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NEWCASTLE AND THE NATION: THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE

Roger Howell, Jr.

THE INTERACTION of local community and central government is one of the pervasive themes of the history of early modern England; it is also, from the standpoint of historical analysis one of the most perplexing. While never wholly neglected, even by those historians whose focus was on broad national issues of constitutional or religious conflict, local history and the sense of local perspective have increasingly drawn the attention of those investigating the development of politics and political structures in Stuart England. The results have been stimulating and refreshing, and yet some key problems of interpretation remain. From a view of historical development that stressed the centrality of the court and parliament, there has been a marked shift of interest to the local political perspective, to the realization of the importance of local issues for the vast bulk of the political nation, and towards the view that political attitudes and actions were shaped more by local perceptions of developments than they were by abstract and general concerns with issues of economic, political, or religious liberty so beloved by an earlier generation of historians.¹ The change of emphasis has no doubt served as a healthy corrective, but what has not yet emerged is a satisfactory working model of the interaction of the two perspectives. If a history of seventeenth-century England written from the vantage point of Westminster distorts and exaggerates the picture, the replacement of it by a history written solely from the vantage point of the parish pump does little better. What one needs to know is the manner in which the local issues, local perceptions, and local problems shaped and informed the national perspective as they were expressed and generalized, for example, in parliament, and conversely how that sense of generality, which is so integral a part of the national perspective, was transferred and perhaps translated back into the framework and language of local politics.² That the flow of influence was not unidirectional seems obvious enough; conflict, for example, over a particular local clergyman influenced in major ways the locality's view of national religious policy, but in equally significant fashion a sense of national religious policy informed the locality's interpretation of its own particular situation.³

Newcastle in the seventeenth century provides a useful case study of the interaction of local community aspirations and perceptions with the broader issues agitating state and church throughout the century. The pattern of interaction was far from tidy or clear-cut; there were times when the interests of Newcastle coincided closely enough with the intentions of central policy to make a close working partnership seem

appropriate and orderly, but equally there were occasions when the divergence became so marked as to raise questions not only about the specific application of policy to Newcastle, but also about the general nature of the policy itself. If there are threads to be found that run consistently through the whole story, they can perhaps be reduced to two. On the one hand, Newcastle, given its sizeable population and its obvious political, economic, and strategic importance, was always a natural area of concern for the central government, whether that government were king and parliament, king acting alone, parliament acting alone, or parliament and lord protector. On the other hand, the Newcastle reactions to such forms of solicitous attention were highly likely to be conditioned by local perceptions of the extent to which they reinforced or diminished the town's cherished sense of liberty and local authority. The stronger the impression of diminution of local liberty and authority, the greater was the possibility that specific local grievance would be translated into a generalized rejection of governmental policy, or, put in another way, the more likely it was that discussion of issues would rise above exclusively local concerns and begin to embrace the characteristics of the "national" issues that dominate histories written from the perspective of the central government. While the consecutive history of the interaction of local and national affairs is beyond the scope of a single paper, a series of case studies drawn from one of the areas where the potential for conflict was high, namely the structure and functioning of local government including the election of members of parliament, can illustrate well the general nature of these relationships for the period between the accession of James I and the Glorious Revolution.⁴

The latter part of the sixteenth century had witnessed an intense struggle in Newcastle over issues related to the structure of local government. That struggle was basically the result of the increasing dominance in local affairs exercised by a small and exclusive clique of powerful merchants. Almost entirely composed of mercers and coal traders, the inner ring, or "lords of coal"⁵ as they were dubbed at the time, were already in a dominating position by the mid-Elizabethan period, well before their control was legitimated and firmly established by charters from the crown; in the period between 1581 and 1591, each of the major coal traders served a term as mayor of the town, eight of those so serving being directly involved in the management of the Grand Lease.⁶ This process, by which power in the world of trade was extended directly to the political sphere, was not unresisted, and there was something in the way of a reform group in the 1590s which sought to preserve the rights of the general body of freemen in town government and to rescue what was conceived as the burgesses' share in the Grand Lease from the private interests of the grand lessees. Though the reform movement succeeded in capturing the mayoralty in 1593, its success was neither impressive nor sustained.⁷

Two factors account, in the main, for the limited success of the reform group, and each has a bearing on the complex interaction of central and local government. On the one hand, the reformers were themselves in an ambiguous position. Hardly classifiable among the economically disinherited of Newcastle, they did not seek the destruction of a system of privilege and monopoly; their aim was the far more limited one of widening the inner ring to a slight degree to include others from the upper levels of town life. Yet

as allies they could only expect aid from interests which sought a wider destruction of the privileges of the town; the Bishop of Durham and the Lord Mayor and chief traders of London were allies of precisely this stamp. It is not unreasonable to conclude that support of this kind probably did as much to curtail the activities and enthusiasm of the reformers as any overt opposition on the part of the inner ring itself.⁸ On the other hand, the reform movement was also faced by a powerful coalition of interests in support of the growing stranglehold of the inner ring on Newcastle politics, for the aspirations of the lords of coal meshed closely with the drift of national policy. Generally speaking, both the Tudor and Stuart monarchs sought to obtain control of the governing bodies of the boroughs, and the most obvious way in which to pursue this policy was to remove the choice of those governing bodies as far as possible from the hands of the whole community of citizens.⁹ Thus, at the start of the seventeenth century, crown policy and the desires of the dominant political group in Newcastle were in apparently total agreement. Local circumstances had led to the increasingly powerful position of a ring of related families with interests in the coal trade. They provided exactly the sort of tight and potentially dependent oligarchy that the crown was seeking, a dependency moreover that could be intensified by royal action to support the monopoly position of the Hostmen. The result of this close community of interest is to be found in the charters of Elizabeth I and James I to the town and to the Hostmen.¹⁰

The pattern of government thus established was to remain the political framework for seventeenth century Newcastle, and political debate was to revolve around its preservation from change, either as the result of local initiatives to widen the base of power or as the result of royal desires to tighten the element of control even further. To forestall the first threat, the inner ring could call on royal support, since the crown had as substantial an interest in maintaining the tight monopoly control as the town oligarchs did; the problem was that recourse to such support from the central government raised the potential for increased royal interference in town affairs. What was, in its origins, a nice conjunction of interests could under stress become something quite different, and that realization obviously influenced in profound ways the interaction of Newcastle government with central government throughout the seventeenth century.

That the stranglehold of the inner ring on town government was the norm for the seventeenth century is graphically revealed by an analysis of town office holding. Such an analysis also reveals clearly that the key to the inner ring was simultaneous position of strength in both the Merchant Adventurers (particularly the Mercers) and the Hostmen, rather than a base in the Hostmen alone.¹¹ The latter company, it should be remembered, was accessible to any free burgess "of any free mystery" by the charter of James I; the very fact that entry was "open" in this manner meant that the company could not, by itself, serve as the screen that filtered membership into the inner ring.¹² On the other hand, the combination of membership in the Merchant Adventurers and the Hostmen was a striking feature of those who ruled the town throughout the seventeenth century.¹³ Between 1600 and 1640, 28 different people held the office of mayor; of these 18 were both Mercers and Hostmen, and 8 others were members of

other branches of the Merchant Adventurers and the Hostmen. The remaining two holders of the office were both Merchant Adventurers. Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, 29 different men held the office of mayor; of these 27 were definitely members of the Merchant Adventurers, and at least 20 and probably 22 were also members of the Hostmen at the same time. The same sort of preponderance is seen in other aspects of office-holding as well; those who became sheriffs, both before the Civil War and after the Restoration, reflect the same affiliations, as do members of parliament for the town. It is striking, for example, that of the 8 different men who served Newcastle as a member of parliament from 1600 to the summoning of the Long Parliament, all were both Merchant Adventurers and Hostmen, and only one was not a Mercer.¹⁴

The omission of the years 1640–60 from the above analysis was both deliberate and significant. In the confused years of the Civil War and Interregnum, the pattern of inner ring dominance was profoundly challenged. But if the overall nature of the interaction of central government and local government is to be appreciated fully, it must be recognized that there were other occasions outside of those chaotic decades when challenges were raised in equally clear fashion. It should not be thought, for example, that the chartered establishment of inner ring control shut off the sort of protest that had characterized town politics in the 1590s; instead it tended to intensify the cleavages that had marked that decade by making the successors of the reform group of the 1590s a dissident element within the corporation.

The Shrove Tuesday riot of apprentices in the town in 1633 reveals this clearly and also casts some useful light on the central problem under investigation, the interaction of the locality and the central government.¹⁵ Ostensibly the riot had been caused by the construction of a lime kiln on the town drying ground by one Christopher Reasley, a non-freeman who had connections with the inner ring. It is clear, however, that Reasley was the pretext rather than the cause of the troubles, and it is striking that the representatives of the central government suspected this before the town authorities were willing to admit it was the case. Secretary Coke was already referring to the events as “the late seditious riot” before the true circumstances surfaced.¹⁶ What was actually at stake, as Coke shrewdly surmised, was the monopoly of the inner ring and the continuing desire of a reform element in the town to modify it. The surviving evidence suggests that the town authorities felt themselves to be in a somewhat ambiguous position with respect to the central government’s interest in the affair. While they welcomed support of their position, they were reluctant to see that support extended to too close an enquiry into their affairs, and the mayor, at least, was clearly less than happy with Coke’s suggestions that he should have taken more forceful immediate action; if nothing else, such reprimands appear to have suggested to those in Newcastle a lack of understanding on the part of governmental authorities of the nuances of the local situation.¹⁷ When the real issues surfaced in June 1633 in the form of a petition from 700 or more burgesses to the King,¹⁸ the inner ring was no doubt grateful for the support it received for its position from the royal government, although it seems that, from the perspective of the central government, the events looked rather more sinister than they did from the local perspective. In retrospect, it appears that the petitioners

were well within the reform tradition that had been established in the 1590s. In that sense, they were, of course, of considerable concern to the inner ring. But crown authorities saw a deeper significance in the events, drawing attention to a growing population of mariners, colliers, keelmen, watermen and those of mean condition "who are apt to turn everye pretence and colour of greivance into uproare and seditious mutinye".¹⁹

Although the evidence is by no means unambiguous on this point, it appears that the town authorities, while desirous of royal support for their position, were concerned about the form that support might take in the deteriorating political conditions of the 1630s. The reform group was limited in their manoeuvring by essentially the same concern, for they too had no interest in lessening the independent privileges of the town, yet this is precisely what increasing reliance on the support of the central government might be thought to lead to. What was happening was that the politics of the town were increasingly complicated by the development of national politics as it became clear that opposition to the inner ring and opposition to the policies of Charles I did not always go hand in hand. This point can be illustrated by a number of circumstances. Opposition to the imposition of ship money, for example, tended to pull inner ring and reformers together; resistance appears to have been widespread, with the general body of burgesses rallying behind the inner ring in a determined effort to avoid payment after the first two levies.²⁰ Attempts by the crown to influence local elections were likewise sternly resisted. In 1639 the King expressly warned the town "that they should be very careful in choosing the mayor for this next succeeding year and by no means admit any factious or seditiously affected person to that place".²¹ It is clear that his message was intended to forestall the election of Robert Bewick, a Puritan against whom he had been specifically warned.²² Yet Bewick was elected and no trace of local discontent about the choice is to be found. That he did not owe his election exclusively to his Puritan opposition to the crown is obvious enough; he was a Hostman and Mercer, a previous holder of the mayoralty, and a member of the inner ring, but that he was elected against the express wishes of the crown is an equally obvious indication of the limits of inner ring subservience to the crown, even at a time of apparently increased agitation over their position.

The municipal and parliamentary elections held within a short time of each other in 1640 provide further examples of the extent to which national politics and local political traditions interacted.²³ The swing in the municipal elections against Puritanism can be attributed to external factors, but not to the machinations of the crown, however helpful the results were for the crown's purposes. The Scottish invasion and occupation had been the critical factor, and the feeling had clearly grown up that Puritan religious sympathies with the Scots had been at least partially responsible for the occupation of the town.²⁴ The elections to the Long Parliament remain somewhat obscure, but one clear fact does emerge, and that is the widespread support for men of local connection. Of the three candidates who stood in the election, only one was thoroughly typical of inner ring politics, Sir Henry Anderson, and he was returned unopposed. The other seat was contested between John Blakiston, whose close local connections were counterbalanced by the fact that he was not a powerful

and wealthy Hostman and the knowledge that he was prominently identified with the Puritan movement, and Sir John Melton, a total outsider to town politics, Secretary to the Council of the North, and a pronounced Straffordian. If powerful external backing was sufficient for Melton to be elected on one return, it should be remembered that the proceedings in the election were under investigation for corrupt practices by the Committee for Privileges when Melton died and that it was subsequently decided simply to amend the return in Blakiston's favour, rather than hold a new election, a strong indication of the popularity of his candidacy in the original election. That an outsider to the inner ring and a Puritan to boot could achieve this level of support in a climate that was clearly anti-Puritan, while a court backer with powerful connections could not attract more significant support, even though aided by the fear that parliamentary reformers would assault the privileged position of the Hostmen, is a telling illustration of the power of local identification and independence in the politics of the period.

The years of the civil wars and Interregnum were to see the pattern of Newcastle politics altered, at times by the application of external pressures.²⁵ On two occasions in those years, the rights of election of mayor were over-ridden by outside authority. In October 1642 Sir John Marley was elected by mandamus from the king; in 1645 he was removed from office by an ordinance of parliament and Henry Warmouth substituted in his place.²⁶ There were, in addition to these actions, various purgings of the town corporation reflecting the shifting fortunes of the war. In April 1643 Henry Warmouth was removed from his aldermancy for neglect of duty,²⁷ while the following September 35 freemen were disfranchised.²⁸ Following the reduction of the town to parliament, the chief royalists such as Marley and Sir Nicholas Cole were ordered purged by parliament.²⁹ Such interference in the normal life of the corporation is hardly surprising, given the conditions of the time, but it is not easy to come by evidence concerning the town's reactions to such exterior pressures, which they clearly would have resented and resisted under normal circumstances. What evidence there is, however, suggests that the existing structures of the town showed remarkable resiliency in the face of such pressures, and that, where changes did occur, they were at least in part the result of anticipatory changes stemming from town initiative rather than wholly imposed alterations from outside.³⁰

The existence of a substantial and important core of town office holders who not only survived all changes in government but co-operated with each in turn is a case in point. Men whose roots were firmly fixed in the pre-Civil War corporate exclusiveness of the town continued to serve as active members of the corporation while Newcastle was held for the King, reduced by the Scots, subjected to parliamentary control and ultimately the control of the Lord Protector, and then returned to what was essentially its pre-war political condition at the Restoration.³¹ The loyalties of such men might well seem baffling, both to the more zealous partisans of their own age and to subsequent generations of historians because, in a real sense, they had no fixed loyalties with respect to the large and complex questions that were agitating national politics. At the worst, they can be pictured as secular vicars of Bray; looked at in a more positive light, they are men whose concerns for the stability and smooth functioning of

traditional local arrangements were paramount.

An analysis of the changes which actually were made during the period reinforces the impression of the persistence of local structures and rivalries, even in the face of intense pressures from outside, a persistence that is frequently disguised at first glance because of the patterns by which the labels of the "national" struggle—royalist versus parliamentary, presbyterian versus independent—were taken up by the participants themselves and super-imposed on the "local" struggle. One certain result of the reduction of Newcastle to parliament was an alteration, extending throughout the Interregnum, in the old inner ring control of town government. The new governing clique, led by Thomas Bonner and the Dawson family, appears to have established an impressive hold on the mayoralty³²; in 1656 it was alleged that the Dawsons in collusion with Bonner had managed the election for mayor as they pleased for some years past,³³ and the results of elections seem to validate the allegation. But while the Dawsons had, in effect, ridden to power on the back of the parliamentary victory, they did not represent a totally new impulse in the politics of the town. They could trace their roots to the reform movement of the 1630s, and their behaviour in office was completely consistent with that line of descent. They had no interest in destroying the privileges of the town; their concern was to broaden the base of monopoly control only slightly to include themselves and their most immediate supporters. In practice they proved as uncompromising in their opposition to genuine reformers and as staunchly defensive of the charter rights and independence of the town as any of the older oligarchs they had for the moment displaced.³⁴

Between the establishment of the parliamentary corporation in 1645 and the reshaping of town government in the aftermath of the Restoration, two aldermen were removed from office, and the circumstances surrounding their removals can be taken as further evidence for the persistence of local issues disguised in the terminology of national issues. The first to be removed was John Cosins in 1647³⁵; although there is some ambiguity about the circumstances of his removal, the chief issue seems to have been the newly created ascendancy of the Dawson group. If Cosins was not a member of the inner ring, his repeated recourse to the town charter as the core of his attack on the Dawsons suggests that he was arguing the case of the inner ring or at least a case with which they could readily identify. Following Cosins' removal, his affairs became much entangled with broader national issues. Cosins himself was a conservative Presbyterian parliamentary and in the context of a growing split between the Presbyterians and the Independents, exacerbated by disturbances in the army, his report that there was danger the town might be secured against the present government received excited attention in London.³⁶ But it should not be thought that the issues thus raised were the ones which had led to his expulsion, for it was not until the beginning of July, more than three months after his expulsion, that the Newcastle authorities raised the argument that Cosins intended to bring the Scots back into England, embroiling the nation once more in civil strife.³⁷ The impression that the root of the trouble was local and connected with inner ring resistance to the Bonner-Dawson clique is further heightened by the minor riot following Bonner's election as mayor the next year; it was triggered off by the actions of Edmond

Marshall, a servant and apprentice of Cosins, and appears to have had no connection with broader issues of national politics.³⁸

The second alderman removed was Leonard Carr, and his case even more clearly reflects the general pattern which has been suggested. Carr was an established figure in the town and in most ways, other than his origins in Yorkshire, a person typical of inner ring politics; he had become an alderman by 1642, had served as steward and governor of the Hostmen before the Civil War, and had been assistant and governor of the Merchant Adventurers in addition.³⁹ He had admittedly participated in the defence of the town in 1644,⁴⁰ but it is striking that no question of his loyalty appears to have been raised on the occasions of royalist scares in 1648, 1651, and 1655. But in 1657 articles accusing him of royalist sympathies were presented to the Council of State.⁴¹ On close examination, the charges now appear to have been fabrications,⁴² but they were sufficient to convince the Council of State; that body directed the mayor and Common Council to remove Carr, which was done on 28th December 1657.⁴³ The spurious nature of the charges against him and the fact that he was an ill man over 80 years old at the time of his removal suggest that this is something other than the case of an active and loyal corporation reporting on and with the help of the Council of State removing a dangerous royalist. When one realizes that Carr had been an outspoken opponent of the Bonner–Dawson clique,⁴⁴ questioning their management of elections and accusing them of extensive abuses of power, all the while continuing to hold an aldermanship and preventing the election to it of one of their own supporters, the whole episode assumes a quite different character and become an excuse to eliminate a person who was a problem in local affairs and to the Dawsons rather than in national affairs and to Cromwell. The election of a close supporter of the Bonner–Dawson clique, Ambrose Barnes, to fill the vacancy would seem to complete the picture.⁴⁵

One final observation about the politics of Newcastle in the aftermath of the parliamentary victory needs to be made: despite a clear recognition on the part of parliament that the town corporation should be reshaped to serve new purposes and new loyalties, the overall form which that reshaping took appears to have been generated as much from below as from above. It is suggestive, for example, that there was a sizable time lag between parliament's naming of delinquents to be removed in March 1645 and the local enactment of their disfranchisement in late September 1645.⁴⁶ What is even more telling is the evidence which suggests that the parliamentary ordinance for settling the government of Newcastle confirmed an existing situation rather than created a new one. Details of how the town government functioned between the reduction of the town and the parliamentary ordinance are scanty.⁴⁷ Part of the resulting obscurity concerns the critical entry into aldermanic office of Henry Dawson and Thomas Bonner, but there is no doubt that they were occupying such places a month or more before parliament named them.⁴⁸ Likewise, one of the aldermen named in the parliamentary ordinance does not appear in the first list of the new corporation, nor for that matter in any subsequent list of town office holders, and it is surely more than coincidence that his place was assumed by a relative of Henry Dawson.⁴⁹ Bulstrode Whitelocke was later to assert that the House of Commons took order for settling the magistrates of Newcastle in violation of their charter⁵⁰; on one

level that observation was valid, but on another it was misleading. If the breaking of inner ring control and the rise of the Bonner–Dawson clique constituted something in the way of a civic revolution, it was a revolution which in key ways had been engineered from within Newcastle itself and the parliamentary role can more accurately be described as a confirmation of a situation already existing in the town.

The restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and the consequent purging of the corporation in 1662 allowed for the re-establishment of inner ring control. But again, the process by which that control was established must be observed carefully if the delicate interaction of town affairs and central government actions is to be rightly understood. The task of investigation is complicated by the fact that no complete list of members of the town government exists for 1660–61 and thus tracing the changes in membership between 1659 and 1662 is difficult. But the only signed order for the mayoral year of John Emerson shows that at least one of the old inner ring oligarchs, Sir John Marley, who had been purged in the 1640s, had re-established himself in the town government before the actual purging under the terms of the Corporation Act,⁵¹ and there is some additional evidence to suggest that others in this category, Sir Nicholas Cole and Sir Francis Bowes among them, had done the same.⁵² The actual purge of 1662 was a relatively limited affair, and again there must be a sizable suspicion that the impetus for the precise changes made came from within the town rather than from without. Five aldermen were removed, all clearly associated with the Bonner–Dawson group; five members of the old inner ring of pre-Civil War days replaced them.⁵³ Those whose early careers and family connections had cut them out for inner ring politics survived, their activity in the Commonwealth and Protectorate corporation notwithstanding.

The Restoration, then, returned Newcastle politics to its normal seventeenth century stance. The inner ring dominated, grateful no doubt for the general support of the monarchy, but anxious, as before, that this solicitous concern should not interfere in local rights and privileges under the guise of solidifying that support. The increasingly aggressive stance of the later Stuart monarchs towards the issue of royal control of boroughs made that sort of partnership in the long run impossible. The fine line between support and control had always made such conflict a potentiality; the policies of Charles II and James II made it a reality.

For the initial part of the reign of Charles II, the political situation in Newcastle appears to have been relatively settled, even though the activities and agitation of dissenters became a prominent part of the scene and inevitably had political overtones.⁵⁴ The town had been quick to make a loyal address to the restored monarch, expressing the hope that he would be the instrument to unite a divided church, compose a distracted kingdom, and ease an oppressed people.⁵⁵ In the heady atmosphere of the Restoration itself, aggressively overt royalism became the order of the day; at the parliamentary elections a health was drunk to the King and confusion to Zion,⁵⁶ while a number of tracts were locally published to stress the deep and continuing loyalty of the town.⁵⁷ For his part, the King in February 1664 by a charter of *inspeximus* confirmed the charters of Elizabeth I and James I with their ancient privileges.⁵⁸ As late as 1682, John March, the vicar of Newcastle, could express in a

sermon the confident feeling that the magistrates of Newcastle and the monarchy were still working in a pattern of close co-operation, despite the many distractions that plagued national affairs⁵⁹:

“This famous Town, over which you preside, has always been esteemed a place of very great importance . . . Now a Town of this importance, as it well deserves, so in such times of distraction as we live in, it may justly challenge the greatest care and vigilance of those that are intrusted with the Government of it, And I do heartily rejoice, that I need not fear the least imputation of flattery, whilst I proclaim to the world that as there is not any Town which can equal it for Trade, Populousness, and wealth, so there is none that doe Surpass it, and but very few that equal it in point of Loyalty and Conformity.

This Happiness and Glory we owe in great measure to that Loyalty and Conformity which shine forth in your own Examples; partly also to that great encouragement you give unto the Loyal and Orthodox Clergy of the place, but chiefly to the due exercise of your Authority, in suppressing Conventicles, those notorious Seminaries of Popery, Schism, and Rebellion.”

Despite these hopeful comments, a crisis was at hand in the relations between Newcastle and the central government. In the last years of his reign, as he sought to rule without parliament, Charles II escalated the pressure exerted by the monarchy on the boroughs, and Newcastle was one of the targets of that pressure. The precise nature of the intrigue and in-fighting that ensued escapes us at some key points, but the general outcome of the pressure was clear enough. The attempt to enforce confusing and ultimately unpopular royal policies through the manipulation of the corporation in defiance of its chartered rights led to a repudiation of the Stuart monarchy which the corporation had long claimed to support.

The first act in the unfolding crisis appears to have passed off with surprisingly little overt negative reaction. Early in 1684, Charles II signified to the corporation that he expected a surrender of their charter, “which was to be renewed on condition that the mayor, recorder, sheriff, and town clerk might always be in the King’s power to appoint or confirm”.⁶⁰ While the surrender was not enrolled, the King granted a new charter in 1685, in it constituting several new aldermen and reserving to himself the power to displace the mayor and aldermen at his pleasure.⁶¹ The charter itself did not reach Newcastle until after the death of the King; the proclamation of James II and the arrival of the charter fell within two days of each other. A contemporary tract recalled the two events as being the cause of great celebration⁶²;

“Bells rang, Minstrills play’d, and Cannon did Thunder . . .
Pikes, Muskets and Drums, and mony gay Fellowes
The King’s Health was Drunk at ilk Tavern and Ale-house
Instead of fair water their Fountains sprang Clarret.”

The tract labelled the new King “the justest Man on Earth”,⁶³ and referred to the charter as “their Rule, their Light, and their Guide”.⁶⁴

As the unhappy mayoralty of Sir Henry Brabant revealed, the actual situation was far from as stable as these observations might suggest.⁶⁵ Brabant himself was a confirmed loyalist, one who, as Richardson observed in the nineteenth century, “carried his attachment to the sovereign to an extent bordering on monomaniacism”.⁶⁶ His administration appears to have been the source of contention from

the very beginning, though it is unclear whether his attitude towards the crown or his rivalry with other town political figures, especially Sir William Blackett, was the root cause of the difficulty. In any case, the clash led to efforts by both sides to the controversy to invoke the aid of the crown in support of their position. The election of the sheriff and Common Council had been suspended by Brabant because of an effort to elect his opponents; he wrote to the Earl of Sunderland to seek royal support and appears to have received it, for he summoned the electors, told them he had the King's support, and asked if they had any reason why the Common Council as named by him should not be sworn. He recalled that Sir William Blackett, speaking for the dissident group, "dissatisfiedly said they had nothing to do, since your Majesty took the power from them, and so departed before the said Common Council could be all sworn".⁶⁷

In an apparent attempt to solidify his position, Brabant called a meeting of all the freemen of the town to explain the nature of the King's interference. According to his account, the meeting was awkward since his opponents "did most wickedly disperse and spread abroad that the Mayor called a Gill [*sic*] in order to give up their Charter, which made the Mobile much more numerous at and about the Town Court that day than ever was seen before".⁶⁸ This uneasiness about the charter suggests that the picture of happy acceptance of Charles II's new charter may be somewhat overdrawn. Despite the obstruction of a significant number of aldermen, Brabant was able to calm the crowd by assuring them there was no further action contemplated with respect to the charter. "They unanimously gave a great shout of 'God bless the King'" and were dismissed without any disorder. "All things", he noted, "looked very serene and peaceable amongst the Commons, of which the far greater number are very loyall, but of late years much disheartened by the overawe of the Magistrates, who make a great many act against their inclinations".⁶⁹

The next stage in the crisis came by an unexpected route. Sir William Blackett, utilizing his position as a member of parliament, appears to have been able to persuade the crown to purge the corporation under the terms of Charles II's charter, in order to reduce Brabant's forces to a minority. Given the fervent loyalty of Brabant himself, the action of the crown at this juncture is difficult to explain, unless it is assumed that Blackett's true intentions and feelings were deliberately misrepresented, as Brabant claimed.⁷⁰ Even more puzzling is the failure of the crown to make any reply to Brabant's impassioned petition that the situation be rectified and the ascendancy of the Blackett group curtailed by a royal order continuing Brabant in his mayoralty for an additional year.⁷¹

The tenseness of the situation and the interaction of local rivalries with national issues was well illustrated in the celebrated struggle during Brabant's mayoralty to erect in Newcastle a statue of James II.⁷² It is clear that Brabant himself was the moving force behind the decision to erect the statue, but the Blackett group entered strong objection to the scheme and refused to sign an order for it until Brabant threatened to send a list of those who would not sign directly to the King. At this point, he noted, they agreed, "more out of fear than love".⁷³ If the opposition to Brabant had its origins in local rivalries, it was by now clearly intertwined with national concerns as well. Blackett may not have hesitated to use the King to purge the corporation, but

when it came to erecting a statue to him, his supporters were not slow to declare publicly that "the erecting of the said statue looked like Popery".⁷⁴

In the succeeding municipal elections, the Blackett group had its way. Brabant was not continued in office, and the Blackett-backed candidate Nicholas Cole was elected mayor. Although Cole's mayoralty passed without undue intensification of the growing rift between crown and community, two events falling within it were disturbing pointers to the continuation of crisis. At the end of May the King sent a mandate to the corporation instructing them to admit Sir William Creagh, a notorious papist, to his freedom and he was duly admitted a month later.⁷⁵ In September, an address, signed by Cole as Mayor, was sent to the King; though couched in terms of formal loyalty, it clearly expressed deep concern about a growing pattern of interference with civic privileges and overt support of Catholics in the process. It thanked the King for his "repeated acts of grace and bounty vouchsafed to this your ancient corporation" but then added the significant qualification that the thanks were being extended for those acts "not only in the free enjoyment of our liberties and privileges, but more especially in the full exercise of the professed religion of the Church of England, whereof we are true members, true loyalty being inseparable from the principles of that church".⁷⁶

In the months that followed, the intertwining of local grievance with general national policy was intensified. There is every reason to suspect that Newcastle's antagonism towards the King would have markedly increased even had they conceived the interference with local conditions to be directed against the corporation alone; when they could see it as part of a broader policy, their sense of grievance in like manner broadened. Newcastle's experience in the last years of James II was far from unique; that unhappy monarch was busily unravelling the complex web of support for the monarchy that his brother had so patiently created, and his hand fell clumsily on many corporations and institutions.⁷⁷ In Newcastle the net result of his machinations was the alienation of the older governing elite by his interference with the charter, the alienation of the nonconformists by his papist policy, and the eventual restoration of inner ring control in reaction to both these developments.

In 1687 John Squire was elected mayor in succession to Nicholas Cole; as a Merchant Adventurer and Hostman, he was a typical inner ring candidate. At the end of December, James II, acting under the terms of the new charter, moved to reconstruct the corporation into a more pliant instrument of his will. By mandate he displaced the mayor, six aldermen, the sheriff, the deputy recorder, and fifteen of the Common Council. In addition he commanded the electors to choose the recently intruded Sir William Creagh as mayor, along with a carefully selected new set of officials to replace those he had removed.⁷⁸ Apparently the electors refused to elect them on the grounds that they were "papists and persons not qualified" but this action had no effect, for Creagh and his colleagues assumed office notwithstanding.⁷⁹ Within a month the new corporation had drafted what was described as "a remarkably fulsome address"⁸⁰ to the King, but it was not sent, a majority of the Common Council over-ruling it. Despite that setback, the adherents of royal policy appear to have believed that they had succeeded in controlling the corporation for James II. In a sermon preached before the

mayor on 29th January 1688, a Jesuit Philip Metcalfe remarked that on the basis of "universal applause" he could only conclude that Creagh "commanded the hearts of all".⁸¹ If Metcalfe was apparently blind to the tension created by royal interference in the town's politics, he did sense that Creagh's religion was a source of contention: "our Prince is pleased with your constant Loyalty; the famous Town of Newcastle with your prudent Government; good Christians with your exemplary life; I wish your Religion were in the same esteem with many as your Person is".⁸² Given the consistently anti-Catholic stance of the Newcastle clergy in the years preceding 1688, the latter point was hardly surprising.⁸³ Even Vicar March, who could not accept the Glorious Revolution in good conscience, had never been able to tolerate the slightest sympathy for the religion of his royal master.

In fact, both religious and political concerns were present. If the traditional elite had been disturbed by the issue of a new charter and the use made of it to date, their concern must have been immeasurably heightened by a further breach of the privileges carried out with the connivance of Creagh and his subservient colleagues.⁸⁴ In February a *quo warranto* was served on the mayor; the closeness of the date to that of the failure to carry the loyal address to the King is suggestive. At the beginning of March Creagh and his colleagues surrendered the charter of Charles II, although once again the surrender was not enrolled. Sometime after 9th June and before 22nd September James II granted a further new charter to the town "whereby the ancient custom of electing the mayor &c and burgesses for parliament were changed and the same in great measure put into the power of the mayor and aldermen", a power being "reserved in the King to place or displace".⁸⁵ The most plausible reconstruction that can be made of the ensuing municipal elections is that a combination of dissenters who opposed the Catholicism of Creagh and his colleague and traditional Newcastle political figures who were horrified by the manipulation of the town's charter combined to thwart the continuation of the Creagh group. The design of the latter was to secure the election of Catholics as both mayor and sheriff; the result was a victory for two protestants, William Hutchinson and Matthew Partis. It is certain that Ambrose Barnes played a critical role in organizing the opposition and securing the result, but it is worth remembering that his biographer was at pains to stress that this was no "clandestine election of Dissenters" but rather that many who co-operated "were known to be zealously affected to the Church of England".⁸⁶

The royal policy with respect to Newcastle was clearly in a shambles. Even a corporation already reshaped in the royal interest could not be coerced into the desired results in 1688. The last desperate gamble of reversing the policy of charter interference in October did nothing to alter the situation from the royal point of view. All it allowed was a quiet transition back to inner ring control following the repudiation of the new charters of Charles II and James II.⁸⁷ On 5th November Hutchinson and Partis relinquished their offices, to be replaced by Nicholas Ridley, the sheriff of 1682, and Matthew White, both typical inner ring figures; as James Clephan put it, "corporate life had flowed back to its old channels".⁸⁸ It was coincidental but appropriate that the soon-to-be William III landed on the same day.

To use the terminology of modern political discussion, one could argue that the

political consciousness of Newcastle had been considerably, if perhaps temporarily, raised in the events that culminated in the Glorious Revolution. It had been raised in that familiar progression by which specific grievance was generalized and then elevated to the level of ideological opposition. In describing these events with specific reference to Newcastle in the following year, James Welwood noted, "The Accession of a Popish Prince to the throne, the barefac'd Invasion of Liberty and Property, the palpable Incroachments on Laws and Fundamental Constitutions . . . were Events too great and important not to awaken England out of a Lethargy the reiterated Promises of preserving the Protestant Religion as by Law establish'd had cast her into".⁸⁹ His analysis is substantially correct. A corporation whose general stance was in favour of the crown because of the support the crown could give to its own peculiar forms of monopoly was turned to opposition when support was replaced by control; a dissenting element excluded from town political life was not long deceived about the true import of James II's interest in toleration and not willing to continue their support at the price demanded. In December 1688 Lord Lumley entered Newcastle declaring "for the protestant religion and a free parliament"⁹⁰ and in May of the following year the statue of James II was pulled down by an unruly mob incited to action by the garrison soldiers.⁹¹

Not everyone in Newcastle accepted the Glorious Revolution without question. A sermon by Thomas Knaggs, preached in June 1689 struck a strongly protestant and loyal note and asked for a blessing on the forces of William and Mary in the war against the French; in his preface to the printed version, Knaggs noted "A few hot, inconsiderable men among us were very angry after I preach'd it".⁹² Vicar March, though remaining strong in his denunciation of papacy, could not reconcile his view of monarchy with the events of 1688; in July 1690 he was warned by the Common Council that his salary would be stopped unless he would pray for William and Mary by name.⁹³ But for the bulk of the population, the outcome of these stirring events meant the return to life as normal, at least so far as political life was concerned. At various points throughout the century local and national politics had intersected in ways that intensified the nature of political debate. Local grievances became the medium through which many national concerns were perceived, while the issues and labels of national debate were used to clothe the continuing local political struggles. The two perspectives were deeply intertwined. If local issues or the local interpretation of issues continued to be predominant and concern for the town's chartered privileges remained to the fore, both were touched, influenced, and informed by the constant concern of the national government for the secure allegiance and peaceful governance of such a populous and economically important town.

NOTES

¹ For a general discussion of this tendency with respect to the years of the English Revolution, see R. C. Richardson, *The Debate on the English Revolution* (London 1977), chap. 7. R. Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution* (Oxford 1967), was an early attempt to apply this perspective. J. S. Morill, *The Revolt of the Provinces* (London 1976), is an excellent recent study informed by this perspective.

² This critical point is raised, briefly discussed, but not wholly resolved in R. Ashton, *The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution 1603–1649* (London 1978), chap. 3, esp. pp. 67–70.

³ This situation is amply reflected in the case of Newcastle in the period of the English Revolution. See Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, chaps. 3 and 6.

⁴ The interaction of local and national perspectives was hardly confined, of course, to the political sphere, and given the relations of political, religious, and social factors, the isolation of the political element for study here has some aspects of artificiality. This paper is not intended to minimize the importance of the other forms of interaction but rather to offer some suggestions about the manner in which the process of interaction worked by examining its specific manifestation within the political sphere.

⁵ B.L. Lansdowne MSS 66, no. 86.

⁶ R. Welford, *History of Newcastle and Gateshead* (Newcastle 1884–7), 3:420. C. H. Hunter Blair, *The Mayors and Lord Mayors of Newcastle upon Tyne 1216–1940 and the Sheriffs of the County of Newcastle upon Tyne 1399–1940* (Newcastle 1940), pp. 44–6. The grand lessees holding office were William Johnson, William Riddell, Henry Anderson, Henry Mitford, Henry Chapman, Roger Nicholson, William Selby, and George Farnaby.

⁷ Lionel Maddison was the mayor in 1593; he was said to be in sympathy with the reformers and to have “proved the Townes interest in the grannde lease”. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 81, no. 41.

⁸ The Lord Mayor of London noted in January 1596 that the prominent reformer Henry Sanderson refused to act in any way to the prejudice of the Newcastle corporation and would only testify on behalf of London if the suit were directed solely against the co-partners of the Grand Lease. J. U. Nef, *The Rise of the British Coal*

Industry (London 1932), 2:124. The general difficulties of the reform group over this point are usefully discussed *ibid.*, 2: 121–25.

⁹ For a brief discussion of this point, see J. H. Sacret, “The Restoration Government and Municipal Corporations”, *EHR*, vol. 14 (1930), pp. 232–59 and B. L. K. Henderson, “The Commonwealth Charters”, *TRHS*, 3rd Series, vi (1912), pp. 129–62.

¹⁰ On the charters and the nature of town government, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, pp. 42 ff.

¹¹ For a more detailed discussion of this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 46–7. In any case it is clear that the Hostmen did not exactly usurp power from the older merchant guilds as some have asserted. For an example of this sort of view, see *A Short View of the Rights of the Freemen of Newcastle upon Tyne in the Town Moor* (Newcastle 1962).

¹² F. W. Dendy, ed., *Extracts from the Records of the Company of Hostmen of Newcastle upon Tyne* (Durham 1901), Surtees Soc., vol. 105, p. xli; J. F. Gibson, *The Newcastle upon Tyne Improvement Acts... with an Introductory Historical Sketch* (London 1881), p. xxxvi. While the Hostmen argued that this provision did not include the 15 bye-trades, this point was not consistently enforced; for example, Thomas Turner, a barber surgeon, was admitted on 17th January 1604. Dendy, *Records of the Hostmen*, p. 267.

¹³ Statistics on the mayors and sheriffs are compiled from Blair, *Mayors and Sheriffs of Newcastle*; M. H. Dodds, ed., *The Register of Freemen of Newcastle upon Tyne* (Newcastle 1923); and the records of the Hostmen and Merchant Adventurers.

¹⁴ Statistics on M.P.s are compiled from C. H. Hunter Blair, “Members of Parliament for Northumberland and Newcastle upon Tyne 1559–1831”, *AA*⁴, xxiii (1945); Dodds, *Register of Freemen*; and the records of the Hostmen and Merchant Adventurers.

¹⁵ For a detailed discussion of the riot, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, pp. 53 ff.

¹⁶ *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1625–49 *Addenda*, p. 453.

¹⁷ For Coke’s criticisms see *ibid.* For the mayor’s despondent response see *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1631–33, p. 585.

¹⁸ PRO SP/16/240/27. The text of the grievances

is printed in Welford, *History of Newcastle*, 3:313–15.

¹⁹ PRO SP 16/245/32. The Council of the North noted that it had decided to look more fully into the matter because they realized the significance of the town to the King. *Ibid.*

²⁰ M. H. Dodds, "Ship Money", *Newcastle Citizen*, vol. 1 (1930), pp. 68–70. Cf. also *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1638–9, pp. 4–5, 80, 105, 321, 325; *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1639–40, p. 460; *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1640, p. 133.

²¹ *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1639, p. 480.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 450–51; the informant was Sir John Marley.

²³ For a detailed discussion of these elections, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, pp. 124 ff. The discussion of the elections to the Long Parliament should be supplemented by R. Howell, "The Elections to the Long Parliament in Newcastle: Some New Evidence", *AA*⁴, xlvii (1968), pp. 225–7.

²⁴ For an example of the reaction against the Scots, see *A Letre from an Alderman of Newcastle Shewing in Part the Grievances There* in M. A. Richardson, ed., *Reprints of Rare Tracts* (Newcastle 1847), vol. I. This letter appears to have been circulated in manuscript form. There are copies in PRO SP 16/466/89; Bodleian Library Tanner MSS 65, ff. 110–11v; B.L. Harleian MSS 1576, ff. 312–13v; William Trumbull MSS, xx, f. 48 (Berkshire Record Office).

²⁵ For a detailed discussion of political life in Newcastle in this period, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, chaps. 4 and 5.

²⁶ A. M. Oliver, *The Mayoralty of Newcastle upon Tyne* (Newcastle 1910), pp. 21–2.

²⁷ M. H. Dodds, ed., *Extracts from the Newcastle upon Tyne Council Minute Book 1639–1656* (Newcastle 1920), p. 24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27–8. The order was confirmed at the beginning of October. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

²⁹ They were named in an act of 24th March 1644/5. Newcastle Common Council Book 1645–50, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 25. They were also named in the ordinance for the government of Newcastle, 26th May 16445. *L.J.*, 7:395.

³⁰ The pattern is not unusual to Newcastle. I have discussed this point in more general terms in R. Howell, "The Structure of Politics in the English Civil War", *Albion*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1979), pp. 111–27.

³¹ Examples among the aldermen would include

Robert Shafto, Mark Milbank, and John Emerson. Again, the existence of this middle group, which successfully sought accommodation with successive and conflicting regimes, would seem to be a general feature of urban politics in the period rather than a peculiar Newcastle feature. Cf. Howell, "Structure of Urban Politics", pp. 116–19, 122–3.

³² For a detailed discussion of the Bonner–Dawson clique, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, chap. 5.

³³ Newcastle Common Council Book 1650–9, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 406.

³⁴ This was revealed clearly, for example, in their struggle with Ralph Gardner. If anything, Gardner seems to have fared less well under the parliamentary corporation than he had when the inner ring predominated. See R. Howell, *Monopoly on the Tyne 1650–58: Papers Relating to Ralph Gardner* (Newcastle 1978).

³⁵ The effective order for his removal was dated 24th March 1647. Dodds, *Council Minute Book*, pp. 68–9. An order to remove him had been signed as early as 18th February. Newcastle Common Council Book 1645–50, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 110. It is interesting to note that Cosins invoked both a "local" and a "national" argument against his removal. On the one hand, he relied on the charter for his position; on the other, he argued he could not be removed since he was brought in by parliamentary ordinance. *Ibid.*, ff. 124–6.

³⁶ *C.J.*, 5:208. Cosins was not alone in commenting on this subject. Cf. the two letters from Skippon, the parliamentary governor of Newcastle, printed in H. Cary, *Memorials of the Great Civil War 1642–1652* (London 1842), 1:229–32.

³⁷ *C.J.*, 5:229.

³⁸ Dodds, *Council Minute Book*, pp. 102–4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21; MSS Hostmen, Old Book, ff. 185, 187, 188; MSS Merchant Adventurers, Order Book, ff. 1, 18, 26.

⁴⁰ Cf. E33 (17), *A True Relation of the Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army* (London 1644), pp. 11–13; *Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 69, 21–7 August 1644, pp. 556–7; E16 (5), *A Particular Relation of the Taking of Newcastle* (London 1644), pp. 12–13, 9 (2nd pagination).

⁴¹ *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1656–7, p. 272.

⁴² On the falsity of the charges, see Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, pp. 180–81.

⁴³ *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1656–7, pp. 226–7; Newcastle

Common Council Book 1656–1722, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 12v.

⁴⁴ Cf. Newcastle Common Council Book 1650–9, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 406.

⁴⁵ It is perhaps suggestive that George Blakiston, a younger generation member of an old-style Newcastle political family, resigned from the Common Council in protest at the election. *Ibid.*, f. 467. But it may be that the objection was simply to Barnes's youth. Cf. W. H. D. Longstaffe, ed., *Memoirs of the Life of Mr. Ambrose Barnes* (Durham 1867), Surtees Soc., vol. 50, p. 99.

⁴⁶ Newcastle Common Council Book 1645–50, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 25.

⁴⁷ No records of meetings of the Common Council were kept until 28th March 1645. Dodds, *Council Minute Book*, p. 25. The financial machinery of the town appears to have been re-established more quickly. Receipts were kept from 22nd November 1644 and payments from the fourth week of October. Newcastle Chamberlains' Accounts 1642–5, Tyne and Wear County Archives, ff. 58, 190v.

⁴⁸ They are among the signatories of a letter to Speaker Lenthall a month before the first official notice of their appointment. *C.J.*, 3: 714.

⁴⁹ The alderman so named was Henry Lawson, the fifth senior member of the Common Council. Dodds, *Council Minute Book*, p. 21. William Dawson appears in his place in the earliest list of the parliamentary corporation which dates from the audit of accounts, 4th October 1645. Newcastle Chamberlains' Accounts 1642–5, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 167.

⁵⁰ B. Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign of Charles I to the Happy Restoration of King Charles II* (Oxford 1853), 1: 348.

⁵¹ Newcastle Common Council Book 1656–1722, Tyne and Wear County Archives, f. 43.

⁵² *Ibid.*, f. 44.

⁵³ Those removed were George Dawson, Christopher Nicholson, Henry Rawlings, William Johnson, and Peter Sanderson. Seated in their stead were Sir James Clavering, Sir Francis Anderson, Sir Francis Liddell, Henry Maddison, and Cuthbert Carr. Predictably, the middle group represented by Robert Shafto, Mark Milbank, and John Emerson survived.

⁵⁴ Concern about the dissenters is widely reflected in the literature emanating from the Newcastle clergy in the later Stuart period. Cf. for example, J. March, *The False Prophet Unmaskt*

(London 1683); J. March, *A Sermon Preached before the Right Worshipful the Mayor, Recorder, Aldermen, Sheriff &c of ... Newcastle* (London 1677); J. Rawlet, *A Dialogue betwixt Two Protestants* (London 1685); and J. Shaw, *No Reformation of the Established Reformation* (London 1685). When Thomas Story visited a conventicle at Newcastle he was most impressed by the political overtones. "Expecting to hear something like Doctrine from so noted a Man among them", he was disappointed that the message was substantially "suggestions of Jealousy and Dislike against the Government". *A Journal of the Life of Thomas Story* (Newcastle 1747), p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Cal. S.P. Dom.*, 1660–1, p. 4.

⁵⁶ E1038 (8) *The Lords Loud Call to England* (London 1660), p. 19.

⁵⁷ R. Astell, *Vota Non Bella* (Gateshead 1660); R. Hooke, *The Bishops' Appeale or an Address to the Brethren of the Presbyteriall Judgment* (Newcastle 1661); R. Thomson, *The Loyall Subject* (Newcastle 1660 and 1662).

⁵⁸ J. Brand, *The History and Antiquities of the Town and County of the Town of Newcastle upon Tyne* (London 1789), 2: 193.

⁵⁹ J. March, *Th' Encaenia of St. Ann's Chappel in Sandgate* (London 1682), sig. A3–A3v.

⁶⁰ Brand, *History of Newcastle*, 2: 194.

⁶¹ Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 176 n.

⁶² G. Stuart, *A Joco-Serious Discourse in Two Dialogues* (London and Newcastle 1686), pp. 1–2.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, sig. A4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶⁵ The following account of events in the mayoralty of Brabant is drawn substantially from *The Eve of the Revolution in Newcastle upon Tyne* in M. A. Richardson, ed., *Reprints of Rare Tracts* (Newcastle 1847), vol. iv.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15. The biographer of Barnes recorded that Brabant once declared "if the king should command him to kill a man in cold blood, he took himself bound in conscience and duty to execute his command". Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 193.

⁶⁷ *Eve of the Revolution in Newcastle*, p. 8.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

⁷² On the statue see M. R. Toynbee, "Fresh Light on William Larson's Statue of James II at Newcastle upon Tyne", *AA*⁴, xxix (1951), pp. 108–17; M. R. Toynbee, "A Further Note on

William Larson's Statue of James II at Newcastle upon Tyne", *AA*⁴, xxxiv (1956), p. 91.

⁷³ *Eve of the Revolution in Newcastle*, p. 13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 176 n.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ M. Ashley, *James II* (Minneapolis 1977) and J. Miller, *James II: A study in Kingship* (London 1977), *passim*.

⁷⁸ Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 176 n.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ P. Metcalfe, *A Sermon Preached before the Right Worshipful the Mayor of the Town & County of Newcastle upon Tyne* (London 1688), sig. A2.

⁸² *Ibid.*, sig. A2v.

⁸³ For examples of this anti-Catholicism, cf. J. March, *A Sermon Preached before the Mayor*; J. March, *Sermons Preach'd on Several Occasions* (London 1699); J. Rawlet, *A Dialogue betwixt Two Protestants*; J. Rawlet, *An Explication of the Creed, the Ten Commandments, and the Lords Prayer* (London 1679); J. Shaw, *No Reformation of the Established Reformation*; J. Shaw, *Origo Protestantium or an Answer to a Popish Manuscript* (London 1679); J. Shaw, *The Pourtraicture of the Primitive Saints* (Newcastle 1652). For the importance of anti-Catholicism in the period, see J. Miller, *Popery and Politics in England 1660-1688* (Cambridge 1973).

⁸⁴ Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 176 n.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Oliver gives the date of 24th July for the new charter. Oliver, *Mayorality of Newcastle*, p. 25.

⁸⁶ Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, pp. 176 n, 177-8.

⁸⁷ Blair, *Mayors and Sheriffs of Newcastle*, p. 79.

⁸⁸ J. Clephan, "William Hutchinson Merchant Adventurer", off-print from *AA*, 1880, p. 16.

⁸⁹ *Vindication of the Present Great Revolution in England in Five Letters Pass'd betwixt James Welwood M.D. and Mr. John March* (London 1689), sig. A2.

⁹⁰ *Universal Intelligencer*, no. 1, 11 Dec., 1688, quoted in *Destruction of the Statue of James the Second at Newcastle* in M. A. Richardson, ed., *Reprints of Rare Tracts* (Newcastle 1847), vol. iv, p. 8.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-17. The frequently repeated statement of Bourne that the statue was torn down in 1688 is clearly erroneous. H. Bourne, *The History of Newcastle upon Tyne* (Newcastle 1736), p. 131.

⁹² Longstaffe, *Memoirs of Barnes*, p. 436.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 438. *Vindication of the Present Great Rebellion in England*, p. 25 accuses March of labelling the actions of the Prince of Orange "with the infamous Names of Rebellion, Damnation and the like". March himself asserted that passive obedience was "a Principle founded in the Word of God". *Ibid.*, p. 5.