equilibrium.

A more complex situation arises when the indicator is an element of a certain behavioural-psychological syndrome composed of both observable phenomena (like, for example, our indicator) and hidden phenomena and/or features. An empirical situation described by K. Modzelewski can be used as an example. The indicator concerned is the rich grave goods associated with the Lombard elite in
early medieval Italy. Following a naïve interpretation, the ‘natural economy’ prevailing in Italy at that time was understood as a moneyless economy. The reason for this state was to be the lack or shortage of bullion, in this case gold. Many historians, however, did not see how one could speak about the prevalence of a ‘natural economy’ among the Longobards when so much gold was put into their graves.

A response to this objection might be that what the grave goods really reveal is the influence of extra-economic values upon the economic preferences of the Early Medieval elite. This resulted in a particular attitude towards valuable metals, especially towards gold, which in the social consciousness became a symbol of ostentatious luxury and a ‘magical’ (as it were) symbol of the social status and prestige of the individual.

Thus the gold coins in graves have a threefold significance. They indicate by definition the whole syndrome of the described phenomenon; they are an empirical indicator of corresponding behaviour; and they are an inferential indicator of corresponding attitudes and accepted hierarchies of values. The methodological suggestions of Carlo Ginzburg and the debate which followed are of interest in this context. Two problems are of particular interest to archaeologists: the relationship between the ‘context of justification’ and the ‘context of discovery’; and the role played by conjectural abduction or reasoning, culminating in a probable hypothesis in historical and archaeological inference. The ‘context of discovery’ seems to constitute an integral part of the ‘context’ of justification. But the logic of discovery seems to be, in the historical (as in other) sciences, ‘still a grossly underdeveloped domain’, and the emphasis upon verification rather than discovery still constitutes ‘a distortion of the actual emphasis in the practice of science’. It seems that the publications of Ginzburg and the debates following them contribute to a better cognition of the problem-solving process in the historical sciences.

The second question concerns the framework of an intelligible model within which we can draw inferences about phenomena in disciplines where construction of formal systems cannot be done through experimentation. It is true, for example, that historical and archaeological research procedures usually are post-gnostic; the point is to find the causes of certain facts or phenomena which we believe to be the effects of these causes. The problem is that the unobservable phenomena of the past cannot be experimentally reproduced. Thus we can only infer the causes from the observable effects. Therefore the cognitive process is necessarily based on inverse reasonings in which the order of reasoning, running from premises to conclusion, is opposite to the ‘cause and effect’ order. According to Charles Peirce this type of reasoning may be called ‘reproduction’ or ‘abduction’ and characterizes the ‘context of discovery’. This third type of reasoning (after deduction and induction) is basic for medical diagnosis, criminal investigation and historical inference. It has recently constituted the subject of many methodological studies and will be of great interest to archaeologists in the future.

Stressing the importance of post-gnostic cognitive procedures does not mean that we want to neglect the others. In the historical sciences and archaeology prognostic procedures are also important in as much as they are used to discover
causal regularities. In order to explain a fact, i.e. to indicate its cause or causes, we have to refer to a prognostic statement: cause and effect appear always as an ordered pair.64

This is one more reason to undertake a more profound analysis of the range relationships between indicator and indicatum. We need to determine whether an indicator is reliable (and in what sense it is so) or whether we have to ascribe it some lower degree of validity.65

Problems of Explanation

Problems of explanation — as in any historical and social science — belong among the most difficult. Only explanation allows us to put together in one whole the apparently independent fragments of our knowledge, and to indicate their common pattern.66 Omitted here are two kinds of historical explanation: humanistic interpretation and functional-genetic explanation, which have repeatedly been the subject of discussion, especially in Poland.67 Another model is, however, worth considering here: that of explanation based on the understanding of motivation structures, and the possibilities of observing of human activities (and their products) from inside. In other words to penetrate thought processes, reasoning, and motivation structures, the external vehicle of which is the activity itself and results of that activity. We should remember that analysis of the ‘emic’ type, attempting to re-create the motivating structures present ‘dans la tête de l’indigène’ generally appeared until recently simply a postulate which was not very realistic. On the basis of experience in linguistics it was accepted that a certain kind of ‘catalysis’ of ‘etic’ features into ‘emic’ ones was possible; they could be arranged on a continuum which would depict progressive passage from the one to the other. This seemed possible however only for those domains of archaeology in which the archaeological materials could be confronted with sources of another type. Hodder, who represents most fully the symbolic-structural approach, goes further, postulating the treatment of the view of ‘the inside of things’ as a permanent component of archaeological interpretation.69

There is a second aspect of rethinking or re-enacting of the thought patterns of the people responsible for creating and discarding archaeological materials as postulated by R.G. Collingwood. The inference very often assumes here, as in certain other historical disciplines, a retroductive form (see above). We seek the (unknown) reason for the (known) result. From this follows the continuing debate on the ‘conjectural paradigm’ and value of circumstantial evidence in the investigation of the past.70 This creates particularly unfavourable conditions for the effective application of the procedure postulated by Hodder. Furthermore, there is a subsequent debatable point, the discovery of the real cause of human activity beyond the consciousness of the studied individuals and beyond the studied epoch. Here both the intentional and unintentional results of individual or group activity should be taken into account.71 An awareness of this becomes particularly important in the research of complex societies, with polysemantic cultures.72 Here, with regard to the different behaviour standards of members of groups of different social status, the reliable reconstruction of the causative reason (causa quod) and the intentional reason
(causa ut) of the investigated individual activity is especially difficult. Also, the mutual interdependence of our recognition, understanding and interpreting of the past phenomena on the one hand, and our culturally determined categories of thinking (our preconceptions) on the other, also becomes clearer.

This circular interdependence which characterizes the investigative processes of all domains of the science of Man can be related to contemporary hermeneutics. Shanks and Tilley have drawn attention to the particular involvement of archaeological interpretation in the fatalism of the ‘hermeneutic circle’. The solutions proposed in connection with Collingwood’s ideas are not fully convincing; but the difficulties constitute a challenge, making archaeology potentially exciting intellectually, and promising cognitively. Indeed, it is a lack of reasonable alternative which affirms the cognitive status of archaeological investigation and its role in the process of understanding the human past. The access to meaningful information potentially contained in the archaeological sources is, however, especially difficult. As a result, the solution of many of the problems is not possible within the framework of archaeology alone. However, archaeological material could be treated as independent empirical evidence potentially falsifying interpretative hypotheses formulated mainly beyond the discipline. That alone is very important; many philosophers even maintain that ‘scientific knowledge is defined in part by the possibility of its empirical refutation’. There is, moreover, something more than this; the material correlates of culture defined in time and space allow the dynamics of change to be followed. However, the critical moment of passage from our conceptual categories, i.e. the ‘etic’ approach, to their conceptual categories, i.e. the ‘emic’ approach, is still highly problematic.

Two particularly promising fields of advance in this direction are ethnoarchaeology and historical archaeology, medieval archaeology having an especially important role. This is, however, dependent on the dialogue between historians and archaeologists ceasing to be, as experience too often has shown can be the case, a ‘dialogue of the deaf’.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper was originally written for the John Hurst festschrift, on the initiative of Hugo Blake and Stephen Moorhouse. I would also like to thank Paul Barford for his kind help with the translation, and Dorota Cyngot for technical assistance.

NOTES

2 The aims of the paper are not to demonstrate the value and importance of archaeology, but rather to point out some aspects of the not always satisfactory relationship between history and archaeology. This situation may anyway fluctuate considerably from one country or period to another. It depends often on many factors, such as scientific traditions, real situations of research, personal preferences and sensibilities. Nevertheless, these situational and idiosyncratic factors should not obscure the main relationships of both these disciplines. It seems that a reliable measure of the practical links between history and archaeology is defined by the relations of each of them to cultural and social anthropology.
3 M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester, 1954), 27.


8. Ibid., 52.


22. J. Topolski, Teoria, op. cit. in note 17.


33. See bibliography given by J.-M. Pesce, ibid., 98-130.

34. See bibliography given by J.-M. Pesce, ibid., 98-130.

35. Sztompka, ‘Struktura społeczności jako podstawowa kategoria analizy teoretycznej w marksizmie (Social Structure as a Principal Category of Theoretical Analysis in Marxism)’, Elementy sociologii dialektycznej, Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Nauki, 6 (1981), 123.

72 S. Piekarczyk, ‘Z problematyki polisemantyzacji kultury. Próba konstrukcji modelu (Problems of Polyseman-
73 M. Shanks and C. Tilley, Re-Constructing Archaeology. Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 1987), 103–15; idem,
74 G. Gibbon, op. cit. in note 26, 51, with references to K. Popper’s works.
75 Z. Kobylinski, ‘Ethno-archaeological Cognition and Cognitive Ethno-archaeology’, and, in particular, E. M.
Melas, ‘Etics, Emics and Empathy in Archaeological Theory’, in Hodder (ed.), op. cit. in note 49, 122–29 and
137–55 respectively.
76 C. Renfrew, ‘Dialogues of the Deaf’, in B. Burnham and J. Kingsbury (eds), Space, Hierarchy and Society, British