

# **REPORT ON MILITARY HISTORY FOR THE BOSWORTH BATTLEFIELD INVESTIGATION**

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# **Section 1: Description and assessment of the sources**

**Janet Dickinson and Anne Curry**

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Historians have generally taken a somewhat negative view of the usefulness of the written sources for the Battle of Bosworth. John Gillingham suggests that ‘there are only two accounts worth mentioning’: the Crowland Chronicle and Polydore Vergil’s later account of the battle.<sup>1</sup> S.B. Chrimes observes that ‘many attempts have been made to reconstruct in detail what exactly happened at the battle of Bosworth, but mostly in vain’.<sup>2</sup> Michael Bennett comments that ‘it is painfully apparent that from its very source the flow of news was broken and muddled on the banks of ignorance and fear, and deflected by streams of self-interest and propaganda’.<sup>3</sup>

A popular impression has also developed that writings on the battle were somehow suppressed, either because those who had supported the defeated regime did not wish to publicise the fact, or that the new, victorious, regime of Henry VII was committed to reconciliation. All accounts were written after the battle, in the knowledge that Henry VII had won. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the event from the Ricardian perspective. However, the problems surrounding Bosworth are little different from those for other battles of the Wars of the Roses, as will be explored further in section 4. Accounts of battles were never particularly detailed and were often written from a moral and political, rather than military, perspective. Rarely were they the work of eyewitnesses or participants. Furthermore, the tale tended to improve in the telling, as chronicle gave way to history. In this respect, we must approach with caution the longer narrative accounts of Polydore Vergil, Edward Hall and Raphael Holinshed, where the subject could be approached with a great deal of hindsight and also with the impact of beliefs on the nature and purpose of ‘history’.

## Earliest mentions – The York House Books

The York House Books are extremely important for our understanding of initial reporting of the battle and also for its initial naming.

These books form part of the records of the City council of York.<sup>4</sup> As their editor, Lorraine Atreed, notes, they are rather eclectic in content, recording council meetings as well as letters sent to and by the city’s government. They are not, however, without their problems. The bound volumes which now exist in the York City Archives may not fully reflect the format and contents of the original House Books. Some of the material concerning the battle is not found within the current books but in transcripts made in the early eighteenth century by Francis Drake for his history of the city.<sup>5</sup> It has been speculated that the pages he saw were deliberately removed from the books because they were politically sensitive in the new Tudor regime. This is unlikely, since the comment on Richard ‘late mercifully reigning upon us’ occurs within the bound volumes. More likely the original books became flood damaged (the City Archives were held in the council chamber on Ouse Bridge which was subject to frequent inundations) and simply fell apart, with leaves seen by Drake subsequently being lost. The House Books were certainly rebound into their current formation in 1892. Another possibility is that the transcripts Drake made were not from the House Books themselves but from other stray records.

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<sup>1</sup> John Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses: Peace and Conflict in Fifteenth-Century England* (London, 1981), p. 242.

<sup>2</sup> S.B. Chrimes, *Henry VII* (London, 1972), p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Bennett, *The Battle of Bosworth*, 2nd edn (Stroud, 2000), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *The York House books 1461-1490*, ed. by L. Atreed, 2 vols (Stroud, 1991).

<sup>5</sup> Francis Drake, *Eboracum, or the History and Antiquities of the City of York* (London, 1736), pp. 121-23. Printed in *York House Books*, pp. 734-7.

Within the current House Books there are two early references to the battle. On folio 169 verso (York House Books, Text1), we have what are essentially the minutes of the meeting of the council on 23 August under the presidency of the mayor. Those present learned from ‘diverse personnes’, but particularly from John Sponer (office) who had been ‘send unto the feld of Redmore to bring tidings from the same to the citie’, that Richard, ‘late mercifully reigning upon us’ had been killed, along with other lords and nobles of the north ‘to the grete hevynesse of this citie’. This is therefore the earliest written mention of the battle and its outcome. It is significant not only for the mention of Sponer’s journey and its destination (the significance of which will be explored further in the next section) but also because of the immediate belief that the defeat had been caused by the ‘grete treason’ of the duke of Norfolk and of others who had turned against the king. The city council was not sure what to do next. This is not surprising given its earlier close relations with Richard III. So it was decided to send a letter to the duke of Northumberland, believed to be moving towards Wressle (one of his manors) presumably on his way from the battlefield, although this is not said in the record. The text of the letter to Northumberland follows.

After noting the deaths of the king and local nobles ‘to the grete hevynesse of this citie’ the entry continues: ‘the names of whome foloweth hereafter’. In fact no names are listed. On the previous folio (f. 169 recto), however, there is a note of the battle in Latin (York House Books, Text 2). This again mentions Redemore as the location of the battle, placing it near Leicester and dating the event as 22 August. It notes that it was between Richard and some nobles, and Henry, with other nobles. It lists as the dead Richard, the duke of Norfolk, Thomas, Earl of Lincoln, Thomas, Earl of Surrey, Francis, viscount Lovell, Walter Devereux, Lord Ferrers, Sir Richard Ratcliffe and Sir Robert Brackenbury. It may be that these were the names reported to the council on 23 August by Sponer, but it could be that the note was entered after a royal proclamation sent by Henry VII to the city had been received and published on 25 August (York House Books, Text 4). The reason for this is that the list of names is the same and in exactly the same order as that in the proclamation (although, as we shall see, the latter does not give Redemore as the location of Richard’s death, but rather Sandeforde). Since it was subsequently known (although we cannot be sure when) that Lincoln, Surrey and Lovell had not died at the battle, their names were later crossed through in the note on f. 169.

The proclamation and its context, however, are not found within the York House Books but known only through the transcripts taken by Drake. (Indeed, there is no known manuscript copy of the proclamation. It is known solely through its inclusion in Drake’s history of York.) These begin with a record of a meeting of the council on 24 August (York House Books, Text 3).<sup>6</sup> Here it was decided that the mayor and others should meet with Sir Henry Percy (the son of the earl of Northumberland?) at 2 pm that afternoon ‘ther to understand how they shall be disposed entent the king’s grace Henry the event, so proclaimed and crowned at the feld of Redemore’. It was also noted that the messenger sent to the earl at Wressle had returned with news that the earl of Northumberland was with the king at Leicester. The entry also noted that Sir Roger Cotam had come to the city (probably Windsor herald) but did not dare enter it ‘for fere of deth’. The implication is that York was still believed to be likely to support Richard’s cause.) The mayor and others therefore went to meet him and were reassured of Henry’s graciousness.

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<sup>6</sup> Drake, *Eboracum*, p. 121. Printed in *York House Books*, pp. 734-5.

The entry for the meeting on 24 August ends with decisions on the pay to be given to the soldiers raised by the city in response to Richard's orders. They had served for four and a half days of the anticipated ten.

In Drake's transcripts there follows a record of the council meeting held on Thursday 25 August (York House Books, Text 4).<sup>7</sup> They agreed to send five men to Henry VII, 'beseeching his grace to be good and gracious lord unto this citie', as well as sending letters not only to the earl of Northumberland and Lord Stanley 'for the good speed of the premises' (i.e. asking them to put in a good word for the city as it sought Henry's grace). At this stage, therefore, the city believed Northumberland to be in the king's favour. There is no suggestion that they suspected that both he and Stanley had switched sides in the battle (remember that it had been the treason of Norfolk which was mentioned at the meeting on 23<sup>rd</sup>).

At this same council meeting it was agreed that the new king's proclamation should be published throughout the city. This had been brought by Windsor herald. The actual date of receipt is not given (unless Cotam was the one who brought it on the day before?) but the proclamation, of which the text follows, is dated at Leicester on 23 August (York House books, Text 4).<sup>8</sup>

This proclamation shows Henry's desire to control the behaviour of armies coming away from the battle field, and also to prevent further conflict ('quarells for old or for new matters'), as well as offering an opportunity for complaints against any despoiling. Such clauses, and the fact that there is no specific address, would suggest that this proclamation was intended for wide publication, although no reference has so far been found to it in any other records than those of York. If it was sent solely to York then it suggests Henry thought that Richard's erstwhile supporters who had escaped from the battle – many of whom were from the north – would be making for the city. (Remember too that the loyalty of Northumberland was not wholly certain from Henry's perspective – had the earl gone to Leicester with him or not?) (May be also the Scottish troops which had served Henry might also be moving northwards. The second part of the proclamation begins 'and moreover the king assertayneth you'. The news he wished to publicise was the death of Richard and of eight named nobles (these are the same as in the note on folio 168recto). 'Richard duc of Gloucestre, late called king Richard, was slayne at a place called Sandeford, within the shyre of Leicestre, and brought dede of the feld unto the towne of Leicestre and ther was laide openly that every man might se and luke upon him'.

There are many interesting elements to the wording of this proclamation, all aimed at reinforcing the position of the new king. Amongst these is perhaps the naming of the place of Richard's death as Sandeford. Thornton argues that this was not a real location at all but a name chosen because it fulfilled well known prophecies. Note too that Henry denies Richard's kingship, whilst exalting his own by claiming not only to be king of England and France and lord of Ireland (Richard's previous titles) but also prince of Wales, thereby undermining any other claims from Richard's heirs general.

In Drake's transcript, there follows another letter to the duke of Northumberland, written at York on 26 August and asking not only for his own good lordship but for his support in their approach to King Henry (York House Books, Text 5). This is followed by a record of the council meeting of 27 August (York House

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<sup>7</sup> Drake, *Eboracum*, pp. 121-22. Printed in *York House Books*, pp. 735-6.

<sup>8</sup> *The York House books 1461-1490*, ed. by L. Attreed, 2 vols (Stroud, 1991), i, pp. 735-6. The text of the proclamation is also printed with modernised language in *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 3 vols, ed. by Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (London, 1964), i, p. 3.

Books, Text 6). Robert Rawdon, royal sergeant at arms had been sent with his warrant under the king's signet for the arrest of Robert Stillington, bishop of Bath and Sir Richard Ratcliff. The full text of the warrant, dated at Leicester on 23 August, is given, with instructions that all the property they held on 22 August should be seized into royal hands. Rawdon had had this for several days so presumably had been trying to track Ratcliffe and Stillington in other places en route between Leicester and York.

[The York House Books are also useful for materials on Richard's attempts to raise an army. For instance, at a meeting on the 16 August the council had agreed to send John Spomer to Richard to determine the king's 'pleyser as in sending up any of his subgiettes within this cite to his said grace for the subduyng of his ennemyes late arryved in the parties of Wallez'. They also made preparations to defend the city, in case of attack. On the 19 August, they sent a contingent of soldiers to support the king, under the captaincy of John Hastings. This material will be discussed in more detail in the section on Armies.]

## The earliest narratives

There are accounts of the battle in various chronicles and other writings composed within the ten to fifteen years which followed it. That said, it is often extremely difficult to date with precision when the actual account was written since in most cases the mention of the battle was part of a longer narrative which eventually appeared as a whole.

The earliest accounts are as follows (in a likely chronological order of final composition):

1. Report by the Spaniard, Diego de Valera, in a letter to the king and queen of Spain 1 March 1486
2. Crowland Continuation, written in two stages, up to Bosworth in the autumn of 1485 and up to April 1486.
3. The Chronicle of Jean Molinet (Burgundian, 1435-1507). Although the chronicle covers the years 1474 to 1504 it is likely that the section on the battle was written within a few years of it
4. Chronicle of Philippe de Commines (or Commines) (French, (c.1447-1511)), written c. 1490
5. *Historica Regum Angliae* by John Rous (c.1420-92), brief note on battle commonly dated to c. 1490
6. The anonymous *Great Chronicle of London*, dating from before 1496. This is one of a number of London Chronicles, which will be discussed as a group. There is a link to what is likely the first printed account published in Robert Fabyan's *A New Chronicle of England and Wales* (1516, but written before the author's death in 1513).

### 1. Diego de Valera

Diego de Valera (1412-88?) was a long-standing servant of the Castilian monarchs, beginning his career as a page in the royal household in 1427 before being knighted for his service at the siege of Huelma in 1435 and embarking on a career travelling throughout Europe on minor diplomatic missions and participating in a series of conflicts, visiting the courts of France, Burgundy and England (in c.1443). At least

from 1441 he had written a series of letters to the Castilian monarchs offering political advice and reporting back on the European political scene.

By 1486 he was living in retirement at Puerto de Santa Maria, where, on 1 March 1486 he wrote a memorandum (in Spanish) on English affairs for Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, containing an account of the battle of Bosworth. De Valera's narrative is the only detailed account of the battle to directly cite an eye-witness source: Juan de Salazar, a Spanish mercenary, present at the battle as part of Richard III's forces. It seems that de Valera derived this information from an, at best, second-hand account of the battle from some recently arrived Castilian merchants who had returned from England, where they had possibly spoken to Salazar. Nonetheless, as the only account to cite a directly contemporary source, written by an experienced commentator on European affairs, de Valera's account is a valuable early source for historians, and it is also a significant account of the battle from a member of Richard's army.

Salazar is mentioned in Harleian MS 433, a manuscript which covers governmental business of the reigns of Edward V and Richard III. On the 16 June 1485 a letter of passage is provided for 'Rodigo de Onover', a servant to 'captain Salasar'. De Valera describes Salasar as 'one of your minor vassals who was there in the service of King Richard'. It is he who tells Richard of treason against him in the battle and who urges the king to flee. The response attributed to Richard was 'Salazar, it does not please God that I move one step, that on this day I seek to die as a king or to win'. The king is then described as putting a very valuable crown over his helmet.

De Valera gives no location for the battle, but does include commentary on the size and command structures. HE suggests that Richard's army consisted of 70,000 men, clearly an exaggeration. It also provides some information on Richard's deployment of his forces: 'When King Richard was certified of the near approach of Earl Henry in battle array, he ordered his lines and entrusted the van to his grand chamberlain with 7,000 fighting men'.

De Valera's account has been widely used as the major source for the involvement of Lord Stanley. He reports that Henry, 'previous to his entry into England ... had the assurance that my Lord "Tamorlant" ... would give him assistance when they came to battle and would fight against King Richard'. During the battle, Lord 'Tamorlant' 'with King Richard's left wing left his position and passed in front of the king's vanguard with 10,000 men, then, turning his back on Earl Henry, he began to fight fiercely against the king's van, and so did all the others who had plighted their faith to Earl Henry'. 'Lord Tamorlant', has been identified by some historians as Lord Stanley, muddled by a Spanish pronunciation, but this would appear to be wishful thinking; the alternative, the earl of Northumberland is far more likely. There is further discussion of this, and on how we can use De Valera's account to study the deployment of the army, in section 3. De Valera comments on the bad treatment of Richard's body, but claims that it was kept in a hermitage close to where the battle had been ('una pequena hermita que esta de donde la batalla se dio') for three days for all to see.

De Valera provides a heroic picture of Richard's performance in battle, fighting vigorously, 'putting heart into those that remained loyal, so that by his sole effort he upheld the battle for a long time'. But it is important to note that De Valera (similarly to Commynes and Molinet) prefaced his account with a mention of Richard's evil deeds ('our good lord did not permit his evil deeds to remain unpunished'), reminding us that it was already widely believed in Europe that Richard had murdered his nephews in taking the throne for himself. De Valera also speaks of

Henry as the man ‘to whom the realm lawfully belonged’. There was not doubt an element of being wise after the event, another case of history being shaped by the victors.

## 2. The Crowland Continuation

The first substantial account of the battle written in England (although in the medium of Latin) survives in the ‘second continuation’ of the Crowland abbey chronicle, written in two stages, up to Bosworth in the autumn of 1485 and up to April 1486.<sup>9</sup> The majority of the chronicle survives in a 1684 edition by William Fulman, following the loss of much of the original, Cotton MS Otho B.xiii, in the fire at the Cottonian library in 1731.

The identity of the anonymous Continuator has been much debated by historians. Until 1890, it was generally assumed that the Chronicle was the work of a single man. Sir Clements Markham’s *English Historical Review* article of that year, focusing on the Chronicle’s verdict on the circumstances of Richard III’s accession to the throne and the fate of the sons of Edward IV, suggested that in fact there were multiple authors.<sup>10</sup> Markham’s argument is not in itself convincing, but his work opened the way for other historians to consider the possibility that more than one author was at work in the Chronicle. A series of works was published during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, advancing the debate and assessing the value of the chronicle and its continuation as a reliable historical source.<sup>11</sup> Much of this work tended towards interpreting the sections dealing with Bosworth as being either the work of a monk of Crowland Abbey or of a civil servant near to the king. Antonia Gransden attempted a compromise between the two, suggesting that the chronicle may have been adapted by a monk from a memoir prepared in chancery. This theory failed to convince the chronicle’s most recent editors, Nicholas Pronay and John Cox.<sup>12</sup> Most recently, Michael Hicks has published two articles on the identity of the Continuator. In the first, he suggested that the Continuator was a civil servant, eye-witness to the politics that he describes if not to the events that he narrates.<sup>13</sup> In the second, he suggests Master Richard Langport, clerk of the royal council as ‘the most probable candidate to date’, but more work needs to be done on Langport and on his possible authorship of the chronicle before the full implications of Hicks’ work can be assessed.<sup>14</sup>

The complexity of the authorship issue for the chronicle and its continuation reflects its usefulness to the historian, but also the problems it presents as a source for the battle of Bosworth. The level of information contained within the continuation not only points to a well-informed author with access to court news, but provides us with a contemporary *interpretation* of events at Bosworth, as well as a valuable picture of events from those that had been with Richard shortly before the battle.

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<sup>9</sup> Published in parallel text by Nicholas Pronay and John Cox, eds., trans., *The Crowland Chronicle Continuations: 1459-1486* (London, 1986). They include an exhaustive discussion of the provenance of the surviving versions of the mss, pp. 39-65.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Clements Markham, ‘Richard III – a doubtful verdict reviewed’, *English Historical Review*, 6 (1891), pp. 250-84; *Crowland*, pp. 9-13.

<sup>11</sup> These works are discussed in detail by Pronay and Cox in *Crowland*, pp. 13-33.

<sup>12</sup> Antonia Gransden, *Historical Writing in England* (London, 1982), ii, pp. 268-73; *Crowland*, pp. 25-6. Pronay and Cox provide a detailed discussion of the authorship question, pp. 78-98.

<sup>13</sup> Michael Hicks, ‘Crowland’s World: A Westminster View of the Yorkist Age’, *History*, 90 (2005), pp. 172-90.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Hicks, ‘The second anonymous Continuation of the Crowland Abbey Chronicle 1459-86 revisited’, *English Historical Review*, 122 (2007), pp. 349-70.



Crowland Continuation gives a good amount of information about the battle, and has proved a major source for historians. It tells of Henry's landing at Milford and of Richard's efforts to summon forces to his bases first at Nottingham then Leicester. Richard's camping place on the night before the battle is given as near to Merevale Abbey, which he chooses after his scouts tell him of Henry's position. No other place names are mentioned although the account ends with 'ad hoc bellum Miravellense', a further reference to the abbey. This interest in ecclesiastical establishments is not surprising on the part of an author who was writing in the tradition of monastic chroniclers, even if he was not himself a cleric. That said, we need to bear in mind the Merevale naming in the light of the compensation warrants to the abbot later in the year (see later section).

There is some information on troop deployment. The earl of Oxford is given command of Henry's French soldiers, placed opposite the wing of the king's army under the command of the duke of Norfolk. The earl of Northumberland, 'with a fairly large and well-equipped force' is said to offer 'no contest against the enemy and no blows given or received in battle'. There is otherwise no account of the fighting per se save that 'a glorious victory was granted by heaven to the earl of Richmond', now sole king. This is reminiscent of De Valera's emphasis on God's will, and also a reminder that Richmond had already called himself king in the weeks before the battle, thereby effectively creating a situation of two kings in England.

Crowland Continuation gives an account of the role of the Stanleys before the battle although not in it. Lord Thomas Stanley is given permission to visit his home in Lancashire, having sent his eldest son Lord George Strange as a surety to Richard. Lord Thomas Stanley is summoned to meet the king, who distrusts his loyalty, fearing 'that the earl of Richmond's mother who was the wife of Lord Stanley might induce her husband to support her son's party.' Strange, attempting to escape from Richard, is seized and confesses details of a plot between Henry, William Stanley and Sir John Savage before pleading for mercy and promising his father's swift support. During the battle the king orders the execution of Strange but those commissioned to carry it out decide otherwise.

Crowland Continuation does not give actual numbers but claims that on Richard's side 'there was a greater number of fighting men than there had ever been seen before, on one side, in England'. We must take into account the author's tendency elsewhere in the chronicle to use comparatives and superlatives. This comment cannot be taken as proof that the army *was* the largest ever assembled. On Henry's side, fifteen of his leading military supporters are listed by name, including Lord Thomas Stanley and William Stanley, Edward Woodville (whose presence at the battle is not wholly certain). In addition, four other men are mentioned as counsellors to Henry: the bishop of Exeter, Master Robert Morton, clerk of the Chancery, Christopher Urswick and Richard Fox. He comments that the former became almoner to the king, the latter secretary. Urswick is also claimed to be a source for Polydore Vergil's account. There is also a suggestion that Henry may have dubbed knights at some point, but the Latin text ('militari ordine insigniti') may have a less technical meaning of 'notable for their military standing' (as translated by Pronay and Cox)

A list is given of six of Richard's men killed in the battle: 'the duke of Norfolk, Sir Richard Ratcliffe, Sir Robert Brackenbury, Constable of the Tower of London, John Kendall, the Secretary, Sir Robert Percy, Controller of the king's Household and Walter Devereux, Lord Ferrers', as well as 'many northerners'. The later (implicitly after Henry had arrived in Leicester) capture of the earl of

Northumberland, the earl of Surrey, and William Catesby is also mentioned, along with the latter's execution at Leicester.

There is also an amount of information on Richard's personal conduct at the battle. On the eve of the battle the king is troubled by a 'terrible dream', breakfast is not prepared and, in a further bad omen for the day ahead, his chaplains are not ready to say mass for the troops, an essential preparation for conflict. (This is also found in a story ascribed to one of Henry's servants and found in a text of the reign of Mary I.)<sup>15</sup> Richard's performance in battle is briefly described, but echoes the words of De Valera, suggesting that this idea was in wide circulation: 'like a spirited and most courageous prince, [he] fell in battle on the field and not in flight.' The denigration of his corpse, carried to Leicester with a noose around the neck, is noted, and there is perhaps a sympathetic note in the expression that it was treated 'non satis humaniter' ('with insufficient humanity'). The Crowland Continuator describes how Henry accedes after Richard's death as 'there remained no worthy or trained troops to make the glorious victor, Henry VII submit himself again to the trial of battle.' This could be seen as less than favourable to Henry but in reality was intended as a criticism of the northerners in whom Richard had placed his trust but who had 'fled before coming to blows with the enemy'. This comment fits with the earlier remark that in Northumberland's part of the battle there had been no fighting. Henry is praised for his clemency and the chronicle ends on a positive note with the new king receiving 'praise from everyone as though he was an angel sent from heaven through whom God deigned to visit his people and to free them from the evils which had hitherto afflicted them beyond measure.'

### 3. Jean Molinet

Jean Molinet (1435-1507) wrote his *Chronicle*, covering the years 1474-1504 whilst serving at the Burgundian court, writing within a few years of the battle of Bosworth.<sup>16</sup> His work was a continuation of Georges Chastellain's *Chronicle*, Molinet's predecessor as historiographer to the house of Burgundy, and has long been criticised as being inferior in style and historical value; indeed, it was not printed until 1828 by J.A. Buchon, though a more recent edition by G. Deutrepont and O. Jodogne also now exists and the reputation of Molinet's work has improved in recent years.<sup>17</sup> A noted rhetorician, Molinet's approach to his source material is not always to be relied upon – in the section preceding his account of Bosworth, he claims that Richard III made Elizabeth of York, the eldest daughter of Edward IV, and future wife of Henry VII, pregnant.<sup>18</sup> At the beginning of the account, Molinet speaks of Richard as a cruel tyrant ('le plus cremeu de tous les roix d'Occident à cause de sa tirannie'. In his account of the battle, his priority is to give Richard the death he deserves. Thus, unlike in De Valera and Crowland Continuation which have the king fighting valiantly, Molinet's Richard suffers an ignominious death, trying to flee from the field, at the hands of a Welshman armed with a halberd (therefore presumably a lower ranking soldier), whilst attempting to flee the field of battle.

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<sup>15</sup> British Library Additional MS 12,060 ff. 19-20. The account is bound within a book entitled 'Lord Morley on Transubstantiation' and dedicated to Queen Mary. This is commonly dated to c. 1553.

<sup>16</sup> *Chroniques de Jean Molinet*, ed. Georges Deutrepont and O. Jodogne, 3 vols. (Academie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Collection des Anciens Auteurs Belges, Brussels, 1935-7), i, pp. 433-436.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Bennett, pp. 3-4.

<sup>18</sup> Molinet, i p. 432.

Although Molinet's description of the 'palus' (marsh) in which Richard's horse became stuck may provide us with a crucial topographical detail about the battlefield (and significantly, one which tallies with the mention of a marsh in Polydore Vergil, it may equally have been intended for rhetorical effect, emphasising the degradation of Richard's death and corpse as a reflection of his moral iniquity.<sup>19</sup>

No place names are given. We cannot be certain of the course of Molinet's information, although since there were French soldiers present at the battle on Henry's side it is possible that his informers were such men returning to their home country. There is much more commentary provided on Henry's period in France, reflecting the author's local interest. For instance, the events at Hammes are included as also Charles VIII's assistance to Henry.

Molinet's account provides an amount of credible detail on the battlefield manoeuvres, though possibly influenced by what he knew of continental actions. He tells us that the French made their preparations by marching against the English, who were in the field a quarter of a league away.<sup>20</sup> He details Richard's deployment of his forces, with a vanguard and rearguard, the former under the command of Lord John Howard, duke of Norfolk and Sir Robert Brackenbury, captain of the Tower of London, giving it 11-12,000 men. He says nothing about the way Henry drew up his troops at the outset but a comment in his account of the battle may suggest some movement from an initial position. He also tells us that Richard had a large quantity of 'engiens volans' which he ordered to fire on Henry, and that this led the French to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard's battle.<sup>21</sup> This has been interpreted as the use of gunpowder artillery. No other early source mentions this, although the act of attainder in the parliament which met in November includes 'gunnys' in the list of weapons with which Richard and his men had attempted the destruction of Henry.

Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, is said to have been in charge of 10,000 men but that he failed to engage on Richard's behalf, instead deserting the king, 'for he had an undertaking' with Henry. This is strikingly similar to the comments made in De Valera on the actions of Lord Tamorlant, and the comments in the Crowland Continuation on the lack of action in Northumberland's area. Molinet claims that the duke of Norfolk was captured in the engagement and taken to Henry who sent him on to the earl of Oxford who had him 'dispatched'.

In Molinet's account it is only after the defeat of Richard's vanguard that Lord Stanley, with 20,000 men, arrives at the battlefield to engage with the fleeing remnants of the vanguard. Unless Tamorlant is Lord Stanley, this is the earliest reference to the actual military involvement of Lord Stanley. Molinet gives the overall death toll for the battle at only 300 men on either side. This contrasts with references in the York House books and the Crowland continuation to many deaths, and to De Valera's figure of 10,000 men from both sides.

#### **4. Philippe de Commynes**

A French-Burgundian chronicler, writing in c.1490 at the French court, Philippe de Commynes (c.1447-1511) mentions the battle only briefly on two occasions in his *Memoirs*. Born into a minor gentry family in Flanders, de Commynes began his career

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<sup>19</sup> Molinet, pp. 435-6.

<sup>20</sup> Molinet, p. 435.

<sup>21</sup> Molinet, pp. 434-5.

serving Charles the Bold at the Burgundian court before moving to France and the service of Louis XI.<sup>22</sup> Like de Valera, de Commynes fought in several European battles and served as a diplomat before Louis' death in 1483, after which he was briefly imprisoned then exiled to the country before returning to the court and to diplomatic service. Completed in 1498, the *Memoirs* comprise eight books, first printed in Paris in 1524 (the first 6) and 1528. As a near-contemporary account written by a seasoned politician, de Commynes' *Memoirs* provide a useful, if brief, account of the battle, with special emphasis on the French involvement.

According to Commynes, Henry received assistance from the king of France, including 'some artillery', and 'just enough money to pay for the passage of three to four thousand men', later described as a 'small sum of money', though the king is said to have given 'those who were with him [Henry] a large sum of money'. Leaving Brittany with a force of around 3000 'men taken in Normandy - and the most badly behaved you could find', he is also supported by his stepfather, 'Lord Stanley', who brought him 'reinforcements numbering more than twenty-six thousand men'. Although he notes the support provided by the French and is critical of 'the cruel king Richard', and believes that he killed his nephews, Commynes is sceptical of the validity of Henry's claim to the throne. There is no detail on the fighting, however, since Commynes says vaguely 'Ilz eurent la bataille et fut mort sur le champ le dict roy Richard'. They had a battle and on the battlefield Richard died. No place for this battle is given.

## 5. John Rous

Writing in c.1490, the historian, antiquary and Warwickshire priest John Rous (c.1420-92) included a very short section on the battle in his *Historica Regum Angliae*, stating that it took place 'on the border of Warwickshire and Leicestershire' ('in confinibus comitatum Warwici & Leicestriae').<sup>23</sup> Rous gives the place of Henry's landing in Milford Haven and says that he 'gained many followers on the road', though he does not give numbers – Richard's forces are described as a 'great army'. Dedicated to Henry VII, Rous's account is extremely critical of Richard, describing him as 'cruel beyond measure', though he describes his death in heroic terms: 'though small in body and feeble of limb, he bore himself like a gallant knight and acted with distinction as his own champion, until his last breath'. According to Rous, Richard 'was suddenly cut down like a wretch in the thick of his army by a comparatively small force of armed men', 'crying "Treason! Treason! Treason!"

## 6. London chronicles (including Fabyan)

There was a long tradition of chronicle writing in London, deriving from annals added to the notes of the annual mayoral and city elections, and linked to the Brut tradition. By the second quarter of the fifteenth century these chronicles were in English, and are a valuable source for the Wars of the Roses as a whole. That said, the various texts are extremely difficult to date and their inter-relationship is also complex. The fact

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<sup>22</sup> Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires*, ed. Joseph Calmette, 2 vols (Paris, 1925), vol. 2, pp. 234-5, 306. Translations by M.C.E. Jones (ed), *Philippe de Commines, Mémoires* (Penguin Classics, 1972), p. 355 and by Anne Curry.

<sup>23</sup> Joannis Rossi, *Antiquarii Warwicensis Historia Regum Angliae*, ed. Thomas Hearne (Oxford, 1716), p. 218. English translation in Bennett, pp. 136-7.

that the texts give similar if not identical accounts is not proof of historical truth, but more of traditions of copying and continuing existing texts.

Brief accounts of the battle occur in a number of London chronicles. Written for a London audience, these chronicles may provide an insight into contemporary reactions to the battle, though this is limited, both by their brevity and by the political context in which they were written – aimed at a London audience and written in close proximity to the centre of Tudor government. It is also possible that they reflect the official view which was circulated by the government.

The earliest of the London accounts is probably the anonymous *Great Chronicle of London*, dating from before 1496, surviving in manuscript form in the Guildhall Library, MS 3313. It tells of Richard's initial slowness to respond and Henry's rapid gathering of men as the two sides converged on Leicester. It also relates how Richard's forces deserted him at Leicester. In this context the *Great Chronicle* betrays its London interests, since it focuses particularly on the desertions from the company of Robert Brackenbury, commander of the Tower of London.

'But that nyght king Richard lost much of his people, ffor many Gentylnen that held good Countenaunce w' mastyr Brawghyngury than lyewtenaunt of the Towyr, and hadd ffor many of theym doon Rygth keyndly, took theyr leve of hym In guyvyng to hym thankis ffor his keendnesse beffore shewid, and exortid hym to goo wyth theym, ffor they fferid not to shewe unto hym that they wold goo unto that othyr party, and soo departid, levyng hym almoost aloon In thys whyle.'<sup>24</sup>

The implication is that these men were Londoners. So far no evidence has been found in the city records of troops being raised.

and the earl of Derby and the earl of Northumberland 'which hadd everych of theym grete companies made slowe spede toward kynge Rychard', causing him to leave Leicester 'wyth grete triumph & pomp' without them. This links to the comment in the *Crowland Continuation* that Richard had to move his army from Nottingham to Leicester 'though it was not fully assembled', observations which need to be taken into account when we look at the possible size of his army.<sup>25</sup>

Richard left Leicester on the morning of the battle and 'contynuyd his Journey tyll he cam unto a vyllage callyd Bosworth where in the ffyeldys ajoynaunt bothe hostys mett, and fowgthyn there a sharp & long ffygh'.<sup>26</sup> The desecration of Richard's corpse is described, stripped of all clothing, with nothing even to 'covyr his privy membr'y' (this is similar to the account in *de Valera* of the poor quality of the cloth covering his body, but *De Valera* has the cloth covering him from the waist down) tied on a horse behind Norrey pursuivant, 'as an hogg or an othyr vyle beest' (similar to *Molinet's* comment that his body was slung across a horse like that of a sheep), and taken to a church in Leicester 'for all men to wondyr uppon' before being 'inreverently buried'.

No detail is given of the fight but the account is important for two reasons. The first is the mention of Sir William Stanley as the man who won Richard's helmet with the crown on it (the helmet as noted in *De Valera*) and brought it to Henry and 'sett it upon his head saying, sir here I make yow kynge of Engeland'.

The second is that it is the earliest use in a chronicle account of Bosworth as the location for the battle ('and afftyr contynuyd his (i.e. Richard's) Journey tyll he cam unto a village callyd Bosworth where in the ffyelds ajoynaunt bothe hostys mett'). Could the use of Bosworth reflect a more urban view of life? Perhaps Market

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<sup>24</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 237.

<sup>25</sup> *Crowland Continuation*, pp. 178-9: 'licet nondum integer congregatum'.

<sup>26</sup> A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley, eds., *The Great Chronicle of London* (London, 1938), pp. 237-8.

Bosworth was seen by London based writers as the first place of any size in the vicinity.

Both the naming and the role assigned to William Stanley appear to reflect 'new' traditions developing in the decade after the battle. The role of Sir William is interesting given that in 1495 he rebelled against Henry, supporting Perkin Warbeck, and was executed. Was the text written before his execution, or was it a later attempt to redeem his reputation? The last speculation links to the vexed issue of the dating of the ballads, to which we will return later. (NB Vergil and the Ballad of Bosworthe Fielde have Lord Thomas Stanley, not his brother, crowning Henry. It is tempting to say that the switch was made because of William's fall from grace in 1495.)

Another London chronicle, BL Vitellius A XVI, survives in an early sixteenth-century copy. Its mention of the battle is very brief, but it too says that the battle occurred on the 'feeld of Bosworth' and reports the death of Richard, and the treatment of his corpse, 'carried vpon an hors behind a man all naked to Leyciter, fast by the ffeeld'. Again paying special attention to Brackenbury, the entry also reports the death of Norfolk and the capture of his son, Surrey, as well as recording Henry's entry into London on 27 August, 'wt the Mayr, Aldermen and the ffelishippys clothed in violet', a similar passage being found in the Great Chronicle, which gives more detail of the king riding to the North Door of St Pauls and offering up three standards (the arms of St George, a red dragon and a Dun cow).

Another brief account occurs in an early sixteenth-century set of annals for the years 1502-13, surviving in a heraldic miscellany at the College of Arms, the so-called 'Historical notes of a London citizen'. These are in the standard format of the London chronicle with the year and mayor's name being followed by a note of historical events. It is possible that the entry dealing with Bosworth was composed at an early date, though it was not copied into the miscellany until 1513-22.

It relates the landing of Henry at Milford Haven, together with the earl of Pembroke and the earl of Oxford, and again notes the deaths of leading participants, including Norfolk, Ferrers (i.e. Sir Walter Devereux) and 'Hakinbery' (Brackenbury?) as well as the capture of Northumberland and Surrey. It claims that both of the last named were brought to the Fleet prison in London where they were for nine days, then to the Tower where they were kept for two days, before being taken to Queenborough castle in Kent. This shows again a London interest. Most significantly, this text says that Henry 'mett with' Richard at 'Redesmore'. This is the only other reference to that place outside that in the York House Books.

There is also a brief account of events in a town chronicle of Calais, again surviving in an early sixteenth-century. The Calais chronicle states that the battle took place at 'Bosworthe heth' (the first reference to a particular type of geographical location) and dates it to St Bartholomew's Eve which is actually 23 August. It reports the deaths of Richard, Norfolk, Ratcliffe, Catesby 'and gentle Brakenbery' (terminology influenced by the London Chronicle tradition), as well as of, on Henry's side, Sir William Brandon, 'who bare kynge Henry's standard that day'. The capture of Northumberland, Surrey, Lord Zouche is noted, with the earl of Shrewsbury being added to the list of those taken prisoner as well as the escape and flight of Lord Lovell.

Although the *Great Chronicle* is anonymous, it has sometimes been suggested that it was written by another London writer, Robert Fabyan, who wrote another very popular chronicle which was the first to appear in print. Fabyan was a member of the draper's company, an alderman of Farringdon Without and was made sheriff in 1493. He died in 1513, by which time he had long retired to the country. His chronicle was

first printed in London in 1516 by Richard Pynson as *The new chronicles of England and of France*, at which point it ended in 1485. In 1533 a second edition was printed by John Rastell, with continuations down to 1509. A third edition appeared in 1542 and a fourth in 1559, with additions to that year. It is unclear as to whether Fabyan intended to go beyond 1485, though it is possible that he did continue till 1511, but it seems certain that the section on Bosworth was written by Fabyan. It is shorter than the account in the *Great Chronicle*, omitting and abbreviating some information whilst expanding its account of Henry's piety on arrival at Milford Haven.

The place of battle is given as 'nere unto a village in Leycetershire named Bosworth, nere unto Leyceter'. This is the first *printed* mention of Bosworth as location, and was likely the source of later writers who used the name. The battle was described as 'sharpe', a term found in the *Great Chronicle*. But Fabyan adds 'and sharper shulde have been if the kynges partye had been fast to hym; but many towarde the felde refucyd hym, and yode unto that other partie, and some stode houynge a ferre of, tyll they sawe to which partye the victory fyll'. This is reminiscent of Rous's account, but it also has links to the ballads.

The account mentions that Norfolk was killed, noting that he was 'before tyme named lorde Howarde'. This may also reflect a London-centred approach since Howard held property in the city. Brekyngbury, lieutenant of the Tower was also noted as dying, 'and many other'. Those taken alive were given as the earl of Surrey, who was described as being takern to the Tower 'where he remained as prisoner longe tyme after'. The account ends with a mention of how Richard's body was 'spoyled and naked' as it was 'cast behynde a man, and so carried unreverently overthwarte the horse backe unto the fryers at Leyceter'. It was displayed for a while and then buried 'with lytel reverence'. This is close to the description given in the *Great Chronicle* and other texts, and clearly was seen as a matter of popular interest, most likely as it typified the wheel of fortune – how the mighty could fall. The moral emphasis is continued in the last sentence of the account: 'and thus with mysery endyd this prynce, which rulyd mostwhat by rigour and tyrannye, when he in great trowble and agonye had reynge or usurpyd by the space of ii yeres ii moneths and ii dayes'. That Richard was 'doomed' is emphasised by reference to this pattern of three times two: such number patterns were much used as signs and symbols.

What we are seeing in Fabyan, therefore, is the culmination of popular traditions: that Richard had been deserted by his men; that his body was abused (as a symbol of a man once powerful now being brought so low); and that he reaped the reward of his own evil.

Fabyan forms a direct link to the histories of the sixteenth century. This is not surprising since, as a printed work from 1516, it reached a much larger audience than any of the texts we have considered. This is particularly significant in the area of naming since it placed the battle as near Bosworth. (indeed it is worth noting that these London chronicles do not say at Bosworth (although the Calais chronicle says 'at Bosworth Hethe').

## Later histories – sixteenth century

### **Bernard André**

Bernard André (d. 1522), was an Augustinian friar from Toulouse and had probably accompanied Henry VII to England. He seems to have come to the king's attention through Richard Fox, who became bishop of Winchester, and who, as we have seen,

was noted as present as a counsellor of Henry at the battle by the Crowland Continuation. Having already written panegyric poems for the king, including one for the triumphal entry into London in September 1485, he was commissioned by the king to write his biography in 1500. He abandoned the task in 1502. The work remained in manuscript, and there is no evidence that the king ever received the work, although André continued to present poems to the king each year.

André's *Historia Regis Henrici Septimi* only goes as far as 1497. His account of the battle of 1485 is most notable for what it does not include. He gives quite a lot of material on the support of the French king. He also invents speeches for Henry, such as that before he embarks for England in 1485. A speech in reply is provided for the earl of Oxford, as well as another for Henry as he lands in England. He briefly covers Richard's rage at Henry's landing in Wales (Richard is described as a tyrant), tells us that Lord Stanley, 'a good and wise man, now earl of Derby' who had suffered from Richard's tyranny, gives his faith to Henry, although no detail is given of time or place.

This is followed almost immediately by 'Then the day arrived when the two sides decided to give battle'. However, André continues: 'I have learned somewhat of this battle from oral sources, but in this matter the eye is a more reliable witness than the ear. Rather than affirm anything rashly, therefore, I pass over the date, place and order of battle, for as I have said I lack the illumination of eye-witnesses. Until I am more fully instructed, for this field of battle I shall leave blank a space as broad ...'. There follows a blank space in the manuscript. He notes the presence of certain clerics in Henry's company, much as is found in the Crowland continuation. He leaves further gaps for the names of the captives and details of Richard's burial. But no places are mentioned at all. The narrative moves immediately to the coronation.

It may be that André was well aware of just how muddled the news from the battlefield was, and he was not prepared to take rumours as the basis for an account of what went on (this might be compared to Vergil's approach). Perhaps also he feared offending the king by making errors. It may also be that he was unsure how to treat the battle given the subsequent disloyalty of Sir William Stanley and his execution in 1495. However, we must not become too carried away by his decision to leave a blank space. A study of the text shows that this was something he did frequently, as the use of the symbol \*\*\*\*\* in the Rolls series edition demonstrates. The order of the work is also odd, making it in effect a set of notes for a fuller project. The manuscript shows that this was definitely a 'work in progress' which was never completed.

## **Polydore Vergil**

By far the longest and most detailed account of the battle comes in Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia*. Born in Urbino in c.1470, Vergil came to England in 1502, as an agent of Cardinal Adriano Castelli, who had been appointed bishop of Hereford. Four years after Castelli was transferred to the see of Bath and Wells in 1504, Vergil was appointed archdeacon of Wells as well as being used as an envoy to the papal court till he fell from Wolsey's favour in 1514. He remained in England until 1553 before returning to Urbino where he died in 1555. His *Anglica Historia*, a classical humanist narrative written in Latin, was begun in around 1506, at the request of Henry VII (perhaps because André had failed to deliver?), though his treatment of the king is not entirely uncritical. In fact the work took many years to complete.

The first part of the *Historia*, from Anglo-Saxon times to 1513, was completed in 1531 and dedicated to Henry VIII. It survives in manuscript form in the Urbino



collection in the Vatican archives, in what has been identified as Vergil's own handwriting.<sup>27</sup> It was not printed till 1534 in Basle (but omitting the narrative after 1509; second and third editions were printed in 1546 and 1555, taking it up to 1537). In the latter part of the reign of Henry VIII an English translation of the sections covering Henry VI, Edward IV and Richard III was made, but this did not appear in print until the 1840s.<sup>28</sup> The section from 1485 to 1537 from the Vatican manuscript was printed in a modern critical edition by Denis Hay in 1950. There is a useful on-line edition of the 1555 version with a translation by Dana F. Sutton.<sup>29</sup> The battle narrative appears in the section on the reign of Richard III (and hence is also to be found in the English translation made towards the end of Henry VIII's reign).

It seems that Vergil began his research soon after his arrival in England, very possibly before he received his commission from the king. He is also known to have drawn upon some of the London chronicles, including the *Great Chronicle* and Fabyan. That was why he also used the location of 'Bosworth'. It is also thought that More gave him a copy of Richard III, and it is also thought that he knew John Major's work, though he does not mention Scottish participation in the battle. It is likely that Vergil's account of Bosworth was based on eyewitness accounts of the battle, taken at Henry's court, albeit at least 18 years after the event. Richard Fox and Christopher Urswick, amongst the clerics noted in Crowland and André as being with the king, are thought to have been sources.<sup>30</sup>

Vergil's account begins with Henry in France, where rumours that Richard is planning to marry Elizabeth of York, eldest daughter of Edward IV, drive him to action. After explaining how the earl of Oxford and others joined Henry, the latter departs for England on 1 August, accompanied by 'only 2,000 soldiers' and 'a few' ships. After landing at Milford Haven he sets off through Wales, sending messengers 'to his mother Margaret, to the Stanleys, and to Talbot and others, bearing his instructions'. As Henry begins to gather support, Vergil provides some useful information on troop numbers. Richard (i.e. Rhys ap) Thomas brings him 'a goodly number of soldiers'; in Newport, Gilbert Talbot brings him 'more than 500 soldiers'.

Vergil includes an amount of material on the role of the Stanleys. First, we are told of Richard's suspicions of Henry's stepfather, Lord Thomas Stanley following the revolt of the duke of Buckingham, intensifying after the death of Queen Anne, when Richard refused to allow Thomas to retire to his country estates without leaving his son, Lord George Strange as a hostage at court. As Henry makes his way out of Wales, at Stafford William Stanley comes to visit him before returning to 'the soldiers he had collected'. Sir Thomas Stanley enters the picture early, visiting Lichfield with around 5,000 armed men three days before Henry go there, before retreating to Adderstone to await Henry there there without arousing Richard's suspicions, since he was scared the latter would kill Lord Strange. Henry is shown to distrust Thomas, not knowing whether he will support him at the battle, on account of his fears for his son. Henry moves from Litchfield to Tamworth, being met en route by Walter Hungerford, Thomas Bouchier and others who give their allegiance, having defected from Robert Brackenbury at Stony Stratford. Henry becomes detached from his forces and

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<sup>27</sup> *The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil: 1485-1537*, ed., trans. by Denys Hay (Camden Society, new series, 74, 1950), p. xiii.

<sup>28</sup> British Library MS Royal CVIII.IX; Ed. H. Ellis, *Three Books of Polydore Vergil's English History comprising the Reigns of Henry VI, Edward IV and Richard III* (Camden Society, 1844)

<sup>29</sup> Polydore Vergil, *Anglica Historia* (1555 version), a hypertext critical edition by Dana F. Sutton, <http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/polyverg/>

<sup>30</sup> Ellis, p. xix; Hay, p. xix.

wanders alone at night before reuniting with his army in the morning and then going to Adderstone to meet with Thomas and William Stanley, who are camped there together. Henry enters into accord with the Stanleys and they discuss ‘how to wage war against Richard, if it came to blows’. That evening Henry is joined by further deserters from Richard, which heartens him for the coming battle.

However, as the forces begin to take their places on the field of battle, Thomas Stanley fails to do as he had agreed with Henry. As Stanley approaches, ‘midway between the two armies’ he replies to Henry’s instruction to place his forces in battle order that he ‘would bring his forces into the battle after making his appearance with his army in battle array.’ Henry is therefore anxious ‘and began to ponder’ but none the less drew up his lines. As battle commences, Vergil states that Henry has just 5,000 men, not including the 3,000 men standing off from the battle, under the command of Thomas Stanley.

Interspersed with this narrative is an account of Richard’s movements. Richard, at Nottingham, is initially unimpressed by the threat Henry’s small force poses, before deciding to respond. He writes to the earl of Northumberland and other nobles, to Sir Robert Brackenbury, lieutenant of the Tower, Thomas Bouchier and Walter Hungerford, summoning them to his support. When he hears that Henry has reached Shrewsbury, Richard rails at those who have broken their oaths, but decides that he needs to confront his enemy as soon as possible. He therefore sends spies, who report that Henry is encamped at Lichfield. Once he has discovered this, he orders his own army to march along the same road as he had learned his enemies to be using, with his baggage in the centre. He is described as following with his bodyguard and horsemen on each side. He reaches Leicester by sunset (unfortunately no dates are given). Richard is said to have collected a huge number of armed men, but Denys Hay has exposed a crucial inconsistency here in the first four versions of the *Anglica Historia* – the manuscript version in the Vatican archives and the first three printed editions. In the ms version, Richard’s forces are stated to have been 15,000 men; the printed editions simply state that Richard had ‘armatorum numerus ingens’.<sup>31</sup> This would possibly fit with the information that Vergil gives as battle commences, Richard’s forces are described as being ‘at least twice as large’ as Henry’s – if one takes Stanley’s forces into account, this could be roughly correct.

Hearing his enemy was approaching, Richard ‘hearing that the enemy were advancing, was the first to come to the *place of the fight*, Bosworth, as the name of the area is given, a little beyond Leicester. There he pitched camp...’. Henry is also said to have pitched his camp nearby but no location is given nor is any date. The wording ‘Ricardus, audiens hostem adventare, prior *ad locum pugnae* parum ultra Lecestriam, Bosworth, id pagi nomen est accedit’, suggests that the place of battle had been prearranged. The place indication is close to that in the *Great Chronicle* and *Fabyan*.

Vergil provides a reasonably detailed account of the battle, with some ostensibly convincing detail on troop deployment, though it may be that some of this was derived from Vegetius’s advice on battle tactics and there are similarities with his accounts of other battles (further work is needed on this). He does not mention guns or cannons, only arrows and swords.

On the day of battle Vergil deals with Richard’s movements first. Richard leads his army out of camp and forms a battle line of ‘astonishing length’, placing his archers in front ‘like a wall’, under the command of the duke of Norfolk. Richard

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<sup>31</sup> D. Hay, *Polydore Vergil: Renaissance historian and man of letters* (Oxford, 1952), app. II, p. 198, n. 2.

himself comes after this line, with 'a choice company of soldiers'. By contrast, Henry is forced by the 'paucity of his men' (the order suggests that this was because of the reluctance of Thomas Stanley to commit) to form a 'simple battle-line', placing his archers in front, under the command of the earl of Oxford. Gilbert Talbot is given command of his right wing; John Savage the left. Henry himself, 'relying on the support of Thomas Stanley', followed, with one squadron of horse and one of foot.

With the two armies lined up, the soldiers see each other from afar and put on their helmets, awaiting the battle signal. There then follows the following important section: 'Between the armies was a marsh which Henry purposely kept on his left so it would serve to protect his men'. 'By the doing thereof also he left the soon upon his bak (This last sentence is not in the 1555 edition. The whole passage is influenced by Vegetius. See discussion in section 3). When the king (i.e. Richard) saw the enemy pass by the marsh (the implication is that Henry's army moved first), he commanded his men to attack'. This attack includes an arrow shower, but Vergil says that when the armies got close, they used swords. Oxford, afraid his men will be outflanked, orders them to keep close to the standards. Their clustering confuses Richard's men, who break off the fighting. (Vergil introduces a strange sentence here saying that in fact they preferred to see their king dead than safe, another allusion to the lack of loyalty to Richard.) This enables Oxford to renew the assault by pushing forward together.

The narrative then moves to Richard, saying that when the lines first engaged, he was informed that Henry was at a distance with his bodyguard. As he drew closer he identified him and so spurred on his horse to attack him. There follows an account of this, with the initial killing of Henry's standard bearer, William Brandon, and then John Cheyney's unhorsing of Richard. At this point William Stanley is said to have come to Henry's aid with his 3,000 men. (This either indicates that Thomas and William's troops were already together, or that Vergil had become somewhat confused, since earlier he speaks of Thomas with the 3000 standing off.) At this intervention, Richard's army take flight and Richard is killed, 'fighting in the thick of the fray'. (In a later section, Vergil adds that 'the story goes that (note this particular expression) Richard could have saved himself by flight, and was brought a swift horse when his army began to flee, but he refused it, saying that he would either make an end of his life or the fighting.) Oxford defeats the rest of the army. Vergil adds that many on Richard's side stopped fighting since they had only supported him because they feared him.

The death toll is given as about 1000 men, including the duke of Norfolk, Lord Walter Ferris, Robert Brackenbury and Richard Ratcliff. William Catesby is executed after the battle; Lord Francis Lovell and Humphrey and Francis Stafford flee to sanctuary in Colchester. Only 100 men are said to have been killed on Henry's side. Vergil says that the battle lasted a little more than two hours ('*dimicatio ampius duas horas*, though the mid sixteenth century English translation has this 'lasted more than two hours'). After the battle Thomas Stanley finds the crown on the field and crowns Henry with it. Richard's body, slung across a horse and naked, is taken to Leicester.

Writing under commission from Henry VII, Vergil offers a distinctly Tudor view of Richard, which colours the battle narrative at many points. On the night before the battle Richard suffers a nightmare, of which Vergil says: 'I believe this to have been no dream, but rather his conscience, burdened by his many crimes; his conscience, I say, which was all the heavier because his sin was the greater'. There is also repeated emphasis that men only supported Richard because they were afraid of him. In addition to defections before the battle, Richard's forces are shown to have

quickly deserted his cause: ‘many more not unwillingly abstained fighting because they had followed Richard out of fear rather than of their own free will.’ They surrender to Henry as soon as the king is killed. Vergil says that more would have deserted, had not Richard’s spies ‘flying hither and thither’ prevented them. Among those who would have deserted, Vergil mentions Northumberland and the earl of Surrey. The latter is imprisoned but the former is released, ‘being a willing friend’ (a reflection of the considerable hindsight of the *Historia* since by the time of writing, Surrey’s military support for Henry was well known). Before the battle, Vergil says that Henry attempted to send messages to Northumberland but that they did not get through.

Vergil’s account has become the basis of modern ideas on the battle even though it was written over thirty years later and has been approached rather uncritically by historians. Fabyan and the *Great Chronicle* were certainly influences, especially in the naming of Bosworth. The story of Richard being offered a horse to flee is similar to *De Valera* yet it is extremely unlikely that Vergil had seen that text. More likely it was a commonplace tale (and indeed I suspect that there are parallel narratives in other battles or in classical sources used by Vergil). Similarly, it is unlikely that Vergil knew Molinet’s account which mentioned the marsh but was influenced rather by Vegetius, even to the point of the reference to keeping the sun on their backs. Vergil’s narrative followed the standard, but equivocal views, on the Stanleys, but most of all it sought to show how Richard had lost the trust of his people. The tradition of Richard’s nightmares on the eve of battle recall the account in the *Crowland*, and also in the reminiscence included in a text of the reign of Mary I.<sup>32</sup> It would seem, therefore, to be an enduring story, not surprisingly since it fitted with the way Richard was portrayed after 1485.

## Edward Hall

Edward Hall (1497-1547) was a London lawyer, member of parliament and historian. Written in English for a London audience, the full title of the chronicle gives a fair sense of Hall’s priorities in writing: ‘*The Union of the two noble and illustre families of Lancastre and Yorke, being long in continuall discension for the croune of this noble realme, with all the acts done in both the tymes of the Princes, both of the one image of the other, beginning at the tyme of Kyng Henry the fowerth, the first auctor of this devisioun, and so successively proceeding to the reigne of the high and prudent Prince kyng Henry the eyght, the indubitata flower and very heire of both the said linages.*’ A key text in the making of the ‘Tudor myth’ of Bosworth, Hall’s *Chronicle* proved very influential in shaping subsequent accounts of the battle; his work is known to have been used as a source by Holinshed and Shakespeare. Written in English, unlike Vergil, Hall’s *Chronicle* was widely read and accessible.

The *Chronicle* was unfinished at Hall’s death in 1547, when he bequeathed it to the publisher and historian Richard Grafton, who began to print it that year, before pausing and then producing a larger sized edition in 1548 before a second edition in 1550, followed by a third in 1560, printed after the withdrawal of Mary’s order banning the work on account of its enthusiastic support of the Henrician Reformation. The most accessible modern edition of the text remains the version printed in London in 1809, reprinted in New York in 1965.

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<sup>32</sup> British Library Additional MS 12,060 ff. 19-20. The account is bound within a book entitled ‘Lord Morley on Transubstantiation’ and dedicated to Queen Mary. This is commonly dated to c. 1553. No place name is given for Richard’s camp however.

Hall drew on the London chronicles, including Fabyan, but his main source was Vergil, and much of his book as a whole follows Vergil's account. His account of the battle largely follows Vergil, with the insertion of two pre-battle speeches by Richard and Henry, firmly in the classical tradition of inspiring battle oratory. As Michael Bennett has pointed out, these speeches have proved 'curiously influential' – Bennett's discussion of the text is worth repeating at length:

In his speech to the troops Henry Tudor is presented as referring to the enemy ahead and uncertain allies on each side, which statement seems to be the basis for the popular assumption that the Stanleys had armies both to the north and south of the field. Then at the point when the rebels are described by Vergil as having the sun at their backs, Hall amplifies the description by adding that their enemies had it on their faces.<sup>33</sup>

It is impossible to know whether these details on troop deployment were included for rhetorical effect (perhaps drawing on Vegetius's advice on battlefield tactics) or whether Hall had an independent source for them, but they clearly must be treated with more caution than has sometimes been the case.

Hall also introduces a story that the duke of Norfolk was warned before the battle not to take part, as Richard's forces were intending to desert him; a note is pasted up on his door: 'lack of Norffolke be not to bolde / For Dykon thy maister is bought and solde.'<sup>34</sup> Bennett suggests that this may have reflected a 'well-founded tradition',<sup>35</sup> but it may also reveal the impact of the later history of the Howard line.

Hall's only other substantial alterations to Vergil come in his treatment of the role of the Stanleys – he enlarges their role. This reveals the fact of their continuing place in Tudor politics in the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI. He portrays Lord Stanley's decision to withdraw from Lichfield before Henry arrives as an act to benefit the latter: 'gave to hym place'.<sup>36</sup> Hall also is more explicit on Thomas's guile ('this wilye foxe') in order to avoid Richard taking action against Lord Strange.<sup>37</sup> He also does not include any indication that Thomas's reply at the Atherstone meeting caused any anxiety for Henry. Rather the three men 'eache reioysed of the state of other, and sodeinly were surprised with great ioye, comfort and hope of fortunate successe in all their affaires and doynge'.<sup>38</sup> In Hall's account Henry is with Lord Stanley and the earl of Pembroke at the battle ('he with the aide of the lord Stanley accompaigned with therle of Penbroke havynge a good compaignie of horsemen and a small number of footmen').<sup>39</sup>

Hall tidies up Vergil's account of the Stanleys' intervention in the battle. As the forces draw close and engage in battle, rather than holding back Lord Stanley moves forward and commits: 'at whiche encounter the lord Stanley ioyned with therle'.<sup>40</sup> When the king is later threatened (by Richard's attack), it is (as in Vergil) Sir William who comes to his rescue with 3,000 tall men, 'at whiche very instant kynge Richardes men were dryven backe and fledde', and Richard himself was slain.<sup>41</sup> Meanwhile, Oxford, 'with the aide of the Lord Stanley' (another departure

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<sup>33</sup> Bennett, p. 7.

<sup>34</sup> Hall, p. 419.

<sup>35</sup> Bennett, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> Hall, p. 412.

<sup>37</sup> Hall, p. 412.

<sup>38</sup> Hall, p. 413.

<sup>39</sup> Hall, p. 414.

<sup>40</sup> Hall, p. 418.

<sup>41</sup> Hall, p. 419.

from Vergil's account) discomfited the vanguard of Richard.<sup>42</sup> Lord Stanley is the one who crowns Richard.<sup>43</sup> Hall adds a longer story here about Richard's relations with Lord Stanley, saying that when Richard came to Bosworth 'he sent a pursuivaunt to the lord Stanley, commaundyng hym to auauance forward with hys compaignie and to come to his presence', threatening that if Stanley failed to do this he would behead his son. Richard ordered Lord Strange's execution as soon as the two armies had sight of each other (one imagines that Richard intended to carry out the act in sight of Henry and Stanley's army) but his advisers persuaded the king that it was time to fight and that Strange should be kept a prisoner till the battle was ended. So he was delivered to the keeper of the lord's tents, where, following Henry's victory, Richard's counsellors submitted themselves to Lestrangle's custody, who took them to the new king.<sup>44</sup>

### **Raphael Holinshed**

The Elizabethan chronicler Raphael Holinshed's late sixteenth century account of the battle is copied almost verbatim from Hall, but with one additional observation on the terrain, apparently drawn from a personal visit to the site, or from a contemporary report. After mention of the marsh Holinshed gives a comment on its current state

'between both armies there was a great marish then (but at this present, by reason of diches cast, it is growne to be firme ground)'.<sup>45</sup>

Holinshed's chronicle was printed in two volumes in 1578, with an expanded version (including the section on Bosworth) produced in 1586, after Holinshed's death in 1580. Although the chronicle continued to bear his name, it was by this time the work of several authors (including the London chronicler John Stow and 'a learned corrector' Abraham Fleming), and this may be the case for the section on Bosworth, though there is no reason to doubt that the state of the battlefield site was as described.

John Speed's *History of Great Britain* (1611), is the first source to claim that Jasper Tudor, Earl of Pembroke, was present at the battle.<sup>46</sup>

### **Scottish histories**

There are two Scottish accounts of Bosworth. A Scottish intellectual and historian, who had studied at the University of Paris before returning to Glasgow in about 1500, John Major's Latin history of Scotland (probably written whilst he was in France) tells us that 1000 of 5000 troops provided by the king of France were Scottish, under the command of 'John son of Robert Haddington'.<sup>47</sup> His account of the battle is only a

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<sup>42</sup> Hall, p. 419.

<sup>43</sup> Hall, p. 420.

<sup>44</sup> Hall, pp. 420-1.

<sup>45</sup> Raphael Holinshed, *The Third Volume of the Chronicles* (London, 1586), STC (2<sup>nd</sup> edn) 13569, p. 758.

<sup>46</sup> P. 724. More likely he remained in Wales 'to safeguard his nephew's line of retreat': T.B. Pugh, 'Henry VII and the English nobility', in G.W. Bernard (ed.), *The Tudor Nobility* (Manchester, 1992), p. 50. All cited by R. Griffiths, *Sir Rhys ap Thomas and his Family* (Cardiff, 1993), p. 229 note 62.

<sup>47</sup> J. Major, *A History of Greater Britain*, ed. A. Constable (Scottish Historical Society, 1892), p. 393.

couple of sentences and adds nothing to our knowledge of the event. It gives no location.

Writing in Pittscottie, Fife in the later sixteenth century, the Scottish historian Robert Lindsay included an account of Bosworth in his *Historie and Chronicles of Scotland*, first printed in 1778.<sup>48</sup> Drawing on oral tradition, Lindsay gave a lengthy account of the battle although he does not give its location. His discussion of troop deployments and battlefield manoeuvres similar to the account offered in de Valera, which he cannot possibly have seen. Like de Valera, Lindsay says that Richard's vanguard turned and fought against him, though he does not mention who led the vanguard. He records the death of Norfolk and the imprisonment of Surrey.

Leaving France for England, Henry is said to have had three ships, with 10,000 troops, comprised of 3000 Englishmen, 6000 Frenchmen and 1000 Scots, which latter group were under the command of captains such as Sir Alexander Bruce of Erlshall (in charge of the cavalry) and Captain Henderson, son of Robert Haddington (in charge of the footmen).<sup>49</sup> In the battle, the Scots form part of Henry's vanguard.

Lindsay also covers Lord Stanley's defection to Henry, along with 'Edward' (Robert) Brackenbury (which is not found in any other account and shows confusion), though his account here becomes rather muddled, as it is only after Henry's messengers return from Stanley and others with 'good answers' that he unloads artillery, powder, bullets and 'all manner' of weapons from his ships before burning them, that his forces might not be tempted to return. This is an invention based on later warfare styles. Lindsay's subsequent assessment of Richard's forces as comprising 100,000 men is similarly influenced and an exaggeration.<sup>50</sup> Further inaccuracies occur, with command of the king's vanguard given to 'Edward' Brackenbury (although this makes 'sense' of the passage saying the king's vanguard turned against him, since Brackenbury is described as defecting to Henry.)

Richard's resolution to fight Henry and his donning of the crown of England to do so is said to have been witnessed by the Bishop of Dunkeld, the Scottish ambassador, present in England on behalf of James III.<sup>51</sup> According to Lindsay, the bishop was accompanied by his 'most secret' servant, MacGregor, a Highlander, who witnesses the bringing of the crown to Richard and, after spying on the tent where it is placed, steals it. His theft is discovered by the bishop, who brings him before several of Richard's council, who are so amused by MacGregor's speech that they release him and allow him to depart with the bishop.<sup>52</sup> It seems unlikely that this story is true.

## Ballads

The major source on the Stanleys' involvement in the battle is a set of three ballads written about the battle which have been identified as being written in a north-western dialect, the stronghold of Stanley power. There is no further evidence on authorship

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<sup>48</sup> *The Historie and Cronicles of Scotland from the Slauchter of King James the First to the Ane Thousande Fyve Hundreith Thrie Scoir Fyftein Yeir*, written and collected by Robert Lindsay of Pittscottie, ed. A.J.G. Mackay, 3 vols (Scottish Text Society, 1899-1911), I, pp. 190-99. Translation in Bennett, p. 140.

<sup>49</sup> Pp. 191, 195.

<sup>50</sup> Pp. 194-5.

<sup>51</sup> P. 196.

<sup>52</sup> Pp. 196-8.

and provenance, and it is impossible to say for certain why these ballads were written, or whether they were composed under Stanley patronage.

The earliest ballad account of Bosworth comes in 'The Rose of England' whose earliest manuscript is a mid-seventeenth century copy.<sup>53</sup> Its original date of composition is not known, but it could reflect an early need to redeem the reputation of William Stanley after his involvement in pots against Henry in 1495 which led to his execution.

It provides an amount of detail regarding Henry's route to Bosworth, including a rendezvous with the Stanleys at Atherstone (this could suggest the influence of reading Hall, copying Vergil) and the gathering of support in Wales and from Cheshire and Lancashire (thereby expanding on this in Vergil and Hall). There is some information of troop deployment; the ballad's account of the battle places the earl of Oxford to the right of Richard's forces, 'the sunn & wind of them to gett'. It also says that both Lord Stanley and William Stanley were actively involved in the battle.

As a piece of Tudor propaganda, the ballad is highly effective. It begins with an allegorical description of England as a garden with a rose bush, representing the house of Lancaster, destroyed by a white boar (Richard III), who drives Henry Tudor, the eponymous 'Rose of England' into exile before his return and victory at Bosworth, whereupon 'this garden flourisheth freshly & gay, / with fragrant flowers comely of hew'. The theme is reinforced throughout the ballad: William Stanley's forces fight in white and red jackets.

The 'Ballad of Bosworth Felde' again survives in a seventeenth-century copy (this seems to be the first use of Bosworth 'Field': the expression is not found in Hall or Holinshed) and there is also a late sixteenth-century prose summary of the ballad which implies its earlier existence, although as with the Rose of England, exact dating has not been possible.<sup>54</sup> The vocabulary and content of the Ballad suggest that it was written by a northerner, probably not present at the battle but writing within living memory, working under the patronage of the Stanleys. The Ballad provides a narrative of the build-up to the battle, focusing especially on the decision of Lord Stanley and Sir William Stanley to transfer their allegiance to Henry, and detailing Henry's and the Stanleys' itineraries en route to Bosworth.

The Ballad's account of the battle provides an amount of military information, describing troop deployment and Richard's ordnance (although much of the weaponry is anachronistic we think – more work could be done on this). Neither give a place name for the battle (save in the title of the ballad, but this could be a later addition). The Ballad also gives the numbers of Richard's forces as 'forty thousand and three' in the poetic version; 20,000 in the prose summary. Again, as in 'The Rose of England', Oxford is placed on the right of Henry's forces, again taking advantage of the 'sun and wind'. Like Molinet, the ballad tells us that Henry's forces decided to attack the flank of Richard's army, having originally drawn up against his front line. Lord Stanley is again said to have actively participated in the battle; in fact, the significance of his involvement is presented as having persuaded Richard that his defeat was

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<sup>53</sup> BL Additional Ms 27879. Printed in *Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript*, ed. by J.W. Hales and F.J. Furnivall, 3 vols. (1868), iii, pp. 187-94.

<sup>54</sup> BL Additional MS 27, 879, fos. 434-43. Printed in *Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript*, ed. by J.W. Hales and F.J. Furnivall, 3 vols. (1868), iii, pp. 233-59. For the late sixteenth century prose summary, see BL Harleian 542, f.34, printed in *Leicestershire and Rutland Notes and Queries*, ed. John and Thomas Spencer, vol I (1881-1891), pp. 53-8.



inevitable and that his only option was to die in battle. (This creates some degree of confusion as to whose side he was fighting on during the battle as a whole!)

The Ballad also lists the names of ninety men apparently present on the battlefield. One might question the authenticity of such a detailed list – could it really have survived intact down to the seventeenth century? In literary form it is reminiscent of Michael Drayton’s poem on Agincourt of the early seventeenth century, and both are likely influenced by what is known as the Homeric catalogue, where one group follows another. Yet the inclusion of a number of obscure names, whose presence at the battle can be confirmed by other sources, suggests that the author of the Ballad must have been able either to draw upon accurate testimony or some relevant source material. Charles Ross felt that the Ballad had been underused, pointing out that the roll call of names indicates an informed grasp of northern politics.<sup>55</sup> Michael Bennett argues that the list of names must be regarded as authentic:

An oral tradition which preserved so faithfully the names of so many Ricardian stalwarts for over a century must have originated in firm intelligence derived from the field by a Stanleyan herald or spy. The only alternative is to claim that the ballads were the product of a later antiquarian, who was equipped with an extraordinary knowledge of fifteenth-century politics and possessed of a sufficiently devious intelligence to throw in a few wild spellings.<sup>56</sup>

Overall it seems likely that the Ballad was originally composed at an early date, but the version which survives to us was written down, or possibly copied later and the information contained within it had become corrupted over time. It is nonetheless an important source for information on Richard’s army and the other information it contains cannot be dismissed, as there was almost certainly an original, directly contemporary source.

The ‘Song of the Ladye Bessiye’ is a romanticised later version of the ‘Ballad of Bosworth Fielde, and is the only ballad to actually place the battle at Bosworth. The poem creates a central role for ‘Ladye Bessiye’, Elizabeth of York, future wife of Henry VII, who pleads with Lord Stanley, described as the earl of Derby (Henry VII elevated him to the earldom on 27 October 1485) to support Henry against Richard. Throughout, the Stanleys are at the heart of the action; Stanley writes to his brother William Stanley, his sons Lord Strange and Edward Stanley, Gilbert Talbot and Sir John Savage, summoning them to a meeting in London on 3 May, where they agree to support Henry. Lord Stanley agrees to provide 10,000 men, William Stanley promises 10,000. The Song also gives some details on Richard’s support. ‘Lord Percy’ (the earl of Northumberland) pledges 30,000 men. Norfolk, Surrey, the earl of Kent, the bishop of Durham, Lord Scroope, Sir William Bawmer and Sir William Harrington all promise money and men. Richard also sends messages to Lord Stanley and William Stanley summoning them to provide 20,000 and 10,000 men respectively, threatening to behead Lord Strange.

In the Song, Sir William Stanley seems to be the person who decides on the place of the battle several days beforehand (although getting the day of the week wrong):

then another Herald can appear:

“to Sir william stanley *that noble Knight,*

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<sup>55</sup> Charles Ross, *Richard III* (London, 1981; new edn, 1999), pp. 235-7.

<sup>56</sup> Bennett, p. 11.

bidd him bring 10000 men,  
or to death he shalbe dight.” – 214.872

then answered *that* doubtye *Knight*,  
& answered the herald without lettinge:  
“Say, on Bosworthe feilde I wyll hym meete  
On munday earlye in the morninge. – 215.876

“such a breakeffast I him hett  
as neuer subiect did to Kinge!”  
the messenger is home gone  
to tell *King* *Richard* this tydand. – 216.880

And later, when there is a rumour Lord Stanley has already engaged with Richard in a fight:

now is word comen to Sir *william* stanley  
Early on the sunday morninge,  
*that* the Erle of Darby, his brother deere,  
had giuen battell to *Richard* the Kinge. – 225.918

“that wold I not,” said Sir william,  
“for all the gold in christentye,  
except I were with him there,  
att the Battell ffor to bee. – 226.922

then straight to Lichefeild can he ryde  
in all the hast *that* might bee.  
& when they came to the towne,  
they all cryed, “*King* HENERY!” – 227.926

then straight to Bosworth wold he ryde  
in all he hast *that* might bee.  
when they came to Bosworth ffeild,

There is no marsh in this poem, but plenty of hills (even with windmills on them) and even mountains!

The chronology of the respective protagonists’ journeys to the battlefield is very confused: Sir William Stanley rushes to join the battle after hearing that his brother has already engaged with Richard, leaving for Lichfield and then travelling straight on to Bosworth. On the field of battle, Lord Stanley lines up with his 20,000 men, William Stanley with his 10,000, Sir John Savage (Lord Stanley’s sister’s son) with 1500 men and Rhys ap Thomas with ‘1000 speres mightye of tree’. It is Lord Stanley that directs the battle – Henry comes to him to beg for command of the vanguard, which he is granted (in other words, Oxford is expunged from the narrative for the sake of enhancing the Stanleys’ reputation), with the support of William Stanley and Rhys ap Thomas, with John Savage on the wing.

Meanwhile, Lord Strange comes very close to execution, despite the counsel of Sir William Harrington that Richard should wait till he had captured all of the Stanleys and can execute them together. Strange makes a heroic declaration of resistance, sending a message to his wife to take his son into exile so that a future

generation can gain revenge on Richard, should Henry's challenge fail, and gets as far as placing his head down upon the block before the king is, at the last minute, distracted by the enemy's attack.

The battle itself is only briefly described. There is a tremendous noise of bugles and guns, with great loss of life. Rhys ap Thomas defeats Lord Percy, Sir John Savage cuts off Norfolk's attempt to flee and kills the duke, capturing Surrey. Then Richard's support begins to dissipate: Lord Dacre flees, along with many others. Seeing this, Harrington counsels Richard to leave, but the king refuses, accepting the impossibility of victory but saying that he would rather die 'than with the stanleys taken bee'. Richard puts on the crown and is struck down, the crown hewn from his head. His naked corpse is taken to Leicester, where it is greeted by words of reproach from Lady Bessye. Elizabeth and Henry marry and the new king is crowned by Lord Stanley and William Stanley – William's later disgrace is briefly acknowledged (dating this part of the poem to after 1495) before the poem closes with a call for God to 'saue & keepe our comelye King / & the poore cominaltye!'

The problem is that we cannot know when the ballads were written or whether the copies we have reflect later re-writings. More work by literary scholars would help, by comparison with early Tudor writings, use of vocabulary etc. (See Appendix 2 for assessment of the ballads by Professor John McGavin, English Department, University of Southampton).

We have since come across a reference to a poem in Welsh by Huw Pennant (fl. 1465-1514). In this the poet 'assumes that Rhys ap Thomas would support Henry once he landed in Wales, but we do not know whether he was writing with hindsight'.<sup>57</sup> The poem is printed in E.P. Roberts, *Dafyd Llwyd o Fathafarn* (Caernafon, 1981). There is also an early seventeenth-century life of Rhys ap Thomas, with an account of the battle based upon Polydore Vergil and John Speed's *The History of Great Britain* (1611).<sup>58</sup>

## Other materials

### **Before the battle.**

#### **BL MS Harleian 433.**

This collection of royal letters and orders relating to the reign of Edward V and Richard III records a series of official documents relating to Bosworth. On the 16 June 1485 a letter of passage is provided for 'Rodigo de Onover', a servant to 'captain Salasar', who must be the Spanish mercenary captain Juan de Salazar, later to provide the testimony that informed de Valera's account of the battle.

A set of documents dating from 22 June is also preserved in this manuscript, recording Richard's instructions to his commissioners of array in the county of Yorkshire to prepare themselves for a rumoured invasion by Henry Tudor. This letter was also to be copied to every shire in England. This provides useful information on how Richard may have tried to prepare for invasion, and will be discussed further in section 4 on the Armies. The collection also includes a copy of the official proclamation denouncing Henry as a traitor, along with the bishop of Exeter, the earl

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<sup>57</sup> R. Griffiths, *Sir Rhys ap Thomas and his Family* (Cardiff, 1993), p. 41. See also H.W. Lloyd, 'Sir Rhys ap Thomas and his family, illustrated by the poems of contemporary bards', *Archaeologia Cambrensis*, 4<sup>th</sup> series, IX (1878).

<sup>58</sup> Printed in Griffiths, *Sir Rhys ap Thomas*, part II, pp. 228-31.

of Pembroke, the earl of Oxford, Sir Edward Widevile and ‘othre diverse his Rebelles and traytors’.

### **Letter of Richard III to Henry Vernon**

Residing in Beskwood Lodge in Nottinghamshire, on the 11 August Richard wrote to members of the Vernon family, announcing the landing of ‘our rebelles and traitours’ at Milford Haven, ‘entending our uttre destruccion, thextreme subversion of this oure realme and disheriting of oure true subgiettes of the same’. He summons the Vernons to his support: ‘we wol and straitely charge you that ye in your persone with suche nombre as ye have promysed unto us sufficiently horsed and harneised be with us in all hast to you possible, to yeve utno us your atendaunce without failing, al manere excuses sette apart, upon peyne of forfaicutre unto us of all that ye may forfait and loose.’<sup>59</sup>

The speed with which Richard had been informed of Henry’s landing suggests that he may have had another route of information other than the one which is usually cited – a letter from Richard Williams, the constable of Pembroke, who had observed the landing. It is clearly possible that news could have made it from northern France to Nottingham by a shorter route than via Milford Haven.

### **Paston Letters**

In the letter collection of the Paston family, Richard’s proclamation denouncing Henry as a traitor is recorded, along with a letter from the duke of Norfolk to John Paston, summoning him to join the king’s forces at Bury, with ‘suche company of tall men as ye may goodly make at my cost and charge’, which men were to be dressed in Norfolk’s livery.<sup>60</sup> It should be noted that in the Household book of John Howard, duke of Norfolk, we have ‘the names of the M men that my lord [the duke] hath graunted to the Kyng’.<sup>61</sup> This is dated 26 Feb in the first year of the reign (ie 1484). It cannot therefore be used as a definite list of the troops Howard brought with him to Bosworth but there would surely have been some of these men present with him at the battle. Paston is not mentioned in the list.

### **Letters of Henry, earl of Richmond**

Just as Richard wrote to Vernon (and no doubt to other men), so too Henry wrote to possible supporters summoning them to his aid. One surviving letter was written to John ap Maredudd (who lived in Eifionydd in South Carnarvonshire) just as Henry as crossed the River Teifi at Cardigan (it is likely that more letters of this kind were sent out by Henry at this stage). The wording used was very similar to that used by Richard, showing the standard form of summons for the defence of the realm. John was to come to Henry ‘with all such power as ye may make defensively arrayed for the war’ but no location was indicated. The original of this letter does not survive but it is found in the History of the Wynn family of Gwydir of Carnarvonshire, written by Sir John Wynn (d. 1627). There is, however, a surviving original of another letter sent

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<sup>59</sup> *Historical Manuscripts Commission. Twelfth Report Appendix Part IV. The Manuscripts of his Grace the duke of Rutland, GCB, preserved at Belvoir Castle*, vol. 1 (London, 1888), pp. 7-8.

<sup>60</sup> *The Paston Letters*, ed. by James Gairdner, 6 volumes (London, 1904), vi, pp. 81-5.

<sup>61</sup> *The Household Books of John Howard, duke of Norfolk, 1462-1471, 1481-1483*, introduction by Anne Crawford (Gloucester, 1992), pp. 480-90.

by Henry from Machynlleth on 14 August, the day after his arrival there. This was sent to Sir Roger Kynaston urging him to come Henry's aid with the 'folks and servants' of lord Powis.

## After the battle

### Parliamentary record

In the roll of the parliament that met on the 7 November 1485, the place of battle was given as 'in the county of Leicester'.<sup>62</sup> The parliament rolls record the act of conviction and attainder that was passed against 'Richard, late duke of Gloucester' and his supporters, who are listed at length.<sup>63</sup> A list is given of the weapons brought to the field of battle: Richard's supporters are described as having been 'strongly armed and equipped with all kinds of weapons, such as guns, bows, arrows, spears, glaives, axes and all other weaponry suitable or necessary for giving and advancing a mighty battle'.<sup>64</sup> The inclusion of this list is not for the sake of accuracy but rather to justify the attainder of Richard and some of his supporters. Just as in criminal law the nature of the offence was affected by the weapon and level of violence, so too rebellion was 'measured' and defined by the level of violence intended against the legitimate king.

### The compensation warrants

In November 1485, Henry issued two warrants for issue to 'Sir John Fox, parson of Witherley and John Atherston, gentleman', to 'certain townships' and to the Abbot of Merevale for damage to their land and crops at the time of the battle.<sup>65</sup> These warrants have assumed a great deal of significance in the historiography of the battle, as they inform the debate over the location of the battlefield, though they have been subjected to differing interpretations.

In November and December 1485, Henry issued two compensation warrants, the first to 'Sir John Fox, parson of Witherley and John Atherston, gentleman' and to 'certain townships' (Atherstone, Witherley, Atterton, Fenny Drayton and Mancetter), the second to the Abbot of Merevale, for damage to their land and crops at the time of the battle.<sup>66</sup> These warrants have assumed a great deal of significance in the historiography of the battle, as they inform the debate over the location of the battlefield, though they have been subjected to differing interpretations.

The first of these originates with M.K. Jones, who distinguishes between the payments, attributing the payment to the Abbot to damage caused by Henry's army camping near the Abbey and consequent damage to its crops.<sup>67</sup> The other payment, Jones argues, was for losses sustained during the battle itself, therefore locating it in the region of Atherstone. John D. Austin follows Jones, offering a reading of the compensation warrants that supports Jones's suggestion that the battle took place on

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<sup>62</sup> *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504*, XV ed. by Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 108.

<sup>63</sup> *Parliament Rolls*, pp. 107-8.

<sup>64</sup> *Parliament Rolls*, p. 108.

<sup>65</sup> TNA E 404/79/339. TNA E 404/79/340. Printed and transcribed in Sean Cunningham, *Richard III: A royal enigma* (Kew, 2003), pp. 70-1.

<sup>66</sup> TNA E 404/79/339. TNA E 404/79/340. Printed and transcribed in Sean Cunningham, *Richard III: A royal enigma* (Kew, 2003), pp. 70-1.

<sup>67</sup> M.K. Jones, *Bosworth 1485: psychology of a battle* (Tempus, Stroud, 2002), pp. 175-9.

the land owned by the villages named in the first warrant- nearer to Atherstone than to Dadlington.<sup>68</sup> Jones and Austin both argue that the warrants must be read together to be properly understood, suggesting that the December warrant refers to the passage of Henry's troops towards the battle and the November payment to the battle itself.

Yet there are problems with Jones's interpretation of the warrants. Foard has noted that the payments cover a very wide area, 'including land in Atherstone which is on the other side of the river from the suggested battlefield'.<sup>69</sup> Further, 'when the troop movements suggested by Jones are superimposed it is seen that several of the townships are actually wholly avoided, including Fenny Drayton which received one of the highest payments'. Foard's suggestion is that the largest payment, to Merevale, probably indicates where the headquarters were located (where Jones himself suggests that Henry camped before the battle) and that the overall pattern reflects that of similar payments made in the seventeenth century, 'resulting from an army quartering on a group of villages'. Similarly, Goodman and Foss have interpreted the payments as recompense for the losses in grain and corn suffered by the villages as Henry's army foraged for food in the area on the night before the battle.<sup>70</sup> Foss's reading of the warrants expands the definition of the December warrant slightly, to incorporate the neighbourhood where Merevale managed demesne farms and also suggests that it may have covered damage inflicted by Stanley forces.<sup>71</sup> This allows him to locate the site of the battle further away from Merevale and nearer his preferred site of Dadlington.

Austin suggests that the compensation payments indicate that Henry's army camped at/near Merevale Abbey, not on Royal Meadow – this, therefore, 'must' have been Richard. Austin's reading hinges on his interpretation of 'repair': his argument is that the 'great repair and resort' that Henry's people are said to have made 'coming toward our late field' in fact suggests that they were repairing to Merevale, ie. going there to camp. Yet this cannot be taken as definite proof that either Henry or his troops were at or near Merevale abbey. It is possible that 'our people' refers to the subjects of the king as a whole, and therefore embraces the troops of the opposing side. (Significantly, the other compensation payment to the parishes speaks of 'our company', a much more specific term.)

M.K. Jones argues that Richard was not camped on Ambion Hill but near to Atherstone, citing the Crowland Chronicle, which records that Richard camped near to Merevale Abbey on the 21 August and describes the battle as the 'battle of Merevale', and John Rous, who says that it was fought on the Warwickshire/Leicestershire border – ie, where Atherstone is. This could tie in with the evidence of the compensation warrant. We could perhaps conclude that the armies were in the vicinity of the abbey on the evening before, and hence also the morning of, the battle. Richard's order to pitch camp 'near Merevale abbey' would also make sense if his scouts had reported to him that Henry was in the vicinity of the abbey. Although there is a tradition that that Henry moved his army to Whitemoors on the eve of the battle, it is likely equally likely that Henry spent the night of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> at or near Merevale Abbey, in Warwickshire, as he later paid the surrounding villages for food taken from their land.

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<sup>68</sup> John D. Austin, *Merevale and Atherstone: 1485. Recent Bosworth Discoveries* (The Friends of Atherstone Heritage, 2004), pp. 2-6.

<sup>69</sup> Glenn Foard, *Bosworth Battlefield: A Reassessment* (Leicestershire County Council, 2004), p. 15.

<sup>70</sup> Anthony Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society 1452-97*, (Routledge, London, 1981); P.J. Foss, *The field of Redemore : the battle of Bosworth, 1485*, (Kairos Press, Newtown Linford, 1998)

<sup>71</sup> Peter J. Foss, *The Field of Redemore: the Battle of Bosworth, 1485* (Headingly, 1990), p. 26.

## Other governmental records

The historian can also draw on Inquisitions post mortem. These record enquiries into the landholdings of deceased tenants of the crown, and include some who died at Bosworth. David Baldwin has suggested that the relatively high number of deaths on the previous day reflect a skirmish on that day.<sup>72</sup> Also useful are the Calendars of Patent and Close rolls which show grants to Henry VII's supporters after the battle., Together, these can contribute to the list of those known or likely to have been at the battle.

## Documents relating to Dadlington Chantry

There are two main sources for the chantry at Dadlington. The first is a signet warrant, issued in August 1511 by Henry VIII, authorising the collection of alms for a period of seven years, in the dioceses of Lincoln, Chester, Worcester and Norwich, 'for and towardis the biolding of a chapell of sainte James standing upon a parcell of the grounde where Bosworth feld, otherwise called Dadlyngton feld ... was done'. The money is also meant to fund the stipend of a priest, to pray for the souls of those killed in the battle.<sup>73</sup> There is also a subsequent Letter of Confraternity, stating that Henry VII had issued 'his letters patent', and granting indulgence and pardon for those that supported the 'buyldynge & meyntenaunce' of 'Seynte James chapell' where prayers were said 'for ye soules of them that weyr sleyne at bosworth feelde', and supported 'ye preestes and mynysters that beyth found ther to synge & rede & praye for ye seyde soules'.<sup>74</sup>

The property acquired to support a chantry priest in Dadlington is also described in an early seventeenth-century court case, stating that the property came to the crown at the dissolution of the chantries in 1547.<sup>75</sup> The contemporary documents relating to the dissolution of the chantry have not been found, though the survival of documents from this period is typically incomplete and patchy.

Foss, drawing on Parry's work has 'shown that the expression 'biolding' would indicate repairs and improvements to the existing church of St James, rather than to a new structure as such'. Foss and Parry also point out that 'it is highly unlikely that another chapel would have been built within the chapelry, and indeed there are precedents for the use of the term'. There is no evidence that the work was ever carried out, though Parry suggests that signs of the work may be seen in 'some of the fabric' of the chapel.<sup>76</sup> One might also question the lack of further references to any additional structure. Any such commemoration at Bosworth would have been politically very sensitive, and certainly Henry VII would have been anxious to incorporate any memorial into the official programme of commemoration, rather than

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<sup>72</sup> Paper delivered to conference at Bosworth, 19 August 2006. Baldwin discovered 16 deaths on 22 and 23 August, and six deaths on 20 and 21 August.

<sup>73</sup> TNA C 82/367. Calendared in *Letters and Papers, foreign and domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII*, ed. by Brewer, Gairdner and Brodie, 21 vols (1862-1932; repr. Vaduz, 1965), I, p.454

<sup>74</sup> The letter survives in two or three copies, at the BL and at Harvard University. Both the signet warrant and the letter of confraternity are reproduced in Foss, pp. 39-40 and transcribed in O.D Harris, 'The Bosworth Commemoration at Dadlington', *The Ricardian*, vol 7, no 90 (September 1985), 115-31.

<sup>75</sup> TNA C 66/1287 m.37, TNA C 3/369/13.

<sup>76</sup> Foss, p. 39. I haven't yet seen T.V. Parry, *A Church for Bosworth Field* (the author, 1987).

risk it becoming a focus for Yorkist opposition.<sup>77</sup> In the absence of any additional evidence to the contrary, it does not seem likely that the warrant referred to the building of an additional structure. As to the question of why there was interest in 1511 and not before, it may be that the warrant was issued on the death of an incumbent. Harris argues that the Dadlington chapelry was under severe financial strain, drawing attention to ‘evidence that the Dadlington curate was not adequately provided for’, and pointing out that the chapelry was either not mentioned in ecclesiastical visitation records from 1489-1510 or shared the priest from Stoke, in 1509-10.<sup>78</sup> It seems that there was no priest in place at Dadlington in 1511, and thus the ‘initiative for the appeal came, not from the King, but from Dadlington’s churchwardens’, taking advantage of their links with Bosworth ‘to secure royal patronage and to appeal to a wider public’.<sup>79</sup> The dating of this opportunistic effort makes sense, as the signet warrant was issued during Henry VIII’s visit to Nottingham Castle. Harris has reconstructed the king’s route at this point, taking in Leicester and Merevale Abbey. He points out that the warrant is dated 24 August, thereby suggesting that it is possible that the king’s visit may have incorporated ‘some sort of commemoration’ of the battle.<sup>80</sup> Harris’ argument again indicates that it is unlikely that an additional structure was built at Dadlington after 1511, given the impoverishment of the parish. He draws attention to the change of wording between the signet warrant and the letter of indulgence, from the implication that an additional chapel was to be built, to the ‘buyldynge & meyntenaunce’ of the existing structure.<sup>81</sup>

Harris has also drawn attention to the unusualness of the letter of indulgence, as one which is ‘in effect ... issued in the King’s name alone’, a rarity before the break with Rome. Indulgences were more usually granted by the Pope; the king’s involvement was limited to the licensing of the pardoners, sent out to collect donations, by royal letters patent or to the licensing of the collection of alms, without the offer of an indulgence. In the case of the Dadlington indulgence, Harris points out that it is ‘particularly vague about the spiritual benefits: real indulgences gave precise details of the amount of penance to be remitted’.<sup>82</sup> The dioceses asked for assistance may be of significance in giving a guide to the areas the dead came from: Lincoln, Chester (Coventry and Lichfield), Worcester and Norwich. Leicester was in Lincoln diocese, Chester covers lands from which Stanleys would have come from, Norwich the Howard areas, Worcester possibly those recruited en route by Henry.

The wording of the confraternity letter of indulgence may be significant – it states that the bodies of the dead ‘were brought’ to be buried at Dadlington chapel: ‘to whyche ye bodyes or bones of the men sleyne in ye seyde felde beth broght & beryed’. This indicates that the battlefield was near enough for the bodies to be brought to the chapel, thereby suggesting that the battle may have occurred somewhere in the vicinity of Dadlington, though it is also likely that the largest

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<sup>77</sup> Philip Morgan’s short paper on battlefield memorials, given to a meeting of the Shropshire Archaeological Society, provides some useful information on battlefield chapels: some were founded by private speculators, in many cases they implied pilgrimage, some signified government involvement, being integrated into an official programme of memorialisation rather than risk them becoming a focus for opposition. ‘The Building and Restorations of Battlefield Church’, 11 January 2003.

<sup>78</sup> Harris, p. 118.

<sup>79</sup> Harris, p. 118. From 1516-7, Dadlington was served by its own chaplain, Roger Normanton (Harris, p. 120).

<sup>80</sup> Harris, p. 119.

<sup>81</sup> Harris, p. 121.

<sup>82</sup> Harris, p. 116.



number of deaths would not have occurred during the battle itself but during the rout. Harris suggests that this took place ‘in the direction of Stoke Golding’, taking ‘the combatants over the parish boundary, and into the chapelry of Dadlington’.<sup>83</sup>

A close analysis of the language used in the warrant and the letter of indulgence may shed some light on their contemporary meaning. We have sought here the advice of Dr John J McGavin. Understanding the verb ‘biel’d’ to mean repairs and improvements, he suggests that the phrasing of the signet warrant, seeking alms ‘for and towardis the bielding of a chapell of sainte James standing upon a parcell of the grounde where Bosworth’ feld, otherwise called Dadlyngton feld, in our countie of Leicestr’ was done’ signifies that the structure in question was already standing on the ground where the battle was fought. The use of the present participle here is significant - if the ‘bielding’ was to be done elsewhere, it would have been described in the future tense, as ‘to be placed upon’, for example. The term ‘bielding’ may not have indicated building works in the physical sense, but rather the intention to ‘sustain, nourish and feed’. There may also be a local, dialectical significance here. In the letter of indulgence, the term used to describe the fate of the remains of those that died at Bosworth, ‘beth’, is best understood as ‘have been and continue to be’. It is likely that remains – bones – continued to appear from time to time, and it appears from the letter that the chapel at Dadlington was the place they were taken to for interment. The term ‘beyth’, used to describe the priests and ministers at Dadlington, could signify past, present or future; that they were ‘found’ there signifies that they were furnished, provided and maintained there. This again suggests that the chapel at Dadlington was the recognised memorial to the dead of Bosworth and lends further weight to Harris’s argument that the chapel was in financial difficulties in 1511 and needed further support to continue its commemorative activities.

The chantry issue is of particular significance to the debate over the location of the battlefield and has aroused particular controversy amongst historians since 1985, when Colin Richmond drew particular attention to the signet warrant in a *History Today* article in which he located the fighting to around Dadlington parish, not Ambion Hill.<sup>84</sup>

The issue of the chantry also forms a vital part of Foss’s relocation of the site to somewhere near Dadlington village. Foss argues that this location is borne out by the initial naming of the battlefield – ‘Dadlyngton Feld’ and ‘the feld of Redemore’. Redemore was initially named as the place of battle by John Sponer in his report to the city of York, also in the ‘Londoner’s Notes’. Foss also draws attention to the geology of the site, arguing for the possible presence of reed-beds, named in a surviving document from 1283, mentioning ‘six roods of meadow in Redemor in the fields of Dadlington’.<sup>85</sup>

M.K. Jones’s alternative siting of the battlefield leads him to argue that Henry chose Dadlington as the burial place for those who died in his service as it would have been the first parish church on his route from the field of battle towards Leicester. Thus ‘not only was the battle named from its principal burial site, but the site itself had a symbolic significance to the victor, the first consecrated ground passed in the aftermath of conflict’.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Harris, p. 116.

<sup>84</sup> Colin Richmond, ‘The Battle of Bosworth’, *History Today* (August 1985), 17-22. The article, coinciding with the expansion of the Battlefield Centre at Bosworth, gave rise to an article in *The Times* and a letter from D.T. Williams – 27 July, 1985, 3 August, 1985.

<sup>85</sup> Foss, pp. 30-8.

<sup>86</sup> Jones, pp. 183-4.

D.T. Williams, in his short pamphlet account of the battle, engages with some energy with the Dadlington issue, arguing that the letter of Confraternity does not mention Dadlington but, rather, ‘refers to an existing commemorative Chapel of St James already served by priests and ministers and previously endowed with indulgencies and pardons’. Williams argues that ‘the only establishment that satisfies all these criteria’ is the memorial chapel of St James at Towton Field in Yorkshire, where Towton chapelry had recently been granted to Henry Lofte, recently returned from pilgrimage to Jerusalem, on condition that he presented the pardons acquired on this expedition to his living, and prayed for the souls and memory of the recently deceased Henry VII and his wife, Elizabeth of York. This, Williams argues, enabled Henry VIII to commemorate his father and Bosworth and to arrange the ‘badly needed refurbishment and repair’ of Towton chapel ‘at no cost to himself’. He further suggests that that the remains of the Bosworth dead were to be removed to this chapel, though does not go as far as to suggest that this actually happened.

### **First recorded visit to battlefield**

Another useful later account of the condition of the battlefield is provided by the antiquary William Hutton.<sup>87</sup> Of a visit in 1807, he says that compared to an earlier viewing, he ‘found so great an alteration since I saw it in 1788, that I was totally lost. The manor had been inclosed; the fences were grown up; and my prospect impeded. King Richard’s Well ... was nearly obliterated; the swamp where he fell become firm land; and the rivulet proceeding from it, lost in an under-drain; so that future inspection is cut off.’<sup>88</sup>

On his earlier visit, Hutton had observed a site known as ‘*Redmoor Plain*, from the colour of the soil’, belonging to Sutton-Cheney. The site is described as ‘uneven’:

the south end, where Henry approached, is three miles from Bosworth, now a wood of four or five acres, bounded by [a] ... rivulet. About thirty yards above the wood is a spring called at this day *King Richard’s well*. A small discharge of water flows from the well, directly down the hill, through the wood, into the rivulet, but having no channel cut for its passage, it penetrates through the soil, and forms that morass, which Henry is said to have left on his right.<sup>89</sup>

Hutton further reports that the site of battle, formerly clear and uncultivated, was now full of fences and hedges

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<sup>87</sup> William Hutton, *The Battle of Bosworth Field* (First published 1788, second edn, with additions, 1813; repr. Stroud, 1974, 1999), pp. 19, 79-80.

<sup>88</sup> Hutton, p. 19

<sup>89</sup> Hutton, p. 79.

## **Section 2: Thoughts on the battle**

### **An analysis based on the narrative sources and on military treatises**

Anne Curry

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## Location

### 1. Sandeford

The proclamation issued by Henry shortly after the battle (known only through its proclamation at York on 25 August, which is known only through transcripts made by Drake in the early eighteenth century – see section 2 on York House books) does not give a location for the battle but claims that Richard was ‘slain at a place called Sandeford within the shire of Leicester’.<sup>90</sup> Some chronicles suggest that Richard was fleeing from the field, and therefore Sandeford need not be the location of the battle proper. Thornton has suggested that there was no actual place called Sandeford, and that the name was used in order to fit with prophecy.<sup>91</sup>

There is a brief undated entry in the York City House Book immediately before a record of the meeting of the city council on 23 August which mentions the battle, giving its date as 22 August and its location ‘at Redemore near Leicester’ (‘apud Redemore iuxta Leicestre’).<sup>92</sup> The note also says that ‘the lord king at Sandeford beside Leicester and others in the field there with many other nobles, knights, esquires and gentlemen were killed’ (‘dominus rex apud Sandeferth iuxta Leicestre et alii in campo ibidem cum aliis quampluribus nobiles, militibus, armigeris et generosis interfecti fuerunt’). This entry was likely inserted after the proclamation had been published in York on 25 August. It may be that the author of the entry was trying to distinguish between the *battle field* of Redemore where men died, and Sandeford, where the king died. If Richard had tried to flee, then it is possible that he was killed away from the main battle field. (Section here is also Redemore 2c)

No further references to Sandeford have been found in connection with the battle. But since it occurs within a royal proclamation we can say that it was a place which Henry wished to associate with his victory in its immediate aftermath, perhaps for the reasons Thornton suggests.

### 2. Redemore

a. The first *dated* reference to a location (‘the field of Redemore’) is to be found in the record in the York House Book of the city council meeting held on 23 August.<sup>93</sup> The wording of the entry for the council meeting suggests that the news of the battle had been brought by divers men, including John Sponer (sergeant of the mace in the city of York), who appeared in person before the city council at its meeting of 23 August. Interestingly it does not say that these men brought news *from* the field of Redemore,

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<sup>90</sup> *The York House books 1461-1490*, ed. by L. Attreed, 2 vols (Stroud, 1991), i, pp. 735-6. The text of the proclamation is also printed with modernised language in *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 3 vols, ed. by Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (London, 1964), i, p. 3.

<sup>91</sup> T. Thornton, ‘The battle of Sandeforde: Henry Tudor’s understanding of the meaning of Bosworth Field’, *Historical Research*, 78 (2005), pp. 436-442.

<sup>92</sup> York City Archives House Books B2-4, f. 169v, printed in *The York House books 1461-1490*, ed. L. Attreed 2 vols (Stroud, 1991), i, pp. 368. It is perplexing why this should be in Latin. Normally only the headings of entries in the York House Books is given in Latin. Worth looking at the original here to see handwriting (although as these books have received so much attention I doubt if there is anything unusual here, since surely it would have been spotted already).

<sup>93</sup> *York House books*, i, pp. 368-9.

but rather than they had been ‘sent unto the field of Redemore to bring tidings from the same to the city’.

If we were to take this literally, then the messengers sent from the city had known precisely where to go, implying that the battle field had been known and/or announced in advance. On 16 August the York city council had agreed ‘that John Sponer seriant to the mase shuld ride to Notingham to the kinges grace to understand his pleyser as in sending up any of his subgieetes within this citie to his said grace for the subduying of his ennemys late arryved in the parties of Wallez or otherwise to be disposed at his most high pleyser’.<sup>94</sup> On 19 August the York city council had met and agreed that 80 men should depart in all haste to the king to assist him subdue his enemies.<sup>95</sup> Their captain was to be John Hastings ‘gentleman to the mace’. Could Sponer have been part of the contingent?

Had Sponer and his associates been present at the battle, they would have needed to have travelled swiftly from the battlefield in order to appear before the York city council on 23 August (although admittedly we do not know the time at which the council meeting was held on that day. The implication is that the battle occurred early enough in the day on 22 August for them to be in York on the following day. It is possible, of course, that they never went to the battlefield, but received news of the battle at Leicester or elsewhere en route. However, the news which Sponer and his associates brought on 23 August included a report that the earl of Northumberland had come/was making for (‘was commen’) to Wressle, so they were aware that he had not fallen in the battle and that he was unlikely to be out of favour with Henry. Otherwise, why would he be regarded as someone worth approaching at this point?

b. There is a further dated reference to the ‘feld of Redmore’ in another entry in York records but in the transcripts made by Drake (where the originals are now lost). This is dated 24 August and speaks of Henry the seventh ‘so proclamed and crowned at the feld of Redmore’.<sup>96</sup> This entry also speaks of Sir Roger Cotam who had come to the city to proclaim the new king. The implication is that he came with the news on 24 August. It is likely that he brought with him Henry VII’s proclamation which, as we have seen, was announced in the city on 25 August.

c. There is a brief undated entry in the York City House Book immediately before a record of the meeting of the city council on 23 August which mentions the battle, giving its date as 22 August and its location ‘at Redemore near Leicester’ (‘apud Redemore iuxta Leicestre’).<sup>97</sup> The note also says that ‘the lord king at Sandeford beside Leicester and others in the field there with many other nobles, knights, esquires and gentlemen were killed’ (‘dominus rex apud Sandeferth iuxta Leicestre et alii in campo ibidem cum aliis quampluribus nobiles, militibus, armigeris et generosis interfecti fuerunt’). This entry was likely inserted after the proclamation had been published in York on 25 August. It may be that the author of the entry was trying to

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid, i, p. 367. Continues with order that evere warden of this citie serch the inhabitauntes within his ward, that they have sufficient wapens and aray for ther defence and the well of this citie’, and also that proclamations be made throughout cities ‘that evere man fraunchest within this citie be redie in ther moost defensible aray to attend upon the mayre for the wilfare of this citie within an owre warnyng upon pagne of imprisonment etc’.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, i, p. 367-8.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., i, p. 734 (from the missing sections transcribed by Drake).

<sup>97</sup> York City Archives House Books B2-4, f. 169v, printed in *The York House books 1461-1490*, ed. L. Attreed 2 vols (Stroud, 1991), i, pp. 368.

distinguish between the *battle field* of Redemore where men died, and Sandeford, where the king died. If Richard had tried to flee, then it is possible that he was killed away from the main battle field.

d. The ‘field of Redemore’ is also mentioned in a set of notes made by an unknown citizen of London: ‘this year the earl of Richmond and Jasper earl of Pembroke... came forth into England and met with King Richard III at Redesmore and there was King Richard slain...’.<sup>98</sup> These notes were not compiled until the early sixteenth century, but can be taken to represent an ongoing tradition on the location of the battle.

### 3. Merevale

The Crowland Continuation does not name the place of the engagement. It does, however, comment on Richard’s location on the evening before the battle. Richard left Leicester on Sunday 21 August. The chronicler tells us that once the king’s scouts had reported to him where the enemy was likely wishing to spend that night,<sup>99</sup> he set up his own camp ‘eight miles from the town (‘ab eo oppido’, i.e. Leicester) near (‘iuxta’) Merevale abbey’.<sup>100</sup>

The mile was established as 1,760 yards (5,280 feet) under Elizabeth I. Before then, based upon Roman usage, it was taken as 1,000 double paces or 5,000 feet (1,618 modern yards). Eight ‘Roman’ miles would therefore be 7.35 modern miles. Using modern measurements, Merevale is 18.4 miles distant from Leicester. Measuring 7.35 modern miles from Leicester would place Richard somewhere between Desford and Kirby Mallory.<sup>101</sup>

The Latin term ‘iuxta’ is often used fairly loosely in a geographical sense (so too is the usage of ‘near’ in Middle English, as in the York city record of ‘Redemore near Leicester’). In classical usage ‘iuxta’ can mean ‘just before’.

At the end of his account the Continuator speaks of ‘this battle of Merevale’ (‘ad hoc bellum Mirivallense’).<sup>102</sup> Note that Bennett translates this as ‘this battle which was fought near Merevale’. Translation into modern English is difficult because ‘Miravellense’ is an adjectival form. Literally, then, the translation should be ‘this Merevalian battle’. I think ‘of Merevale’ is preferable to ‘near Merevale’, but I can see why Bennett chose the latter. –ensis forms are sometimes applied to regions/neighbourhoods.

A compensation payment was ordered to be made to Merevale Abbey on 7 December 1485. This spoke of the losses incurred ‘by occasion of the great repair and resort that our people coming toward our late field made as well unto the house of Mirvale aforesaid as in going over his ground to the destruction of his corns and

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<sup>98</sup> College of Arms, MS 2M6. Printed in R.F. Green, ‘Historical notes of a London citizen, 1483-1488’, *EHR*, 96 (1981), p. 589.

<sup>99</sup> ‘ubi hostes sequenti nocte de verisimile manere volebant’. Note here the suggestion that Richard’s scouts were not wholly sure of where Henry would pitch camp but were simply telling the king where they thought the enemy were likely to want to spend the night.

<sup>100</sup> *The Crowland Chronicle Continuations: 1459-1486*, ed. by Nicholas Pronay and John Cox (London, 1986), p p. 178-80. ‘ad octo miliaria ab eo opido distantia iuxta abbathiam de Mirivall castrametatus est’.

<sup>101</sup> I suppose it is just possible that there is a copying error in the Crowland Continuation and the eight miles should in fact be eighteen. But this is clutching at straws!

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 182-3.

pastures'.<sup>103</sup> This cannot be taken as definite proof that either Henry or his troops were at or near Merevale abbey. It is possible that 'our people' refers to the subjects of the king as a whole, and therefore embraces the troops of the opposing side. (Significantly, the other compensation payment to the parishes speaks of 'our company', a much more specific term.<sup>104</sup>)

There is no source which places Henry **at** Merevale Abbey. However, if we take account of the Crowland Continuator's comment on the location of Richard's camp on the 21 August as well as the compensation warrant, we could conclude that *both* armies were in the vicinity of the abbey on the evening before, and hence also the morning of, the battle. Richard's decision to pitch camp 'near Merevale abbey' would also make sense if his scouts had reported to him that Henry was in the vicinity of, or even actually at, the abbey.

#### 4. County names

For John Rous, the two armies met 'on the border of Warwickshire and Leicestershire'.<sup>105</sup> De Valera also links the place of battle to Warwickshire. He tells us that Henry 'crossed as far as a town called Coventry near which Richard stood in the field with as many as 70,000 combatants'.<sup>106</sup>

It is worth noting here that Atherstone is in Warwickshire, as also Mancetter, but not Fenny Drayton, Witherley and Atterton (the places mentioned in the compensation warrant of 29 Nov. Merevale Abbey is also in Warwickshire.) However, Mancetter and Witherley are extremely close to the county boundary. Might Rous's location therefore have some credibility? But it is moving it away from the Dadlington area.

Note that the compensation warrants do not give a place of battle. Money is ordered to be paid to the townships noted in the previous paragraph 'which sustained losses of their corns and grains by us and our company at our late victorious field'. It is perfectly feasible that these were losses caused by victualling, especially to feed horses as it was always difficult to carry enough fodder with an army. It was also common for armies to be billeted across a number of villages. (There are examples in the Agincourt campaign.) The 'at' does not have to be geographically specific but can have the sense 'during the time of'. The compensation to Merevale does suggest trampling by horses: 'by the occasion of the great repair and resort that our people coming toward our late field made as in going over his ground to the destruction of his corns and pastures'. But this suggests damage caused by troops moving into the area not fighting in it.

In the parliament of November 1485, the location was given simply as 'in Leicestershire'.<sup>107</sup> I think that is because it is within an act of attainder. This is legal

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<sup>103</sup> The National Archives (TNA) E 404/79/339 E 404/79/340. Facsimiles and transcripts printed in Sean Cunningham, *Richard III: A royal enigma* (Kew, 2003), pp. 70-1.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Johannis Rossi, *Antiquarii Warwicensis Historia Regum Angliae*, ed. Thomas Hearne (Oxford, 1716), p. 218.

<sup>106</sup> *Epistolas y otros varios tratados de Mosén Diego de Valera*, ed. José A. De Balenchana (La Sociedad de Bibliófilos Espanoles, Madrid, 1878), p. 92. Michael Bennet, *The Battle of Bosworth* (Sutton: Stroud, 2000) Translation from E.M. Nokes and G. Wheeler, 'A Spanish account of the battle of Bosworth', *The Ricardian*, 2, no. 36 (1972), p. 2, printed in M. Bennett, *The Battle of Bosworth* (Sutton: Stroud, 2000), p. 137.

<sup>107</sup> *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504*, XV ed. by Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 108

speak (as also the listing of weapons since that helped to define the nature of the rebellion), and therefore a county location was enough to locate the offence (ie within the remit of a particular shrievalty).

## 5. no location given

Molinet gives no location but writes as though the place of battle was decided upon in advance (*'la lieu fut prins et journée assignée ez octaves de l' Assumption Notre-Dame, pour combattre puissance contre puissance'*).<sup>108</sup> His wording could be taken to mean that both sides had agreed to it. This was not unknown in the later medieval period<sup>109</sup> and would have been achieved by negotiations between envoys of both sides. None, however, are mentioned for this battle in any narrative.

No location is given by De Valera, nor in the Scottish accounts (Major, Pittscottie).

## 6. Bosworth

a. The earliest known reference to Bosworth is found in the Great Chronicle of London (c. 1496). 'and afftyr contynuyd his (i.e. Richard's) Journey tyll he cam unto a village callyd Bosworth where in the ffyelds ajoynaunt bothe hostys mett'.

b. The name also appears in the chronicle of the Londoner, Robert Fabyan, where the armies meet 'a village in Leycetershyre named Bosworth'.<sup>110</sup> He died in 1513, and his work was printed three years later (which no doubt brought it to a much bigger audience than any other source we have so far considered). When exactly he wrote the section on 1485 is uncertain.

c. Other London-based chronicles of the early sixteenth century, such as British Library Vitellius A XVI, also give the location as 'the feeld of Bosworth'.<sup>111</sup> Another of the early sixteenth century, *The Great Chronicle of London*, claims that after Leicester, Richard 'contynuyd his journey tyll he cam unto a vyllage callyd Bosworth where in the ffyelds ajoynaunt bothe hostys mett', though it should be noted that the chronicler claims that Richard did not leave Leicester until the 22 August.<sup>112</sup> There is also a brief account of events in a town chronicle of Calais, again surviving in an early sixteenth-century.<sup>113</sup> The Calais chronicle states that the battle took place at 'Bosworthe hethe' but dates it to St Bartholomew's Eve which is actually 23 August.

But why should Bosworth be chosen as a name at all? Was it a place at which courts for the area would be held/tax collected/troops assembled in shire levy? Or does the choice of a market centre simply reflect the urban interests of London based writers?

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<sup>108</sup> Chroniques de Jean Molinet, ed. Georges Deutrepont G. Doutrepont and O. Jodogne, 3 vols. (Academie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Collection des Anciens Auteurs Belges, Brussels, 1935-7), I, p. 435.

<sup>109</sup> I think there may be some suggestion of it for Towton but need to probe further.

<sup>110</sup> Robert Fabyan, *Chronycle* (London, 1533), STC (2nd ed.) 10660, p. 227.

<sup>111</sup> Vitellius A XVI. Printed in *Chronicles of London*, ed. by C.L. Kingsford (London, 1905; repr. Stroud, 1977), p. 193.

<sup>112</sup> *The Great Chronicle of London*, ed. A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley (London, 1938) [Guildhall Library MS 3313], p. 237-8.

<sup>113</sup> John Gough Nichols, ed., *The Chronicle of Calais in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the year 1540*, (Camden Soc., 35, 1846), p. 1.



d. Given that Polydore Vergil is known to have drawn on Fabian his use of Bosworth is likely from that source. ‘Meanwhile Richard, hearing that his enemy were approaching, was the first to reach the place of the fight a little beyond Leicester – Bosworth (that is the name of the *pagi*). There he pitched camp...’<sup>114</sup> ‘Interea Ricardus, audiens hostem adventare, prior ad locum pugnae parum ultra Lecestriam, Bosworth (id pagi nomen est) accedit, ibique positis castris suos ea nocte a laboribus recreat, hortaturque multis verbis ad futurum praelium.’ NB the expression ‘locum pugnae’ (the place of the fight) could also imply the battle field had been established in advance.

In medieval usage, *pagus* meant district, even county. Vergil’s choice of the term might imply that he knew that the battle was not fought at or near the settlement of Bosworth, but rather in its region (much as the Great Chronicle implies with ‘fields adjoining’). That said, the classical usage meant village or district, so that Vergil may simply have been translating Fabian here.

The assumption has been that Vergil had written his account of the battle from what he had gleaned from eyewitnesses. If so, it would seem that they preferred Bosworth. But more likely Vergil was simply using Fabian here.

e. Edward Hall’s account follows that of Vergil, claiming that Richard marched ‘to a place mete for two battayles to encounter by a village called Bosworthe, not farre from Leycester and there he pitched hys felde’.<sup>115</sup> This wording (followed by Holinshed, whose account is identical here to Hall) suggests that Richard chose the site, although there may also be an indication in the wording that the place of engagement had already been agreed between the protagonists, as Molinet’s text also implies.<sup>116</sup>

At the end of the account Hall writes ‘This battaill was fought at Bosworth in Leycestershire the. xxii. daye of August in the yere of our redempcion a. M. CCCC. Ixxxvi’. Here he is not following Vergil exactly since the latter gives the date but not the place.

In Vergil, Hall and Holinshed, Richard reaches the place of battle on Sunday 21 August. On the following day, all he has to do is to lead his army out of camp and establish his battle lines. All three writers also say that Henry had pitched his camp near that of his enemies and spent the night there (i.e. the night of 21 August). Therefore the implication is that both camps were pitched near to the actual place of fighting. The location of the camps on the night of 21 August is important since it affects the possible timing of the battle on the next day.

The Crowland Continuation tells us that Richard chose his camp site near Merevale abbey once his scouts had told him where his enemy were likely to spend the night.<sup>117</sup> In Vergil (and Hall and Holinshed), the suggestion is rather than Henry chose to pitch his camp near that of his enemies. This difference can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Crowland Continuator’s information came from those in Richard’s army, and Vergil’s from Henry’s side.

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<sup>114</sup> Polydore Vergil, *Anglica Historia* (1555 version), a hypertext critical edition by Dana F. Sutton, <http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/polyverg/> Book 25, chapter 23.

<sup>115</sup> Edward Hall, *Chronicle* (London, 1809; repr. New York, 1965), pp. 413-4.

<sup>116</sup> Molinet, p. 435.

<sup>117</sup> Crowland, pp. 178-81.

## Topography

There are no indications of topographical features in the Crowland Continuation, in the account of de Valera, or in the London Chronicles. Molinet gives only one indication of a topographical feature. When giving his account of Richard's death, he tells us that he was trying to flee but his horse jumped into a 'palus' from which it could not get out ('ravoir').<sup>118</sup> He subsequently says that Richard died 'en enfange et bedare' ('in the dirt and the mire'), again emphasising the mud. But it should be noted that this is being used for rhetorical effect: Molinet wants to give Richard the death and burial he deserved. His description of Richard's death makes this clear: 'Et ainsy, lui qui avoit miserablement ochis pluseurs personages, fina ses jours iniquement et ordement, en fange et en bedare, et lui qui les eglises avoient exploité, fut monster au peuple tout nud et sans quelque vesture et sans solennité royale fut sepulture à l'entrée de l'eglise d'ung village.'<sup>119</sup>

A 'palus' is also mentioned in Vergil but in a different context. Therefore we cannot assume that the 'palus' in Molinet and the 'palus' in Vergil are the same. Even so, it would suggest that the site as a whole had wet areas within it: *Palus* in classical Latin means a swamp, marsh, bog, fen.<sup>120</sup> Vergil speaks of the 'palus' when he deals with Henry's deployment: 'There lay between each army a marsh ('palus') which Henry skilfully put on his right ('dextram') so that it might stand as a protection for his men. By doing this, he simultaneously left the sun to his rear. When the king saw the enemy pass by the marsh, he commanded his men to attack'.<sup>121</sup>

'Inter untrunque exercitum intercedebat palus quam Henricus de industria ad dextram dimisit, ut suis instar munitionis esset. Simul etiam id faciendo solem a tergo reliquit. At rex, ubi vidit hostes praeterisse paludem, suos impetum in eos facere iubet.'

In Dana Sutton's online translation this is given as 'Between the armies was a marsh (palus) which Henry purposefully kept on his *left* so it would serve to protect his men'. This is a misreading. The Latin word is *dexteram* – the right. Her translation misses the next phrase relating to the position of the sun, which is present in the Latin. In the English translation made in the latter part of the reign of Henry VIII reads as follows:

'Ther was a marishe betwixt both hostes, which Henry of purpose left on the right hand that yt might serve his men insteade of a forteresse by the doing thereof also he left the soon upon his bak. But when the king saw thenemys passyd the marishe he commandyd his soldiers to geave charge upon them'.

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<sup>118</sup> I need to check the meaning of this word with colleagues in French, but it is as others have translated it.

<sup>119</sup> Molinet, pp. 435-6. And so he who had wretchedly killed divers persons – is this a reference to the princes? – finished his days ignominiously and filthily, in the dirt and the mire, and he who had exploited churches was shown to the people completely naked and without any clothing, and without royal solemnity was buried at the entrance to a village church'.

<sup>120</sup> *Palus*, *paludis* (f). *Palus*, *pali* (m) is a pale or stake, i.e. a stake on which Roman recruits exercised their weapons, but the grammar (i.e. the relative pronoun *quam* in the feminine accusative) means it must be the other term which is used here.

<sup>121</sup> Vergil, book 25, chapter 24. Anne Curry's translation. 'instar munitionis esset. Simul etiam id faciendo solem a tergo reliquit'.

It is interesting that the positioning of troops in relation to the sun is mentioned in the fourth-century military treatise, the *De re militari* of Vegetius:

‘when the sun is in front of your face, it deprives you of sight... Therefore let the lines be ranged with these problems behind our backs and if possible so that they may strike the faces of the enemy’.<sup>122</sup>

Milner, editor of a modern English translation of Vegetius, observes that this was ‘the problem to which the Romans attributed their defeat by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BC’. Cannae was a much cited battle. Christine de Pisan in her *Faits d’armes*, writes as follows:

likewise when Hannibal had to fight against the Romans in the battle of Cannae, which was so devastating to them, he made use of three schemes: first he positioned himself in a place where he was certain that he would have the sun and wind at his back, for they were both in evidence that day, as well as dust. Second he ordered that when the battle had begun a part of his troops should act as if they were fleeing along a byway where a trap had been placed to catch the Romans who would follow the escapees; third he ordered that four hundred men-at-arms should likewise seem to be fleeing towards the Romans as if frightened by the battle and should give up. When these commands had been put into operation and the battle begun, the Romans were troubled by the sun and the dust that distorted their vision, and also by the trap that caught them and where many were killed, and by those who had surrendered to them and who, according to the custom of the day, were disarmed and placed behind the combatants. But those who had surrendered had secreted beneath their underclothes sharp instruments, with which they crippled the Romans who were fighting’.<sup>123</sup>

So did Henry actually do what Vergil suggests in terms of putting the sun at his back, or is the author simply introducing classical allusions for effect, much as Walsingham did in his account of Agincourt?<sup>124</sup>

The significance of having the sun in one’s face is apparent in other medieval battles, such as in Juvenal des Ursins account of Agincourt:

It was after eight o’clock in the morning. *Our men had the sun in their eyes*, so, in order to better withstand and to reply to the English fire, they lowered their heads and inclined them towards the ground. When the English saw them in this position, they advanced on them so that our men knew nothing until they hit them with their axes. And the archers who were behind in the ambush party assaulted them with arrow fire from behind. Furthermore, the mounted men whom the English had put in the wood (as noted earlier) sallied out en masse and came from the rear onto the second battle of our men, who were close to the first battle - only two lance lengths away.’<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> *De re militari*, Book III chapter 14, in *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, translated with notes and introduction by N.P. Milner (Liverpool University Press, second edn, 1996), p. 93.

<sup>123</sup> *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, ed. C.C. Willard (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p. 103. The battle is also mentioned on pages 75 and 77. (It is likely that these examples come from Valerius Maximus, *Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri*, book VII, iv).

<sup>124</sup> A. Curry, *The Battle of Agincourt. Sources and Interpretations* (The Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 2000), p.p. 48-53

<sup>125</sup> Curry, *Sources*, p. 133. Note that elsewhere Juvenal gives much emphasis to the muddy conditions in which the French found themselves at Agincourt.

Hall's version specifically adds mention of the fact that the sun on Henry's back meant that it was in the face of their enemies.

Between both armies there was a great marrysse which therle of Riche mond left on his right hand, for this entent that it should be on that syde a defence for his part, and in so doying he had the sonne at his backe **and in the faces of his enemies**. When kynge Richard saw the earles compaignie was passed the marresse, he commaunded with al hast to sett vpon them,

Holinshed's later account follows Vergil and Hall in describing the marshy nature of the site but testifies that by the time Holinshed visited the land had been drained: 'Betweene both armies there was a great marish then (but at this present, by reason of diches cast, it is growne to be firme ground)'.<sup>126</sup>

It is in Vergil too that Henry is described as going to a nearby hill ('in proximum collem') after the battle from where he orders the wounded to be tended, and then gives thanks to his men. Thomas Stanley finds the crown amongst the spoil on the field and puts it on Henry's head. Hall changes the order of Henry's actions here, and, after his prayers, says he 'ascended vp to the top of a littell mountaine'. Harleian 542 (the prose summary of one of the ballads) uses a similar expression 'Then they removyd to a mountayne hyghe'. 'Mountains' also feature in the Ballad of Bosworth Field. Sir William Stanley looks down from one before the battle and sees the troops arrayed.

then he remoued vnto a mountaine full hye,  
& looked into a dale ffull dread;  
5 miles compasse, no ground they see,  
ffor armed men & trapped steeds.

And Richard sees them there:

*King* Richard looked on the mountaines hye,  
& sayd, "I see the banner of the Lord Stanley."  
he said, "ffeitch hither the Lord Strange to me,  
ffor doubtlesse hee shall dye this day; -- [125.500](#)

(So here it is Stanley on the hill. Richard is never described as being on a hill.)

And later:  
then they moued to a mountaine on height,  
with a lowde voice they cryed *king* HENERY,  
the crowne of gold *that* was bright,  
to the Lord stanley deliuered itt bee.

Mountains also feature in Lady Bessye  
*King* Richard [houed] on the mountaines,  
& was ware of the banner of the Lord stanley.

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<sup>126</sup> Holinshed, p. 758. The phrase in brackets is unique to Holinshed and is not found in Hall. The draining had therefore occurred between the 1540s and the 1580s.

he said, “ffeitch hither the *Lord* strange to me  
ffor doubtlesse hee shall dye this day.” – 235.962

Indeed, the use of ‘mountains’ instead of hills in these poems would suggest a late composition. I don’t think we can trust any of the topographical remarks of the ballads. And certainly we cannot say that the hill on which Henry stood after the battle was at Stoke Golding. The latter is never mentioned in any account. This is just later romantic invention.

The ballad of Bosworth Field contains some other topographical elements. At the meeting of Sir William Stanley and Henry:

Sir William Stanley the rerward wold bee,  
& his sonne Sir Edward with a winge.  
thé did remaine in their array  
to waite the coming of Richard King. -- [106.424](#)

then they Looked to a fforrest syde,  
they hard trumpetts & tabours tempered on hye:  
they thought King Richard had comen there,  
& itt was the Noble prince, King HENERYE. -- [107.428](#)

ouer a riuer then rydeth hee;  
he brake the ray, & rode to him:  
itt was a comelye sight to see  
the meeting of our *Lord* & Kinge. –

The ballads do not mention a marsh. However, there is a prose summary (dated to the late sixteenth-century) of ‘The Battle of Bosworth Field’ which adds mention of marsh. The differences in the prose summary are indicated by #.<sup>127</sup>

King Richard did in his army [‘in a marsh’#] stand,  
He was numbered to forty [‘twenty’#] thousand and three  
Of hardy men of heart and hand,  
That under his banner there did be.

## Timing

Only Polydore Vergil gives any indication of how long the battle lasted – ‘a little more than two hours’ (‘duravitque dimicatio ampius duas horas’).<sup>128</sup> He is not explicit on when it started, speaking simply of Henry ordering his soldiers to arm ‘in the full morning’ (‘bene autem mane’).<sup>129</sup> Vegetius defined pitched battle as a struggle lasting two or three hours.<sup>130</sup> Is this another case where Vergil is simply borrowing?

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<sup>127</sup> BL Harleian 542 folio 34, printed in *Leicestershire and Rutland Notes and Queries*, ed. John & Thomas Spencer, vol I (1881-1891). See <http://www.r3.org/bosworth/ballad.html>.

<sup>128</sup> Vergil. Book 25, chapter 24.

<sup>129</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 23. Anne Curry’s translation. Sutton translates this as ‘early in the morning’.

<sup>130</sup> *Epitome*, ed. Milner, p. 83. See section on comparisons with other battles.

Hall and Holinshed follow Vergil speaking of ‘in the morning be time’.<sup>131</sup> The Great Chronicle of London speaks of a ‘sharp and long ffygh’.<sup>132</sup> De Valera also claims that Richard ‘upheld the battle for a long time’ (‘se sostouo gran pieca’).<sup>133</sup> But these are very unspecific terms, aimed at indicating the kind of fight rather than its precise length.

The Crowland Continuation does not indicate what time the battle started, but tells how the chaplains were not ready to celebrate mass nor was breakfast ready ‘at dawn on the Monday morning’.<sup>134</sup> This story is apparently confirmed by a reminiscence of the reign of Queen Mary, which was said to derive from a gentleman named ‘Bygott’ who was ‘carrier’ to Henry VII.<sup>135</sup> This could imply that Henry pressed Richard to give battle earlier than the latter had expected. That said, the story may simply be a retrospective moral explanation. Since Richard did not have time for mass (nor perhaps for confession – a common act before battles) he was bound to be defeated since he had offended God as well as man. The Crowland Continuation notes that the king, ‘so it was reported, had seen that night in a terrible dream a multitude of semons apparently surrounding him’.<sup>136</sup> This was an idea picked up in later works and portrayed dramatically in Shakespeare. The problem again is whether this was retrospective moralising, since by the time the author was writing, the outcome of the battle was known.

The Great Chronicle of London has Richard leaving Leicester on the morning of 22 August but as discussed earlier, no other account says this.<sup>137</sup>

Dawn on 22 August would have been around 5.00 am GMT. Even if the armies arose at dawn, we cannot know for certain at what time the battle commenced. There certainly would have been time needed for preparations, especially for confession and breakfast. Men would not have gone into battle unshriven, although perhaps there was collective absolution and blessing as we find in some accounts of Agincourt.

Bennett, based on his translation of a phrase in the Crowland Continuation,<sup>138</sup> suggests that Henry dubbed some knights before the battle. The Latin may be translated, however, in a more general sense, as Pronay suggests,<sup>139</sup> to mean ‘those notable for their military standing before this disturbance as well as in the conflict just begun’. In my view, standing could be replaced by rank, with the last phrase reading ‘as well as in the battle to come’.

We do not know how far the troops had to move in order to take up their positions. Molinet tells us that the French made their preparations by marching against the English who were in the field a quarter of a league away.<sup>140</sup> Is this indicating the distance between the camps, or the distance between the two armies as drawn up in battle line? A league is usually taken to be the distance which can be

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<sup>131</sup> Hall, p. 414.

<sup>132</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 238.

<sup>133</sup> de Valera, p. 93; Bennett’s translation, p. 137.

<sup>134</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>135</sup> British Library Additional MS 12,060, folios 19-20, bound within a book entitled ‘Lord Morley on Transubstantiation dedicated to Queen Mary’. This is dated to c. 1553.

<sup>136</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>137</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 237-8.

<sup>138</sup> et alii plures tam ante hanc turbationem quam in isto ingressu belli, *militari ordine insigniti* (*Crowland*, p. 180)

<sup>139</sup> *Crowland*, p. 181.

<sup>140</sup> Molinet, p. 435. ‘Les Francois pareillement firent leurs preparations en marchans contre les Englèz, estant aux champz à ung quart de lieue.’

walked or ridden in an hour, namely around 3 miles. Therefore a quarter of a league would be 1,980 yards. Since the mile in 1485 was more likely taken to be 5,000 feet (1,618 yards), the quarter league could be interpreted as 1,820 yards. Both seem to be too great a distance between two battle lines and therefore are more likely to be the distance between the camps (slightly over a mile in modern measurements). But it is possible that a shorter measurement was meant. In Ancient Rome, the league was 1.5 Roman miles. If this was the calculation being used in the sources, then a quarter league was 625 yards, a much more likely distance between the armies in the first position.

The battle needs to be over soon enough for Henry to have reached Leicester before sunset (around 7.15 pm GMT).

### **Deployment and actions**

In this section, I will begin with the chronicles written closest to the time of the battle, and then move forward chronologically.

The contemporary chronicle accounts (ie those written within a few years of the battle) give some idea of deployment but these are problematic. The Crowland Continuator gives positions of both armies only by implication. He says that ‘the earl of Richmond with his knights advanced directly upon King Richard, while the earl of Oxford, next in rank after him in the whole company and a very valiant knight, with a large force of French as well as English troops, took up his position opposite the wing (*alam*) where the duke of Norfolk was stationed’.<sup>141</sup> He then goes on to mention that at the place (*loco*) where the earl of Northumberland stood with ‘an adequately large and experienced force’, there seemed to be no fighting.<sup>142</sup>

The implication is therefore that Richard’s army has at least *two* distinct parts to it, one under Norfolk and the other under Northumberland.

This two-fold division of Richard’s army is also found in de Valera’s account. He says that Richard ordered his lines and entrusted the van (‘el avantguarda’) to his grand chamberlain with 7,000 fighting men. The ‘Lord Tamorlant’ with ‘King Richard’s left wing (‘el ala yesquierda’) left his position (‘su lugar’) and passed in front of the king’s vanguard with 10,000 men’, then turned to fight the king’s van.<sup>143</sup> We can be certain that the grand chamberlain was Norfolk. Tamorlant is close linguistically to Northumberland, and the deployment on the left fits with that implied by the Crowland Continuator, but the issue of who Tamorlant was will be returned to later. De Valera says nothing of the position of Henry’s troops, but linking what he says to the account in the Crowland Continuator would place Oxford on Henry’s left, so that the earl could face Norfolk on the right of Richard’s army, the traditional place of the vanguard.

Molinet likewise speaks of Richard preparing his battles ‘where there was a vanguard and a rearguard’ (où il y avoit avangarde et arrière garde). The van, he tells us, was commanded by Lord John Howard whom Richard had made duke of Norfolk. (This creation had been almost immediately after he became king, and was

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<sup>141</sup> Inita igitur acerrima pugna inter ambas partes, comes Richmundiae cum militibus suis directe super regem Richardum processit, comes autem Oxoniae, major post eum in tota ipsa societate valentissimus miles, in eam alam ubi dux Norfolchiae constitutus erat magno, tam Gallicorum quam Anglicorum, comitatu stipatus tetendit.

<sup>142</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>143</sup> de Valera, p. 93.

undoubtedly linked to Howard's support for his usurpation.) Molinet also puts Sir Robert Brackenbury (described her as captain, but more properly titled constable of the Tower) in this van, and gives it 11-12,000 men.

Molinet says nothing about the way Henry drew up his troops at the outset, saying simply that they also made their preparations in marching against the English, who were on the field a quarter of a league away.<sup>144</sup> A comment in his account of the battle suggests further movement. He tells us that Richard had a great number of cannons ('engines') which he had fire on the earl of Richmond, and that this led the French to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard's battle ('de costé à la bataille dudit roy et non point de front').<sup>145</sup>

Note, incidentally, Molinet's description of Richard's army as the English and of Henry's army as the French. Is he implying that the French in Henry's army were grouped together? Can we assume that they were under the command of De Vere since they had crossed with him and with Richmond himself? The Crowland Continuation also notes that Oxford's division consisted of 'a large body of French and English troops'.

Molinet speaks of the king's battle (la bataille du roy'). The Crowland Continuator also implies that Richard could have been in a distinctly separate battle, with its comment that the earl of Richmond with his soldiers advanced directly upon King Richard ('comes Richmundiae cum militibus suis directe super regem Richardum processit'). He goes on to say that Oxford drew up his troops opposite the wing in which Norfolk had taken up position, thereby suggesting that Henry had at least two divisions, one under himself and one under Oxford.<sup>146</sup>

In none of these three accounts (Crowland, Molinet, de Valera), however, is it wholly explicit that Richard or Henry is in a distinct centre battle. This is an assumption based on what is believed to be the common ordering of three battles – the centre under the main commander, with the van on the right and the rear guard on the left.

Note too that none of these three accounts gives any indication whatsoever of whether troops were mounted or on foot, men-at-arms or archers. In a letter written by a French soldier who fought at the battle (which unfortunately only survives in part and at second-hand in an article by the nineteenth-century historian, Alfred Spont), he describes Henry as being on foot. 'Il voult estre a pye au milieu de nous, et en partie fusmes cause de gagner la bataille' (he wanted to be on foot in the midst of us, and in part we were the reason why the battle was won').<sup>147</sup> He also speaks of Richard: 'il vint a tout sa bataille, laquelle estoit estimee plus de XVM hommes en criant: ces traictres francois aujourd'uy sont cause de la perdicion de nostre royaume' (he came with all his battle – Jones translates this as division – which was estimated at more than 15,000 men, crying, "These French traitors are today the cause of our realm's ruin'.) Jones comments: 'this seems to be a reference to Richard's cavalry charge', but there is actually no indication in the text that Richard and his men were on horseback. They could easily have advanced against Henry, and made their cry, on

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<sup>144</sup> Les Francois pareillement firent leurs preparations en marchans contre les Englèz, estant aux champz à ung quart de lieue.

<sup>145</sup> Molinet, pp. 434-5. Le roy fit tirer les engiens de son armée contre le comte de Ricemont ; et adonc les Franchois, cognoissans par le trait du roy la situation du lieu et manière de sa bataille, eurent, pour eviter le trait desdis engiens, advis d'asssembler de costé à la bataille dudit roy et non point de front.

<sup>146</sup> Crowland, pp. 180-1.

<sup>147</sup> M. K. Jones, *Psychology of a Battle. Bosworth 1485* (Tempus Publishing: Stroud, 2002), p. 22, from A. Spont, 'La milice des Francs-Archers (1448-1500), *Revue des Questions Historiques*, LXI (1897), p. 474.



foot. We shall return in a moment to the issue of Richard and his horse, and in the section on armies there will be fuller discussion of the important role played in the battle by French soldiers.

This letter mentions Richard's assault. In the three contemporary chronicle accounts the movement is largely that of Henry's army, with an implication that Richard had drawn up a defensive position at least at the outset, which was then attacked by Henry and Oxford. (He could therefore be on a hill!) Richard's use of guns (as in Molinet) would also imply that. Indeed, the sentences concerning the French response to the guns are most interesting. 'The king had the artillery of his army fire on the earl of Richmond, and so the French, knowing by the king's shot the lie of the land and the order of his battle, resolved, in order to avoid the fire, to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of the king's battle'. (Le roy fit tirer les engiens de son armée contre le comte de Ricemont ; et adonc les Francois, cognoissans par le trait du roy *la situation du lieu*<sup>148</sup> *et manière de sa bataille*, eurent, pour eviter le trait desdis engiens, advis d'assambler de costé à la bataille dudit roy et non point de front.) How were they able to know the lie of the land and the order of Richard's battle because of the artillery? The answer must be that the guns were in fixed positions (implying they were heavy cannon, anchored to avoid ricoche) and could only fire forwards. The implication is that there were not so many as to create a wide range of fire. The assumption of Henry and Oxford may have been that the guns were positioned in front of Richard's division, i.e in the centre of the 'English' line. It was feasible for the French (de Vere's company on the left?) to move to their left, thereby focusing their attack on Richard's right – the van under Norfolk. Indeed, Molinet immediately goes on to say that they got the mastery of the vanguard, which then dispersed, adding that it was in this conflict that Norfolk and his son were captured. (That they were taken to Richmond implies he was in a stationary position behind the main lines? Molinet adds that the earl sent Norfolk on to the earl of Oxford who had him killed. Does this suggest Oxford also in a set position and not in the advance of the French, or are we seeing here different phases of the battle?)

Crowland mentions the forward movement of Henry's army twice. Before the example already cited, he claims that 'with the enemy commander and his soldiers approaching at a fair pace, the king ordered that lord Strange should be beheaded immediately', but goes on to say that those charged with this decided against it and 'returned to the middle of the fight' ('ad interiora belli').<sup>149</sup> The structure of Crowland is awkward here. Did the king issue the execution order before the armies engaged? The reference to the approach of the enemy might suggest that, yet his comment that the would-be executioners returned to the fight suggests that the order came during the battle. For the beheading of Lord Strange to have any potential psychological impact it surely needed to be carried out in view of Henry's army. The implication is too that the executioners were concerned that the outcome of the battle was uncertain. Things were not going well for Richard if he had to resort to this act of specific violence, and if his orders were being ignored. (See discussion later of 'treason' against him, and also on his reputation for violent acts in war.)

De Valera speaks of one movement within Richard's army. After telling us that Richard had entrusted his left wing to Lord Tamerlant, he says that the latter 'left

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<sup>148</sup> Bennett, p. 139, translates this as 'lie of the land'. Literally it is the 'situation of the place'. It may mean more specifically therefore the way in which Richard had drawn up his position rather than being a reflection on the enemy's landscape awareness. But perhaps the trajectory of the guns does help to reveal the steepness or otherwise of slopes?

<sup>149</sup> Bennett, p. 135 translates this as 'the thickest of the fight' but that is taking it too far.

his position and passed in front of the king's vanguard with 10,000 men, then turning his back on Earl Henry, he began to fight fiercely against the king's van, and so did all the others who had plighted their faith to Earl Henry'. The implication here is that Tamerlant made to advance against Henry's army but then ordered his troops to an about turn, so that they then attacked Richard's army instead. Their attack on the king's van is specifically mentioned (although de Valera does not name Norfolk as commander of the van as do the other texts).

If Tamerlant is Northumberland (the argument being based on linguistic similarity and the fact that the earl is described in Crowland as being in command of a separate division, though he does not say the left wing), then the earl switched sides in the battle and fought for Henry. Crowland does not go that far but says that no action occurred in the place where Northumberland was posted. Molinet's account lies half way between these interpretations: 'the earl of Northumberland, who was on the king's side with 10,000 men, ought to have charged the French but did nothing except to flee, both he and his company, and to abandon his king Richard, for he had an understanding with the earl of Richmond, as had some others who deserted him in his need'. The Great Chronicle of London also claims that whilst Richard was at Leicester 'therle of derby [ie Thomas Stanley] and therle of northumbyrlande which hadd everych of theym grete companies made slowe speed toward kyng Rychard'', so that Richard set out from Leicester without him. The York city records tell us that Northumberland was making for Wressle after the battle. This could imply that he had not surrendered at the battle to Henry and then accompanied him to Leicester, but rather that he was fleeing northwards. The role of Northumberland therefore remains problematic.

Even if Tamerlant is not the earl of Northumberland, and therefore that the latter did not actually switch sides in the battle, there is enough to suggest he did not enter into the fray on behalf of Richard. The wording and ordering of both Crowland and Molinet suggests that Richard's vanguard was already effectively defeated when Northumberland decided to withdraw. This would fit with his commanding the rearguard on the left, such a division being intended to enter the battle later as a new, fresh force. (see also my arguments here in *Agincourt. A New History* that the rearguard was positioned obliquely, further back down the field. This would make it easy for it to withdraw. If a formation had been used where each battle was positioned behind the other, rather than side by side, then again Northumberland would be at the rear and find it easy not to participate but to flee. This would parallel my suggestions for why not all of the French army chose to fight at Agincourt.) Certainly the prisoners taken at Bosworth were all either in Norfolk's division or the king's. It does seem that Northumberland and his men either joined the enemy or fled. If they fled then it is easy to see how rumours developed that they had acted traitorously, a suspicion fanned by the lack of Henrician 'revenge' against them for previous support of Richard.

Could Tamerlant be Lord Stanley? This would be Thomas, whom the Crowland Continuator says was ordered to present himself to Richard at Nottingham, but who did not come, claiming he was ill. Strange was, however, in Richard's custody, effectively to guarantee the good behaviour of his father.<sup>150</sup> Molinet follows his account of the capture of Norfolk by saying that 'the vanguard of King Richard, which was put to flight, was picked off by Lord Stanley, who with all of 20,000 combattants came at a good pace to the aid of the earl' (the earl of Oxford is meant

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<sup>150</sup> Crowland, pp. 178-9.

here, since he is the last earl to be mentioned in the previous sentences). Molinet then goes on to tell use of Northumberland's withdrawal, as noted above. Crowland makes no mention of any action by the Stanleys. However, he does comment on Richard's order to execute Lord Strange. Since the latter was the son of Lord Thomas Stanley, Richard's order during the battle to kill Strange would fit with a surprise move by Lord Thomas. At least two possibilities suggest themselves. First, that Lord Thomas was with Richard's army when it deployed, but then acted, as de Valera suggests, advancing towards the enemy and then turning to fight his erstwhile companions-in arms. This could have prompted Richard's order to behead his son, but also the reluctance of the executioners to act when things were so uncertain and it could be seen that Richard's troops were switching sides. Alternatively, Lord Stanley had not been present in the initial royal deployment, either coming late or holding off (see later discussion of the role of the Stanleys). Richard had anticipated him to fight for him, but when he saw that he was fighting for Henry, he ordered the execution of his son.

The fullest account of deployment and action is found in Polydore Vergil. He is the only author to mention types of troops in either army. Not surprisingly, his account gives a much fuller description of the deployment of Henry's army. He drew up one line (on account of the paucity of men) in front of which he put his archers under the command of John, earl of Oxford. On his (Richmond's or Oxford's) right wing he placed Gilbert Talbot, and on the left wing John Savage. The account does not say that the companies under these two men were on horse. The implication must therefore be that all of the troops so far mentioned were initially drawn up to fight on foot. Vergil adds that Richmond himself, relying on the help of Thomas Stanley, followed with one squadron of horse and a handful of foot.<sup>151</sup> This suggests that there were only two battles: a vanguard under Oxford with two distinct wings to protect the flanks.

Vergil gives little detail on Richard's deployment save to suggest that the king set up a 'battle-line of astonishing length composed of both foot and horse', and 'stationed his archers in front like a wall' and put the duke of Norfolk in command of them. The king himself followed behind with 'a choice company of soldiers'.<sup>152</sup> In other words, the deployments are essentially identical. Both armies have two parts: a front line (can we call it a vanguard?) with archers positioned in front, with the commanders in a second line with smaller forces.

Here Polydore Vergil's description of deployment is similar to what he provides for Agincourt. It is also close to Vegetius in so many ways. We must therefore ask whether Vergil's account is of an imagined model battle rather than real battle.

All battles are episodic, and the chronicles are not very good at dealing with this. Who moved first? The Crowland Continuator implies it was Richmond's army, since he says that the earl 'advanced directly upon king Richard'.<sup>153</sup> This is also suggested in Vergil. According to the latter both armies were in sight of each other, and awaiting a signal for battle. Then Henry moved keeping on his right a marsh which lay between the armies. This implies a skirting movement. According to Vergil, it was this movement which led to Richard ordering his own men to charge. 'They raised a sudden shout and first attacked the enemy with arrows'.<sup>154</sup> This fits

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<sup>151</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 23.

<sup>152</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 23.

<sup>153</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>154</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 24.

very neatly with Vegetius who says that the war cry should not be raised until both lines have engaged each other. 'It is a mark of inexperienced or cowardly men if they cry out from a distance. The enemy are more terrified if the shock of the war cry is made to coincide with the blows of weapons'.<sup>155</sup> Vergil has Richmond's own archers shooting back.<sup>156</sup> But no archers are mentioned in any other account of the battle.

After the exchange on arrows, Vergil has the two armies engaging with the sword (i.e. this was the *mêlée*). At this point the earl of Oxford ordered his own men not to stray more than ten feet from the standards. This suggests his desire to keep close formation in the *mêlée*. There may also be an implication of a feigned retreat. Certainly Vergil implies the move made Richard's men think Oxford was breaking off from the fighting, and therefore did so themselves (although this comment simply allows Vergil to claim that Richard's army was not keen to fight and preferred to see their leader dead than safe). In this account, Oxford then renews his attack on the enemy. Elsewhere, some (possibly of Oxford's company – the meaning is unclear) grouped themselves into a wedge and renewed the fight. A further *mêlée* ensued. Whilst this was happening Vergil's implication is that Richard and Henry were not engaged in the fight (this would be standard practice for commanders, and fits with the notion that the first stage of the engagement was between the vanguards). Richard, on seeing Henry, rode against him, attacking him from the flank 'riding outside the battle line'. At first Richard met with success, overthrowing Henry's standard bearer, but was repulsed. No further comment is provided on Richard. The battle simply continues, with Sir William Stanley subsequently entering it on Henry's side. The implication here is that Stanley's reinforcing of Henry's army puts fear into Richard's men who then flee. Richard is killed 'fighting in the thick of the fray', and Oxford routs the remainder of Richard's army, killing many in the flight.

Vergil's account therefore owes much, especially in what it says about deployment, to his knowledge of classical texts. For the battle itself, which is dealt with swiftly, it reads as a series of reminiscences which the author may have picked up from those present. But most importantly, the narrative account is peppered with references to defections from Richard, that his army did not care whether he lived and died, and that Richard himself knew how unpopular he was. There is therefore a strong moralistic tone.

Hall's account shows the further influence of classical writers with its two long invented speeches for Richard and for Henry (also seen in the account of Agincourt, with speeches for Henry V and for the French constable. There is a similarly nationalistic tone. Hall has Richard inveigh against the French and the Welsh.) But the account is influenced by Vergil. Richard placed his archers in front of his army 'like a strong fortified trench or bulwark'. Norfolk and Surrey were given command of the van, Richard followed with a strong company, with wings of horsemen on either side. The battle commences exactly as Vergil has it, although more poetically and in a longer winded manner in almost all sentences (i.e. Hall embellishes Vergil but gives effectively the same version of events. A notable exception is that Lord Stanley is introduced into the fight at first mention of the *mêlée*, and again to assist the earl of Oxford in the final rout. Holinshed follows Hall exactly save for the additional clause on the draining of the marsh.

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<sup>155</sup> Vegetius, p. 101.

<sup>156</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 24.

## Weapons

Molinet mentions a Welshman with a halberd who kills Richard, but there are no mentions of weapons in Crowland, de Valera or Fabyan.<sup>157</sup> In Vergil, Richard orders his men to charge once they see Henry's army passing the marsh. 'They raised a sudden shout and first attacked the enemy with arrows'.<sup>158</sup> Vergil has Richmond's own archers shooting back.<sup>159</sup> But no archers are mentioned in any other account of the battle.

After mentioning the reciprocal arrow fire, though with no comment on the damage it did, Vergil says that when the combatants 'drew close to each other, they henceforth did their work with the sword'.<sup>160</sup> The ordering of the text suggests that this is the order of proceeding although Vergil does not make this explicit. The account goes on to tell us that the earl of Oxford feared his men might be outflanked in the fight (this is the kind of situation Vegetius envisaged – where a line might be too thin and break thereby letting the enemy through). Therefore he ordered his men to regroup by ensuring they were within ten feet of the standards.<sup>161</sup> It is tempting to see this as the movement described in Molinet in response to Richard's cannon fire: that the French massed their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard's battle.<sup>162</sup>

Molinet is the only source which mentions artillery. The author says that Richard had a great number of cannons ('d'engiens volans') and that he had them fire on the earl of Richmond, leading the French to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard's battle.<sup>163</sup> The assumption must be that this was before hand to hand engagement. No guns are mentioned in any other chronicle source. They appear again in 'The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde', where the king's ordnance is described as seven score serpentines chained in a row and a similar number of bombardes.<sup>164</sup> This is an excessive quantity for the period, and more likely a reflection of later sixteenth century provision than that typical in 1485. The same can be said of the mention of harquebusiers (in the vague expression 10,000 pikes and harquebusiers.<sup>165</sup> The OED has the earliest use of this term as 1532, and of 'hackbush' as 1484.

So far it has not been possible to find any source which shows Richard took artillery from the Tower of London (there is no surviving Exchequer Issue roll in which we might have found references to the cost of transportation.<sup>166</sup> On the assumption that he did so, we remain unsure as to whether he took the artillery north with him in May or had it sent up later. Towns had artillery pieces which could also have been gathered en route by both commanders.

If Richard or Henry had gunpowder artillery, it is perhaps strange that this is not mentioned by Vergil. (is this because he was so heavily influenced by classical narratives that he could not 'fit' guns in?)

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<sup>157</sup> Molinet, p. 435.

<sup>158</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 24.

<sup>159</sup> Vergil, Book 25, chapter 24.

<sup>160</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>161</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>162</sup> Molinet, p. 435.

<sup>163</sup> Molinet, pp. 434-5.

<sup>164</sup> 'The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde', 123.489-92.

<sup>165</sup> 'The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde', 124.493-6.

<sup>166</sup> For an example see TNA E 101/55/7 for a list of gunpowder artillery delivered from the Tower to Calais for the French campaign of Edward IV in 1475.

There is evidence of a man being injured by a 'hackebushe' at the second Battle of St Albans in February 1461, and it is certainly possible that some of the soldiers at Bosworth may have had handguns, though they were slow to load and could be unreliable.<sup>167</sup> In an early 16<sup>th</sup> C medical treatise, there is mention of a 'gentyllman that was shot at Barnarde or Bozard feld' who had been hurt in the eye with a 'hackebushe'.<sup>168</sup>

## The question of numbers

There are no numbers given in the Crowland continuator's account, but he comments on the size of Richard's army as it left Leicester: 'on the king's side there was a greater number of fighting men than there had ever been seen before, on one side, in England'.<sup>169</sup> But what is he comparing it with? There is no information given on the size of the forces led by Richmond and Oxford, but the chronicler adds that Northumberland had what Pronay and Cox translate as a 'fairly large and well-equipped force'.<sup>170</sup> But is this an accurate translation? The Latin here is 'satis decenti ingentique militia'; 'decenti' really means fitting and 'ingenti' means vast.

The foreign chroniclers give a more detailed, but obviously exaggerated, account of numbers: de Valera says that Richard was in the field with 70,000 combatants, that the vanguard had 7,000 men under the Lord Chamberlain and that 'Lord Tamorlant', with Richard's left wing, turned against the Richard's van with 10,000 men.<sup>171</sup> Molinet's account says that the French king Charles VIII gave the earl of Richmond 1800 'compaignons de guerre', and later says that Richmond's army numbered 20,000 armed heads ('testes armées', which means 'armed heads'). Molinet says that Richard's army numbered 60,000 combatants, adding that the vanguard contained 11-12,000 men and that Northumberland had 10,000, though they fled the battle. He also states that lord Stanley had 20,000 men and had come 'at a good pace' to aid Richmond.<sup>172</sup>

Vergil tells us that Henry landed with only 2,000 soldiers. Gilbert Talbot joined Henry at Newport with more than 500 soldiers and Thomas Stanley came to Lichfield three days before Henry's arrival there, with 'a little less than 5,000 armed men'.<sup>173</sup> Vergil estimates Henry's army at the battle as barely 5,000, not counting those belonging to Stanley of whom about 3,000 were present at the battle under William's leadership (he mentions later that William Stanley came to Henry's aid with 3,000 men).<sup>174</sup> He says that the royal forces were at least twice as large but which figure should one double?<sup>175</sup>

## The role of the Stanleys

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<sup>167</sup> Andrew W. Boardman, *The Medieval Soldier in the Wars of the Roses* (Stroud, 1998), pp. 151-4.

<sup>168</sup> Bodleian MS Ashmole 1500 f. 206.

<sup>169</sup> Crowland, pp. 178-9.

<sup>170</sup> Crowland, pp. 180-1.

<sup>171</sup> de Valera, pp. 92-3. Translation in Bennett, p. 137.

<sup>172</sup> Molinet, pp. 434-5. Translation in Bennett, pp. 138-9.

<sup>173</sup> Vergil, 25:20.

<sup>174</sup> Vergil, 25: 23, 24.

<sup>175</sup> Vergil, 25:23.

In Vergil's account, Henry was joined outside Newport by Gilbert Talbot, 'with more than 500 soldiers'.<sup>176</sup> Then, at Stafford, William Stanley visited Henry, 'accompanied by a few men', and, following a 'brief conversation', returned to his soldiers.<sup>177</sup> Three days before Henry's arrival at Litchfield, Thomas Stanley visited the town, 'accompanied by a little less than 5,000 armed men', before retreating to the village of Atherstone, to await Henry there, intending thereby to avoid attracting Richard's suspicion.<sup>178</sup> At this point he was keen to avoid suspicion for fear that Richard would kill his son, George, Lord Lestrangle, but there is no indication that Thomas made contact with Richard, or that Richard knew he was at Atherstone. According to the Crowland continuation, Thomas had been given permission by Richard to return to his home in Lancashire.<sup>179</sup> The chronicle gives no evidence that he ever returned to Richard. It speaks of Lord Lestrangle being held as a hostage by Richard, and that the king ordered him to be beheaded on the day of the battle as the enemy army approached, adding that those ordered to carry out the task let him go and returned themselves to the heart of the battle.<sup>180</sup>

According to Molinet, the vanguard of Richard, 'put to flight, was picked off by Lord Stanley who with all of 20,000 combatants' had come to the aid of the earl ('venoit le beau pas a l'ayde du comte').<sup>181</sup> What is the meaning of 'beau pas'? Bennett translates it as 'at a good pace.' This implies that he had not been part of Henry's army at the outset, but that he arrived with his men in time to carry out a rout against Richard's vanguard. It is possible, however, that Molinet was confusing the two Stanleys and meant Sir William who had first met with Henry on 18 August and then joined him during the course of the battle. Against this, however, is the fact that he mentions Lord Stanley earlier as the husband of Margaret Beaufort, Henry's mother.<sup>182</sup> He tells us that Lord Stanley had already indicated his support for Richmond whilst the latter was preparing to come to England.<sup>183</sup>

It has been suggested that the 'Lord Tamorlant' in de Valera's account is Lord Stanley, and that he was serving in Richard's army but then turned his troops against the king's vanguard. As noted above/below, it is much more likely that Tamorlant is meant to be Northumberland since it was he who was given the command of the left of the royal army in other sources. The York city council determined on 25 August to write to both Lord Stanley and the earl of Northumberland.<sup>184</sup>

As we have seen, Vergil claims that Thomas Stanley came to Lichfield with 5,000 men and then made for Atherstone to await Henry. He subsequently places both of the Stanleys at Atherstone and has Henry go to meet with them. There they discussed together 'how to wage war against Richard, if it came to blows, since they had heard he was not far away'.<sup>185</sup> Henry cannot have been far from Atherstone at this point. The text reads as though this was on the evening before the battle. On the day of the battle, early in the morning as he ordered his soldiers to arm, Henry 'sent to Thomas Stanley, who was now approaching, midway between the two armies, asking that he should come with his forces and place his soldiers in battle order' (cum suis

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<sup>176</sup> Vergil, 25:20.

<sup>177</sup> Vergil, 25:20.

<sup>178</sup> Vergil, 25: 20.

<sup>179</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 178-9.

<sup>180</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>181</sup> Molinet, p. 435. Translation in Bennett, pp. 138-9.

<sup>182</sup> Vergil, 25:10.

<sup>183</sup> Vergil, 25:11.

<sup>184</sup> York House Books, p. 734.

<sup>185</sup> Vergil, 25:22.

copiis accedat ad milites ordinandos). Thomas's reply was that 'he would bring his forces into the battle after making his appearance with his army in battle array'. Vergil says that Henry was taken aback by this reply and filled with 'no little anxiety'. But none the less he continued, the chronicler says, to rely on the help of Thomas. He then tells us that Henry had 5,000 men not counting those of Stanley, 'of whom about 3,000 were present at the battle under William's leadership'.<sup>186</sup>

There is no further mention of Thomas Stanley in Vergil's account until he crowns Henry after the battle.<sup>187</sup> During the fighting it is William Stanley who comes to Henry's aid with 3,000 men.<sup>188</sup> Since William had been with Henry all along, there is nothing surprising about this. Therefore the military involvement of Thomas remains opaque in the chronicles. There is no persuasive indication, however, that he was ever in Richard's company (another reason for discarding the view that Tamorlant was Thomas Stanley).

Hall follows Vergil's account although he portrays Lord Stanley's decision to withdraw from Lichfield before Henry arrives as an act to benefit the latter ('gave to hym place').<sup>189</sup> Hall also is more explicit on Thomas's guile ('this wilye foxe') in order to avoid Richard taking action against Lestrangle.<sup>190</sup> He also does not include any indication that Thomas's reply at the Atherstone meeting caused any anxiety for Henry. Rather the three men 'eache reioysed of the state of other, and sodeinly were surprised with great ioye, comfort and hope of fortunate successe in all their affaires and doynge'.<sup>191</sup> In Hall's account Henry is with Lord Stanley and the earl of Pembroke at the battle ('he with the aide of the lord Stanley accompaigned with therle of Penbroke havynge a good compaignie of horsemen and a small number of footmen').<sup>192</sup> (Polydore Vergil does not mention the earl of Pembroke as being present at the battle.) Hall says that the royal army was 5000 'beside the powr of the Stanleys whereof iii thousand were in the felde under the standard of sir William Stanley'.<sup>193</sup>

In the fight, after the armies have joined, Hall claims that 'at whiche encounter the lord Stanley ioyned with therle'.<sup>194</sup> When the king is later threatened (by Richard's attack), it is Sir William who comes to his rescue with 3,000 tall men, 'at whiche very instant kynge Richardes men were dryven backe and fledde', and Richard himself was slain.<sup>195</sup> Meanwhile, Oxford, with the aide of the Lord Stanley' discomforted the vanguard of Richard.<sup>196</sup> Lord Stanley is the one who crowns Richard.<sup>197</sup> Hall adds a longer story here about Richard's relations with Lord Stanley, saying that when Richard came to Bosworth 'he sent a pursevaunt to the lord Stanley, commaundyng hym to auance forward with hys compaignie and to come to his presence', threatening that if Stanley failed to do this he would behead his son. Richard ordered Lestrangle's execution as soon as the two armies had sight of each other (one imagines that Richard intended to carry out the act in sight of Henry and

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<sup>186</sup> Vergil, 25:23.

<sup>187</sup> Vergil, 25:25.

<sup>188</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>189</sup> Hall, p. 412.

<sup>190</sup> Hall, p. 412.

<sup>191</sup> Hall, p. 413.

<sup>192</sup> Hall, p. 414.

<sup>193</sup> Hall, p. 414.

<sup>194</sup> Hall, p. 418.

<sup>195</sup> Hall, p. 419.

<sup>196</sup> Hall, p. 419.

<sup>197</sup> Hall, p. 420.



Stanley's army) but his advisers persuaded the king that it was time to fight and that Strange should be kept a prisoner till the battle was ended. So he was delivered to the keeper of the lord's tents, where, following Henry's victory, Richard's counsellors submitted themselves to Lestrangle's custody, who took them to the new king.<sup>198</sup>

The ballads give a much greater role to the Stanleys than any of the contemporary chronicles, and are very pro-Stanley in tone. Indeed, we can suggest that they were written to glorify the Stanleys. The myth of their crucial role has been derived largely from the ballads: both 'The Ballad of Bosworth Felde' and 'Ladye Bessye' suggest that the Stanleys are as powerful as the kings.

'Bosworth Felde' has Richard sending messengers to Lord Stanley asking him to bring as many troops as he can or else lord Strange will be killed.<sup>199</sup> This is not actually found in any other source. A similar message was sent to Sir William Stanley, who sends a hostile response. The king says he will kill all knights and esquires between Lancaster and Shrewsbury. The ballad gives the itinerary of the Stanleys before the battle: William meets Henry at Stafford.<sup>200</sup> Sir William takes the rearguard, Lord Stanley the vanguard and his son Edward a wing, and prepare to await Richard.<sup>201</sup> This looks as though they intend to fight Richard themselves. Henry comes to them and they both meet him. Henry 'desired the vaward right' of lord Stanley.<sup>202</sup> As the forces prepare to engage, Richard looks towards the mountain and sees the banner of Lord Stanley, which leads to a scene in which Lord Strange is brought to him to be executed.<sup>203</sup>

The vanguards engage, implying that lord Stanley commands Henry's vanguard; what is striking here is that the ballad largely airbrushes out the earl of Oxford, since to give a great role to him would be to minimise the role of the Stanleys. As Sir William Stanley attacks the king a knight comes to Richard urging him to flee since the Stanleys are so strong.<sup>204</sup> As Richard dies and the battle concludes, Henry and his entourage move to a 'mountaine on height', where Lord Stanley gives him the crown.<sup>205</sup> Throughout, there is no indication of Lord Stanley holding off: he is in the battle on Henry's side, as is his brother.

Ladye Bessye offers a very similar account. Richard sends a letter to the earl of Derby asking for 20,000 men or Lord Strange will be killed. William Stanley is also asked for 10,000 men. William says 'I'll meet him on Bosworth felde', again implying it is the Stanleys who will fight Richard.<sup>206</sup> Indeed, on Sunday morning news comes to Sir William (who has met Richmond at Stafford) that his brother had given battle to Richard.<sup>207</sup> The ballad offers a confused narrative of Lord Stanley's route to the battle, having him going from Lichfield to Stafford (rather than vice versa) and then on to Bosworth. Once the Stanleys arrive, Henry comes to Derby and asks him to take command of the vanguard; Derby agrees, and says William Stanley should be included.<sup>208</sup> There is further Lancashire/Cheshire bias in Lady Bessy. For

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<sup>198</sup> Hall, pp. 420-1.

<sup>199</sup> 'The Ballad of Bosworth Felde', 35.139ff.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.366ff.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.420; 106.421-2.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.449-50.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.497-500

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.565ff.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.633ff.

<sup>206</sup> 'Ladye Bessye', 212.861ff.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.897-900; 225.915-8.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.941ff.

instance, it is Sir William Harrington who persuades Richard not to kill Strange.<sup>209</sup> Sir John Savage is also made to kill Norfolk.<sup>210</sup>

## Defections and treason

This is an important element of the battle accounts. We could argue that Henry's success made it likely that those who had opposed him would be keen to pretend they had in fact already abandoned Richard. However, the mentions are so common that they surely speak true. Richard lost the battle because his own army was already diminished by defections, and at the battle itself, he could not rely on the loyalty of those who remained. Once he was dead, of course, there was no reason for his supporters to fight on. If he died quite early in the battle, then this would be a reason for its foreshortening. There was no obvious heir for the sake of whom his army could fight on.

There are some references to troops defecting in advance of the battle. Vergil speaks of 'John Savage, Brian Sanford, Simon Digby and other defectors from Richard' joining Henry on the evening before the battle.<sup>211</sup> He also mentions Sir Walter Hungerford and Sir Thomas Bouchier being brought up from London by Sir Robert Brackenbury, constable of the Tower, to join Richard, but managing to abscond near Stony Stratford to join Henry. He adds that other persons also came to Henry with their troops.<sup>212</sup>

It is highly likely that some troops were present at the field of battle but never engaged. This is a factor which needs to be taken into account in the discussion on size since it means that size by itself is not the only thing. Some fled (see section on the rout) but what of those who chose not to fight or who defected from Richard?

There is the lingering problem of the involvement of the earl of Northumberland. The Crowland continuation claims that 'in the place where the earl of Northumberland stood, however, with a fairly large and well-equipped force, there was no contest against the enemy and no blows given or received in battle'.<sup>213</sup> This fits with the comment in Molinet that 'the earl of Northumberland accompanied by 10,000 men ... ought to have charged against the French but did nothing. He and his company fled and abandoned Richard because he had an understanding with the earl of Richmond, as had several others who left off the business of the day'.<sup>214</sup>

In addition we have the reference of de Valera about 'lord Tamorlant' who was on the left wing of Richard, left his position and passed with his 10,000 men before ('delante') the vanguard of the king. 'Then, turning his back on Earl Henry he began to fight fiercely against the king's van, and so did all the others who had plighted their faith to Earl Henry'.<sup>215</sup> This looks like the same manoeuvre as Molinet is describing, but in that account Northumberland and his men did not fight. In de Valera's version they fought – against Richard. Earlier in his text he mentions that before Henry entered England he had assurance that 'lord Tamorlant', one of the leading nobles of England, and other leading men had given him their sealed undertakings that when it came to the battle they would aid him and fight against

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 243.991-4.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., 251.1023-5.

<sup>211</sup> Vergil, 25:22.

<sup>212</sup> Vergil, 25:21.

<sup>213</sup> Crowland, pp. 180-1.

<sup>214</sup> Molinet, p. 435. Anne Curry's translation.

<sup>215</sup> de Valera, p. 93. Translation from Bennett.

Richard.<sup>216</sup> Molinet also mentions that Northumberland had an agreement with Richmond. Whether or not this was the case, it does indeed seem likely that Northumberland did not bring his part of the army into the fight to assist Richard. It may be, of course, that Richard was already dead when the time came for the rearguard under Northumberland to engage, and that his decision not to was influenced by this knowledge. There is also the Crowland comment that ‘many northerners, in whom, especially, King Richard placed so much trust, fled even before coming to blows with the enemy’.<sup>217</sup> There is also the account offered by Vergil or Henry’s early efforts to gather support, where it reads as though Henry made efforts to send messengers to the earl for his support but that they did not get through.<sup>218</sup>

What exactly happened to Northumberland after the battle? The York city council believed that he was making for (or indeed had already reached) Wressle by 25 August, and sent a letter to him on the 26th.<sup>219</sup> Yet in transcripts made by Drake of now missing folios of the York House book, it seems that already by 24 August, the city council had sent a messenger to Wressle and had been told by Sir Henry Percy who was there (the earl’s son – suggesting he could not have been at the battle in person?) that the earl was with the king at Leicester.<sup>220</sup> The Crowland Continuation has him captured whilst the king was going to Leicester and Richard’s body was being taken there.<sup>221</sup> Vergil says that after the battle Northumberland was amongst those that ‘voluntarily submitted’ to the new king and would have done so before the battle, had they not been prevented from doing so ‘if Richard’s spies, flying hither and thither, would have let them’.<sup>222</sup> In recognition of Henry’s trust of the earl, Vergil says that he was not taken prisoner, ‘being a willing friend’, unlike the earl of Surrey, taken at the same time, who remained under custody ‘for a long time’.<sup>223</sup>

Vergil also speaks of men ‘furtively slinking away from the battlefield’ even as the fight began.<sup>224</sup> John Rous comments that Richard died shouting ‘Treson, Treson, Treson’.<sup>225</sup> Fabyan observed that the battle would have been sharper if the king’s party had been fast to him – implying treason or, at best, cowardice:

and sharper shulde haue ben, if the kynges partie had ben fast to hym. But many towarde the felde refusyd hym, and rode vnto that other partye. And some stode houynge a ferre of, tyl they saw to the wyche partye the victory fyll.<sup>226</sup>

The meeting of the York city council on 23 August heard that Richard had been killed ‘through grete treason of the duc of Northfolk and many othre that turned ayenst hyme’. This may have been a rather partisan view, since they also believed that ‘many othre lordes and nobilles of this north parties’ had died alongside Richard.<sup>227</sup> Colin Richmond has noted that very few of Richard’s supporters can be shown to have

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<sup>216</sup> de Valera, p. 92.

<sup>217</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>218</sup> Vergil, 25:19.

<sup>219</sup> *York House Books*, p. 736.

<sup>220</sup> *York House Books*, p. 734.

<sup>221</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>222</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>223</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>224</sup> Vergil, 25:25.

<sup>225</sup> Rous, p. 218.

<sup>226</sup> Fabyan, p. 227.

<sup>227</sup> *York House Books*, p. 369.

fallen in the battle.<sup>228</sup>

## Richard's death

In the Crowland continuation, Richard's body was found among the other slain, the author having previously noted that the king had fallen in the field, struck by many wounds, fighting as a bold and valiant prince: 'like a spirited and most courageous prince, fell in battle on the field and not in flight'.<sup>229</sup> It is explicitly stated that he was killed in the thick of the fight, not in the act of flight. De Valera includes the story that Salazar advised the king to flee once the treason of his supporters was apparent, but that the king refused. Donning his crown over his helmet, he entered the fight, but was finally killed.<sup>230</sup>

Molinet tells us that Richard, abandoned by the earl of Northumberland, fought bravely, but found himself alone on the field. He sought to flee with the others, but his horse jumped into a 'palus' from which it could not recover. Richard was approached by a Welshman carrying a halbarde, with which he was beaten to death. Molinet also tells us that another man (ie not the Welshman who had killed the king) put Richard's body across his horse and carried him, with his hair hanging down, as one might do a sheep.<sup>231</sup>

Polydore Vergil tells us that as Richard tried to get close to Henry but encountered John Cheyney who threw himself in the way. He later tells us that 'the story goes that Richard could have rescued himself by flight', and that he was brought a swift horse when it was clear that the battle was not going his way, but that he refused to flee. But there is no detail on Richard's death. Vergil simply says that he was killed fighting in the fray, and places this after Sir William Stanley had brought his troops to the aid of Henry. Vergil later tells us that Richard's naked body was flung across a horse. The lack of a full account of his actual death suggests that it was not clear to Vergil (and hence perhaps to Henry himself) how Richard had met his end. The account does not say he was killed by John Cheyney.

## Rout

De Valera does not mention a rout and there is no mention of a rout in the Crowland continuation, although there is a comment that the northerners took to flight without engaging.<sup>232</sup> Molinet speaks of Richard's vanguard turning to flight ('tourn e en fuy e') and being picked off ('recoellie') by Lord Stanley who with 20,000 combatants had come to the aid of the earl of Richmond. He then tells us that Northumberland was supposed to charge against the French but did nothing, taking to flight both himself and his company ('ains s'enfuy lui et sa compagnie'). After Richard's death he tells us that the vanguard led by the chamberlain turned in flight. This could imply a rout.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> '1485 and all that, or what was going on at the battle of Bosworth', *Richard III: Loyalty, Lordship and Law*, ed. P. Hammond (London, 2000), p.205.

<sup>229</sup> *Crowland*, pp.182-3.

<sup>230</sup> de Valera, p. 93.

<sup>231</sup> Molinet, pp. 435-6.

<sup>232</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>233</sup> Molinet, pp. 435-6.

Vergil claims that after Richard was killed, the earl of Oxford quickly routed others fighting in the front line ('in prima acie'), of whom many were killed in their flight, suggesting a rout. He also notes, however, that many others simply stopped fighting out of choice (and specifically 'because they had followed Richard out of fear rather than of their own free will').<sup>234</sup> His comment that such men left the field without suffering harm again suggests that if there was a rout it was only against a relatively small group (likely under Norfolk) who had continued fighting after the death of Richard.

## Henry's crowning

The Crowland Continuation mentions that Henry won the precious crown which Richard had previously worn on his head, but gives no further details on this.<sup>235</sup> Vergil mentions Richard going into battle wearing the crown. After the battle he has Henry climbing a nearby hill. There he praised his soldiers, thanked his nobles (implying some kind of post battle oration) and 'ordered the wounded to be tended to, and the dead to be buried' (this would suggest a burial there and then). His soldiers acclaimed him as king, at which point Thomas Stanley placed on his head Richard's crown which had been discovered amongst the spoils of the battle.<sup>236</sup>

The Great Chronicle of London has Sir William Stanley winning possession of Richard's helmet with the crown upon it. He takes it to Henry and puts it on his head saying 'sir I make you king of England'.<sup>237</sup>

The York city council meeting on 24 August noted that Henry the seventh as 'so proclaimed and crowned at the feld of Redemore'.<sup>238</sup>

## Richard's body

Molinet notes that Richard's body was shown to the people completely naked, although he does not say where, and adds that he was buried without royal solemnity in the entrance of a church in a village.<sup>239</sup> De Valera says that Henry ordered Richard's body to be laid in a little hermitage near where the battle had taken place. The implication is that was naked since Henry ordered that it should be covered from the waist down with a black cloth of poor quality. De Valera concludes the passage by saying Henry ordered the body to be exposed for three days for all to see. The implication is that this was in the previously mentioned hermitage. The translation given in Bennett is 'to be exposed there' but in fact the text does not include a word for here. This may be a misreading of 'asy' meaning 'thus'.<sup>240</sup> Interestingly, the three day period is much as implied in Vergil but in the latter, there is no account of public display, and the burial is in the Friary at Leicester.

The Crowland continuation says that Richard's body was found among the dead and was subject to many insults (presumably a reference to its stripping), and was then taken to Leicester with a noose around the neck. After this Henry, wearing

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<sup>234</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

<sup>235</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>236</sup> Vergil, 25:25.

<sup>237</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 238.

<sup>238</sup> *York House Books*, p. 734.

<sup>239</sup> Molinet, pp. 435-6.

<sup>240</sup> de Valera, pp. 93-4; Bennett, p. 137.

the crown he had won, also went to Leicester (presumably on the same day, although this is not specified).<sup>241</sup>

Later accounts give a fuller version. BL Vitellius A XVI writes that after the battle was over, Richard, naked, was carried on a horse behind a man to Leicester and buried there within the Friary. There is a slight difficulty here in terms of geographical precision, since the text reads ‘all naked to Leyciter, fast by the ffeeld’.<sup>242</sup> The Great Chronicle of London says that Richard was taken on the same day to Leicester (this enables the writer to compare his kingly leaving of the town in the morning with his ignominious return in the afternoon). Again the king’s body is naked save for something to cover his ‘prvyv membyr’. He was trussed behind Norrey pursuivant as a ‘hogg or an othyr vyle beest’ might be, and, covered in dirt, was taken to a church in Leicester for ‘all men to wondyr uppon’ before he was finally buried.<sup>243</sup>

Polydore Vergil also has Henry reaching Leicester by the evening of the same day, with Richard’s naked body ‘slung over a horse, its head, arms and legs dangling’. It was taken to the Franciscan monastery and buried two days later. No public display is mentioned. Henry, we are told, spent two days at Leicester to refresh his soldiers and prepare for his march to London. The implication is therefore that Richard was buried on the day Henry left Leicester. The assumption is therefore that Henry did reach Leicester on the evening of the battle.<sup>244</sup>

On 25 August the new king’s proclamation was read at York to which it had been carried by Windsor herald. It seems likely, therefore, that the proclamation was drawn up at Leicester between 22 and 24 August. The fact that it announces the deaths of Lincoln, Surrey and Lovell, who had in fact survived the battle, reflects the state of confusion at that point (and also surely means that Surrey was not captured at the battle or by the time that the proclamation was drawn up).<sup>245</sup> It also announces the death of Sir Richard Ratcliffe, yet on 23 August Henry issued an order to Robert Rawdon, one of his sergeants at arms, to arrest Ratcliffe and Bishop Stillington, again indicative of a level of confusion on who had died at the battle.<sup>246</sup> This could suggest that Henry’s proclamation on the battle had been drawn up on the previous day. There would have been clerks with Henry’s army, although it is more likely that the document was drawn up at Leicester than in the field, and that messengers had taken it from there to sheriffs of counties and to the town administrations. Although we have evidence only of York’s receipt of the proclamation, its wording reads as though it was distributed more widely. When it was presented to the city council at York by Windsor herald, he also communicated orally to the mayor Henry’s desire to be as good and gracious lord to the city as any of his predecessors.<sup>247</sup>

In addition to reporting the death of Richard, Henry’s proclamation ordered that ‘no manner of man robbe nor spoyle no manere of commons comyng from the feld, but suffre theme to passe home to ther cuntrees and dwelling places with their horses and harnessse’. The proclamation went on to order that ‘noe manner of man take upon hym to goe to noo gentilmanz place neither in the cuntree nor within cities nor borows, nor pike no quarells for old or for new matters but kepe the kings peace upon payne of hanging’. Anyone who claimed that they had been robbed was invited

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<sup>241</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>242</sup> Vitellius A XVI, p. 193.

<sup>243</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 238.

<sup>244</sup> Vergil, 25:25.

<sup>245</sup> *York House Books*, pp. 735-6.

<sup>246</sup> *York House Books*, p. 737.

<sup>247</sup> *York House Books*, p. 735.

to approach the king's sergeant, Richard Borow, for a warrant 'unto the tyme the kings pleasure be knowne'. In other words, Henry did not want the struggle to continue. Those who had supported Richard were to be allowed to return home. If large numbers of prisoners had been taken, they were all released save for those deemed to be Richard's closest associates. Henry's desire for clemency is noted in the Crowland continuation.<sup>248</sup>

### Deaths at the battle and afterwards

The proclamation gives the names of seven slain in addition to the king: John, duke of Norfolk, John, earl of Lincoln, Thomas, earl of Surrey, Francis Viscount Lovell, Sir Walter Devereux (Lord Ferrers), Sir Richard Radcliffe, Sir Richard Brackenbury, adding 'with many othyr knights, squires, and gentilmen'. In fact Lincoln, Lovell and Surrey had not been killed. The proclamation therefore shows that there was some confusion and ignorance immediately after the battle.

The Crowland continuation notes the deaths in the battle of Richard, Norfolk, Ratcliffe, Brackenbury, John Kendall, the king's secretary, Sir Robert Percy, controller of his household, and Walter Devereux, lord Ferrers, 'and many others'. The author adds that subsequently (whilst the king was going to Leicester and Richard's body was being taken there – so suggesting on the day of the battle?), the earl of Northumberland, the earl of Surrey, and William Catesby were captured. The author notes the beheading of the latter at Leicester. He also notes that two esquires from western England, father and son called Brecher, had been captured after the battle and were hanged (presumably at Leicester, although this is not explicit).<sup>249</sup>

Molinet has Norfolk captured during the battle with his son, and taken before Henry, who sends him on to the earl of Oxford who dispatches him to his death.<sup>250</sup> All other sources say that Norfolk was killed during the battle. De Valera mentions no deaths other than that of Richard. The Great Chronicle mentions Richard, Norfolk, Lovell, Brackenbury 'and many others'; Vitellius A XVI notes the deaths of Norfolk and Brackenbury, with Surrey being captured on the field.<sup>251</sup>

On 23 August Henry had given an order to Robert Rawdon to arrest Robert Stillington, bishop of Bath and Sir Richard Radcliffe, and bring them to his presence,<sup>252</sup> suggesting that if present at the battle, they had fled. It must have been thought that they would have been making for York since that was where Rawdon made for, appearing before the city council on 27 August.

Vergil is the only writer to give a total number of dead on Richard's side: 'about a thousand'. He names the duke of Norfolk, Lord Ferrers, Brackenbury and Ratcliffe. He says that Catesby and some others were executed at Leicester, implying that they had been taken prisoner. He adds that Lord Lovell, Humphrey and Thomas Stafford and their companions fled to sanctuary at St Johns in Colchester. On the other side, Vergil tells us that Henry lost only 100 men, the only nobleman being William Brandon who had carried the battle standard.<sup>253</sup> Molinet claims that only 300

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<sup>248</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>249</sup> *Crowland*, pp. 182-3.

<sup>250</sup> Molinet, p. 435.

<sup>251</sup> *Great Chronicle*, p. 238; Vitellius A XVI, p. 193.

<sup>252</sup> *York House Books*, p. 737.

<sup>253</sup> Vergil, 25:24.

were killed in total from both sides involved in the battle.<sup>254</sup> De Valera says 10,000 were said to have perished on both sides.<sup>255</sup> Vergil also says that the number taken prisoner was great since once Richard was killed, everyone surrendered to Henry, including the earl of Northumberland and the earl of Surrey.<sup>256</sup>

There were therefore very few prisoners executed. We cannot even know whether many were taken to Leicester but this would surely make sense, and would also explain the wording of the proclamation that they should depart home in peace (but also not continue the struggle against Henry).

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<sup>254</sup> Molinet, p. 436.

<sup>255</sup> de Valera, p. 93.

<sup>256</sup> Vergil, 25:24.



## Section 3: Comparison with other battles 1455-87

### Introduction

It has been speculated that there was little written on the battle of Bosworth at the time for political reasons: in this interpretation, Henry VII wanted to wipe away memories of the contested past so that he could begin his reign in a mood of reconciliation. It is dangerous, however, to read anything significant into the lack of contemporary accounts. The battles of the Wars of the Roses are collectively ill-served by the chronicles of the time but this has more to do with the decrease in chronicle writing *per se* than any reluctance on the part of authors to avoid recording such events. In order to investigate this point, and to provide opportunities for comparing the Bosworth narratives with those of earlier engagements, chronicle accounts of all battles from 1455 onwards have been studied. This has been limited to the major chronicles in print (see bibliography at end).

First battle of St Albans Thursday 22 May 1455

Blore Heath Sunday 23 Sept 1459

Ludford Bridge Friday-Saturday 12-13 Oct 1459

Northampton Thursday 10 July 1460

Wakefield Wednesday 31 Dec 1460

Mortimers Cross Tuesday 3 Feb 1461 (day after feast of Purification) (not mentioned by Polydore)

Second battle of St Albans (Shrove Tuesday) 17 Feb 1461

Towton Palm Sunday 29 March 1461

Edgecote Sunday 24 July 1469 (not mentioned by Polydore)

Barnet Sunday 14 April 1471 Easter day

Tewksbury Saturday 4 May 1471.

Stoke 16 June 1487

There are very few accounts which give much detail on matters such as location, deployment of troops, actual fighting. The situation concerning Bosworth is therefore by no means unique. Indeed, it is wholly typical.

The most detailed accounts of the battles of the Wars of the Roses are to be found in the Croniques of Jean de Waurin, a Burgundian. These record engagements up to and including 1471. It is noticeable that Polydore Vergil's accounts become longer the closer to the time he was writing, presumably because he was furnished with testimony from survivors.

Although the lack of accounts of the battles of the Wars of the Roses is mainly the result of changes in styles of chronicling, some other suggestions can be put forward. The first is that little information on the battles came to writers (in comparison with engagements such as Agincourt, where there was a deliberate desire and effort to record). The second is that many of the battles of the Wars of the Roses were not on such a large scale that they prompted recording.

The Crowland Continuations, which begin in 1459, are a very poor source for battles. Although they are mentioned as events there is no detail of the fighting (eg Ludford Bridge, Northampton, Wakefield, Second battle of St Albans, Mortimer's Cross, (intriguingly Towton is not even mentioned), Edgcote, Stamford, Barnet (there is slightly more on this, but as with earlier battles the emphasis is on the names of those who fell), Tewkesbury). This lack of attention to military matters is important in assessing the account of Bosworth in this chronicle. For instance, the author's obvious lack of interest and expertise surely undermines his comment on the army being the largest ever seen in England.

We can detect certain themes which repeat themselves. This is partly because of the nature of chronicle writing, but it might also suggest some basic patterns in the armies and battles of the period.

### **Numbers**

Rarely do chronicles give numbers. Where they do, they are rounded, and hence put in for effect as part of the story rather than as an accurate measure. Quite often numbers appear only in relation to alleged casualties.

Armies were built up incrementally. This is seen in several of Vergil's accounts (particularly noting the importance of London as a recruiting place, especially for Yorkists). See also Vitellius AXVI on Northampton. 'The lords of Calais came to London and from thence they departed to Northampton to whom the people drew fastly'. Note also the value of the 'Arrival' text for Edward's military manoeuvres in 1471 (also showing how armies were built up incrementally).

We cannot assume that the crown could necessarily raise the largest army. The relation of the first battle of St Albans in the Paston papers gives the size of the royal army as 3,000, and of the army of the duke of York as 5,000 men.<sup>257</sup> The account claims that the duke of Norfolk came a day after the battle with 6,000 men, then lists a further four peers and knights (the last named being Sir Thomas Stanley) with 10,000 men.<sup>258</sup> No numbers are given in the London Chronicles or English Chronicle for this battle.

The accounts relating to 1471 (Arrival and Warkworth) are more reliable on military detail. Note in particular the size of individual companies (showing again how armies were made up incrementally).

Some examples:

St Albans – Waurin. York with 20,000

Blore Heath – the English Chronicle says the king assembled a great power. Waurin has 25 knights, and 6-7K 'hommes defensables' of which there were only 40 men-at-arms

Northampton- the English Chronicle says that the earls with 60,000 came to the town. Waurin mentions earlier 400 archers from Lancashire, and then 40K under the yorkists, 100,000 in the king's army

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<sup>257</sup> Paston, vol III, item 1023, p. 154)

<sup>258</sup> Paston, p. 155.

Wakefield – the English Chronicle says Lord Neville raised 8,000 by getting commission from York falsely. It gives York's group as 2,000.

Mortimers Cross - the English Chronicle, Welshmen slain to number of 4000  
Second St Albans the English Chronicle says 1,916 persons were slain. An odd number! Could therefore reflect actuality?

Towton - Vitellius AXVI – 9 lords slain with other knights and about the number of 28,000 men. Great slaughter of lords, knights and common people.

1471 – Warkworth (p. 13) has Edward returning to England with 900 Englishmen and 300 Flemings with hand guns. Sir William Stanley joins him at Nottingham with 300 men, and Sir William Norris and divers other men and tenants of Lord Hastings so that he had 2000 men or more. He made his way to Leicester where Warwick and Montague were with 4000 men or more. Then speaks of Clarence with 7,000 men meeting Edward. When king in London speaks of him there with 7000 men. Also that the king understood Warwick etc had 20,000 gathered to fight the king (this sounds like propaganda!)

1471- Arrivall p 1 has Edward returning with 2000 English men. At landing has Richard, duke of Gloucester and his company of 300 men landing at another place from the king 4 miles away. Gives numbers for the other companies. As Edward's march continues the account shows how sometimes he got assistance from places, and raised men, and sometimes not. But it is useful in showing companies; for example, at Nottingham Sir William Parr and Sir James Harrington with two bands of men well arrayed and apparelled for war with 600 men. Shows also how king used outriders/scouts/forriders, and also that he used a good band of speeres and archers as his 'behind riders' to counter, if needed, such of the earl's party as he should have sent to trouble him on the bakhalfe, yf he so had done. (p 14) But NB much more movement of both armies) At Leicester there came to him 300 men 'well habyled for the wars'. When Clarence accepts his brother, he comes with more than 4000 men. When possibility of a battle outside Coventry says that Warwick had 6-7000 men

Barnet - Arrival p 20, 30,000 men in enemy army (ie Warwick) as they numbered themselves.

Barnet – Warkworth p 17 says number of dead of both parties was 4,000 men  
NB also on composition Barnet Arrival p 20 notes deaths of knights, squires, good yeomen, and many other menial servants of the king  
Says 'that it cothe not be judged that the Kynges host passyd in nombar ixm (9000) men

Waurin p 662 gives same numbers, 30K v 9K (king)

Tewksbury Arrival p 2, good stuff on how queen and her party tried to recruit men – sent all about in Somerset, Dorset and Wilts to make ready and array the people by a certain day, and plan to gather up and array power of Devonshire and Cornwall: at Exeter they sent for Sir John Arundell, Sir Hugh Courteneay and many others upon whom they had any trust, and 'arrayed the hoole myght of Cornwall and Devon', then went to Glastonbury and Bath and gathered able men of all those parties. . King has a problem due to sick and hurt men who had been with him at Barnet, so he sent to all parties to get him fresh men and prepared all things as was thought behovefull for a new field (***ie. shows that 'field' means battle in general not a place – this is important for how we assess the compensation warrants for Merevale abbey.***)

## **Location of battle**

Occasionally there is some topographical detail, eg meadows, mention of a settlement. But this is not a major feature of writings. Again, the accounts of Bosworth are not exceptional.

For the first battle of St Albans a report in the Paston papers (III, 1023 p 154) says that 'the jurny was in the market place'. An English chronicle has the duke of York entering into St Peter's Street, and mentions that the king came out of the abbey into the same street (Marx, pp. 72-3). The London Chronicles do not mention any specific location but say that whilst the negotiations were going on between York and the king, the earl of Warwick entered 'the othir ende of the towne' and fought against the king's party.

Blore heath – English Chronicle 'the felde called Bloreheath'.

Northampton – English Chronicle king's army 'in the medowys besyde the nonry' (noted previously that king lay atte Freres)

Wakefield - Vitellius AXVI at Wakefield

English Chronicle notes York lodged at castle of Sandal and at Wakefield

Mortimer's cross - English Chronicle fought beside Wigmore in Wales

Second battle of St Albans English Chronicle king heard earls coming so went out and 'took hys feld besyde a lytelle towne called Sandrygate not far from St Albans in a place called Nomannes land' (from which king watched)

Towton - Vitellius AXVI on this side of York 9 miles at a place or village called Shyrborn

Barnet - Vitellius AXVI on the plain outside Barnet town

Barnet - Warkworth p 16 – Edward got into the town and Warwick lay outside it. All night each side fired guns on each other

Barnet Arrival – 10 miles out of London. Skirmish of fore-riders. Edward enters town; under a hedge side were ready assembled a great people in the array of the earls of Warwick. The king issued order that no man should abide in the town but had them all to the field with him and drew towards his enemies outside the town. As it was dark he could not see quite where they were so he lodged himself and his host afore them nearer than he supposed 'but he toke nat his gound so even in the front afore them as he wold have done yf he might bettar have seene them, butte somewhate a-syden-hands, and so they kept them still' without noyse. Earl's guns shot all night, but they always overshot King's host as it was nearer than they thought. King kept silence so that the enemy would not know where they were, and did not shoot any guns on his side.

Tewksbury - Warkworth p 18: Prince Edward made a field not far from the river Severn

Tewksbury Arrival - p 24 interesting stuff on why Edward wanted to encounter Margaret as far away from London as possible as he did not want to give her the chance to assemble might out of any other counties than where they currently were. He knew they would cross at Gloucester or Tewksbury, or Worcester. Used foreriders again (his route is given). He expected a battle outside Bath – so he wanted to set his people in array. He drove all the people out of the town and lodged himself and his host that night in the field three miles out of the town. Next day he moved on to Malmesbury. The enemy then planned battle at Sudbury nr Bristol – they appointed a ground for their field at a place called Sudbury Hill. King came towards this with all his host in array and ‘faire ordinaunce’. Enemy likewise, but then when they knew king was approaching they turned away (though their herbergers were involved in a skirmish). King sent out his scourers looking for them. What is clear from this narrative is that he was moving trying to find them (much longer march than for Richard at Bosworth).

P 28 after getting to Tewksbury the same night they fight them in a field in a close even at the town’s end, the town and the abbey at their backs, and upon every hand of them foul lanes, deep dikes, many hedges with hills and valleys, a right evil place to approach as would well have been devised.

Arrival adds more eg p 29 that in the front of their field were so evil lanes, deep dykes, so many hedges, trees and bushes that it was right hard to approach them near.

### **Time of day and length**

No time is given in any of the narratives of Bosworth. Where times are given in chronicles for other battles, they tend to give an early start time.

The first battle of St Albans, according to the report in the Paston papers, claims that ‘it was don on Thursday last past atwyx xi and xii at mydday).

Northampton –English Chronicle, 2 hours after noon (when earl gives order that no man should lay a hand on king or on common people but only on the lords knights and squires)

Second battle of St Albans – Vitellius AXVI, three of the morning

Barnet - Vitellius AXVI upon the morne early the field began  
Warkworth p 16 on easter day in the morning right early each came upon the other  
Warkworth p 19 king at about 4 or 5 in the morning despite the fact there was a mist, committed his cause to God, advanced banners, blew trumpets and set on them first with shot and then they joined and came to handstrokes  
Waurin p 661 between 5 and 6 in the morning

In terms of **length of fighting,**

The report in the Paston papers of the first battle of St Albans says that 'it was done wiyth inne di. Hourse', i.e. half an hour. But other vernacular chronicles (Vitellius AXVI, Great Chronicle of London) speaks of their fighting 'a good while'

Blore Heath – Waurin has had to had part of battle lasting half an hour, 'hoping that they would be comforted by the cavalry'

Northampton –English Chronicle, hosts fought together for half an hour

Barnet - Warkworth p 16 they fought from 4 of the clock in the morning until 10 of the clock the fore noon. Arrival p 20 this battle lasted fighting and skirmishing some time in one place and some time in another, right doubtfully because of the mist by the space of three hours before it was fully achieved

Barnet – Waurin, lasted four hours.

## **Deployment**

Leaders are usually mentioned, but types of troops rarely. There is a tendency to vagueness e.g. Northampton 'the king had pitched his field (Vitellius AXVI). But there are quite often references to vanguard etc (linked to leader), and threebattles are spoken of at Tewkesbury. Accounts of deployment at Barnet are particularly interesting, with the battle being fought in fog.

Blore heath - Waurin gives interesting account where Salisbury, Warwick etc put themselves on foot in front of a wood which also gives them protection on one side, and on the other side they put their baggage and horses tied to each other. And behind them they made a trench to protect themselves.

Northampton – English Chronicle speaks of Lord Grey that was the king's vawewarde, breaking the field and coming to the earl's party which caused the salvation of many a man's life

Second St Albans - English Chronicle - Lovelace that was in the Vauntwarde

Barnet - Warkworth p 17 king Henry being in the forwarded during the battle was not hurt

Barnet - Arrival p 19 joining of both their battles was not directly front to front as they should have joined if there had not been the mist, which made it difficult for each group to see each other but for a little space, and that of likelihood caused the battle to be more cruel and mortal, 'for so it was that one ende of theyr batayle ovarrechyd the end of the kynges battayle and so at that end they were much mightier than was the kyngs battayle at the same end that joyned with them, which was the west end, and therefore upon that party of the kyngs battayle they had a gretar distres upon the kynges party wherefore many fled towards Barnet, and so for the to London or ever thay lafte, and they fell in the chace of them and dyd moche harme. But the other parties and the residue of neither battle could not see the distres, the fleeing, nor the chace because of the mist. so the kings battle which did not see any of this was not discouraged save only for a few who were near. And also at the east end the kyngs battle when they came to joining overreached their battle and so distressed them there

greatly, and so drew near towards the king who was about the myddest of the battle and sustained all the might and weight thereof. King could have been defeated by those who had fled at west end but he fought well, and he was well assisted by his fellowship who were loyal to him. He manly vigoursly and valiantly assailed them in the midst and strongest of their battle, where he with great violence beat and bore down all before him that stood in his way, turning to one side then the other.

Arrival - Tewksbury p 28-9 'king ordained three wards, displayed his banners, blew the trumpets, committed cause to God etc, and advanced directly on his enemies, approaching to their field which was strong in a marvellously strong ground put, full difficult to be assailed. But the king's ordinance was so conveniently laid afore them and his vawarde so sore oppressed them with shot of arrows that they gave them right a sharpe shwre. And they did ageyne ward to them, both with shot of arrows and gones (they did not have as many as the king) Goes on to say that Somerset had the vawarde. Perhaps because he and his men were annoyed in the place they were by gun shot and arrows or else because of their great courage, advanced with his fellowship somewhat asyde hand the kynges vawarde and by certain paths sought out in advance but unknown to the king's party, he departed out of the field, passed a lane and came to a fair place or close even afore the kynge where he was enbattelred, and from the hill that was in that one of the closes, he set light fiercely upon the end of the kynges battle. The king full manly set for the even on them, entered and won the dyke and hedge, upon them into the close and with great violence up the hill, and ***so also the kyng's vaward being in the rule of the duke of Gloucester.*** Here we must remember that when the king had come to the field he had noticed that on the right hand of their field there was a parke and therein much wood, and he thought he should provide a remedy in case his enemy had laid an ambush in the wood of horsemen. So he had chosen out of his fellowship 200 spears and set them in a plomp together about a quarter of a mile from the filed, giving them charge to have a good eye upon that corner of the woods in case any were needed. They had been told to employ themselves as best they could and when necessary. Turned out this was useful as when they did not see any chance of an ambush in the wood, they came down on Somerset and his vaward, asyde-hand. This led to Somerset's force being dismayed and taking light into the park and the meadow that was near, and into lanes and dykes hoping to escape, but many were killed there. The king then set upon that other field where Edward the prince was, and in a short while put him to discomfiture and flight. And so fell in the chase of them that many were slain. And namely at a mylene (mill stream?) in the meadow fast by the town many were drowned, many ran towards the town, many to the church the abbey and elsewhere.

Waurin - Tewskbury – very similar account pp 669. King puts troops into good ordinance, blows trumpets, commits quarrel to God, advances. Enemy in a very strong place, but none the less he orders it to be assailed. Adds that at 'la commencerent la bataille les archiers du roy' who give the enemy a harsh assault, who defended themselves 'tant de trait dengins comme de sajettes'.

Gives story of Somerset's advance but says it was 'en belle ordonnance droit a opoiste de la bataille du roy'. Suggests Edward forced to retreat by taking the close. Then mentions king and park, with 200 of the best lances in his host who come to rescue After Somerset flees, king moves against prince and wins.

NB Waurin also has Edward making of his host three battles as he goes across a 'champaigne' called Sottesvoled, and sending his chevaulchers from one side and the other, and arriving at Citheuham 5 leagues from Tewksbury where he hears news that enemy had arrived to await him. He goes on, but when 3 leagues from enemy it is night so he awaits next day.

Tewkesbury – Waurin. Edward engages with the vanguard under Somerset, and achieves success. All the vanguard was forced to flee, and many were killed. When the king had routed the vanguard he marched against the battle which Edward, prince of Wales was leading. No third battle mentioned. Implies tactic was to engage each battle separately.

## **Fighting**

This is usually very vague (e.g. English Chronicle on Blore heath – fought mortally. Northampton – Vitellius AXVI 'with soor fight', Barnet - Vitellius AXVI a sore fight)

More detail in Waurin (eg Blore Heath with first arrow exchange which kills many horses). A pity Waurin is not around at the time of Bosworth.

There are frequent indications that a signal was given to start battle  
St Albans (Paston – alarum bell and every man went to harneys).  
Northampton – English Chronicle, earls issue an order re king and common people, then the trumpets blew up (Engl Chron)  
Barnet - Arrival p 19 king commits his cause to God, advanced banners, blew trumpets

Barnet – Waurin. Battle began with archers of the king's battle shooting arrows (sajettes) but then soon the armies joined in hand to hand fighting. Detail of the bravery of Lord montague 'hacking heads and arms of all he met', but then he was brought to the ground and killed. Some parallel here with Richard at Bosworth.

Barnet Warkworth p 16-17 duke of Exeter fought manly that day and was greatly despoiled and wounded and left naked (NB parallels with Richard at Bosworth) for dead in the field and lay there from 7 of the clock till 4 after noon when taken to a leach then to sanctuary at Westminster

Barnet - Arrival speaks of skirmish between foreriders of both groups (p 18). Edward's chased them out of the town. See also the story of what happened at night re earl using guns but overshooting Edward's force which was camped nearby (weapons section below).

**Barnet Arrival p 19 King sets upon them first with shot then hand to hand.** His enemy were courageous and received both in manly fashion.  
Waurin p 662 says king, Clarence, Gloucester, Rivers and others fight very bravely (parallels with Bosworth)

## **Weapons**



Archer shoot outs at beginning of battle seem to be common. This is well dealt with by Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, so I am sending a copy of the relevant pages. He also has a section on guns, but here are some additional reference from chronicles:

Blore Heath – Gregory p 204– (cited in Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, p 28). Earl of Salisbury nearly captured the night after the battle:

‘But the earl of Salisbury had been taken save only a Friar Austin shot guns all that night in a park that was at the back side of the field and by this means the earl came to the duke of York. And in the morrow they found neither man nor child in that park but the friar and he said that for fear he abode in that park all that night’ (a good story, but can we take it as evidence? NB does not suggest guns used by army!)

Ludford bridge – cited in Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, p 30, p 121, , from Rolls of Parliament, vol v, p. 348 – ‘they fortified their chosen ground, their carts with guns set before their battles, made their skirmishes, laid their ambushes there, suddenly to have taken the advantage of your host’. Also says Yorkists ‘falsely and traitorously reared war against you (king Henry) and then and there shot their said guns, and hot as well at your most royal person as at your lords and people with you then and there being’. The fact that guns are mentioned in this parliamentary text suggests that use of them was deemed to be a major act of war. Is this first definite use of guns in field engagement in England?

Second Battle of St Albans – Gregory, p 212, mentions foreign gunners

Siege of Bamburgh 1464 – for use of guns by the earl of Warwick, see Goodman, p. 64

Northampton – English Chronicle p 91- king’s army armed and arrayed ‘with gonnys’, but after the battle account tells us that ‘the ordenaunce of the kyngis gonnys avalyed nat, for that day was so grete rayn that the gonnys lay depe in the water and so were queynt and myght nat be shott.

Northampton – first time Waurin mentions guns at an English battle. (p. 323). Says the cannoniers by reason of laziness had not put any stones (‘pierres’ in their ‘engiens’, so that when they lit them (put fire to them) all that came out were ‘tampons’

1471 – Warkworth (p. 13) has Edward returning to England with 900 Englishmen and 300 Flemings with hand guns

Barnet - Warkworth p 16 – Edward got into the town and Warwick lay outside it. All night each side fired guns on each other (‘all night each loosed gonne at the other’) Barnet - Arrival p 18. Both parties had guns and ‘ordinaunce’ but Warwick had more than the king. He fired them all night hoping to annoy king, but thankfully they overshot king’s camp as he was nearer to them than they (and he) thought. King did not fire his guns since he wanted to keep silence so enemy did not know where he was

so they could not use their gunfire more effectively. Similar account in Waurin: 'the two hosts were very well furnished with 'tous engiens a pouldre', but the earl had more than the king etc.

Tewkesbury – Arrival p 24, Edward purveyed artillery and ordnance guns and other for the field great plenty. p 28-9 'king ordained three wards, displayed his banners, blew the trumpets, committed cause to God etc, and advanced directly on his enemies, approaching to their field which was strong in a marvellously strong ground put, full difficult to be assailed. But the king's ordinance was so conveniently laid afore them and his vawarde so sore oppressed them with shot of arrows that they gave them right a sharpe showre. And they did ageyne ward to them, both with shot of arrows and gones (they did not have as many as the king)

Tewksbury- Arrival p 25 Margaret got money men and artillery at Bristol. But when discussing battle, chronicler says they did not have as many guns as the king (i.e. Edward)

Tewkesbury – Waurin. Margaret's army defend selves against arrows of king's army with 'de trait dengins comme de sajettes'

Goodman, *Wars of the Roses*, pp. 160-1 has information on guns but derived from Blackmore largely. There is good stuff on later pages, emphasising continuing reliance on foreigners. I will send photocopy.

Goodman suggests that by 1462 there was a definite distinction between siege and field artillery (this is based on letter of John Paston 11 Dec 1462, Paston Letters, ii no 464.

## **Defections/Trickery**

Loyalties were uncertain in civil wars. As at Bosworth, changing sides could have an impact on outcome. Not in particular the defection of Anthony Trollope from the Yorkists at Ludford Bridge

Also, Vitellius AXVI on Warwick's ability to get to Calais in 1460 – because the people being with the duke of Exeter owed more favour to the earl than to him.

Wakefield – English Chronicle says Lord Neville went to York under a false colour desiring a commission of him to chase rebels out of the country. Having got this he raised to the number of 8,000 men and brought them to Richard's enemies. Waurin also speaks of trickery used by Trollope pretending to have come to help York so encouraging him to leave the safety of his castle.

Second St Albans - English Chronicle stresses impact of withdrawal of Lovelace (as does Waurin)

Warkworth pre Barnet. King summons Warwick but Clarence has written to latter saying he should not fight with king till he arrived himself. So Warwick let Edward pass towards London. (I think this is an interesting parallel with 1485 – Richmond not intercepted soon enough)

Barnet Warkworth p 16 (problems with the mist). Also notes that Warwick supposed he had the field but there was a problem with mistaking the earl of Oxford men's livery for that of the king, especially with the mist, so that in fact the earl of Warwick's men shot and fought against the earl of Oxford's men. Also Montague came to agreement with king and put on his livery so was killed by man of earl of Warwick

Tewksbury – Warkworth p 18. the duke of Somerset and Sir Hugh Courteney went out of the field by the which the felde was broken and the most part of the people fled away from the prince by the which the felde was loste in hire party

## **Outcome/fatalities**

It was common to mention fatalities and wounded. The tendency to do this with a short list of names and expressions such as 'many others' (eg Vitellius AXVI for Northampton)

The report in the Paston papers of the first battle of St Albans names 13 of the dead and adds 'wyth many othir men to the noumbrre of iiiic. It also gives the names of five noblemen who were wounded.

Mortimers Cross- English Chronicle Welshmen slain to number of 4000

Second St Albans English Chronicle - were slain 1,916 persons

Towton - Vitellius AXVI – slain 9 lords with other knights and about the number of 28,000 men. Great slaughter of lords knights and common people. This is also the case in Waurin who sees huge killing 'as the father did not spare the son nor the son the father'. 36K killed according to Waurin

Post battle executions

Ludford Bridge – five nobles have heads cut off after the battle (Waurin)

Wakefield – English Chronicle, Salisbury taken to Pontefract but got out by common people who beheaded him

Townton – earl of Devon beheaded after battle.

Barnet Warkworth p 16 speaks of Warwick fleeing and hiding in a wood near the field. One of Edward's men had spotted him and came upon him, killed him and 'dispoiled him naked' (Parallels with Richard at Bosworth)

Barnet Warkworth p 17 says number of dead of both parties was 4,000 men. Bodies of Warwick and marquis put in a cart and taken to London and displayed at St Pauls.

Barnet – Waurin says bodies of Warwick and brother taken to St Pauls and displayed

Tewksbury – Warkworth names those slain but also names those taken and beheaded afterwards (but trickery here as king seems to be offering pardon – they were killed on the Monday afterwards – battle was on the Saturday. NB Arrival p 31 gives a rather more flattering portrayal of Edward here suggesting he did not kill those who

went into abbey. Waurin gives a similar account. Some found in the town eg Somerset and judged by Edward, the duke of Norfolk and others and beheaded (parallel with Bosworth)

Barnet – arrival, p. 20. Warwick killed afterwards somewhere fleeing. Montague killed in plain battle. Exeter wounded and left for dead. Same comment on bringing W and M bodies to London and displaying them. Bodies shown naked (parallels with treatment of Richard at Bosworth – I suspect this is to emphasise treason).

## **Comparison of accounts of battles in Polydore Vergil**

**NB in no account are guns mentioned**

### **First battle of St Albans Thursday 22 May 1455**

*Prelude:* York marching on London with well prepared forces: learning of approach king gathered an army and decided he must quickly go against them

*Location:* King obliged to pitch his camp at St Albans when he heard York was at hand who had arrived by forced marches

*Deployment:* none

*Numbers:* none

*Composition:* Warwick's part of the army the greatest in number and strength of footmen

*Fighting:* Warwick sounded the charge and was first to engage the royal forces

*Timing:* both sides put up a hard fight from dawn till the ninth hour

*Outcome:* much slaughter, till in the end with fresh adversaries replacing their wearied comrades the royal forces were defeated and put to rout, with many soldiers killed along with their captains including Somerset, Northumberland, J Clifford and many other doughty knights

*Burial:* Somerset at St Albans monastery

### **Blore Heath Sunday 23 Sept 1459**

*Prelude:* members of royal household come to blows with that of the earl of Warwick at Westminster. Warwick then goes to Calais, York and Salisbury turn words to deeds. Decided that Salisbury should set out for London with a great army and expostulate with king about breach in agreement. Queen and PC agree to send army under James Tuchet lord Audley against Salisbury while on the march and fight him should the matter require it. By forced marches Tuchet came to district of Lichfield

*Location:* district of Lichfield

*Deployment:* enemy had arrived there already. Tuchet placed his camp close to theirs.

*Numbers:* none

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* they fought sharply and in the end Salisbury got the upper hand

*Timing:* pitch camps. On the following day Salisbury did not refuse this offer of a fight and began the battle at daybreak. For a number of hours they fought sharply.

*Outcome:* many killed on both sides including Tuchet, with the result that save for a few nobles taken prisoner nearly the entire royal army was destroyed.

### **Ludford Bridge Friday-Saturday 12-13 Oct 1459**

*Prelude:* with Salisbury, York recruited a new army and encamped in Yorkshire. Decided to await enemy or to go to confront him as he approached. Exaggerated rumour brought to London of their upheaval. King assembled an army as quickly as he could and with great haste made for Yorkshire and encamped near enemy before they were aware of his coming. BUT 'the fight was scarcely memorable'. For the conspirators suddenly took off in all directions, because Warwick had come from Calais with a large band of soldiers and joined himself to the duke and his father. His forces thus increased, the duke decided to fight a battle with his enemy on the following day. But Trollope, who had long served at Calais, learned they were to fight king next day went over to Henry during the night.

*Location:* Yorkshire?

*Deployment:* king encamped near enemy before they were aware of his coming

*Numbers:* king has more in York's opinion: 'he knew for sure that the king had greater numbers'

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* none

*Timing:* none though morning implied as decision made as soon as York discovered Trollope's defection during the night

*Outcomes:* York pondered defection. Was sure the king had greater numbers, also regretted Trollope, an excellent captain had been made his enemy. So he deferred to the times. Went to Ireland, Salisbury, Warwick and Edward his son to Calais. Rest of his army was partly captured and partly scattered to the winds.

### **Northampton Thursday 10 July 1460**

*Prelude:* Somerset sent to Calais, Warwick refuses to admit him. Somerset goes to Guines: daily battles between the men of each. Warwick crosses to England then to Ireland then back to Calais. Gives opinion of duke that they should cross to England with a ready army .... to trouble Henry with their fighting till he himself could come to their aid with a large number of soldiers. Set out for London, city not defended. There they armed men of lower classes and anyone else who came running to them and prepared other things necessary for war, and marched on Northampton where the king had come earlier. Queen then assembles an army summoning nobles of her faction from all over. Since king sees he is in possession of no mean army, he decides to come to blows with his enemies.

*Location:* marched on Northampton where king was. When king decides to fight, he encamps outside the town in the nearby meadows along the river Nene

*Deployment:* when king learns enemy are at hand he went to meet them and gave signal for battle.

*Numbers:* see outcomes

*Composition:* each noble of Margaret's faction made his appearance with a company of armed men and in a short time she assembled her forces. King in possession of 'no mean army'.

*Fighting:* enemy did not shun a fight

*Timing:* battle joined early in the morning and it was noon when king was defeated

*Outcomes:* little less than 10,000 died including Buckingham, Talbot, Egremont and many others. Many captured as men horsemen had elected to send away their horses and fight on foot as was their habit. Henry captured. Rest of nobles who escaped with queen and prince went to Yorks. and thence Durham so they might there rebuild their army or if no hope for renewing the war, go to Scotland

### **Wakefield Wednesday 31 Dec 1460**

*Prelude:* York knew queen would not be content with decree of parliament hastened to Yorkshire to pursue her. Pitched camp and consulted with his captains about attacking the enemy. Some advised a wait

*Location:* York pitched camp in a village defended by a castle named Wakefield about ten miles west of York

*Deployment:* York led his soldiers out of camp against his enemies in battle array. Queen had assembled a large army. When she learned her enemies were approaching immediately went to meet them and engaged them in a battle

*Numbers:* York few in numbers, queen's a multitude

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* they fought with wonderful dash until many of those who had joined the battle were killed and York's men were surrounded by queen's multitude because they were few in numbers. Then the queen exhorted her men and in a trice they overwhelmed their surviving enemies

*Timing:* in a trice

*Outcomes:* in the battle fell York, Rutland, 7 knights named, and four others named. Salisbury taken prisoner, beheaded later. Heads carried to York

### **Second battle of St Albans (Shrove Tuesday) 17 Feb 1461**

*Prelude:* queen headed for London with a fast army and had reached St Albans when she met Warwick coming to aid of York

*Location:* had reached St Albans

*Deployment:* none

*Numbers:* none

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* the woman attacked and acting no less spiritedly than she had in Yorks. attacked and defeated her enemy

*Timing:* none

*Outcomes:* got her husband back

### **Towton Palm Sunday 29 March 1461**

*Prelude:* March had retired to Wales after battle of Wakefield and there having defeated Earl Jasper an adherent of Henry's who had come against him and was preparing a new army. So Warwick went to him and met him with a large number of armed men as he approached the borders of Oxon. They decided to go to London. King decides to go from St Albans to York, imagined he was now at end of his perils: entertained hopes of destroying what remained in a single battle. But men came flocking to Edward (very popular in London). He marches for York and came within eleven miles of it. Halted at a hamlet named Towton. When Henry learned his enemies were near he did not immediately leave his camp for this was Palm Sunday and he thought he should pray rather than fight to be more prosperous in battle the next day. But his soldiers habitually impatient of delay brought it about that on the dawn of that day that after consuming many words in urging each man to fight boldly for self, he gave the signal for battle. Enemy not behindhand in doing the same

*Location:* Edward halted at hamlet named Towton

*Deployment:* none

*Numbers:* see outcome

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* **fight was begun by the archers but soon they used up their arrows and they came to the hand to hand fighting.** So much slaughter that the bodies of the dead served to impede those in the fight. Fought for more than 10 hours, with the victory still hanging in balance when Henry saw enemy forces growing and his own men falling back a little. He urged them to fight harder, then in company of a few horsemen retired from that place a little waiting to see outcome of fight, when suddenly his soldiers fled the field, so he too took to his heels

*Timing:* dawn. Fought for ten hours

*Outcomes:* about 20,000 died on both sides, including Northumberland, Trollope, and a number of other noblemen. Number of captives and wounded, some cured, others died, was about 10,000. 'The fight weakened England marvellously for those who died were adequate to wage a foreign war both in number and strength.' Edward sent some lightly armed horsemen to arrest Henry and queen in mid flight

### **Barnet Sunday 14 April 1471 Easter day**

*Prelude:* Warwick heading for London, knew it could not sustain a siege, and therefore was accustomed to follow the victor. Hears Edward and HVI in London. He halted at St Albans to refresh his soldiers and to take counsel. Turned aside at St Albans to a village lying between St Albans and London about ten miles from the city called Barnet. **Hill** where earl encamped and awaited his enemies. Edward heard of this and added to the army he had brought with him a new draft of young men and likewise sought high and low for new help, replenished his weapons, missiles, horses, furniture of war. Readied an immense army, and so he would be readier for a fight **wherever he found them he marched in square formation.** Took along captive Henry. **Arrived at hill at noon, encamped not far from enemy. So he did not have to fight a night battle he surrounded his encampment by new earthworks.** Delay was advantageous to him since many were coming from all sides to bear aid, but enemy had no hope of reinforcements. Both sides spent night in arms. Very noisy camps.

*Location:* **hamlet set on a hill which has a flat space on its top suitable for a battlefield.**

*Deployment:* **on left wing Warwick stationed brother the marquis and the earl of Oxford with part of his cavalry, he held the right with the earl of Exeter, and the duke of Somerset presided over the middle between the two wings. Warwick gave battle speech.** Edward did the same and stationed his men in proper order, having a great supply of soldiers left over since nobles coming constantly to ingratiate themselves with him

*Numbers:* 'Edward, relying on his numbers, in which he was far superior, attacked with vigour'

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* **first the work was done at a distance with arrows, then they fought at close range with sword.** Fought everywhere with might and main with men falling on all sides and being replaced by new ones. After a lengthy struggle the earl saw his men being hard pressed by enemy multitude and came to the relief of those fighting in the forefront with his light horse, forcing the enemy to back off a little. Seeing this Edward sent new men to support his soldiers. Fight then renewed with even greater slaughter. They had fought from morning to midday and outcome still in balance when Edward who did not wish the battle to continue much longer commanded his

soldiers he had in reserve to attack. **Earl still hopeful, begged his men to sustain final effort, saying it was end of battle, but they refused to respond and he was killed dashing ahead. After earl's death the rest were turned to flight and captured everywhere.**

*Timing:* Edward arrived at hill near Barnet at noon. Both sides spent night in arms. When sky lightened Warwick disposed his lines. After it began to grow light signal given on both sides and they joined the fray....they had fought from morning to midday and outcome was still in balance.

*Outcomes:* After earl's death the rest were turned to flight and captured everywhere. On both sides killed about 10,000 men and so many taken captive there was no way to count them. Somerset fled north with the earl of Oxford, then went to Wales. Exeter took refuge at Westminster. Bodies of Warwick and Montague taken to St Paul's **where displayed in coffins to prevent problem of pretenders**

### **Tewksbury Saturday 4 May 1471.**

*Prelude:* when Edward hears Margaret and Somerset assembling an army he sent out light horse in all directions to discover the size of enemy forces and where they were going. Reported back. Did not learn anything certain from scouts about enemy's route of march he decided they must be confronted before they reached London. So taking the army he had mustered at London he went to Oxfordshire and, seeking a suitable place of encampment, chose one at Abingdon and commanded his forces being collected elsewhere to assemble there. When he had gathered all his army there and learned his adversaries had arrived at Bath, and were delaying there to be enlarged with men flocking in from all quarters, he went to Marlbridge about 15 miles from Bath so he might fight with his enemies should the chance be offered before they could go to Wales where he thought they were going to join with Pembroke who had been collecting large forces there. Queen heard this and left Bath heading for Bristol, and sent horsemen to discover whether there was a safe road through Gloucester to Wales where she needed to go to increase her army, and then to march against the enemy without delay wherever he might be encamped. Horsemen returned and reported that **Gloucester was loyal to Richard** and they had failed to win over townsmen. So she came to town on Severn called Tewksbury bypassing Gloucester so as not to waste time on a siege. Encamping here Somerset heard that Edward, whose tracks they were following, was not far away.

*Location:* town on the Severn called Tewkesbury

*Deployment:* Somerset led his men in battle array though they preferred to wait for Pembroke. Edward made his appearance not long after with his army in fighting formation, and when signal given on both sides battle was joined.

*Numbers:* Duke Edward few, enemy multitude

*Composition:* none

*Fighting:* After long and bitter struggle, **Duke Edward sensing his few men were being hard pressed by enemy's multitude promptly recalled them to their standards so they might put up better resistance, when packed tightly together.** This revived his soldiers' spirits for a little while and they began to kill more freely but queen did not have fresh soldiers to replace those wounded or exhausted so she was at length overwhelmed.

*Timing:* long and bitter struggle

*Outcomes:* followers of Margaret killed or captured almost to a man. Nobles killed Devon, Wenlock, Somerset's brother, many others. Queen, prince, the master of St John (of Jerusalem) and 20 knights taken prisoner. All save Margaret executed in that



same village. Prince taken to Edward, killed. Body with those of others executed buried in a nearby Benedictine abbey

### **Stoke, 16 June 1487**

*Prelude:* Henry has dispatched squadrons of cavalry to keep watch and arrest men from Ireland to learn plans. Henry assembles his forces under Bedford and Oxford. Where squadrons tell him of landing on Lancashire coast, **council agreed he should confront his adversaries as they advanced whatever direction they took lest they be granted time to enlarge their army.** Henry went to Nottingham and nearby forest called Banrys where he pitched camp. More here on commanders and **on the fact that Henry had summoned men from counties as well as commanding those able to bear arms to come to his aid.** Lots of names given. Earl of Lincoln comes into Yorkshire and finds few joining him, **'but mindful that two years previously Henry with a small band of fighters had conquered Richard who had great forces with him'**. So marched towards Newark, so there his forces supplemented he might head for king who he learned was coming to meet him. Henry arrived there quicker than expected on eve of battle. Continued for 3 miles and pitched camp for night. Earl continued his march and on same day came to a village called Stoke near enemy's encampment and made camp.

*Location:* village called Stoke

*Deployment:* King formed his forces into a **triple battle line**, marched to Stoke and came to a stop near the earl's camp where he offered him the opportunity for a fight on level ground. Given this possibility, the earl brought out his forces gave his men the signal and joined battle.

*Numbers:* Lincoln and Lovell get from Margaret of Burgundy an army of 2000 Germans, plus scraped together Irish. See also outcomes

*Composition:* Irish, with national custom, bodies unprotected with armour. King's first line by far the strongest and best manned which alone had joined and continued the fight, made vigorous attack on enemy that it killed opposing captains

*Fighting:* both sides fought very stoutly and fiercely. Germans in front did not yield to the English. Irish fell, their bodies a source of fear to others. King's first line by far the strongest and best manned which alone had joined and continued the fight, made vigorous attack on enemy that it killed opposing captains and turned rest to rout, and in flight the men were killed or captured. All leaders died at the posts they occupied while fighting alive

*Timing:* fought on equal terms for more than three hours.

*Outcomes:* about 4000 men killed, king lost less than half as many of his men who had launched the first attack

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## Section 4: The armies

### Richard III's army

There was no standing army. Royal armies relied on two main sources of troops.

- i. commissions of array
- ii. companies brought by the nobility and gentry in response to royal summons

i. commissions of array.

Technically, by virtue of royal rights dating back into the Anglo-Saxon period, the king could call to arms all able bodied men between 16 and 60. In practice, the commissions of the later middle ages were ways of selecting troops within the counties for service, not of creating a mass citizen army. Usually a group of local knights and gentry were appointed to carry out the selection. Towns were also asked to carry out their own selection and to send troops to the royal army.

For either side in a civil war, troops raised from towns or through commissions of array would only constitute a small proportion of the armies as a whole. They only provided infantry. It was the nobility and gentry who provided the majority of troops for all armies. They provided virtually all of the men-at-arms and a good number of infantry too.

Richard tried but failed to prevent Henry's landing.<sup>259</sup> One problem was anticipating when it might happen. On 7 December 1484 Richard issued a letter for proclamation by the sheriffs. According to Griffiths and Thomas, it was accompanied by what they call elaborate orders, but actually these were standard ways of raising troops by array for national defence: 'for special commissioners to muster armed men at short notice in every shire, to organise them in companies and to raise cash for their payment'.<sup>260</sup> Since no invasion came, whatever troops had been raised were stood down.

On 8 April 1485 Richard had issued a commission to 31 August for Exchequer officials to muster at convenient places within the realm George Neville and his men-at-arms and archers and others of a force which the king had ordered to go to sea to resist his enemies.<sup>261</sup>

By 22 June Richard was at Nottingham. On that day letters were sent to the commissioners of array in every shire.<sup>262</sup> These letters noted that the king had had information that 'our rebelles and traytors associat with oure auncyent ennemys of Fraunce and other straungiers' intend to invade kingdom. The king ordered the commissioners that as quickly as possible after receipt of the letters they 'do put oure commission heretofore directed unto you for the mustering and ordering of oure subgiettes in new execucion according to our instruction which we send unto you at

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<sup>259</sup> *Chroniques de Jean Molinet*, ed. Georges Deutrepont G. Dautrepoint and O. Jodogne, 3 vols (Brussels, 1935-7), 1, p. 434 says that Richard gave Rys Thomas 700 pounds sterling to raise men at arms, and that he ought to have been found with lord Herbert and others to resist the landing, but they did the opposite.

<sup>260</sup> R.A. Griffiths and R. S. Thomas, *The Making of the Tudor Dynasty* (Gloucester, 1985), p. 121.

<sup>261</sup> *Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1476-1485*, p. 545.

<sup>262</sup> *British Library Harleian Manuscript 433*, ed. R. Horrox and P.W. Hammond, 4 volumes (Stroud, 1979), ii, pp. 228-9.

this tyme with thise oure lettres'. These instructions and are likely those orders which Crowland refers to when he speaks of the terrifying orders sent out in letters,<sup>263</sup> and can be summarised as follows.

- The king has had report of the commissioners of the faithful dispositions and readiness of subjects to do him service v enemy. He asks his commissioners to give thanks on his behalf to his subjects.
- commissioners, in all haste possible, were to review the soldiers late mustered before them by force of the king's commission late directed (this is presumably a reference back to the December 1484 call out) 'and see that they be hable persones well horsed and harneysed to doo the kinge service of were. And if they are not, to put others hable in their places'. Payment arrangements were also mentioned. The commissioners were also to make proclamation that 'al men be redy to doo the king service within an houre warniying whensoever they be commaunded by proclamation or othrewise'.
- The commissioners were also to tell immediately on king's behalf all knights, squires and gentlemen to prepare and array themselves in their own persons to do the king service on an hour's warning when they shall be commanded to do so by proclamation or otherwise... 'And that they be attending and awayting upon such capitaigne or capitaignes as the kings good grace shal apoint to have the rule and leding of them and upon otherere.'

A general proclamation seems to have been issued in the realm on 23 June.<sup>264</sup> This ended with expression of the king's will that his subjects should act with all their power for defence of themselves, their wives, children and goods against the malicious purposes of the enemy, and that the king would put his own person to all labour and pain necessary to resist them to the comfort of his subjects. All subjects were ordered to be ready in their most defensible array to do the king service of war when commanded to do so, for the resistance of the enemy.

This is surely what is referred to in the York city York records on 8 July.<sup>265</sup> The city council decided that

'such bill of proclamation as was there shewed by the mayre delivered unto hyme on the kinges behalve by the sheref of the shire to be proclaimed thugh out the citie' should be shown to the searchers of every craft in the city 'which shall have in commaundement by the mayre that evere man of any craft within this citie forsaid being ffranchest be redie defensibly areyed to attend upon the mayre of this citie and his brether for savegard of the same to the kinges behove or otherways at his commaundement.

These measures were all aimed at national defence in anticipation of Henry's landing rather than raising an army to join the king and to fight a battle. It does not seem that any later commissions of array were issued. That said, Lesley Boatwright has shown

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<sup>263</sup> *The Crowland Chronicle Continuations: 1459-1486*, ed., trans. by Nicholas Pronay and John Cox (London, 1986), pp. 177-9.

<sup>264</sup> *The Paston Letters*, ed. James Gairdner, 6 vols. (London, 1904), vi, pp. 81-4.

<sup>265</sup> *The York House Books 1461-1490: House Books One and Two/Four*, ed. by Lorraine C. Attreed (Alan Sutton, for Richard III and Yorkist History Trust, 1991), I, p. 366.

that there were a number of men whose presence at the battle is likely who had previously served as commissioners of array.<sup>266</sup>

On 16 August the York city council agreed that

John Sponer seriant to the mase shuld ride to Notingham to the kinges grace to understand his pleyser as in sending up any of his subgieetes within this cite to his said grace for the subduying of his ennemys late arryved in the parties of Wallez or otherwise to be disposed at his most high pleyser.

In other words, the council was anticipating that the king might want troops sent to him. At the same time the council was concerned about the defence of the city itself.<sup>267</sup> On 19 August the council agreed that 80 men should 'depart in all haste to the king to assist him subdue his enemies'.<sup>268</sup> Their captain was to be John Hastings 'gentleman to the mace'. The soldiers were to be paid 12d per day. Unfortunately the entry does not tell us to which location the troops were to be sent, and it may be that they did not arrive in time to fight for the king at Bosworth.<sup>269</sup>

Evidence from the records of Exeter shows that city also sent troops to Richard. Sixteen soldiers were sent, costing the citizens £31,<sup>270</sup> although it is not clear whether they were at the battle or not. It is possible that other towns and cities sent small numbers of men. More research in urban records is needed. So far, however, no evidence has been found to suggest that any county levies were called out by the king in August or that any were present at Bosworth. This has implications for the composition of Richard's army. Troops from towns or shire levies would tend to be infantry and/or archers.

*ii. companies brought by the nobility and gentry in response to royal summons*

For overseas service, the nobility and gentry would enter into formal indentures with the crown to provide a certain number and type of soldiers for a defined period, and at specified wage levels. In civil war situations, the king issued a personal summons to such men to bring troops, but there is no evidence the king paid for their service. The king might cast his net wide, as was implied in his orders of 22 June, or else he could concentrate on those with whom he had close ties, such as his king's knights and esquires, in other words his retainers. At base, however, his main reliance in civil war situations was on the nobility since they were able to raise the largest numbers of troops for his service.

Henry had landed at Milford Haven on 7 August. Richard, at Bekeswood lodge near Nottingham, received news of the landing on or shortly before 11 August. This is suggested by the fact that he sent out letters of personal summons on that day. This

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<sup>266</sup> L. Boatwright, 'The Buckinghamshire Six at Bosworth', *Tant d'emprises - So Many Undertakings: Essays in Honour of Anne F. Sutton*, ed. L. Visser-Fuchs, *The Ricardian*, vol. XIII (2003), pp. 54-66. Her first appendix lists commissioners who were attainted or who died before the end of 1485.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 367.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, i, pp. 367-8.

<sup>269</sup> C. Richmond, '1485 and All That, or what was going on at the Battle of Bosworth', in *Richard III: Loyalty, Lordship and Law*, ed. P. Hammond (London, 2000), p. 204.

<sup>270</sup> Devon Record Office, Exeter receiver's account 2 Richard III to 1 Henry VII, m. 2, cited in H. Kleineke, 'Ye kynges cite: Exeter in the Wars of the Roses', *The Fifteenth Century* VII, p. 149.

was standard practice in the period. One such letter survives.<sup>271</sup> This was sent to Sir Henry Vernon of Haddon, Derbyshire, a former retainer of George, duke of Clarence who was now an esquire of the body of the king. Sir Henry was told to come ‘come with such number as ye have promised .... Sufficiently horsed and harnesssed. This to be done in all haste, with no excuses permitted, upon pain of forfeiture’ . From other documents in the same manuscript collection, we know that Sir Henry had received the same kind of summons on other occasions. He had failed to turn up when summoned by Clarence in 1471 to bring 20 men.<sup>272</sup> There is no evidence that he was at the battle of Bosworth. If he was, we cannot be sure how many men he brought, but the reference to ‘such number as ye have promised’ refers back to the arrangements which the king had made in the previous year.

Richard must also have sent a letter to John Howard, duke of Norfolk, probably also on 11 August. The duke wrote to John Paston on 14 or 15 August ordering the latter to join him at Bury St Edmunds on 16 August ‘with such company of tall men as ye may goodly make at my cost and charge, beside that ye had promised the king’.<sup>273</sup> Goodman thinks that Paston did not comply since he was appointed sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk soon after Bosworth.<sup>274</sup> There is no evidence he was present at the battle.

There is therefore direct and indirect evidence of two letters sent out by Richard, and we must assume there were more. However, we cannot know precisely how many personal summons were sent out. There are very few surviving records of Richard’s administration in the last few weeks leading up to the battle. The last entry on the Patent Rolls is dated 9 August. The last entry in Harleian 433 is 22 June. It is possible that Richard had inadequate chancery facilities with him in the Midlands, a lack of clerks who could write out the letters, a lack of messengers to take them to their addressees. Shortcomings in administration would not assist the raising of a large army.

All nobles had military resources at their disposal through their tenantry as well as those formally retained to offer service. This is revealed in the indentures which survive for William, lord Hastings (d. 1483).<sup>275</sup> That for Maurice Berkley esquire dated 18 March 1474 reads as follows: ‘at all times when he shall be required come to the said lord with as many persons defensibly arrayed as he many goodly make or assemble at the costs of the same lord’. Other indentures in this collection mention ‘upon reasonable warning’. Although Edward IV had tried to limit such retaining by an act of 1468, it is clear that many continued to enter into such agreements.

As previous kings, Richard had to rely on the nobility and gentry, men such as the duke of Norfolk and Sir Henry Vernon, to bring troops for his service. Norfolk was definitely present at the battle. His military potential of the duke can be detected through a list in his archives dated 26 February 1484 which gives details of 1000 men ‘that my lord had granted to the king’.<sup>276</sup> Some were the duke’s household servants

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<sup>271</sup> *Historical Manuscripts Commission. Twelfth Report Appendix Part IV. The Manuscripts of his Grace the duke of Rutland, GCB, preserved at Belvoir Castle*, vol. 1 (London, 1888), pp. 7-8.

<sup>272</sup> Richmond, ‘1485’, p. 205.

<sup>273</sup> *Paston Letters*, vi, p. 85.

<sup>274</sup> A. E. Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses* (London, 1981), p. 137.

<sup>275</sup> W.H. Dunham, *Lord Hastings’ Indentures Retainers 1461-1483* (Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol 39, 1955).

<sup>276</sup> *The Household Books of John, duke of Norfolk*, ed. J.P. Collier (London, 1844), pp 480-490.

but the majority were his tenants, listed under the duke's lordships 'to be ready at all times at my lord's pleasure'. In addition there were 50 men who were to bring two or three men each at the duke's own cost. These were his estate officers, councillors and others, such as his auditor and secretary.<sup>277</sup> But, as Richmond points out, there is a lack of East Anglian gentry in the list.<sup>278</sup> Therefore the approach to Paston was separate from the men Howard had promised in 1484. It is impossible to know how many men Howard managed to bring to the aid of the king, but it would not be unreasonable to say that it could have reached four figures.

The earl of Northumberland was also present at the battle. His military potential was also substantial.<sup>279</sup> When he met Henry VII at York in 1486 he came with at least 33 knights. In the 1475 expedition to France, he had provided 9 knights, 51 men-at-arms and 350 archers.<sup>280</sup>

The nobility always brought the largest companies to armies whether at home or abroad. However, there were relatively few peers present at Bosworth. In an extremely important article on the battle, Colin Richmond suggested that 'out of forty noblemen whom the king could call for service in August 1485 ... probably only six turned up and fought for him against Henry Tudor: Ferrers of Chartley, Lincoln, Lovel, Norfolk, Surrey, Zouch'.<sup>281</sup> There are a further six who may have been present but Richmond considers this unlikely (earl of Westmorland – who is mentioned only in the ballad of Bosworth Field, the earl of Shrewsbury, lords Audley, Grey of Codnor, Scrope of Bolton, Scrope of Masham). Henry, lord Grey of Codnor had provided 20 men-at-arms and 160 archers for the 1475 expedition.

We know that there were some knights and esquires present.<sup>282</sup> However they would not have been able to bring anything like the numbers at the disposal of the nobility. No knight in the 1475 campaign to France brought more than ten men-at-arms or 100 archers. Most esquires on that occasion brought only one or two men-at-arms, and an average of 20 or so archers. Furthermore, research by Richmond on the presence of even Richard's northern retainers suggests that many let him down.<sup>283</sup> Although the ballads have some present, modern historians are dubious of the truth of this.<sup>284</sup>

Sir Robert Brackenbury, lieutenant of the Tower of London was ordered to join Richard with men in his custody including Thomas Bourghier and Walter Hungerford who were suspected of involvement in revolts of 1483, they gave him the slip and managed to join Tudor. This hardly suggests Brackenbury had a large military force with him. Richard did not draw any troops out of the Calais march. The

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<sup>277</sup> Researches by Louis Ashdown Smith suggest that some of those who probably served with Norfolk at Bosworth had served under him as men-at-arms in Scotland and on naval campaigns earlier.

<sup>278</sup> Richmond, '1485', p. 207.

<sup>279</sup> See M. Hicks, 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society: The career of the fourth earl of Northumberland, 1470-1489', *Northern History*, xiv (1978), pp. 78-117.

<sup>280</sup> F. P. Barnard, *Edward IV's French Expedition of 1475: The Leaders and their Badges* (Oxford, 1925).

<sup>281</sup> Richmond, '1485', p. 202.

<sup>282</sup> For instance, John Cressener, who died at the battle and who had estates in SW Suffolk and N Essex: *Calendar of Inquisitions Post mortem Henry VIII*, vol. ii, nos 81, 95.

<sup>283</sup> Richmond, '1485', p. 214, with reference to Cumbira in particular.

<sup>284</sup> See, for instance, A.J. Pollard, *North-Eastern England during the Wars of the Roses* (Oxford, 1990), p. 363 on Sir Thomas Markenfield.

presence of guns suggests that he had some specialist gunners in his train, but so far no documentary evidence has been found of who they might be. On 29 March 1485 a warrant was directed to the master of the ordnance to deliver 50 bows, a hundred sheafs of arrows, one barrel of gunpowder, fifty spears and three carts of 'renyng ordenance' for the defence of Harwich, because Richard feared invasion there, perhaps by the Brandons who had fled to join Henry in France in the previous November.<sup>285</sup> On 12 May Thomas Rasse was given a warrant to get two barrels of gunpowder, three hundredweight of lead and two serpentines from the victualler of Calais. This order was issued from Windsor, where the king was on this date.<sup>286</sup>

Richard would have had some military potential within his own household: his household officials would have been expected to fight in person and to bring a couple of men (usually archers) each. Sir Robert Percy, controller of the household, was killed at the battle. The yeomen of the royal chamber, even those in the kitchen, would have been expected to fight too. It is possible that Richard had a bodyguard similar to that created by Edward IV in 1467, of 200 archers.<sup>287</sup> But these were small numbers, and hardly crack troops. Furthermore, presumably some of the household troops had to be left to guard Lord Strange, the royal baggage etc. Also, as Horrox points out, several of Richard's household had defected earlier in the year. John Mortimer, esquire of the body may have moved into opposition by February 1485 and certainly fought for Henry at Bosworth. Other esquires of the body proved disloyal: Piers Curtis, who had previously been Richard's keeper of the great wardrobe, had forfeited his lands and office and was in Sanctuary at Westminster by May 1485.<sup>288</sup>

Therefore all evidence (as well as lack of it) argues against the idea of Richard's army being very large. There were some foreign mercenaries present – witness the mention of the Spaniard Salazar in de Valera's text, and also letters of passage given to his servants in April and June<sup>289</sup> – but we do not know what their total military contribution was. It seems likely that Salazar had previously served Maximilian of Austria.

### Henry's army

Henry came to England with an entourage of fellow exiles. This numbered at least 400, and was commanded by Richard Guildford who was created master of the ordnance on 8 August at Henry's landing at Milford Haven.<sup>290</sup> Not only were these men who had accompanied him overseas from the start, but others had joined him in exile. At the end of October 1484 Sir William Brandon and his sons had led a revolt against Richard in Colchester. They had subsequently fled to join Henry in France. Brandon returned with Henry and was his standard bearer at the battle. Another important supporter was the Earl of Oxford. He had been held in the royal prisons at Hammes but on 28 October 1484 Richard ordered him to be brought back to England

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<sup>285</sup> Harleian 433, p. 223.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid, p. 222.

<sup>287</sup> According to annals ascribed to William Worcester: *Letters and Papers illustrative of the Wars of Henry VI in France* (Rolls Series, 1864), vol. 2 part ii, p. 788.

<sup>288</sup> R. Horrox, *Richard III. A Study in Service* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 282-3.

<sup>289</sup> *Harleian 433*, p. 213, 217, 228.

<sup>290</sup> Griffiths, and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 130. Unfortunately they do not give a reference!



by William Burton, yeoman of the crown and a member of Calais garrison. But his gaoler, the captain of Hammes, James Blount, instead declared for Henry, and fled with Oxford to the latter, along with John Fortescue, porter of Calais. Blount had left his wife and most of garrison behind. Richard tried to win them back with a pardon (to Blount and 52 of his men), but then sent troops from Calais under John, Lord Dynham to take control of Hammes. Those inside appealed to Richmond for help and Oxford came back to assist the besieged. Thomas Brandon (exiled in 1483) managed to enter castle with 30 men. Under these circumstances, a treaty was come to whereby the besieged would be allowed to depart. Some from Calais garrison also showed support for Richmond and were ejected.<sup>291</sup>

There are several other examples of people who joined Henry in exile (one even delivering to him suits of armour). These included William Berkeley who fled to France in October 1484, Richard Skerne of Kingston on Thames, who certainly fought with Henry at Bosworth.<sup>292</sup> Roger Machado had been one of Richard's heralds but joined rebels in Fr and became Henry's Richmond herald.<sup>293</sup> By the end of 1484, Henry had begun to send letters to England aiming to raise armed support for his possible return.

'I give you to understand that no Christian heart can be more full of joy and gladness than the heart of me, your poor exiled friend, who will, upon the instant of your sure advertising what power you will make ready and what captains and leaders you get to conduct, be prepared to pass over the sea with such force as my friends here are preparing for me. And if I have such good speed and success as I wish, according to your desire, I shall ever be most forward to remember and wholly to requite this your great and moving loving kindness in my just quarrel'.<sup>294</sup>

The traditional view is that French help was crucial. In May Charles VIII of France supposedly gave Henry 40,000 livres, as well as ordnance.<sup>295</sup> Molinet tells us that at first 1800 men were assembled for the expedition with another 1800 at Honfleur joining just before departure.<sup>296</sup> According to Griffiths and Thomas, 'all told, Henry seems to have raised about 4,000 men who embarked on a flotilla at anchor off Honfleur'.<sup>297</sup> There has been much debate on these points. Cliff Davies considers that the number was more like 2,000.<sup>298</sup> This is based on Polydore Vergil who says that Henry received little from the French king.<sup>299</sup> It has been further suggested by Davis that Henry's French troops were not men of the *ordonnance* companies (i.e. cavalry) but were rather drawn from the francs archers 'units of which were composed of

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<sup>291</sup> Horrox, *Richard III*, p. 282.

<sup>292</sup> Horrox, *Richard III*, p. 324.

<sup>293</sup> M. Condon, *Ricardian*, 1982.

<sup>294</sup> Cited in Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 120. See Rosemary Horrox, 'Henry Tudor's letters to England during Richard III's reign', *The Ricardian*, VI, no 80 (1983), pp. 155-8.

<sup>295</sup> Comynnes, *Memoires*, p. 355,

<sup>296</sup> Molinet, p. 434.

<sup>297</sup> *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 129.

<sup>298</sup> C.S. L. Davies, 'The Wars of the Roses in European Context', *The Wars of the Roses*, ed. A.J. Pollard (London, 1995), p. 244.

<sup>299</sup> See ; M. K. Jones, 'The Myth of 1485: did France really put Henry Tudor on the throne', in *The English Experience in France c 1450-1558*, ed D Grummitt (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002), p. 100.

longbowmen, crossbowmen, handgunners, and bill or pikemen'.<sup>300</sup> It was one of these *francs archers* who wrote a letter home, probably from Leicester, on 23 August 1483.<sup>301</sup> Research by Jones has suggested only 10,000 livres of the 40,000 livres promised may actually have been paid.<sup>302</sup> He considers that, all in all, Henry may have only had 1,000 French troops with him at his invasion.<sup>303</sup> These were discharged soldiers from the French war base at Pont de l'Arche commanded by Philippe de Crevecoeur, sire d'Esquerdes: Jones sees these as well trained (under Swiss influence) pikemen. According to Commines, the Frenchmen were 'the worst kind which could have been found anywhere',<sup>304</sup> but there is no doubt that they played a crucial role at the battle, as the letter of the franc archer also confirms. Indeed, the general historical consensus is that it was these professional troops who made the difference between the two sides.

Henry also seems to have had Scottish troops commanded by Sir Alexander Bruce of Earlshall, who later received a reward from Henry. McDougall suggests there may have been as many as 500 to 1000 Scottish troops at the battle.<sup>305</sup> These had originally crossed to France in 1484, being recruited by Bernard Stuart, lord of Aubigny, and now recrossed to England. Following what we know about scots in the service of the French, most would have been archers. There also seem to have been some Bretons in Henry's company, such as Jean Perret but there was no major assistance from the duke of Brittany.

Henry's choice of a landing in Wales may have been linked to his hope for support. Messages had already come from John Morgan, a Welsh lawyer, that Rhys ap Thomas in Camarthenshire and John Savage in Cheshire would support Henry, and that Reginald Bray had collected large amount of money to recruit more men.<sup>306</sup> Chronicles suggest that as soon as he landed, Henry sent messengers to Sir William Stanley, his step father, who was justiciar in North Wales. Other letters were sent out: One, sent to John ap Maredudd ab Ieuan ap Mareddud of South Caernfonshire found its way into the history of Wynn family.<sup>307</sup>

We desire and pray you and upon your allegiance straitly charge and command you that immediately upon the sight hereof, will all such power as ye may make defensively arrayed for the war, you address you towards us without any trying upon the war, unto such time as ye be with us wheresoever we shall be to our aid for the effect above rehersed'

This letter is reminiscent of that sent by Richard to Sir Henry Vernon, and remind us that Henry was able to invoke quasi-royal authority as he progressed through Wales and England. We do not know the response to this specific letter but some Welsh did join and fight at Bosworth. Rhys ap Thomas had been arrested at Pembroke in May

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<sup>300</sup> S. Cunningham, *Henry VII* (London, 2007), p. 29.

<sup>301</sup> M.K.Jones, *Bosworth 1485. Psychology of a Battle* (Stroud, 2002), pp. 221-3; Jones, 'The Myth of 1485', pp. 104-5.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101. Henry may have got more through private engagements.

<sup>303</sup> Jones, *Bosworth 1485*, p. 191, 'Myth of 1485', p. 104.

<sup>304</sup> Commines, p.306. Anne Curry's translation.

<sup>305</sup> N. McDougall, *James III*, pp. 215-6.

<sup>306</sup> Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 131.

<sup>307</sup> Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 139, from *The History of the Gwydir Family*, written by Sir John Wynn, ed. J. Ballinger (Cardiff, 1927), p. 28.

but the men of the area did offer support to Henry. News of this was brought by Arnold Butler who set out with his men from Haverford West on 9 August. At Cardigan Richard Griffith joined Henry, as did John Morgan of Gwent.<sup>308</sup> According to Polydore Vergil, Cardigan and Aberystwyth castles were won for Henry.

On 14 August Henry was at Machynlleth. On this day a letter was sent to Sir Roger Kynaston of Shropshire, who was also constable of Harlech. This has similarities with Richard's letter to Vernon.<sup>309</sup>

We will and pray you and upon your allegiance straitly charge and command you that in all haste possible ye assemble his said folks (Lord Powis – Kynaston's nephew) and servants and with them so assembled and defensively arrayed for the war ye come to us for our aid and assistance

The response is not known, but the early Tudor chronicler, Elis Gruffyd, claimed that a great number of men from Gwynedd joined Henry before he reached Shrewsbury, such as Rhys Fawr ap Maredudd who also brought men and food. Welsh recruitment was significant: the father of John Baker of Presteigne, Radnorshire, fought for Henry at Bosworth and was later granted the forestership of Radnor.<sup>310</sup> Rhys ap Thomas also seems to have joined Henry with a large force near Shrewsbury. It is possible that the town provided men to Henry also, having been persuaded to accept him through the influence of Sir William Stanley, who sent his messenger, Rowland Warburton.<sup>311</sup> Since Lord Stanley set out from Lathom on 15 August it is very likely that Henry had already been in touch with him by letter.

Sir Gilbert Talbot joined Henry at Newport on 18 Aug with 500 men.<sup>312</sup> Other troops (perhaps 800) were brought by Sir Richard Corbet (whose step father was Sir William Stanley) and others by Roger Acton. Other companies may have come from Herefordshire under Thomas Croft, from Worcester under John Hanley, from Gloucestershire under Robert Pointz. According to the Song of Lady Bessy Sir William Stanley had passed via Nantwich and Holt, having collected men from north Wales and Cheshire. It seems likely that Henry met with Sir William at Stafford on 19 August. Griffiths and Thomas suggest this was when they learned Richard was at Nottingham, and when they therefore decided to intercept his possible return to London.<sup>313</sup> Tradition has it that the two Stanleys met each other, and perhaps also Henry, at Atherstone on 21 August.

Henry moved from Lichfield to Tamworth where he was joined on 20 August in the evening by Sir Thomas Bouchier of Barnes, Walter Hungerford and others who had escaped from Sir Richard Brackenbury, who had been charged by Richard to bring them from the Tower to the king. That there were other defections to Henry is evident. Horrox notes that John Biconnell, one of the commissioners of array in

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<sup>308</sup> Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 145.

<sup>309</sup> See G. Grazebrook, 'An unpublished letter by Henry, earl of Richmond', *Miscellanea Genealogica et Heraldica*, 4<sup>th</sup> series, V (1914), pp. 30-9.

<sup>310</sup> John was MP for Radnorshire in 1542.

<sup>311</sup> Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 150.

<sup>312</sup> Horrox, *Richard III*, p. 317.

<sup>313</sup> Griffiths and Thomas, *Making of the Tudor Dynasty*, p. 151.

Somerset, led his troops to Richmond.<sup>314</sup> If these had been troops raised by royal order, then the defection was all the more significant and symptomatic of the complete collapse of royal government. It is also significant that John Savage, whom Polydoer Vergil says commanded Henry's left flank, was a commissioner of array in Macclesfield Hundred in December 1484.<sup>315</sup>

Henry could also rely on former supporters of William, lord Hastings, whom Richard had had killed early in the reign. One was James Blount, who had brought three men-at-arms and 20 archers on the 1475 French expedition.<sup>316</sup> He had considerable military experience, having been lieutenant at Hammes.

Like Richard, Henry had relatively few peers with him. Dorset had had to be left behind in France as guarantor for the loans which Henry had secured. Henry's leading peer, John de Vere, earl of Oxford (b. 1442), had been in exile so would have been unlikely to have been able to bring as large a company as in the past). But he had substantial military experience, having caused discomfort to Richard's men at Barnet in 1471. He fled to France after the battle, and carried on the war against the Yorkists by actions at sea, successfully capturing St Michael's Mount briefly in 1473. Forced to surrender, he was then imprisoned in the castle of Hammes, from which he escaped in 1485 to join Henry Tudor in his invasion. His military involvement was therefore considerable, being credited also with defending Norfolk so well in 1471 as to prevent Edward IV landing there. After his accession, Henry VII appointed him Lord High Admiral of England, High Steward of the Duchy of Lancaster and Constable of the Tower of London. He commanded the vanguard at the battle of Stoke and also served in Henry's invasion of France in 1492.<sup>317</sup>

## Comparisons

Henry had the great advantage of professional French (and Scottish?) soldiers. This gave him the upperhand in terms of archers. He also benefited from the defection of Lord Stanley, whose military potential was considerable. Some place it at 6,000. This is rather high but Thomas had brought 40 men-at-arms and 300 archers in 1475 which was one of the largest retinues (the same size as that of the then duke of Norfolk, John Mowbray).

Both armies were made up of a multiplicity of companies. Given that Henry was claiming the crown, he was able to raise troops in a very similar way to Richard, and was assisted in this recruitment by his progress from Wales to the Midlands. Henry's long march, both in time and space, therefore redounded to his advantage since it gave opportunity for men to join him. By contrast Richard was damaged by being in one location to which troops had to be summoned, late in the day. Richard faced major timing issues in issuing commissions and sending out letters summoning the nobility, gentry and towns to provide troops, whilst Henry could recruit them as he passed through territory.

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<sup>314</sup> Horrox, *Richard III*, p. 318.

<sup>315</sup> D. Clayton, *The Administration of the County Palatine of Chester 1442-1485*, Chetham Society (1990), p. 117.

<sup>316</sup> Dunham, *Lord Hastings Indentured Retainers*, p. 26.

<sup>317</sup> *Complete Peerage*, X, pp. 239-44.

Furthermore, Henry could be certain that the troops he had raised during his progress would be loyal to him as they had chosen to support him against their anointed king. Richard was less certain of loyalty to him. As noted earlier, it does not seem as though many peers and gentry rallied to his cause. The crucial point to bear in mind, therefore, is that Richard did not inevitably have the easier task in raising an army against Henry in 1485, and that he was as dependent upon troops provided by his nobles much as protagonists in the Wars of the Roses had always been. In this context, political factors, which determined whether the nobility were prepared to support him or not, are more, or at least equally, significant as military factors in the battle itself.

### **Richard III's military experience<sup>318</sup>**

Richard was 32 at the time of the battle (b. 2 October 1452). Given his status he would have enjoyed the typical education of a nobleman with ample training in horsemanship and weapon handling. He is not known, however, to have participated in jousting. He is known to have commissioned a copy of an English translation of Vegetius, *De Re militari*. Caxton also dedicated a work on chivalry to him in 1484.

There is some suggestion that when difficulties began to arise for Edward IV in 1469, through the rising of Robin of Redesdale, Richard 'was able to raise men where others had failed' ... winning over 'a number of John Paston's young acquaintances, "waging" them to fight under his own banner'.<sup>319</sup> The first conflict in which he is thought to have participated was the battle of Barnet (14 April 1471), where Edward IV, recently returned from exile, defeated the earl of Warwick. The exact role Richard, still a teenager, played is uncertain. The *Great Chronicle of London* (written in the late fifteenth-early sixteenth century) claims that he led the vanguard but goes on to give an account which is hardly flattering of the duke.

The duke of Glowcetyr ledyng the vaward of king Edward and therle of Oxfynfford the vaward of the lordys, and afftyr the Sunne was upp, eythir hoost approachid unto othir, But than it happid to be soo excedyng a myst that nowthir hoost cowde playnly see othir, Soo that it happid therle of Oxynfford to sett upon the wyng or end of the duke of Glowcetirs people and afftir sharp fygth slew a certayn of theym and put the remanant to fflygth and anoon as they had a whyle chacid such as flied soom retournyd and ffyll to ryfeleyng and soom of them wenyng that all had been wonne, rood in all hast to london and there told that Kyng Edward hadd lost the ffeeld...

Duke Richard receives a better press for his action at the battle of Tewksbury on 4 May. The *Historie of the Arrivall* tells us that he commanded the vanguard. In the face of an attack by the duke of Somerset, he skilfully mounted what Jones describes as a 'flanking attack on the enemy position...the decisive moment of the battle' since

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<sup>318</sup> For a useful general summary, although not footnoted, see M.K. Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', in *Richard III. A Medieval Kingship*, ed. J. Gillingham (Collins and Brown: London, 1993), pp. 93-112.

<sup>319</sup> Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', p. 101.

it enabled the king and his brother to beat back Somerset and thereby gain the victory. (There is no mention of him in the account of the battle in the Great Chronicle.) Jones adds that Richard's prowess was enough to feature in a poem written to celebrate the victory:

The duke of Gloccetter, that nobill prynce  
Yonge of age and victorious in batayle  
To the honoure of Ectour that he myght comens'<sup>320</sup>

As a younger royal brother, he would be fully expected to play a military command role in any future actions. Both Clarence and Gloucester led troops in their brother's French expedition of 1475. Both indented with companies of the same size: 10 knights, 100 lances (men-at-arms) and 1000 archers. The next largest company was under the duke of Buckingham (4 knights, 40 lances, 400 archers), with the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk each with 2 knights, 40 lances and 300 archers).<sup>321</sup> This expedition, however, saw no fighting. Commynes implies that Richard was not in support of his royal brother's treaty with Louis XI at Picquigny.<sup>322</sup>

Jones writes that 'for nine years after Barnet and Tewkesbury, Richard endured a frustrating lack of military activity', but this view can be no more than an assumption. Even if he opposed the treaty with France in 1475, it does not mean to say that he was obsessed by war and anxious to take part in it.

In the last years of his brother's reign, however, Richard was militarily active on the Anglo-Scottish frontier. This was an area of perennial insecurity, and once the Anglo-Scottish truce expired, conflict reopened. Gloucester was appointed lieutenant general on 12 May 1480. He was responsible for the defence of the border, but also conducted raids into Scottish territory, such as in September 1480. In November plans were laid for a joint land and sea attack in the following summer-autumn. Significantly, the naval element was led by John, lord Howard with 3,000 men. Howard was created duke of Norfolk almost as soon as Richard became king. The land attack, led by Richard, aimed to retake Berwick. In this abortive action Gloucester was accompanied by the Earl of Northumberland (the same earl as was in his army at Bosworth). The Stanleys were also present, but later criticised Richard for failing to coordinate his forces and for leaving their own troops isolated outside Berwick.<sup>323</sup>

In August 1482 Gloucester's army reached as far as Edinburgh, and this time was able to retake Berwick, although this was as much due to political divisions in Scotland as English military success. (The English army on this occasion is described as being 20,000 strong but more work is needed to substantiate this figure.) At one level, these actions gave Richard a considerable military reputation. As expressed by Dominic Mancini in 1483: 'such was his renown in warfare, that whenever a difficult and dangerous policy had to be undertaken, it would be entrusted to his discretion and generalship'.<sup>324</sup> But the Crowland Continuator was critical of his command and of

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<sup>320</sup> Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', pp. 96-7.

<sup>321</sup> *Edward IV's French Expedition of 1475. The Leaders and their Badges*, ed. F. P. Barnard (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1925), 1 verso. Barnard notes (p. 10) that Gloucester did not 'appear in the Tellers Roll for the first quarter of this expedition.

<sup>322</sup> Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', p. 97.

<sup>323</sup> Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', p. 100.

<sup>324</sup> Cited in Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', p. 99.

how little he had gained in the Scottish wars for all the money which had been invested.

His continuing interest in the Anglo-Scottish frontier linked to his northern interests in general. In this context Jones points to the royal grants to him in January 1483 not only of the county palatine of Cumberland but also of the wardenship of the West March. A new expedition to Scotland under his command was in preparation when Edward IV died. In this context it is not surprising that Richard should be able to seize power so easily in 1483.

Many of those associated with his rule, and serving in his army at Bosworth, would have served with him in his Scottish actions. He already had military links before he became king with both Norfolk and Northumberland, his leading commanders at Bosworth. There is some suggestion, however, that relations with Northumberland had been soured by Richard's growing power in the north, and especially the royal grants of 1483. This could therefore have been a contributory factor in Northumberland's apparent defection at Bosworth. The Stanleys had also served militarily with Richard but were not wholly happy with his generalship. Jones jumps to conclusions on his relationship with his soldiers ('Richard was at home in the company of soldiers and respected their outlook'), basing this on a couple of commonplace incidents. There is really no evidence that he was the much loved commander Jones would like him to be. That said, of all the medieval kings, Richard was one of the most militarily experienced at his accession (only Henry V comes close), had shown personal courage, and had experienced two pitched battles where his side had emerged victorious. He had never, however, been in sole command of a battle victory. Indeed, relations with his fellow commanders, as we have seen, were not always smooth. Jones also emphasises Richard's ruthlessness within a military context, citing Waurin's account of Edward IV's attempts to enter York in March 1471 where Richard proposed killing the town rulers if they opposed the royal army, and Warkworth's account of Richard's execution of the Bastard Fauconberg despite the latter holding a royal pardon (Pontefract, Sept. 1471). Such incidents, as well as the summary executions after the usurpation and the likely murder of the princes, make his treatment of Lord Strange more credible, especially his order to kill the young man during the battle of Bosworth (perhaps when he knew of the treason of his father, Lord Stanley). Commanders who behave in this way are not always respected, or successful.

His usurpation in 1483 has some elements of a military coup in that he raised troops from his northern supporters which marched on and secured his position in London, as well as helping to capture the Woodvilles and the princes. Brackenbury, an ally as constable of the Tower, was crucial.

## Appendix 1: The Road to Bosworth

### The Itineraries of King Richard III, Henry of Richmond, Lord Stanley and Sir William Stanley, August 1485.

#### 4.1 King Richard III

There has been little doubt or controversy about Richard's movements immediately prior to the battle. It is clear that he spent several months prior to the battle in and around Nottingham. He received the news of Henry's landing in Wales whilst at Beskwood Lodge, near Nottingham, from where he sent out letters summoning his followers to attend him. On Sunday 20 August he departed Nottingham for Leicester, and the following day marched from Leicester to somewhere in the vicinity of the battle site.

**Early June-August.**  
Nottingham.<sup>325</sup>

**22 June.**  
Nottingham.<sup>326</sup>

**11 August.**  
Beskwood Lodge. Hears of Henry's landing; summons his forces. It is usually stated that he received the news by a letter of Richard Williams, the constable of Pembroke, who observed the landing. However, since Richard states in his letters of summons that Henry had left France on 1 August, a fact which Williams could hardly have known except by speaking with the invaders (which is inconceivable), he may have received news from another source (news could clearly have made it from northern France to Nottingham by a shorter route than via Milford Haven).<sup>327</sup>

**Saturday 20 August.**  
Nottingham to Leicester.<sup>328</sup> This is universally accepted, even though the route is 28 miles: a very long march. Richard could no doubt have made it quite easily on horseback, perhaps with his foot travelling more slowly.

**Sunday 21 August.**  
Marches from Leicester and camps at a place variously reported as 'the village of Bosworth, a little beyond Leicester' (Vergil), 'eight miles from the town [of Leicester], near Merevale abbey' (Crowland Chronicle; Merevale is in fact around 18

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<sup>325</sup> Bennett, *Battle of Bosworth*.

<sup>326</sup> *Harleian 433 II*, 228.

<sup>327</sup> HMC Rutland I, 7.

<sup>328</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 21. Vergil does not give the date here, and in fact he records that Richard 'reached Leicestershire by sunset', but he does say that it was the same day as Henry marched from Lichfield to Tamworth.



miles from Leicester).<sup>329</sup> The only dissent to this is the Great Chronicle of London, which has it that Richard left Leicester on the morning of the 22 August.<sup>330</sup>

**Monday 22 August.**

**BATTLE OF BOSWORTH FIELD.**

### **Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond, afterwards King Henry VII.**

Henry's itinerary to Bosworth is the most problematic of all, and although several attempts have been made to establish a definitive schedule of the march to Bosworth, none has been found to be satisfactory. The most problematic section is the march through Wales, simply because of the lack of documentary evidence: most of the sources only go into any detail on Henry's route when he reaches Shrewsbury. Even after this, although the route itself is basically clear, there are disagreements about dating. For virtually all of the route, therefore, pinpointing an itinerary is essentially a matter of mapping the route which Henry appears to have taken (which the sources broadly agree on) onto the period in which he was marching, taking account of the likely speed with which he marched. Many sources identify places which Henry visited or marched through, though often without clarity as to whether he camped there or not. In view of the shortcomings of the documentary evidence, especially for the Welsh section of the map, it has been necessary to estimate or speculate on some details. In order to do so, Henry's probable pace, estimated at around 16 miles per day, has been employed (see Note 1, below).

**Monday 1 August.**

Henry sails from the Seine.<sup>331</sup>

**Sunday 7 August.**

(around sunset<sup>332</sup>) Henry lands at Dale, Pembrokeshire.<sup>333</sup> He seizes Dale Castle and village and camps. There is little uncertainty about this date; the only significant dissent is Rous, which places his landing on the Feast of the Transfiguration, 6 August.

**Monday 8 August**

At first light, Henry departs Dale for Haverfordwest (13 miles).<sup>334</sup>

***According to Williams, he met with 'Arnold Butler of Coedcantlais, one of Rhys's lieutenants' to pledge support.***<sup>335</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 23. Crowland CC, 179.

<sup>330</sup> Great Chronicle of London, 237.

<sup>331</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20. Also confirmed by Richard's letter of 11 August to Henry Vernon. HMC Rutland i, 7. The only significant dissent to this is the Crowland Chronicle Continuations, 177, which states that Henry *landed* on 1 August.

<sup>332</sup> According to Vergil, it was after sunset. Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

<sup>333</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20. Also confirmed by Richard's letter of 11 August. HMC Rutland i, 7. An exhaustive examination of the exact spot where Henry is most likely to have landed is provided by S. B. Chrimes: 'The landing place of Henry of Richmond, 1485', *Welsh History Review* 2:2 (1964), 173-80.

<sup>334</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

(Later): Leaves Haverfordwest in the direction of Cardigan; camps somewhere along the way. Vergil states that he marched 5 miles beyond Haverfordwest, but ‘tradition’ (quoted by Williams) has it that Henry camped at Fagwr Lwyd, near Cilgwyn, about 20 miles on from Haverfordwest; this is surely too far to have marched, as Williams points out.<sup>336</sup> Therefore it is not clear where the army camped – if Vergil is to be believed, this should be somewhere near Scolton.

### **Following this, Henry progressed through Wales.**

Various efforts have been made to reconstruct and date his route. Ultimately, however, this is impossible. The only concrete date between the landing and the battle is Henry’s presence at Machynlleth on 14 August. None of the surviving sources offers any clarity on the route. As Evans notes, after Cardigan, ‘there is no data which will enable us to describe his itinerary between Cardigan and Shrewsbury [this is before the discovery of the Machynlleth letter].’<sup>337</sup> Williams does, however, give a great deal of detail on the route, appearing to rely primarily on local legend, and seldom quoting his sources.

All this said, the rough outline of the route can be surmised. Most commentators suggest that Henry followed the coast route: as Bennett suggests, Henry would surely have marched north-east from Cardigan, following the coast, towards Llanbadarn, near Aberystwyth. Shortly after that, a coastal route comes to the Dyfi estuary and the road turns inland, towards Machynlleth. Evans is the only noteworthy author who suggests a more inland route: from Cardigan ‘through Strata Florida, Aberystwyth, [to] Machynlleth’. This route has something to recommend it: it is nice flat terrain, along the valley of the Afon Teifi, east and then as far north as Strata Florida, the monastery where Henry would presumably have been able to victual his troops, then north-west to Aberystwyth (or Llanbadarn Fawr) and up the coast from there. Nevertheless, it is somewhat of a detour, and the coast road seems more likely.<sup>338</sup>

Even assuming that Henry did indeed follow the coastal route, we have no information regarding his daily marches or stopping points. In terms of how quickly Henry was moving, the itinerary suggested by Williams posits an extremely rapid pace: from Dale to beyond Machynlleth on 8, 9, 10 and 11 August. This is almost exactly 100 miles (Dale to Machynlleth is about 96 miles; Williams claims Henry camped five miles beyond Machynlleth, at Mathafarn). This would suggest a pace averaging 25 miles a day, which is probably unrealistic. If, however, the Machynlleth letter was written in the morning of 14 August, before departing (as Bennett suggests), this would mean that the march took 6 days, at a more realistic pace of 16 miles per day.

In view of this, the following account has two parts. Firstly, the ‘traditional’ itinerary (which was broadly accepted by scholars until the discovery of the 14 August letter) is outlined, noting the earlier scholarship which covers this; since all significant scholarship on Henry’s itinerary is based on this, it has to be covered. Secondly, an attempt is made to suggest a possible itinerary, taking the 14 August letter into account.

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<sup>335</sup> Williams, ‘Henry of Richmond’s Itinerary’, 36.

<sup>336</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

<sup>337</sup> Evans, *Wales and the Wars of the Roses*, 222.

<sup>338</sup> Evans, *Wales and the Wars of the Roses*, 222.

## **I. The ‘traditional itinerary’.**

### **Tuesday 9 August.**

It must be assumed that Henry marched on from wherever he camped to Cardigan. Williams: Moving on from there, he marched twelve miles and camped in the parish of Llandissilio-gogo; Henry stayed with Dafydd ap Evan at his house, Llwyn Dafydd.<sup>339</sup> This seems over-ambitious: Havefordwest to Cardigan is 27 miles; if, as Vergil suggests, Henry only covered 5 miles of that on 8 August, he had to cover 22 miles to get to Cardigan, so they cannot have marched much further.

According to Williams, Henry is joined by Richard Griffith and John Morgan on Tuesday 9 August; Evans concurs, saying that Griffith came from Carmarthen to meet Henry. Neither quotes a source; it would appear to be Vergil, who refers to Henry being joined by ‘Gryfyn’ (with ‘a small band of men’) and John Morgan.<sup>340</sup>

### **Wednesday 10 August.**

Williams discusses the legend that Henry stayed at Wern Newydd, near Llanarth, a guest of Dafydd Llwyd, and rejects it on the grounds that it is only seven miles from Llwyn Dafydd. He suggests a coastal route going through Aberaeron and a camp near Aberystwyth.

### **Thursday 11 August.**

Williams writes that Henry marched on to the Dyfi estuary and then to Machynlleth, moving on directly to Mathafarn, a farm near Llanwrin.

## **II. Suggested itinerary, Cardigan to Machynlleth.**

This is based on estimates of daily marches of around 16 miles per day. The start and end points of days are mostly significant settlements; it does seem likely that Henry would want to camp in or near towns where possible, in order to supply his men. This also allows Henry to go through the places which tradition holds him to have done. It does, however, assume that Henry marched at a steady pace. There is no evidence for any lengthy pause at any point, nor is it clear what that would have achieved. After all, the army could march on whilst Henry paused to (say) confer with supporters. In summary, all of these suggestions are highly speculative.

**8 August:** Dale to Scolton

**9 August:** Scolton to somewhere short of Cardigan

**10 August:** On to somewhere between Cardigan and Aberaeron

**11 August:** On to Aberaeron

**12 August:** Aberaeron to Llanbadarn.

**13 August:** Llanbadarn to Machynlleth.

## **From Machylleth into England.**

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<sup>339</sup> Williams, 38.

<sup>340</sup> Williams, 37; Evans, 219-20. Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

### **Sunday 14 August.**

**MACHYNLLETH.** This date is concrete: Henry wrote to Sir Roger Kynaston ‘beside our town of Machen Lloyd [Machynlleth] the xiiij of August’.<sup>341</sup> This suggests that Henry camped or at least paused here. Bennett suggests that the letter may have been written in the morning, before departure, and this suggestion has been adopted here.

Leaving Machynlleth, Henry must have moved on to Welshpool.<sup>342</sup> There are two possible routes: a northern route (now the A458) and a southern, via Newtown (A 470/A 489/A 483). There is no clarity as to which was taken; both have been suggested. Bennett argues the south, saying that, Henry was joined by Rhys ap Thomas either at Newtown or Welshpool.<sup>343</sup> Williams also suggests the south route.<sup>344</sup> This route is slightly longer, at 62 miles to the north’s 58 miles.

At around 60 miles, marching from Machynlleth to Shrewsbury must realistically have taken three days, all of which would be moderately rough going, although none of it is terribly challenging. Assuming he left Machynlleth first thing on Sunday 14 August, and arrived late in the day at Shrewsbury, he must have arrived at Shrewsbury on 16 August.

### **Monday 15 August.**

Marching, en route from Machynlleth to Welshpool.

### **Tuesday 16 August.**

Welshpool [?] to Shrewsbury.<sup>345</sup>

Bennett says Henry arrived at Shrewsbury on 15 August.<sup>346</sup> As laid out above, this would require him to have marched 60 miles in two days. As Horrox argues, the 14 August letter requires redating his arrival in Shrewsbury to at least three days later than the usual date of 14 August, and suggests that Henry left ‘the town on the day he had entered it’, rather than spending two days there.<sup>347</sup> If, however, as Bennett suggests, the 14 August letter was written before departing Machynlleth, then the three-day march from Machynlleth would have been completed on 16 August. This would suggest that he arrived at Shrewsbury after a full day’s march and so presumably in the late afternoon or evening.

At Shrewsbury Henry found the town barred against him; he camped that night at Forton, 3 ½ miles from the town.<sup>348</sup> The next morning a compromise was reached and he entered the town.<sup>349</sup> According to ‘Rose of England’, this arose through the

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<sup>341</sup> Horrox, ‘Henry Tudor’s letters to England’, 157.

<sup>342</sup> Bennett, 77.

<sup>343</sup> Bennett, 78.

<sup>344</sup> Williams, 40.

<sup>345</sup> Vergil mentions that Henry passed through Shrewsbury but does not state that Henry slept there or provide any other detail (25 Eng. 20).

<sup>346</sup> Bennett, 78.

<sup>347</sup> Horrox, ‘Henry Tudor’s letters to England’, 157.

<sup>348</sup> Shrewsbury chronicle, quoted in ‘Rose of England’ edition, 188. Forton is in fact more like 5 miles; to the north-east, in the direction of Oswestry.

<sup>349</sup> Shrewsbury chronicle, quoted in ‘Rose of England’ edition, 188.

intervention (by letter) of Sir William Stanley; ‘Lady Bessiye’ says that Stanley sent Rowland Warburton to arrange it.<sup>350</sup>

Vergil writes that Henry received messages and money from supporters at Shrewsbury, but seems to imply that he did not camp there but instead ‘hastened along his way, arriving at a village its inhabitants call Newport’ and camped there. However, since Newport is 20 miles from Shrewsbury, he could hardly have marched that in less than a day.

### **In England.**

All of the sources agree on the basic outlines of Henry’s route through England to Bosworth, although they tend to differ in the assignment of the stages of the route onto particular days.

#### **Wednesday 17 August.**

Henry moves on to Newport.<sup>351</sup> Vergil states that he camps there, and that in the evening Gilbert Talbot joins him.<sup>352</sup>

#### **Thursday 18 August.**

Newport to Stafford (13 miles)

According to Vergil, Henry moved on to Stafford after camping at Newport, and ‘stayed there’.<sup>353</sup>

At Stafford Henry meets with William Stanley. This meeting is documented in several sources, many of which note that Stanley came from his forces at Stone whilst Henry was at Stafford.<sup>354</sup> Vergil describes the meeting, but does not date it, noting that Stanley appeared with a few men before returning to his forces, camped elsewhere.<sup>355</sup> ‘Bosworth Field’ places it on a Tuesday (i.e. 16 August), but in view of the Machynlleth letter, this simply isn’t possible, requiring Henry to have marched 93 miles in 3 days; Harleian 542 appears to put it on a Sunday, which again is impossible.<sup>356</sup>

#### **Friday 19 August.**

Stafford to Lichfield (18 miles)

Vergil implies that Henry camped at Stafford and met with William Stanley; ‘then Henry turned aside and sought Litchfield, where he passed a night outside its walls’.<sup>357</sup>

#### **Saturday 20 August.**

Early in the morning, Henry made a ceremonial entry into Lichfield.<sup>358</sup> According to Bennett (p. 81), this was ‘stage managed’ by Sir William Stanley (despite

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<sup>350</sup> Rose of England, ll. 67-8.

<sup>351</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20. ‘Rose of England’, l. 92.

<sup>352</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

<sup>353</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

<sup>354</sup> ‘Lady Bessiye’, verses 219-220. ‘Bosworth Field’, verse 92. Harleian 542, 56.

<sup>355</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20. Also

<sup>356</sup> ‘Bosworth Field’, lines 368-388. Harleian 542, 56.

<sup>357</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20.

discrepancies between his account of Henry's itinerary and that presented here, he also argues that this took place on 20 August).

Later in the day, Henry marched from Lichfield to Tamworth.<sup>359</sup> This march can be dated more confidently than most, since Vergil states it took place on the same day that Richard marched from Nottingham to Leicester.

Along the way, Henry is joined by Walter Hungerford, Thomas Bouchier and others, who had deserted from Sir Robert Brackenbury's contingent of knights marching from London to join Richard at Stony Stratford (on Watling Street near Milton Keynes) and travelled by night.<sup>360</sup>

(Evening) Henry pauses on the road to discuss strategy and gets left behind by his army, en route to Tamworth. Spends the night at 'a certain hamlet more than three miles from his camp.'<sup>361</sup>

### **Sunday 21 August.**

Tamworth to Atherstone (?)

Henry returns to his army at first light.<sup>362</sup>

Goes secretly to Atherstone to meet the Stanleys.<sup>363</sup> According to Rose of England, this is the first meeting of Henry and Lord Stanley.

(Evening) John Savage, Brian Sanford, Simon Digby et al. defect to Henry with their bands of men.<sup>364</sup>

Vergil's account is a little garbled here; after discussing Henry's 'secret' visit to Atherstone, he moves to Richard and describes his nightmare of the night of 21/22 August, and then Richard's arraying his army for battle on the 22 August. Only then does he return to Henry, still on the 21 August, saying that he 'encamped near his enemies and spent the night [of 21/22 August] there.' He does not offer any more clarity on exactly where this was.<sup>365</sup>

### **Monday 22 August.**

#### **BATTLE OF BOSWORTH FIELD**

## **4.2 Lord Stanley**

The itineraries of the Stanleys are more difficult to reconstruct, mainly because Vergil provides relatively little detail. However, an outline of their route can be reconstructed, primarily from 'Bosworth Field and 'Lady Bessiye'.

### **Late July?**

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<sup>358</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20, makes clear that this was in the morning after Henry had arrived outside Lichfield and camped.

<sup>359</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 21; Vergil does not specify the date, but notes that it was the same day Richard marched from Nottingham to Leicester. Steven Gunn in *ODNB* also states that Henry reached Tamworth on 20 August.

<sup>360</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 21.

<sup>361</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 22.

<sup>362</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 22.

<sup>363</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 22.

<sup>364</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 22.

<sup>365</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 23.

Lord Stanley leaves court and returns to Lancashire, leaving his son as a hostage.<sup>366</sup>

**Unknown date.**

(After he receives news of Henry's landing); 'Bosworth Field' states it was a Monday, so probably 15 August [as Bennett says]: Departs from Lathom 'with knyghts and esquiers in his company, with theyr bannars, fearce to fight, to mantayn Henry to be theyr kyng'<sup>367</sup>

[Picks up forces at Warrington, according to Bennett<sup>368</sup>]

Went to Newcastle-under-Lyme.<sup>369</sup>

**Wednesday 17 August.**

According to Vergil, Lord Stanley arrived at Lichfield 3 days before Henry, which would be 17 August, before moving on to Atherstone ahead to Henry 'in order to avoid suspicion'.<sup>370</sup>

**Saturday 20 August**

Bennett suggests that Stanley was 'establishing himself somewhere around Hinckley, where Fosse Way intersected with Watling Street, perhaps throwing up earth ramparts at Stapleton' [no source quoted].<sup>371</sup>

**Sunday 21 August.**

Lord Stanley and Sir William both camped at Atherstone.<sup>372</sup>

**Monday 22 August.**

**BATTLE OF BOSWORTH FIELD.**

### **4.3 Sir William Stanley**

Brought the men of North Wales and Chester, from the Holt Castle (nr Wrexham). It is not at all clear when he departed. Heads to Nantwich.<sup>373</sup>

**Thursday 18 August.**

(early) Brought his men to Stone. 'Bosworth Field' places this on Tuesday (16 August), and Harleian 542 puts it on Sunday (14 August), but since both sources (and in addition 'Lady Bessiye') have his arrival at Stone when Henry was 'come to Stafford', the Thursday seems more likely.<sup>374</sup>

Later, Sir William rides to Stafford, where Henry is camped, to confer (see above).<sup>375</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> Crowland CC, 179; this was 'a little before' Henry landed in Pembrokeshire.

<sup>367</sup> Harleian 542, 55-6.

<sup>368</sup> Bennett, 81.

<sup>369</sup> 'Bosworth Field', line 355. Harleian 542, 56.

<sup>370</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 20. Bennett concurs with this analysis(81).

<sup>371</sup> Bennett, 82.

<sup>372</sup> Vergil, 25 Eng. 22.

<sup>373</sup> 'Bosworth Field' says 'Nantwich.' Harleian 542 (56) calls it 'the Northwyche', although the printed version misreads this as 'Northwycke'.

<sup>374</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verse 92; Harleian 542, 56; 'Lady Bessiye', verse 219.

<sup>375</sup> 'Bosworth Field', lines 368-388. 'Lady Bessiye', verse 220.

### **Friday 19 and Saturday 20 August.**

'Bosworth Field' implies that Sir William went all the way from Stone to Atherstone in one day: Saturday, i.e. the 20 August. 'Lady Bessiye implies the same, shifting it to the Sunday.<sup>376</sup> As this is 43 miles, it seems unlikely, especially since 'Bosworth Field' gives no clue as to Stanley's movements on Friday 19 August. However, the text may be at fault: it records that Stanley marched from Stone to Lichfield, on the other side of which he 'tarried', which suggests a night's camp; the following day it records him marching on to 'Hattersey', where he also 'tarryed' 'all that night'. The following day is noted to have been Sunday.<sup>377</sup> In view of the great distance and what appears to be the interval of two nights, this suggests Stone to Atherstone was completed in two days, the Friday and Saturday, with a night at or near Lichfield.

Therefore it is suggested that Stanley marched from Stone to Lichfield on Friday 19 August, and Lichfield to Atherstone on Saturday 20 August.

On this account, Stanley left Stone for Lichfield via Wolseley Bridge (between Rugeley and Colwich) where supposedly they saw the king.<sup>378</sup> This would make sense if, on the Friday, Stanley was marching from Stone and Henry from Stafford, both *en route* for Lichfield, and Stanley was crossing the Trent at Wolseley Bridge as Henry's army was passing by.

There was some kind of triumph at Lichfield, according to Vergil in the morning of 20 August, after Henry and (according to this account) Stanley too had arrived the previous night. According to Bennett, this was stage managed by Stanley himself, suggesting perhaps that Stanley entered the town in advance of Henry (although if the Wolseley Bridge incident is accurate, Henry must have arrived first) and made the arrangements whilst Henry camped outside. This does appear to conflict with 'Bosworth Field', which implies that the triumph occurred the same day as the march from Stone (i.e. Friday 19 August), before Stanley slept there.<sup>379</sup> In addition, 'Bosworth Field' does not clearly state that Henry was even present, though Vergil's evidence leads one to believe that he was. Once he had passed through Lichfield, he 'tarryed'.<sup>380</sup>

### **Saturday 20 August.**

Following this account through, Stanley would then have moved on to Tamworth and Atherstone the following day, Saturday 20 August, camping that night near his brother's forces in the vicinity of the battlefield, as is suggested in 'Bosworth Field'.<sup>381</sup>

### **Sunday 21 August.**

Heard mass. Went to the field. Met with Henry.<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> 'Lady Bessiye', verses 225-8.

<sup>377</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verses 98-105.

<sup>378</sup> 'Bosworth Field': Woosley bridge. Harleian 542: 'Worsley Bridge'. 'Bosworth Field' confirms that this was on a Saturday.

<sup>379</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verses 99-101.

<sup>380</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verse 101.

<sup>381</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verses 103-5. Harleian 542, 56.

<sup>382</sup> 'Bosworth Field', verses 105-11.



**Monday 22 August.**  
**BATTLE OF BOSWORTH FIELD**

### Note 1: Henry's pace

The question of how far we can realistically expect Henry to have been marching on a daily basis is of some importance to this reconstruction of his itinerary. Earlier accounts of his itinerary have tended to suggest that Henry's progress through Wales was much more rapid than is suggested here, so that he arrived at Shrewsbury by (say) 15 August. Thus, for example, Rees suggests that Henry marched from Cardigan to Llanbadarn (near Aberystwyth) on 10 August, a distance of 39 miles, which is surely unrealistic. Williams acknowledges that the pace suggested by his article would mean that Henry 'was moving his army at the speed of a forced march'.<sup>383</sup> After this, once in England, by contrast, Henry's progress appeared to be surprisingly slow.

The entire route from Dale to Atherstone is 225 miles, a march which Henry completed in 14 days marching, 8-21 August inclusive. This gives an average march of 16 miles per day. The Furthermore, the Machynlleth letter makes possible an assessment of Henry's average pace over the two sections, before and after Machynlleth. Using this approach, it can be seen that the two sections (Dale to Machynlleth on 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 August, a total of 96 miles; and Machynlleth to Atherstone on 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 August, a total of 129 miles) both average out to almost exactly 16 miles per day. Interestingly, this is very much in line with the distance marched on the only day in Wales which is well-documented (by Vergil), 8 August, when Henry marched from Dale to Haverfordwest (13 miles) and 5 miles beyond that, a total of 18 miles. None of this is to suggest an absolutely steady rate of progress, of course, but since there are no indications of lengthy stops at any stage, it may help to provide guidance on Henry's progress.

This may be somewhat in excess of an average march for a fifteenth century army. A possible comparison is with Spanish expeditions marching from North Italy to the Netherlands in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a journey of 680 miles. Using Geoffrey Parker's figures, and based on a sample of 12 journeys totalling 576 days' march, the average daily journey was just over 14m.<sup>384</sup> These were good-quality, disciplined troops, marching mostly over good roads, but would have been considerably slowed down by the Alps. The length of the journey would also have discouraged rushing. Nevertheless Parker suggests that the 'normal speed' seems to have been about 12m a day, but up to 15m was quite possible, and even 23m was recorded.

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<sup>383</sup> Williams, 39-40.

<sup>384</sup> G. Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567-1659. The logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' wars* (Cambridge, 1972), 280.

## Note 2: Distances.

Making use of this approach to hypothesise about Henry's itinerary requires information on the distances from place to place. In default of better information, these have been sought from a modern route-planning website, making use of existing roads, although where relevant, the route most likely taken by Henry (usually the most direct route) has been specified. A summary of these figures is provided below.

Dale to Cardigan	39 miles.
Cardigan to Machynlleth	57 miles.
[Dale to Machynlleth	96 miles.]
[Cardigan to Shrewsbury	114 miles.]
[Dale to Shrewsbury	153 miles.]
Machynlleth to Shrewsbury (north route):	58 miles.
Machynlleth to Shrewsbury (south route, via Newtown):	62 miles.
[Welshpool to Shrewsbury	20 miles]
Shrewsbury to Newport (direct route, not via Telford)	20 miles.
Newport to Stafford	13 miles.
Stafford to Lichfield	18 miles.
Lichfield to Tamworth	8 miles
Tamworth to Atherstone	10 miles.
TOTAL	225 miles.

225 miles in 14 days marching. An average of 16 miles per day.

The section to Machynlleth, including the marches of 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 August: 96 miles. An average of 16 miles per day.

The section from Machynlleth to Atherstone, including the marches of 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 August: 129 miles: also an average of just over 16 miles per day.

## Literature on the itineraries.

S. B. Chrimes, 'The Landing Place of Henry of Richmond, 1485', *Welsh History Review* 2 (1964), 173-80.

H. N. Jarman, 'A Map of the Routes of Henry Tudor and Rhys ap Thomas through Wales in 1485', *Archaeologia Cambrensis*, xcii (1937). This is simply a map based on Williams (1919).

William Rees, *An historical atlas of Wales* (1951), plate 54, illustrates a reconstruction of Henry's probable route through Wales.

W. T. Williams, 'Henry of Richmond's itinerary through Wales', *Y Cymmrodor* xxix (1919), 33-43.

## Appendix 2: The Ballad: Bosworth Field

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Basically, one has a wide range of relevant dates in material like this: dates of

- the original sources for content
- specific referents, such as people or things, which might be dateable (for example, does this poem contain any aristocratic titles which are closely dateable?)
- the oral traditions which lie behind the style
- the composition of individual parts, which may differ if component elements have different sources and have been assembled
- the *compilation* of the whole, if from different parts or *composition* of the whole, if not
- the first transfer to written form, if the poem had an earlier independent oral life
- any revisions which were made after it was first written down (after a poem is first written down an independent oral tradition may continue, which could then affect the extant written version)
- its extant written form
- the MS in which it appears, especially the handwriting (but also the paper)
- its first publication in print

I don't know the date of the hand in this MS and I would take nothing for granted here since, for example, the Towneley MS of plays has shifted forward by about 120 years in the last 30, and is now thought to be a Marian MS, reflecting Catholic sympathies in the North west, rather than a collection of late 15/early 16C plays from Wakefield. I am assuming that the last line refers to James I, but I'd want to be very sure on scribal grounds that it could not possibly refer to James II.

If James I is referred to in the last line, one is looking to a date of compilation or composition (excluding any possible later changes between the composition and the MS copying) of 1603–25, *provided* that the last line has not been tampered with. It fits in well with the poem's established prosody, and feels very embedded in the poem, but of course the name 'James' could easily be replaced by Charles, Edward, Henry — it is not the key refrain element of the line; the word 'King' is that.

Dating such a poem by style is a nightmare since (a) such dating is frequently circular anyway, and (b) literature of community is notoriously hard to date since it includes conservative, formulaic elements (as does this one).

- The listing of participants in a battle is ubiquitous from Ancient Greece to modern IRA songs, and the naming of participants is part of the claimed authority as well as the appeal of a ballad.
- The tag phrases, standard reactions to information, boasts, manneristic action, and clichéd comparison (e.g., *breme as beare*) all mark it as popular, traditional literature which aspires to be 'true' rather than to be exact.
- The refrain line which has the participants swear that Richard should keep his crown has a parallel in the comic drinking ballad that all 'swore John Barleycorn should die'. Is one earlier than the other or are they contemporary? From a purely literary point of view, it doesn't much matter since they are patently in the same tradition, and what would be interesting is seeing how long the tradition lasted, not establishing the date of specific examples.
- The prominence of alliteration in a northern poem does not help to establish date since this was long a common feature of northern style; is a frequent element in popular literature; is harder to keep out than put in (as Tennyson said); and is, in any case, not an invariable feature of the poem.

Dating by 'historical interpretation', i.e., what interpretative argument such a poem could fit into, is at once the root of the problem, since it is circular and serves special interest groups, but also, given the impossibility of fixing a date by stylistic means, it is paradoxically a sensible thing to do, since it asks questions about the *audience*, the one element in literary production which is less frequently attended to. Why should such a poem be written, when and for whom, and with what purpose? Are there similar poems which are dateable and which might fix this date? But here also the difficulty is balancing a specific purpose against a general tradition. Can one establish historical fact exactly in literary sludge?

My inclination would be to say that this poem, because of its content, a shift of dynasty, is more likely to be from the early reign of James I (though, as I say, I haven't excluded James II). We know that other writers were interested in shaping a historical narrative in which James VI/I's accession could sit. The most obvious example is Anthony Munday's *Triumphs of Reunited Britannia* (1605), which figures James as a second Brutus establishing the country anew — a play which was being performed as the Gunpower plotters were loading their barrels into the Houses of Parliament! We know that James's reign was also a time when issues of rival claims to the throne were of interest in popular culture (viz. the many plays on the theme). We also know that the late 1590s and early 17thC were times when people were looking back with a kind of antiquarian nostalgia to their own local traditions. This is certainly true of the North west. These are the years when, a generation after their last performances, the Chester plays get written down again (in the mss now extant), and young men such as David Rogers write down the information *about* the plays they have been given by their fathers (sometimes quite erroneous, sometimes possibly true, but usually designed to enhance a sense of local identity). This is a time of 'reconstructed' heritage, e.g., the plays are associated with the first mayor of Chester, thus linking them with civic origins.

It is conceivable that this poem is just such a constructed, nostalgic (though not necessarily inaccurate) 'history', containing some traditional elements which were true, some which were believed, some which were false, some which were newly imagined as likely, and some which it was hoped were true. It is even possible that the use of the ballad form itself is (a) nostalgic or (b) a way of asserting historicity. So, I would be asking, 'in whose interests is it to utter this material at this time?' Does the closing wish that Stanley will be taken into the council of James have specific point or is it a general wish? The problem with using ballads for history is that they transmit both specific details and generally popular sentiment. It could be a way of reminding James of the value of Stanley counsel, in a narrative context which also ominously recalls England's past changing of rulers; but stylistically it does not look like a poem which is intended for James's ear. Equally, it could arise from a sense of the timeliness of recalling such history and the desirability of expressing for a local community Stanley's importance to the new regime.

The language of the poem does not feel old, and certainly not 15thC. I would think of it as no earlier than late 16C and probably 17C, however antiquarian a feel the poem may have stylistically.

The opening of the poem seems to situate us fictionally as the audience welcoming the new king Henry VII. But is this evidence that (a) the whole poem was originally written in Henry VII's reign with that as its real purpose (b) the opening part of the poem was, and was subsequently incorporated into a later poem (brilliantly incorporated since the prosody, language, and exact lines link up) (c) the poet wants to involve the hearer dramatically as if the events were going on almost in the present — this might fit with the poem's liking for direct speech throughout, and/or (d) the poet is conveying to hearers in the time of king James I that they may justifiably welcome Henry VII because it was from him that James's right to the throne derived (via Henry's daughter, who married James IV). This point is quite prominent in Munday's account of the historical right of James.

A strange bit of the poem may support this dynastic political argument. Lines 25–46 at first sight look like evidence of disruption in that there is a near repeated stanza (29–32 and 37–40). However, on re-reading, this looks like a deliberate parallelism: after the martyrdom of Henry VI (20), both Edward IV and Henry VII ‘serued Jesu full heartily’ (29 and 37). The implication is that, since both prevailed and came to the throne, both therefore constitute *exempla* for anyone who in the future would wear the crown: ‘these examples may be taken of him / which hath preuailed him with royalte, etc’ (30–32) and ‘this example may be said by him / which preuailed right royallye, etc’ (38–40). This suggests that the date of the poem must be after Henry VII, and it suggests that the poet argues that the new ruler could take example by these earlier English kings, one of whom is an ancestor, to serve God as the best way of preserving rule.

This poem is obviously very much a Stanley-based poem. For example, it does not even include as a participant Sir Thomas ap Rhys of Carew, who reputedly killed Richard. *Lady Bessye* does include him in the next line to Stanley (937–40). If one were sure that it *pointedly* excluded him, one might be able to fix a time when that exclusion might have been desirable. But it is a hard thing to prove in such a formulaic setting. The only thing one might argue is that this is a poem in part about names and probably had local value, so excluding names could have reflected local desires. This does not fix a date however.

The poem does feel ‘unified’ by formula and prosody. For example, the opening line ‘God that shope both sea and land’ is a formula used also by Richard at 595: ‘...by him that shope both sea and land’. Though ballad quatrains are the basic form, these build up to a kind of ballad royal stanza of 8 lines, each marked off by a recurring word at the end, which is like a refrain, though varied. James VI/I said that the ballad royal form was suitable for high and grave matters, which might account for its use in this poem. This is not *exact* ballad royal, however, which is ababbcbc. This poem binds the quatrains together by that final refrain, and sometimes by another popular northern linking device which links a word or sentiment at the end of one stanza with the same word or similar formulation at the start of the next.

There is one point at which the eight-line ‘stanza’ scheme seems to break down: lines 353–76. Here, instead of two quatrains before the refrain (lines which end with ‘King’), there are three: 353–64 and 365–76. At first I thought this might be a simple mistake, evidence of previous versions being imperfectly incorporated, because there is also a line repeated internally in the first group, i.e., ‘told his men both gold and fee’ (356) and ‘tooke his men wages of gold and fee’ (360). But on second thoughts, I think the poet has used this disruption of the normal pattern of eight lines deliberately, extending it to 12 to highlight the meeting of William Stanley and Henry. The stanzas show Henry and Stanley doing similar things (gathering and paying troops) and in movement towards each other, with the climactic act of obeisance by Stanley kneeling to Henry and Henry being his Lord, taking him by the hand and speaking the key words for a Stanley agenda: ‘through the helpe of my Lord thy father and thee / I trust in England to continue Kinge’ (375–76).

Basically, that’s my reading having spent *limited* time on the poem, and alas no time on the MS or its hand: local to Stanley country and audience; post Henry VII; probably early James I but pretty well impossible to date; possibly part of an early 17C nostalgic reconstructing of north-western local history; probably containing older traditions which may be true in part or whole; product of a composer working on the edge of oral and written modes, with an eye for the structuring effect of prosody, but working in an oral ballad tradition; possibly using ballad for reasons of audience receptivity, possibly because the material has come to him in ballad form already; possibly to convey authenticity; possibly to incite local nostalgia; useless for historians who only want hard facts, but brilliant for historians who see attitudes as valuable.

## **Appendix 3: ‘Excellent knights’ and ‘worthy soldiers’: Habsburg captains at Bosworth and Stoke Field**

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Throughout the Wars of the Roses Yorkist and Lancastrian leaders were entwined in European networks of dynastic relations and (more or less volatile) alliances, and often looked across the Channel for aid or sanctuary.<sup>i</sup> No one benefited more enduringly from those connections than Henry Tudor in the run-up to Bosworth. In exile in Brittany since 1471, Henry effectively inherited the ‘traditional’ Lancastrian alliance with France. For most of his exile years French commitment to this alliance seems to have been weak, yet in the end enough support materialised not only to help him evade capture but also to permit the recruitment of Philibert de Chandée’s Franco-Breton brigade.<sup>ii</sup>

On the Yorkist side initial ties to France’s neighbor Burgundy were formalised in 1468 with the marriage of Margaret of York and Duke Charles the Bold. This proved vital during the brief exile (1470/1) in the Burgundian Low Countries of Margaret’s brother Edward IV. Though reportedly irritated at the choice of refuge, Charles supplied funds for Edward’s upkeep and facilitated his return by arranging for shipping and allowing him to take hundreds of Flemish gunners to England. Once back in power Edward reciprocated by letting Charles recruit Englishmen (especially archers) for the Burgundian army. Charles’ siege of the Rhenish town of Neuss (1474/5) and subsequent standoff with the Habsburg Emperor Frederick III, for instance, involved some 2000 English soldiers whom one German observer described as ‘the proudest and most warlike’ of the Burgundian troops.<sup>iii</sup>

When Charles’ death at the battle of Nancy (January 1477) triggered a French assault on Burgundy, his only child Mary rushed to marry the emperor’s son Maximilian to whom she had been betrothed since after Neuss. Mary’s stepmother Margaret of York strongly endorsed the liaison, and her rapport with Maximilian and their joint dislike for Louis XI of France promised to recharge the Burgundian alliance with Edward IV.<sup>iv</sup> A visit by Margaret to England brought new pledges of ‘eternal friendship’, but little direct action. Extant records indicating military collaboration touch mainly on English mercenaries among Maximilian’s forces, for example in the army that beat the French at Guinegate in August 1479 (Fig. 1). Given Maximilian’s troubles and the relative calm then prevailing in England, the most tangible contribution from the Habsburg-Burgundian side seems to have been the occasional shipment of arms, particularly infantry pikes. Such dealings may have sprung from an interest on the part of Edward in the tactics with which Swiss pikemen had destroyed Charles the Bold and which Maximilian had successfully copied at Guinegate.<sup>v</sup>

As the dubious transition from Edward IV to Richard III meant new unrest in England, Maximilian remained preoccupied with France while also facing uprisings in the Low Countries. Despite or perhaps because of this he kept an eye on his under-developed English alliance. In 1484 he offered Richard military aid in a prospective invasion of France and, among other things, help in sorting out the problem of Henry Tudor.<sup>vi</sup> Probably in early 1485 Maximilian sent one of his top military commanders,

the Basque Juan de Salazar (alias *Petit* or *Jeune* Salazar), to Richard, though whether this ‘excellent knight’ came as a diplomat, military ‘advisor’, or both is unclear.<sup>vii</sup> Salazar had joined the Burgundian army in the early 1470s or thereabouts, emerged later as a leader of Burgundian resistance against the French, figured prominently at Guinegate, and by 1480 was captain of 100 lances and *conseiller et chambellan* to Maximilian. In 1481 he went to the provinces of Utrecht and Holland to help curb factionalist conflicts (the so-called Hook-Cod wars) that threatened to erupt into wider rebellion. He appears with some frequency in records relating to campaigns up to 1484, by which time open hostilities in those provinces had largely subsided.<sup>viii</sup>

Whatever the purpose of his mission to England, Salazar is known to have accompanied Richard to Bosworth. The chronicler Molinet (to whom Salazar was undoubtedly familiar) calls him ‘very experienced in war, bold, [an] enterprising and shrewd leader of men-at-arms’, but so far no evidence has come to light that Maximilian meant Salazar to lead troops (Burgundian or other) on Richard’s behalf. The Spanish account of Diego de Valera, the sole source on Salazar’s presence at Bosworth, suggests only that Salazar was near the king during the early stages of the battle. Valera has him advise Richard to abandon the field when he notes the struggle turning in Henry Tudor’s favor. Valera also asserts that Salazar himself ‘fought bravely’, but whether this was in the general *mêlée* or during the final rout is nowhere stated. Considering the fate of Richard’s household troops it seems at least unlikely that Salazar took part in the cavalry charge that cost Richard his life.<sup>ix</sup>

There is no record of how Salazar got away from Bosworth. By early 1486 he was again with Maximilian, fighting against the French. Subsequently he became more of a diplomat especially in missions to and from Spain (1487/8), but in 1488/9 Maximilian sent him to England with an embassy to Henry VII.<sup>x</sup> One can only wonder whether Salazar’s appearance elicited any memories of Bosworth at the Tudor court, yet even if so more recent troubles involving another of Maximilian’s captains were then perhaps weighing more heavily on Henry’s mind. A year before the Lambert Simnel plot had brought a full-blown invasion of England, which Henry had defeated not without difficulty at Stoke Field in Nottinghamshire (16 June 1487). Much mystery surrounds this attempt to install a sham Yorkist pretender, but it clearly had the backing of Margaret of York, whose court at Malines (Mechelen) had become a safe haven for followers of Richard. This and the ‘grete malice’ she showed ‘contynuelly’ toward him had made Henry wary of her ability to draw Maximilian into something like the Simnel plot. That Tudor propagandists would later write most unfavorably about Maximilian may reflect Henry’s sentiments on learning that the Simnel army included up to 2000 Swiss and German mercenaries under Martin Schwartz, a renowned commander for Maximilian.<sup>xi</sup>

The figure of Martin Schwartz and Maximilian’s role in the Simnel plot add an intriguing if murky dimension to the final chapter of the Wars of the Roses. Said to be a shoemaker from Augsburg, Schwartz must have been a soldier in the imperial levies that confronted Charles the Bold at Neuss, for it was there in 1475 that he was knighted ‘for his valor’ by the Emperor Frederick III. Following this first brush with fame Schwartz vanishes from the record, though it is possible that he fought with the Swiss and their south German allies against Charles the Bold in 1476/7. In 1482/3 he surfaces in Maximilian’s army, recruiting Swiss mercenaries and battling rebels in the southern Low Countries (Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, Liège). In 1485 he was captain of Maastricht and in the summer of that year helped Maximilian subdue rebellious Ghent. According to Molinet, another highlight of his career came after Maximilian was crowned ‘king of the Romans’ (April 1486). When the new king made his formal



entry into Brussels he and his retinue (which included the emperor and numerous notables) did so on foot – except ‘*sire Martin*’ who was on horseback ‘pleased...as if he were the son of a prince or great count’. Perhaps this episode had something to do with Schwartz serving as Maximilian’s shield bearer, but regardless of its meaning there can be no doubt that Maximilian greatly valued Schwartz’s services. Long after Stoke Field he would remember him as one of his ‘worthy soldiers’.<sup>xii</sup>

While such a close association may make official sanction for the Simnel plot seem likely, it does not in itself prove active involvement on the part of Maximilian. Similarly, a London chronicler who has Schwartz declare to the leader of the invading army (the Earl of Lincoln) before Stoke that despite their bleak prospects ‘all such promyse as I made unto my lady the duchesse [Margaret of York], I shall perform’ may well have invented the remark to stress Margaret’s responsibility for the carnage – a trait common to Tudor-era accounts of the plot. Reality, however, was more complex, with some support indeed coming ‘by order of’ Maximilian. Burgundian armaments records for the months before May 1487 list various kinds of supplies for the Simnel army, among other things 400 pikes of ash wood, ‘22 to 24 feet in length, tipped with good steel points in the new manner, sharpened and polished’, for the Swiss and German ‘*picquenars*’ of ‘Martin de Zwarte, knight of Germany’.<sup>xiii</sup>

Little else is known about Schwartz’s force. Given the recorded supplies and the composition of Habsburg-Burgundian armies generally, the troops that sailed from Arnemuiden in May 1487 likely comprised pikemen, halberdiers, gunners and/or crossbowmen, swordsmen, and perhaps a few artillerymen with light culverins or falconets (Fig. 2). While this is the sort of mixed composition that would characterize the (in)famous *Landsknecht* armies of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, it was not enough to propel the Simnel army to victory. No reliable casualty figures exist, but most of his men seem to have fallen with Schwartz. In their demise they left a lasting impression on the victors. Nearly all descriptions of Stoke Field stress the mercenaries’ tenacity and Schwartz is portrayed variously as valiant, experienced, and merciless. The Tudor poet laureate André even likens him to the mythical Thracian king Diomedes (he of the man-eating horses) – a literary comparison that pays ample tribute to this new Diomedes’ conqueror, who is the new Hercules naturally, Henry VII.<sup>xiv</sup>

Schwartz’s end at Stoke Field ended Maximilian’s most determined effort to oust the Tudor regime. While it is impossible to know how deeply Maximilian may have been involved in the actual plotting, the military venture was a risk he deemed worth taking. The death in 1482 of his wife Mary erased his rights to Burgundy, at least in the eyes of many of his subjects in the Low Countries. With the rebellions that followed and with the French crown staunchly opposing him, Maximilian wanted a ‘real’ ally in England. Richard III apparently had become such an ally, for the news of Bosworth so upset Maximilian that he thought of claiming the English throne himself via his mother’s line, which ironically made him a Lancastrian by descent.<sup>xv</sup>

But despite all this, the Habsburg dynasty’s unending financial problems and the Low Countries’ age-old economic ties to England required some accommodation with Henry VII to lessen domestic resistance against Maximilian’s rule. Already in 1486 Maximilian endorsed a commercial treaty with England to redevelop vital trade relations. These suffered in the wake of Stoke Field, but only briefly as English merchants also needed the Burgundian trade and because Maximilian became more upbeat about English affairs. His change in attitude resulted at least partly from the realization that Henry VII was not beholden to French interests. Juan de Salazar and other emissaries Maximilian sent to the Tudor court were thus to secure ‘*vera pax*’ and a treaty that included ‘*mutuis Auxiliis Militaribus*’ against France. In September

1490 Henry ratified the Treaty of Woking. Yet Maximilian soon felt let down by Henry and decided to back the confusing international plot around the new Yorkist pretender Perkin Warbeck. This time, however, Maximilian could offer little more than moral support and some money, nothing certainly on the scale of his contributions – direct and indirect – to the Simnel plot.<sup>xvi</sup>




Fig. 1 England and the Burgundian Low Countries in the 1480s



Fig. 2 *Landsknechte* in battle (redrawn, original woodcut by Johannes Grüninger, Strasbourg, 1498)

## Notes

<sup>i</sup> A good summary of these networks is C.S.L. Davies, 'The Wars of the Roses in European Context', in A.J. Pollard (ed.), *The Wars of the Roses* (London, 1995), pp. 162-85. But while Davies considers (p. 162) the conflict's continental range 'well known', many details (especially in military matters) remain obscure.

<sup>ii</sup> On Henry Tudor's early years, see S.B. Chrimes, *Henry VII* (New Haven, 1999), pp. 3-38; and more recently S. Cunningham, *Henry VII*, (London, 2007), pp. 10-42.

<sup>iii</sup> R. Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: the Last Valois Duke of Burgundy* (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 44-83 outlines the complexities of the Yorkist-Burgundian relationship during this period, including the presence of prominent Lancastrians at Charles' court and a possible claim on the English crown by Charles himself through his Lancastrian mother Isabel of Portugal. See also Davies, 'The Wars of the Roses in European Context', pp. 168-74. Records of Burgundian support for Edward and his retinue are in A. Desplanque et al. (eds.), *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790, Nord: Archives civiles, Série B: Chambre des Comptes de Lille* (8 vols., Lille, 1865-1906), iv, nos. 2079, 2084, 2085, 2097, 2103. English archers in Charles' service are mentioned, for example, in T. Rymer (ed.), *Fœdera, conventiones, literæ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliæ et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes...* (20 vols., London, 1704-35), xi, p. 791. The remark on English troops at Neuss is in the anonymous 'Meldung über die Stärke des burgundischen Heeres vor Neuss', Cologne, 19 November 1474, in A. Bachmann (ed.), *Urkundliche Nachträge zur Österreichisch-Deutschen Geschichte im Zeitalter Kaiser Friedrich III.* (Vienna, 1892), p. 317.

<sup>iv</sup> On the events leading up to Charles' downfall, see Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, pp. 359-432; also W. Blockmans and W. Prevenier, *The Promised Lands: the Low Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530* (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 181-95. The definitive study of the Franco-Burgundian conflict in the years after 1477 is A. Sablon du Corail, *Aspects militaires de la guerre pour la succession de Bourgogne, de Nancy au traité d'Arras (5 janvier 1477-23 décembre 1482)*, (3 vols., Paris, 2001 [École

de chartes, unpublished thesis]). On Maximilian, Mary, and the political convolutions surrounding their marriage, see H. Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit* (5 vols., Wien, 1971-86) i, pp. 91-136. On Margaret of York, see E. Münch (ed.), *Maria von Burgund nebst dem Leben ihrer Stiefmutter Margarethe von York, Gemahlin Karls des Kühnen* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1832), ii, nos. [III]1-11; see also S. Dauchy, 'Le douaire de Marguerite d'York, la minorité de Philippe le Beau et le Parlement de Paris – 1477-1494', *Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire*, clv, 1-2 (1989), 49-127.

<sup>v</sup> Documents relating to Margaret's stay in England (summer 1480) and resulting agreements are in Münch, *Maria von Burgund*, ii, nos. [II]1-8; and Rymer, *Fœdera*, xii, pp. 123-34; see also Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I*, i, 156-8; and C. Ross, *Edward IV* (New Haven, 1997), pp. 283-6. On Maximilian's army, see Sablon du Corail, *Aspects militaires*, ii; and specifically on English troops by the same author, 'Les étrangers au service de Marie de Bourgogne: de l'armée de Charles le Téméraire à l'armée de Maximilien (1477-1482)', *Revue du Nord*, lxxxiv, 345-6 (2002), 391-8. A reference in Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, viii, no. 3521, mentions an order, placed in May 1483 by Maximilian's *receveur de l'artillerie* Laurent Le Mitre with Jean de Finet of Malines for 1200 pikes 'of about 22 feet in length, all steel-tipped' to be delivered to the king of England.

<sup>vi</sup> On Maximilian's domestic and foreign problems during this period, see Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I*, i, pp. 136-80. A summary record of Maximilian's 1484 proposals to Richard III is in J. Gairdner (ed.), *Letters and papers illustrative of the reigns of Richard III and Henry VII* (2 vols., London, 1861-63), ii, no. II. An excellent discussion of Richard's foreign policy goals is A. Grant, 'Foreign Affairs under Richard III', in J. Gillingham (ed.), *Richard III: a Medieval Kingship* (London, 1993), pp. 113-32.

<sup>vii</sup> This Salazar must not to be confused with the Hispano-French *routier* Juan de Salazar who rose to prominence during the Armagnac-Burgundian wars. The moniker 'Petit/Jeune' was presumably used to distinguish the Burgundian Salazar from his older namesake. No Juan/Jean features among the children of the latter, however, and there are no known family ties as J.C. Rammelman Elsevier suggested in a biographical entry in *De Navorscher*, ii (1852), 301-2. His inclusion in the group of 'excellent knights' in Maximilian's later pictorial history entitled *Triumph* or *Triumphzug* underscores Salazar's status as Maximilian himself composed the text accompanying the woodcuts in this work, see F. Schestag (ed.), *Der Triumphzug Kaiser Maximilians I. 1516-1518* (Vienna, 1883-4).

<sup>viii</sup> I have seen no clear references to Salazar predating 1476/7, but in 1471 Charles the Bold's agents were actively recruiting mercenaries in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa; see Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, i, no. 334. In 1477 Salazar is mentioned as an officer of the Valenciennes militia in Jean Molinet's *Chroniques*, ed. J.A. Buchon (5 vols., Paris, 1827-8), ii, p. 28. References to other early activities are scattered widely, see for instance Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, viii, no. 3521; J. Brandon et al., *Chroniques des religieux des Dunes* [1384-1488], ed. K. de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1870), pp. 534-77, 659-66; F. Vinchant, *Annales de la province and comté du Hainaut*, (6 vols., Brussels, 1848-53), iv, p. 403, v, pp. 3-58; N. Despars, *Cronijcke van den lande ende graefscepe van Vlaenderen (405-1492)*, ed. J. de Jonghe (4 vols., Bruges, 1840-2), iv, pp. 214, 281; and O. Delepierre (trans. and ed.) *Chronique des faits et gestes admirables de Maximilien I<sup>er</sup> durant son mariage avec Marie de Bourgogne* (Brussels, 1839), pp. 172-9, 195, 212-21, 275, 285, 312-7, 353-6. Salazar's status of councilor/chamberlain is referenced in M. Gachard (ed.), *Inventaire des Archives des Chambres des Comptes*, (5 vols., Brussels, 1837-79), ii, no. 9116. On the unrest that brought Salazar to Utrecht and Holland, see Delepierre, *Chronique*, pp. 363-87; also the modern studies by M.J. van Gent, 'Een middeleeuwse crisismanager: Joost van Lalaing, stadhouder van Holland en Zeeland, 1480-1483', in A. Tourneux et al. (eds.), *Liber Amicorum Raphaël de Smedt* (4 vols., Leuven, 2001), iii, pp. 165-81; and A. Janse, *De sprong van Jan van Schaffelaar. Oorlog en partijstrijd in de late Middeleeuwen* (Hilversum, 2003), pp. 47-63.

<sup>ix</sup> Molinet's characterisation of Salazar is in his *Chroniques*, iii, p. 87. Diego de Valera's report is in J.A. de Balenchana (ed.), *Epistolas y otros varios tratados de Mosen Diego de Valera* (Madrid, 1878), no. XXVI. For an English translation, see A. Goodman and A. Mackay, 'A Castilian Report on English Affairs, 1486', *English Historical Review*, lxxxviii (1973), 92-9. Valera attributes the report to Spanish merchants in England, but it may have originated with Salazar himself. Though Valera writes that Salazar '*ally estaua en seruicio del rey Rixarte*', there is nothing in other sources to suggest that Salazar had been 'lent out' by Maximilian, whose own problems at the time hardly favoured such a move. Interestingly, Molinet in his account of Bosworth (*Chroniques*, ii, pp. 405-10) makes no mention of Salazar. On Richard's brief kingship, see P.W. Hammond and A.F. Sutton, *Richard III: the Road to Bosworth Field* (London, 1985); also numerous articles in the journal of the Richard III Society, *The Ricardian*. The battle and its context are discussed in detail in M. Bennett, *The Battle of*

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Bosworth (Stroud, 1993); P. Foss, *The Field of Redemore: the Battle of Bosworth, 1485* (Newton Linford, 1998); and M.K. Jones, *Bosworth, 1485: Psychology of a Battle* (Stroud, 2002); see also M.K. Jones, 'Richard III as a Soldier', in Gillingham, *Richard III*, pp. 93-112.

<sup>x</sup> Salazar's role in Maximilian's 1486 campaign is described in Molinet, *Chroniques*, iii, 87-92. Regarding his return to England, see the safe conduct Henry VII issued for 'Johannem Salizard, Hispanniae aliã dictum Pety Salizard' at Westminster, 24 December 1488, in Rymer, *Fœdera*, xii, p. 355. Partial summaries of Salazar's ambassadorial career are in W. Höflechner, *Die Gesandten der europäischen Mächte, vornehmlich des Kaisers und des Reiches* (Wien, 1972), p. 78; and M.A. Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la diplomacia española* (8 vols., Madrid, 1990-2003), iv, pp. 247, 307.

<sup>xi</sup> Good overviews of the events leading to Stoke Field are M. Bennett, *Lambert Simnel and the Battle of Stoke* (New York, 1987); and D. Baldwin, *Stoke Field: the Last Battle of the Wars of the Roses* (Barnsley, 2006). The reference to Margaret's 'malice' is in a letter by Henry VII to Gilbert Talbot, Kenilworth, 20 July [1495?], in H. Ellis (ed.), *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* (3 vols., London, 1824), i, no. XI. One of the most unflattering portrayals of Maximilian is in Bernard André's 'Les douze triomphes de Henry VII', in J. Gairdner (ed.), *Memorials of King Henry* (London, 1858), pp. 133-53, 307-27. That Schwartz's contingent included both Swiss and German troops to a total of up to 2000 emerges from the combination of Molinet, *Chroniques*, iii, p. 153; Valerius Anshelm's *Berner Chronik* (6 vols., Bern, 1884-1901), i, p. 284.; Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, viii, no. 3521; and Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia*, ed. D. Hay (London, 1950), p. 23-5.

<sup>xii</sup> Information on Schwartz's early career is even more scattered and ambiguous than for Salazar. There are conflicting references to his origins, but the Augsburg claim is the most plausible. The story of the knighting at Neuss is related in Anshelm, *Berner Chronik*, i, p. 283. Anshelm also emphasizes Schwartz's close ties to Swiss mercenaries, especially from Bern, which had led Swiss resistance against Charles the Bold. To be 'like Martin Swartz' seems to have been a quality aspired to by leaders of the 1493 *Bundschuh* rising in Alsace, a region that had been much involved in the Swiss-Burgundian struggle, but whether this refers to the man of interest here is impossible to say. See A. Rosenkranz, *Der Bundschuh. Die Erhebungen des südwestdeutschen Bauernstandes in den Jahren 1493-1517* (2 vols., Heidelberg, 1927), ii, pp. 52-67. Some sources mentioning Schwartz's activities in the Low Countries are Molinet, *Chroniques*, ii, 421-30; Despars, *Cronijcke van...Vlaenderen*, iv, pp. 249-70; and J. Brandon et al., *Chroniques des religieux des Dunes*, pp. 628-51. Schwartz is named as Maximilian's shield bearer (*Schild-knaap*) in a list of benefactors of the Carthusian charterhouse in Utrecht, see H.F. van Heussen, *Historie ofte Beschryving van 't Utrechtsche Bisdom* (3 vols., Utrecht, 1719), i, p. 650. 'Modern' studies mentioning Schwartz focus mostly on the history of the Swiss and *Landsknecht* mercenary infantries, see for instance W.F. von Mülinen, *Geschichte der Schweizer Söldner bis zur Errichtung der ersten stehenden Garde 1497* (Bern, 1887), pp. 121-2; M. Nell, *Die Landsknechte. Entstehung der ersten deutschen Infanterie* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 148, 179; and F. Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force* (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964), i, pp. 20, 107-8. The 'worthy soldier' quote is also from Maximilian's *Triumphzug*, where Schwartz is listed first among a group of 20 professional soldiers that had served under Maximilian.

<sup>xiii</sup> The statement ascribed to Schwartz is in A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley (eds.), *The Great Chronicle of London* (London 1938), fol. 217v. The 400 pikes are mentioned in Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, viii, no. 3521. The same Jean de Finet of Malines who had received the 1483 order for the 1200 English pikes supplied the ones for Schwartz's *picquenars*. Other references are to 200 arbalests, 60 pavises, and four casks of powder given to Margaret of York, see again Desplanque et al., *Inventaire sommaire...Lille*, viii, nos. 3521, 3523. Molinet, *Chroniques*, iii, p. 153 mentions 'vivres' and 'artillerie', but provides no further details.

<sup>xiv</sup> Place and time of Schwartz's departure are in J. Reygersbergen, *Chroniick van Zeelandt*, ed. M.Z. van Boxhorn (2 vols., Middelburg, 1644), ii, p. 313. Nell, *Die Landsknechte*; remains a solid early history of the increasing professionalization of these mercenaries, but see also Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, pp. 7-141; and more generally R. Baumann, *Landsknechte. Ihre Geschichte und Kultur vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Munich, 1994). Still basic on the rise of Swiss mercenaries are C. von Elgger, *Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen im XIV., XV. und XVI. Jahrhundert* (Lucerne, 1873); and Mülinen, *Geschichte der Schweizer Söldner*. Also of interest are B. Koch, 'Kronenfresser und deutsche Franzosen. Zur Sozialgeschichte der Reisläuferei aus Bern, Solothurn und Biel', *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte*, xlvi (1996), 151-84; and the portrayal of military life in A. Schultz, *Deutsches Leben im XIV. und XV. Jahrhundert* (2 vols., Vienna, 1892), ii, pp. 368-430. Both Bennett, *Lambert Simnel*, pp. 89-103; and Baldwin, *Stoke Field*, pp. 54-69 interpret the sources on the fighting at Stoke Field. So does Nell, *Die Landsknechte*,

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pp. 179-89, but mainly from the mercenary perspective. André's Classics-inspired characterizations of Schwartz and King Henry are in 'Les douze triomphes de Henry VII', pp. 133-53, 307-27.

<sup>xv</sup> Maximilian's mother Eleanor of Portugal was a great-granddaughter of John of Gaunt, first Duke of Lancaster, see Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I*, i, pp. 179-80. Maximilian's claim was very similar to that of Charles the Bold 15 years earlier (see n. 3 above).

<sup>xvi</sup> His election as Roman (i.e. German) king obliged Maximilian to pay more attention to dominions other than Burgundy. The Habsburg territories bordering Hungary were a particular trouble spot, see Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I*, i, pp. 289-95. On the significance of economic relations between England and Burgundy, see J.H.A. Munro, *Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries* (Aldershot, 1994). A series of diplomatic records relating to the Treaty of Woking are in Rymer, *Fœdera*, xii, pp. 350-62. On Maximilian's falling out with Henry and his role in the Warbeck plot, see again Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I*, i, pp. 340, 361, 385-93; and on the plot generally, I. Arthurson, *The Perkin Warbeck Conspiracy, 1491-1499* (Stroud, 1994); and A. Wroe, *Perkin: a Story of Deception* (London, 2003). So far I have seen no entries of men or materiel supplied to the Warbeck enterprise in the records containing the references to Maximilian's equipping of the Simnel army.