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THE ARMY AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION: THE CASE OF ROBERT LILBURNE

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THE LILBURNE family played a prominent role in the period of the English Revolution. Pride of place, both for notoriety and for impact on the unfolding drama, has, of course, been given to the prolific Leveller theorist and organizer, John Lilburne.¹ In more locally oriented annals George Lilburne, the mayor of Sunderland, has his place as a supporter of the parliamentary cause and as an advocate of a preaching ministry,² while Henry Lilburne is remembered as a deserter from the parliamentary side who instigated an abortive royalist revolt at Tynemouth Castle in 1648.³ But next to Free-born John, the member of the family who played the most active role in the wars and the subsequent search for a stable settlement was his brother Robert.⁴ It was also a role that was, in some significant respects, ambiguous. Yet its very ambiguities reveal important clues about the movement of opinion in a period of turbulent change. Robert Lilburne made his career as a professional soldier at a time when the army played an unusually central role in the unfolding of events. While it would clearly be a mistake to interpret either his career or his reactions to events as typical of the army as a whole, his response to and participation in these trying circumstances are illustrative of the pressures which weighed on those committed to the parliamentary cause, and they offer a valuable view of certain stages of the revolution as they were perceived and acted upon by a person whose viewpoint was, in important ways, conditioned by his loyalty to the army.

Because of his connection with the rebel cause and particularly because he had been an active participant in the trial of the King and one of the signatories of the death warrant, Robert Lilburne was the target of violent attack after the Restoration. A tract published in 1660 described him as an avid supporter of the Protectorate, indeed tying him closely to Cromwell by suggesting that he was "a pure Bird of Old Noll's Hatching", and condemned him as "a most implacable Enemy against Kingly Government and a most insolent Infringer of the People's Liberties, one that had more Wit than Honesty, but despised Good Old Law called Magna Charta."⁵ Such adverse sentiments were predictably repeated in other early biographical notices. Thomas Gumble thought he was "a great rebel" and inclined to a "violent" Anabaptism.⁶ Wood described him as one who sided with "the rout against his Majesty in the beginning of the rebellion" and judged that he was "thorow-paced to Oliver's interests".⁷ The Rev. Mark Noble, writing on the lives of the regicides at the end of the eighteenth century, was no less scathing; Lilburne, he argued, had "a prodigious

hatred to the court and even the person of his majesty” and, while admitting that Lilburne displayed bravery during the war itself, characterized him as a man well adapted for the “odious undertaking” of imposing military rule on England and one who “was as assiduous in privately ruining the royalists as he had been openly in the field.”⁸

Such observations do more than indicate the hostility displayed towards Lilburne, in common with other chief actors in the revolution; they also unwittingly pose some of the problems which are most difficult to resolve in assessing his contribution to and stand on the events of 1640–60. What indeed were his political views? Did he have such a burning hatred of the Stuart monarchy that he was determined from the outset of hostilities to bring the crown to ruin? Is it the case that his puritanism took the form of a violent Anabaptism? Was he truly Cromwell’s creature? Not all of these questions can be satisfactorily resolved, but a review of his career, with particular attention to his role in the army in that confusing year of army mutiny in 1647, his role in Scotland in the early 1650s, his activities as a deputy major general in the northern counties in 1655–6, and his actions as the revolution collapsed around him, will provide at least the framework of an answer.

The main events of his life are readily documented and can be quickly summarized. Born in 1613, he was the eldest son of Richard Lilburne of Thickley Puncherdown, Co. Durham.⁹ Of his early life, nothing is known, but when the war broke out he was soon engaged on the parliamentary side. His military career was divided between service in the South, where he acted as lieutenant and captain in the armies of the Earls of Essex and Manchester in 1643–4 and as a colonel in the New Model in 1646–7,¹⁰ and service in the North. In the latter area, he raised a regiment of Durham horse in 1644, including several relations and neighbours among his officers.¹¹ In 1647 he returned to his old regiment in the North and for a brief period served as governor of Newcastle.¹² By 1648 he was second in command of the Northern Army under John Lambert, the army colleague with whom he was to be most closely associated throughout the revolution. In 1650–4 and again in 1657–8, he served with the army in Scotland,¹³ while in 1654–7 and 1658–60, he was in England as Governor of York. While his career was thus essentially that of an army officer, he also exercised important administrative functions in conjunction with his military positions; as commander in chief of Scotland between December 1652 and April 1654, he acted as *de facto* chief magistrate, and as deputy major general in the North between 1655 and 1657, he likewise played a role that considerably transcended normal military command. At the Restoration, he surrendered himself to the new regime in accordance with the King’s proclamation of 6th June 1660 against the regicides, he having been a member of the High Court of Justice and twenty-eighth signatory to the death warrant.¹⁴ He was tried and condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and he lived out his days on St. Nicholas Island where he died in August 1665.

Although his military career had attracted notice before 1647, it was in that year of complicated negotiations between King, parliament, and army that Robert Lilburne first rose to a prominent position.¹⁵ Predictably, his role was intimately connected

with army grievances, including the fear of abrupt disbanding of the forces before such issues as arrears of pay and indemnity for actions undertaken during the war were firmly settled by parliamentary guarantees. The issue which first forced his hand was the question of the redeployment of troops to Ireland in advance of the settlement of such issues. Lilburne quickly emerged as one of the leaders of the opposition in the army to parliament. At some point in 1646, Lilburne had been given the command of the Kentish regiment of foot originally raised and commanded by Ralph Weldon; though authorized by Fairfax, it was an appointment which appears from the first to have created dissension and dissatisfaction among the continuing officers of the regiment.¹⁶ In the following spring of 1647, when the question of disbanding or serving in Ireland was put before the army by parliament, Lilburne's new regiment was clearly divided, one group being prepared to undertake the Irish service and urging the appointment of Lt. Colonel Kempson as their commander,¹⁷ the other, with which Lilburne was prominently associated, backing the demands for satisfaction of grievances embodied in *The Declaration of the Army*.¹⁸ Lilburne's activities in this regard aroused extreme suspicion in Parliament; on 27th March the House had ordered Fairfax to suppress the army petition¹⁹, but two days later they received confirmation that not only was the petition still circulating in the army but that a committee of officers had been formed to take charge of it once it had been subscribed in the ranks, thus establishing a potentially dangerous link between soldiers and officers.²⁰ The reaction of the Presbyterians in the House was both swift and negative; Lilburne in company with a handful of other army officers was sent for by the House on 29th March to answer for his behavior, and the following day both Houses issued a declaration condemning the petition as "dangerous" and "tending to put the army into a distemper and mutiny" and adding that "those who shall continue in this distempered condition and go on advancing and promoting that petition shall be looked upon and proceeded against as enemies of the state and disturbers of the public peace."²¹

While Lilburne was discharged by the House on 25th May,²² it is clear that in the interval he continued in what had been called his "distempered condition". He bent all his efforts to prevent his regiment from volunteering for Ireland in the face of what appear to have been rather underhanded methods employed by Kempson and the officers loyal to the parliament to induce the troops to volunteer.²³ He was reported as giving numerous speeches to the soldiers attempting to hinder them from service in Ireland and to draw them away from obedience to Kempson. On 20th April, for example, he overtook members of the regiment on the march through heavy weather, and told them, "Fellow Soldiers, I am sorry you are marching up and down in such weather as this; you may thank your Lieutenant Colonel for it," while one of his companions added, "They delude you as ignorant men to go to Ireland; no godly man would desire you to go for that affair."²⁴ It appears that his efforts had a marked success; most of those who had marched with Kempson left him again.²⁵ By the time parliament ordered the regiment disbanded on 10th June, the whole army was in revolt and had entered into a Solemn Engagement not to disband until their demands were granted.²⁶

In common with a number of members of the army, Lilburne appears to have been politicized by this sequence of events. The rebuff given by parliament to the petition for redress of grievances, the labelling of promoters of the petition as enemies of the state, his own summoning to the House, and the continued effort to secure volunteers for the Irish service appear to have broadened significantly the scope of Lilburne's demands (or at least of the demands with which he associated himself). As the question was transformed from one of specific grievances to one of the army's honor and its right to petition, Lilburne's position became a more generally political one. On 27th April he was one of the signatories of the vindication of the officers of the army presented to the House of Commons; it argued for the Liberty of petitioning for what now concerned the army as soldiers and afterwards would concern them as members of the commonwealth. The call for a vindication of the army's honor, going beyond satisfaction of immediate grievances, was already apparent. "The Sense of such Expressions is so irksom to us, who have ventured whatsoever we esteemed dear to us in this World for Preservation of your Freedom and Privileges, that we cannot but earnestly implore your Justice in the Vindication of us, as in your Wisdom you shall think fit."²⁷ The process of politicization may be seen as complete by the day on which the regiment was ordered disbanded (10th June 1647), when Lilburne signed a letter to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of London; by that time, the demands for settlement of army grievances had been generalized into a statement about the political interest of the soldiery in the future settlement of the nation. Their demands, the letter stated, "we insist upon as Englishmen, and surely our being Soldiers hath not stript us of that Interest." Arguing that they desired "a Settlement of the Peace of the Kingdom, and of the Liberties of the Subject," the signatories went on to note that "we think we have as much right to demand and desire to see a happy Settlement as we have to our Money and the other common Interest of Soldiers which we have insisted upon."²⁸

During the summer of 1647, Lilburne was detached from his regiment and appointed by Fairfax to be governor of Newcastle, a position he held between the governorships of Skippon and Hesilrige. In that post he seems to have occasioned general satisfaction. The Corporation voted at the conclusion of his appointment that "during the time he hath byn Governor of this Garrison [he] hath shewed many respects and favors to this Corporacion and hath allwaies byn willing to promote what soever might any waies tend to the good and welfare thereof" and presented him with two silver flagons with the arms of the town engraved on them "as a thankful acknowledgement of the respect of this Corporacion to him."²⁹ What precisely it was he had promoted is unclear, other than his expressed concern for the repair of the town walls.³⁰ But even though he had been posted to the North, the association of his name and his regiment with army restlessness continued. In November his regiment of foot was referred to as "the most mutinous Regiment in the Army";³¹ it participated more actively than any other in the abortive army mutiny at Ware,³² at which time its actions revealed that the Leveller ideas of Robert's brother John had spread widely among the rank and file. The incident and Lilburne's reaction to it are revealing with regard to the limits Robert Lilburne would place around direct

political action on the part of the soldiers and is suggestive with respect to his attitude towards his more famous brother John.

That Lilburne was unsympathetic to the more radical movement within the army and feared that it would dissolve army unity and hence its overall political influence was readily apparent. If maintaining their rights as Englishmen was one thing, the throwing off of officers by the rank and file was quite another. Writing to Fairfax, Lilburne asserted that as soldiers and members of the army, they owed all obedience and subjection to Fairfax's authority and command, "from which we humbly conceive neither Birthrights, nor other Priviledges whatsoever, whereof we have or ought to have an equal share with others, can or ought in the least to disoblige us." He added significantly, "malcontented Spirits take Occasion . . . to divide the Army into Parties and Factions, endeavouring to turn every Man's Sword against his Fellows, pleading Necessity where there is none," and noting that such things will be more destructive to the commonwealth if granted than refusal would be.³³

The distancing of himself from the opinions and actions of his brother John is striking and helps to place his own political views in a proper perspective. It raises some doubt about the assertion of Noble that Robert had taken up the parliamentary cause in the war because of a hatred of the king and the court which had its roots in the treatment given to John by the Court of Star Chamber in the 1630s.³⁴ Although the bonds of family led him to stand by his brother's side during his trial in 1649,³⁵ for the most part he publicly disassociated himself from him, most notably in this aftermath of his regiment's mutiny, but also by studiously ignoring John's later trial in 1653. If there was radicalism in the spirit of Robert Lilburne, it was a radicalism that was not in touch with the variety propounded by his brother.

Robert Lilburne's relations with his difficult regiment in 1647 suggest, however, one other possible line of influence. When the officers of the regiment were shuffled in the summer of 1647, Paul Hobson, more distinguished as a preacher than as a soldier, had become major.³⁶ Hobson had been in trouble as early as 1645 for his contravention of the ordinance forbidding laymen to preach.³⁷ Described by an admittedly hostile witness as a subscriber to the confession of faith of the Anabaptists, Hobson continued his preaching activities among the soldiery; it was reported by the same source that "the subject matter of his sermons was much against duties and of revelation" and that "he was a means to corrupt some pretious hopefull young men."³⁸ The obvious Baptist inclinations of Robert Lilburne, which became increasingly evident during his sojourn in Scotland in the early 1650s, when it was noted that Anabaptists were being admitted among his troops through his own favor and intercession,³⁹ conceivably can be traced to his interaction with Hobson. Without doubt, there is a connection between the foundation of Baptist congregations on Tyneside and the presence in the area first of Robert Lilburne as governor of the town in 1647 and then Hobson as deputy governor in 1648.⁴⁰

Lilburne's stay as governor on Tyneside was relatively brief. With the outbreak of the second civil war, he was to be found once again playing a significant military role, still in the North, when he led the defeat of Colonel Grey, Sir Richard Tempest, and the Northumbrian cavaliers in July 1648.⁴¹ In January, he was an active par-

ticipant in the central political act of the revolution, the trial and execution of the king. Named as one of the king's judges, he attended the sessions on 15th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 25th, and 27th January in the Painted Chamber and was present on all days of the trial in Westminster Hall;⁴² the judgement given, he was the twenty-eighth signatory to the death warrant.

At the Restoration he would attempt to put a favorable gloss on this involvement, but his active participation in 1649 suggests that at that moment he was convinced of the political necessity of such drastic action.

He was soon again involved in military affairs as a participant in Cromwell's Scottish campaigns and the subsequent Worcester campaign. His service was exemplary from all accounts, his most notable achievement being the utter rout he inflicted on the Earl of Derby near Wigan on 25th August 1651;⁴³ it was a stroke that removed all danger of a royalist rising in the North and served as a critical step towards the crowning mercy of Worcester on 3rd September. Lilburne's letters to Speaker Lenthall and the Lord General concerning the fight struck a characteristic note, drawing particular attention to the danger posed to the revolutionary regime by the Presbyterians. Like a number of his colleagues in the army, Lilburne had an acute hostility towards the Presbyterians, and he was at pains to point out "that assistance the Ministers and those who are called Presbyterians afforded, and would more abundantly have appeared, for they are the men who are grown here more bitter and envious against you than others of the old Cavaliers' stamp."⁴⁴ It was hardly an attitude likely to stand him in good stead when he returned to his duties in Scotland. For the moment, however, he had the openly expressed good wishes of Cromwell and the gratitude of the parliament, which voted him a grant of lands to the value of £300 a year.⁴⁵

Lilburne's activities in Scotland, where he became commander in chief on the recall of Richard Deane to serve as a general of the fleet,⁴⁶ were dominated by the growing violence and disorder occasioned by Glencairn's rising on behalf of the Stuart cause.⁴⁷ As an officer, Lilburne had had considerable experience of Scottish conditions. He and his regiment had gone there with Cromwell in 1650 and had returned following the Worcester campaign by November 1651; in 1652 he had been involved in a campaign into the Highlands.⁴⁸ The growing unrest, however, provided deep challenges, both to Lilburne's grasp of military strategy and to his comprehension of the needs of the Scottish people. His attitude towards royalists and Presbyterians complicated his actions, while his capacity for effective action was further compromised by successive changes of government in England as the Rump Parliament was expelled; the Barebones experiment faltered, and the Protectorate was created. In addition, the diversion of English attention to the military needs of the concurrent Dutch war caused many of his pleas for aid to be given a secondary priority. The normal judgement of Lilburne's behavior in these trying circumstances has been negative; Gardiner argued that "difficult as the situation was, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Lilburne was far from being a resourceful commander,"⁴⁹ while the most recent historian of the rising comments "it cannot be said that Lilburne personally stood up to the test well."⁵⁰ Both, however, suggest the somewhat para-

doxical point that although his performance as a soldier must be found lacking, his counsels as a statesman were far more worthy of attention. The period of Lilburne's command in Scotland thus becomes a critical testing point of his overall ability and both sides of the conventional judgement (his role as a soldier and his advice as a statesman) need careful investigation.

That Lilburne failed as a military commander is, on one level, obvious enough; he failed to put the rising down and it was left to General Monck who succeeded him in April 1654 to suppress the revolt. If there were signs by the time of Lilburne's departure that the rising was on the wane, it is probably the case that this was due more to internal contradictions within the royalist cause itself than it was to any particular efforts on Lilburne's part.⁵¹ The indictment of Lilburne's military efforts goes a step further, however, in the assertion that his command was characterized by irresolution, agonized attention to detail, and consequent rapid fluctuations in his assessment of the military situation.⁵² That this is, in large measure, a reasonable judgement of his behaviour under stress cannot be denied; one cannot help but feel in reading his letters from this period and in looking at his pattern of command that one is seeing a man lacking in self-confidence and ultimately overwhelmed by the demands of his assignment.⁵³ Dow has accurately summed up the situation by commenting that "his letters to the authorities in England became querulous in tone, full of complaints about the failure of the Council and the Committee for the Army to listen to his demands for more men and better supplies, and displaying in general an unwillingness to take responsibility or to exercise his own initiative."⁵⁴ Particularly worthy of criticism was Lilburne's slow acceptance of the fact that he had a serious rebellion on his hands; especially in the early stages of the rising, he had a tendency to take a short-term view of the situation and this helps to explain his fluctuating assessment of the danger.⁵⁵ It is also probably the case that Lilburne was torn in his letters between emphasizing the seriousness of the situation in order to make compelling his reiterated pleas for reinforcements and other supplies and providing assurance to the authorities that he had the situation under control in order to justify his own handling of affairs. The effort appears to have been too much for him. By the spring of 1654, he clearly conveyed the sense that he was desperate to be relieved of his command⁵⁶ and, looking back on his service, he could describe himself as having been "a pure drudge almost these 4 yeares in Scotland."⁵⁷ It was manifestly with a sense of relief and gratitude that he turned over his command in the spring of 1654 to assume the post of governor of York.

To be fair to Lilburne, one must qualify this picture of faltering leadership by a recognition of the complexity of the situation facing him. After all, it was Lilburne who had to face the movement while it was still on the rise; the acrid internal divisions and the growing disillusionment which stemmed from the failure to keep promises of aid from abroad would eventually make a failure of Glencairn's rising, but those factors were more characteristic of the revolt that Monck faced and suppressed than of the situation initially confronting Lilburne. Monck may have brought more decisiveness to bear on the situation, but his overall plan of pacification was not radically different from that which Lilburne had sought to pursue.⁵⁸ The crucial dif-

ference lay in the facts that Monck faced an increasingly divided movement and that he was better supplied to do so. The factor of supply was a far from negligible element in Lilburne's unhappy efforts to cope. It was his misfortune that his offensive against the royalists coincided so closely in time with England's heaviest involvement in the Dutch war; given the logistical realities of the moment, it was simply not possible for authorities in London to provide men and money for both on an adequate scale at the same time. In fact, during the first month of his command Lilburne had to accept a significant reduction in the infantry and lesser reductions in the horse and artillery to free men and money for the Dutch war.⁵⁹ There can be little doubt that such decisions weakened his ability to take the offensive the following summer, regardless of any personal shortcomings as a commander. The impression is certainly created that Lilburne, especially when compared with Monck, lacked authority in governmental circles, for all that he was commander in chief in Scotland. When Monck wanted action on civil or military matters from Whitehall, he tended to get prompt attention. Lilburne did not. It was in part the result of the fact that the Council had more time and more money for Monck than they did for Lilburne, but it was also a measure of the authority their respective names carried with men in London.

On the military level, then, Lilburne's efforts were frustrated and frustrating. But he did appear to have insight into the root causes of the rebellion and he had plans for dealing with the sources of discontent in Scotland; these should not be overlooked simply on the grounds of his military inadequacy. What should be noted about them, however, is that his sound instincts for conciliation were thwarted in part by his own religious preconceptions, which took the form of a marked antipathy to all but a small section of the Scottish clergy, in part by his increasing reliance on coercive measures to control the rising which, of necessity, ran counter to his aspirations for conciliation.

Lilburne had the perception to realize that the rising drew its strength from "the rooted hostility of the Scottish people"⁶⁰ to the English government and that such hostility was being fed by grievances stemming from current English policy. He was anxious, as a result, that the circumstances surrounding the revolt should not lead to further estrangement and was quite willing, for example, to issue licences to noblemen and gentlemen to retain their arms in order to protect their property against the depredations of the rebels.⁶¹ In like manner he was much concerned that the army deal fairly with the civilian population; in such a way, he believed, the military regime might commend itself to the people. During the summer of 1653 he issued a series of orders in an attempt to prevent the soldiers from taking advantage of the people over whom they held sway,⁶² and he pleaded with authorities in London for money so that he could avoid free quarter, something which he noted would be most "unseasonable" in the circumstances.⁶³ Likewise, he attempted to deal with the assessment, the chief form of taxation on the Scottish people, in such a manner as to make the burden more acceptable without compromising the financial needs of the administration and his aggrieved complaints about parliament's decision to levy the assessment to the full only served to underline the complexity of the situation in

which he found himself.⁶⁴ Lilburne strongly advocated a speedy decision with respect to an act of oblivion for Scotland. He was anxious in this regard to see that people loyal to the regime were restored to their estates;⁶⁵ in both this recommendation and his argument that the courts should not be allowed to press too hard in matters of debt against lords whose loyalty he hoped to retain,⁶⁶ Lilburne's instincts seem sound. He had realized that sequestration of estates and proceedings with respect to debt had produced a situation of necessity for many in which impoverishment seemed inevitable under English rule, relief only possible by rallying to the royal cause. What he hoped to create instead was a situation in which such individuals had everything to gain by remaining loyal to an English government which protected their interests.

In favouring such policies, Lilburne was making a cool and basically sound appraisal of the situation, but when it came to the matter of assessing the religious loyalties of the Scottish people and dealing with their clergy, his own blind spots led him into great difficulty. Lilburne badly misinterpreted the significance and meaning of the split in the Scottish church between the Protesters and the Resolutioners.⁶⁷ On the one hand, he persisted in a belief that the Protesters were potential converts to the cause of Independency, mistaking in the process their antipathy to Resolutioner domination of the institutions of the Presbyterian church for a wavering from the Presbyterian position towards Independency. On the other hand, he was convinced that the overwhelming majority of the clergy, influenced by the Resolutioners, were primarily responsible for instigating support for the royalist cause. It was the latter consideration which led him to take what was perhaps his most controversial action while commander in chief, the dissolution of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in July 1653.⁶⁸ He had asked Cromwell in advance whether "in regard of the fickleness of the times"⁶⁹ he should prevent the meeting; receiving no answer in time, he somewhat uncharacteristically acted on his own initiative and had the meeting dispersed by a party of soldiers. It was not a stroke designed to win the hearts of the Scottish people to the English government. Indeed, the Protesters, on whom Lilburne had placed such hopes, condemned the act as vociferously as the Resolutioners themselves.⁷⁰

Even in the absence of such provocative acts, it is doubtful, however, that Lilburne could have successfully steered the treacherous course between conciliation and coercion. While he sensed correctly that the attitude of the people was central to the problem of English administration, once that attitude had become a military problem, he was led perforce to coercive measures, to the passing of edicts against aiding the royalists, and the attempt to control the movement of the people from place to place.⁷¹ And in the end, he got the worst of both sides; the imposition of his coercive measures had a tendency to cancel out the positive effects of his conciliatory overtures and the incapacity of his soldiers to enforce them strictly allowed the continuing opportunity to offer covert aid to the rebels.

If Lilburne left Scotland with his reputation hardly enhanced, he was soon deeply and actively involved in the affairs of the northern counties. Before he had departed from Scotland, he had welcomed the creation of the Protectorate,⁷² and in 1655 he found himself involved in the active protection of the new regime against royalist

plotters. Since he was in command at York during the attempted insurrection of that year, he took a prominent role in its suppression and more particularly in the subsequent prosecution of those allegedly involved. His actions indicate a ruthless commitment to the preservation of the Protectorate against royalist subversion and totally belie his later pleas that he displayed kindness towards those of the opposite party. To Lambert he wrote about the royalists he was busily hunting down, "I hope the greate estates these blaides leave behinde them will pay for all the charge, if you forgive them not againe."⁷³ And he was of no inclination to forgive. To Thurloe he complained about the reluctance of the judges to proceed with prosecution on the strength of the Protector's ordinance; holding back in "this weighty case" he attributed to "lameness" and "so much knottiness" and indicated clearly his feeling that the events warranted that "the naile . . . bee driven into the head."⁷⁴ After securing Lord John Bellasis, he quickly wrote for instructions and asked for a speedy reply, adding "I . . . shall be glad to know what you doe in generall with such kind of cattle."⁷⁵ Half a year later, he was still writing on the subject, this time to Cromwell indicating his anxiety to pursue an investigation of the late designs; "Your highness may be confident of a faithful performance of my duty to the utmost of my abilyes, and if I were reduced to a corporall, I should cheerfully undertake it rather than this worke should want my best assistance to carry it on."⁷⁶

It was in the aftermath of the royalist risings of 1655 that Cromwell embarked on the experiment of dividing England into military districts and ruling it through the agency of the major generals.⁷⁷ It was a scheme justified as a security measure but ultimately intended to be much more, for the authority of the military was to extend beyond control of the royalist threat to the regulation and supervision of affairs at the local level. Such centralization was as unpopular, probably more unpopular, than the attempts to enforce a Puritan morality and to achieve a reformation of English manners that are usually associated with this experiment in military rule. The various major generals responded in differing ways to the challenges presented by their wide authority. Some were obviously more successful than others in working with the local power structures. Lilburne, who at least had the advantage when he undertook his duties of being a local person, was already active as a militia commissioner for Co. Durham in mid-March 1655, charged with enquiring into the conspiracies and secret meetings of the disaffected.⁷⁸ From the surviving traces in the central records, it would appear that his actions were energetic and sustained. In April he was to be found acting in conjunction with George Lilburne as a commissioner for trial by oyer and terminer of the rebels in the late disturbances in York, Northumberland, and Durham;⁷⁹ later he is to be discovered examining a suspicious stranger detained at Scarborough,⁸⁰ and in October order was sent to Lambert to name Lilburne his deputy and to supervise his activity as a major general for the counties of York and Durham.⁸¹

While evidence of his activity in this office is not abundant, the surviving material is indicative of his range of concerns and shows clearly that he accepted the broader mandate of the major generals to be the agents of reform as well as the arms of repression. This is not to say that he in any way minimized the importance of his

security role. In December he supervised the transfer of arms from Raby Castle to the custody of the governor of Tynemouth Castle,⁸² while in June he concerned himself with the investigation of a recently elected alderman in Hull who was alleged to be disaffected to the government.⁸³ In March he reported from York about the securing and conviction of suspected royalists and indicated that sequestration proceedings had been carried out against those of sufficient estate.⁸⁴ Two months later he wrote to Cromwell excusing his absence at a meeting to which he had been summoned on the grounds that he had more pressing business at hand in seeing to the sentencing of royalists; "this, I presume, would not have had a dispatch without my attendance."⁸⁵ If anything bothered him about the performance of such duties, it was the legal encumbrances which appeared to him to frustrate a more thorough carrying out of the work. He complained to Cromwell, for example, that the income figures set for the decimation tax were too high and urged that they be significantly lowered, "for most of your desperate people, which are a more considerable number then those that are taxt, escape, I may say, unpunished."⁸⁶ In like manner, he clearly felt that the effectiveness of his work was compromised by encumbrances on estates due to previous forfeiture and transfer (much of which he suspected to be fraudulent), and he urged clarification of the matter by the central authorities.⁸⁷ For all his evident enthusiasm in such work, Lilburne was not, however, without some element of sympathetic understanding for hapless bystanders caught up in the web of such proceedings. He petitioned actively, for example, on behalf of one William Brasse who technically came within the purview of the instructions about delinquents on the basis of a minor offence committed a dozen years earlier; he knew the man as a neighbour, was convinced that he had been proceeded against by a person who sought to derive personal benefit from the composition that Brasse paid, and argued that he was of a sober, honest, peaceable disposition and well affected to the state; his spirit, Lilburne protested, was very different from that of the cavaliers, and he begged his discharge from further harassment.⁸⁸

But such activities, important as they were or seemed to him to be, were not the full measure of Lilburne's activity. He extended his interests to include a number of other concerns. Clearly he was anxious that the major generals might become the instrument through which the magistracy might be improved. He complained to Cromwell about the "wicked carriage" of the excisemen in January 1656, although it should be noted that in so doing he revealed a characteristic preoccupation by his suggestion that many of those who abused this position were "desperate cavaliers"; in making the criticism, he was moved not only by a concern for the impact of the excise on the common people but equally by a concern that "such untoward people" should not be appointed to positions of authority since they brought contempt and reproach on the present government.⁸⁹ He made much the same kind of point in reporting his displeasure at the election of a sheriff who was "noted . . . as one somewhat of a loose conversation, and one that is addicted to tippling and that which is called good-fellowship." While he could not resist in this case as well hinting that the man was "somewhat concerned in point of delinquency", his main concern was that appointing such men to responsible positions endangered the hold of the

magistracy on the people; "I doubt not, but it is your highnes care and advantage rather to call good men to places of magistracy then such, and I know it will be more acceptable to godly men, and more honourable to your highnes, and tending more to the quieting of the spirit of all good people."⁹⁰ In yet another case he wrote to Secretary Thurloe stressing the identical point; "it is much against my judgement that any man justly reputed unworthy, or a cavillier, should in these tymes have preferment."⁹¹ Just as the magistrates should be worthy of their trust, so should the clergy, and here too he felt that the major generals had a role to play. He participated actively with the commissioners for ejecting scandalous ministers and complained that not enough commissioners had been appointed to carry on the work effectively; "I . . . humbly intreate your highnes to give some order in this, that the worke of purging corrupt ministers may not sticke for want of commissioners for the more effectual carrying on of that affaire."⁹² At a more humble level, he intervened with the government to procure a patent to change the market day at Thirsk from Monday to Tuesday; his explanation for the requested change was characteristically religious, that it would help to avoid profaning the Lord's Day. "I am senceable it will bee a very greate obligation to the well affected of these parts, and begett a greater esteeme of his highnes and government and be thankfully acknowledged by the towne."⁹³ In common with other major generals, he was concerned about and active in connection with the reformation of manners by the suppression of excessive alehouses and what he saw as "unlawful pastimes dishonourable to God and disturbing the peace of the Commonwealth."⁹⁴ Finally, one should note his interest in and work on behalf of that great educational experiment of the Protectorate, the college at Durham. He was appointed a member of the committee for Durham College in May 1656⁹⁵ and wrote enthusiastically to Thurloe about the project, urging him to further the address about the college and adding "I doubt not but it will turne to the great renowne of his highnes and very much affect the inhabitants of that poore county and citty to him and the government."⁹⁶

For all his efforts, Lilburne's role in the northern counties was no more popular there than that of his colleagues elsewhere in the country, a point made clear as the elections for the 1656 parliament approached. On 9th August he wrote to Thurloe that a spirit to keep out the friends of the government had infected the people of Durham and Northumberland; they "are perfect in their lesson, saying they will have noe swordsmen, noe decimators, or any that receives sallary from the state to serve in parliament."⁹⁷ He was inclined to think that Sir Arthur Hesilrige was behind the agitation, a suspicion perhaps influenced by the fact that he had clashed with Hesilrige earlier in the summer over charges that Sir Arthur was an oppressive landlord.⁹⁸ In any case, his former good relations with Newcastle appear to have been somewhat strained by a suspicion that the town was co-operating with Hesilrige, even if they had decided against his standing as a parliamentary candidate; he noted darkly that the town clerk of Newcastle had been meeting with Hesilrige, though he admitted ignorance as to what the meetings were about.⁹⁹ A week later he wrote to Cromwell in a similar vein, noting that "many at home are fraught with perverse spirits and

labour to sett up some new interest," but adding his hope they would be disappointed and that "there will be sober men enough to ballance such."¹⁰⁰

Lilburne himself was returned to the parliament for the East Riding, and though he was far from an active participant in debate,¹⁰¹ the parliament itself led to a decisive turn in his position. It was during the parliament of 1656 that Cromwell was offered the crown.¹⁰² In common with many in the army, Lilburne was decidedly opposed to such a move and by May 1657 he had openly broken with Cromwell over the issue. As a soldier Lilburne had to this point accepted the successive political changes of the revolution without reservation; he had served the Rump, accepted the Barebones Parliament, welcomed the Protectorate. But even though he did not resign his commission, he could not accept Cromwell's flirtation with the kingship. He wrote angrily about the matter to Luke Robinson, expressing his hope that the opposition to the kingship would come to "some good issue at last" and urging that care be taken to counteract the propaganda spread by any "new royalist" among the troops in the North.¹⁰³ A year later he was reported to be still "a malcontent" because of the changes that were made among his officers in the aftermath of the army resistance to the kingship scheme.¹⁰⁴

As the revolution wound its way to a chaotic close in 1659, the position of Lilburne became increasingly untenable. Given his consistent adherence to the cause of the army, it is hardly surprising to find that he sided with his long-time colleague Lambert in the last ditch efforts of the army to hold on to its revolutionary position. Indeed, he applauded Lambert's turning out of the parliament; identified by this time as "altogether his [i.e. Lambert's] creature", he was alleged to have commented "that he hoped never a true Englishman would name the Parliament again and that he would have the house pulled down where they sat, for fear it should be infectious."¹⁰⁵ The attitude reflects a central ambiguity in his career, an ambiguity shared in common with many others associated with the army cause; originally a soldier in the service of the parliamentary cause, he had come to see the army as more embracing of, more faithful to the original goals of taking up arms than its master, the parliament. Just as events in 1647 had seemed to make a newly politicized army a vehicle more representative of the interests of the nation than the parliament itself, so again in the dying days of the revolution, Lilburne echoed that dubious and dangerous creed. In the last analysis Lilburne's loyal support of Lambert was futile. At the end his own regiment deserted him; he was forced to surrender York, and the command of his regiment was transferred by Monck to Major Smithson, who had been chiefly responsible for its defection.¹⁰⁶

The final public act of Robert Lilburne was his trial before the High Court of Justice in October 1660. His was no heroic performance, no act of final defiance; the fiery spirit of a regicide like Harrison did not burn within him. Already before the trial, Lilburne had petitioned for a pardon on the grounds that he had engaged in the late wars only in the hope of promoting an accord between King and parliament, that he had acted benevolently towards the royalists during the war, and that he was no contriver of the King's death, indeed would have prevented it if he could.¹⁰⁷ That the plea scarcely rings true in view, for example, of what is known about his

attitudes towards the investigation and prosecution of alleged royalists in 1655–6, is obvious enough, and even if he could subsequently produce a certificate from a royalist vouching for the kindness shown to him by Lilburne when he was made a prisoner of the parliamentary forces in 1651,¹⁰⁸ such a defence had little chance of success, especially in the heated atmosphere of the time. Lilburne persisted, however, in this line of defence at his trial. "I shall not wilfully nor obstinately deny the matter of fact, but my Lord I must and I can with a very good conscience say that what I did, I did it very innocently without any intention of murder, nor was I ever plotter or contriver in that murder. I never read in the Law, nor understood the case thoroughly; whatever I have done, I have done ignorantly."¹⁰⁹ Indeed, Lilburne suggested that he had favoured the King's motion for the withdrawal of the court and, thinking of the day on which the King was put to death, he recalled how "I was so sensible of it, that I went to my Chamber and mourn'd and would if it had been in my power have preserved his life."¹¹⁰ The man who had declared a year earlier that he hoped no true Englishman would ever name the parliament again solemnly assured the court "I was not at all any Disturber of the Government; I never interrupted the Parliament at all."¹¹¹ When he argued that he had had no hand in such things, either in 1648 or "at any other time", he was being technically correct; his had not been the hand that did the act, but such technical correctness hardly seems to extend to the question of attitudes. Lilburne was found guilty and at once petitioned for pardon again.¹¹² Though formally sentenced to death, he achieved a partial response to his pleas when the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Lilburne's stance at the trial is, of course, understandable; he was struggling to save his life. At the same time, however, it has a pathetic quality about it that underlines the extent to which Lilburne was an ambiguous revolutionary. The heroism of the battlefield did not extend in the end to a defence of what he had done.

On 31st October 1661, Lilburne was ordered to be sent prisoner to either Plymouth or St. Nicholas Island.¹¹³ It was at the latter place he died in August 1665. Even in his last months the ambiguity remained. The contrite prisoner of 1660, who had announced his intention to lead a loyal and peaceable life,¹¹⁴ was reported in 1665 to be expecting a speedy alteration of government and was suspected by the authorities of being involved in a plot for a new revolution based on the landing of foreign troops in Scotland.¹¹⁵ What truth there was in such suspicions is impossible to say, but if nothing else, they indicate that the government had little faith in the sincerity of his submission at the Restoration.

How should one judge Robert Lilburne? The impression is often that of a man caught up in events that are too sweeping, too complex, too challenging for him to cope with either comfortably or certainly. The sense of inadequacy that he displayed as commander in Scotland is seemingly echoed by the lack of conviction for the revolution he displayed at his trial. His politics remain difficult to characterize; what one knows about them is substantially negative, namely that he disassociated himself from the radical ideas of his brother. For the rest, he accepted the changes of regime as they came, only balking at the offer of kingship to Cromwell. But the latter action scarcely makes him a confirmed republican; it is a reflection of his loyalty to the

army, not a statement of his abstract political views. In religion, the position is more clear and consistent. There seems little reason to doubt either his Baptist orientation or his deep-rooted hostility to the Presbyterian position. That he was a creature of Cromwell is true enough up to a point, but in the end he broke with him, and the break appears to have been decisive. His attitude to the monarchy he resisted and the King whose death warrant he signed remains most ambiguous of all. It was easy for the supporters of restored monarchy to see one of the regicides as "a savage Creature in the midst of civil People",¹¹⁶ but there remains an impression of a lack of resolution in Robert Lilburne when he is viewed in the guise of radical regicide. And therein lies the central paradox and ambiguity of many of the men involved in the English revolution. The fanaticism of a man like Robert Lilburne was never so all-embracing as later critics were to suggest; the radicalism of the regicide and the apparent moral certainty of the major general masked but did not eradicate the sense of ambiguity and uncertainty that was part of the revolution in which he was a major actor.

NOTES

¹ On John Lilburne see the standard biographies M. A. Gibb, *John Lilburne the Leveller: A Christian Democrat* (London, 1947) and P. Gregg, *Free-born John* (London, 1961).

² On George Lilburne see H. L. Robson, "George Lilburne, Mayor of Sunderland", *Antiquities of Sunderland and Its Vicinity*, vol. 22 (1960), pp. 86–132.

³ On Henry Lilburne and the revolt at Tyne-mouth Castle see R. Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 200 ff. and the sources cited p. 200, n. 3.

⁴ There is a brief life of Robert Lilburne by Sir Charles Firth in *The Dictionary of National Biography*. A biographical notice of him by J. S. Morrill will appear in the forthcoming *Biographical Dictionary of Seventeenth Century English Radicals*; I am grateful to the editors of this work for allowing me to see a copy of this entry in advance of publication.

⁵ *A Declaration Concerning Colonel H. Martin* (London, 1660), p. 4.

⁶ T. Gumble, *The Life of General Monck Duke of Albermarle* (London, 1671), pp. 80–81, 206.

⁷ A. Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* (3rd edn., London, 1817), 3: 358.

⁸ M. Noble, *The Lives of the English Regicides* (London, 1798), 1: 378–80.

⁹ *DNB*, s.v. Lilburne, Robert. He was two years old at the visitation of Durham in 1615.

¹⁰ Sir Charles Firth and G. Davies, *The Regimen-*

tal history of Cromwell's Army (Oxford, 1940), 1: 264.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Lilburne served as governor of Newcastle between the appointments of Skippon and Hesilrige. The exact dates on which he was in Newcastle are not certain. The corporation was considering a petition to parliament desiring that Skippon remain as governor on 5th April 1647. The earliest reference in the town records to Lilburne's presence as governor is a letter of his dated 11th August 1647. On 22nd February 1648 it was noted that Hesilrige "is shortly to come downe to this Garrison." Tyne and Wear Archives Dept., Newcastle Common Council Book 1645–50, fols. 138 (5th April 1647) and 163 (12th August 1647); M. H. Dodds, ed., *Extracts from the Newcastle upon Tyne Council Minute Book 1639–1656* (Newcastle, 1920), p. 83 (22 February, 1648).

¹³ On Lilburne's career in Scotland see Sir Charles Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* (Edinburgh, 1895) and *Scotland and the Protectorate* (Edinburgh, 1899); F. D. Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland 1651–60* (Edinburgh, 1979).

¹⁴ J. Nalson, *A True Copy of the Journal of the High Court of Justice for the Tryal of King Charles I* (London, 1684), p. 110.

¹⁵ On the situation in the army in 1647 see I. Gentles, "Arrears of Pay and Ideology in the Army Revolt of 1647" in B. Bond and I. Roy, eds., *War and Society* (London, 1976); M. A. Kishlansky,

- "The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney," *Historical Journal*, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 795-824; M. A. Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army* (Cambridge, 1979), chap. 7; J. S. Morrill, "The Army Revolt of 1647" in A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse, eds., *Britain and the Netherlands*, vi (The Hague, 1977).
- ¹⁶ Firth and Davies, *Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2:453.
- ¹⁷ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Addenda 1625-49*, p. 706.
- ¹⁸ E 390(26), *The Declaration of the Army* (London, 1647).
- ¹⁹ *C.J.*, v: 127.
- ²⁰ *L.J.*, ix: 115.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*; *C. J.*, v: 129; 669 f.9(84), *A Declaration of Parliament* (London, 1647).
- ²² *C.J.*, v: 184.
- ²³ On the underhanded methods of Kempson see Firth and Davies, *Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2: 454-55.
- ²⁴ *L.J.*, ix: 153-4.
- ²⁵ Firth and Davies, *Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2: 455.
- ²⁶ S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649* (London, 1910-11), 3: 280 ff. gives an account of the circumstances surrounding the Solemn Engagement.
- ²⁷ J. Rushworth, *Historical Collections: The Fourth and Last Part* (London, 1701), 1: 471.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: 554.
- ²⁹ Dodds, *Newcastle Council Minute Book*, p. 85.
- ³⁰ Tyne and Wear Archives Dept., Newcastle Common Council Book 1645-50, f. 163.
- ³¹ Rushworth, *Historical Collections Part IV*, 2: 875. It is interesting to note that Lilburne had to defend his then regiment against a charge of being "the beginners of Mutinies" in 1645. E 302(17), *Col. Lilburne's Letter to a Friend* (London, 1645).
- ³² On the events at Ware see Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, 4: 21 ff.
- ³³ Rushworth, *Historical Collections Part IV*, 2: 913-14.
- ³⁴ Noble, *Lives of the English Regicides*, 1: 378.
- ³⁵ Gibb, *Lilburne*, pp. 279, 288, 291; Gregg, *Free-born John*, p. 298.
- ³⁶ Firth and Davies, *Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2: 436.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ T. Edwards, *Gangraena* (1646, reprint edn., Exeter, 1977), pt. I, p. 90.
- ³⁹ Gumble, *Life of Monck*, pp. 80-1.
- ⁴⁰ Howell, *Newcastle and the Puritan Revolution*, p. 248.
- ⁴¹ Rushworth, *Historical Collections Part IV*, 2: 1177.
- ⁴² Noble, *Lives of the English Regicides*, 1: 379.
- ⁴³ G. Ormerod, ed., *Tracts Relating to Military Proceedings in Lancashire during the Great Civil War* (Manchester, Chetham Soc., 1844), 2: 296-307, reprinting the text of *A Great Victory by the Blessing of God Obtained* [1651] and two letters from Robert Lilburne to Lenthall and Cromwell.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 2: 301.
- ⁴⁵ *C.J.*, viii: 247; W. C. Abbott, ed., *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937-47), 2: 296-7.
- ⁴⁶ Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp. 62, 72 n. 1; The appointment was only intended to be a temporary one, but the pressure of the Dutch war meant that a replacement was not provided until May 1654.
- ⁴⁷ On Glencairn's rising see Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*; Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*; and Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, chaps. 4-5.
- ⁴⁸ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, p. 78.
- ⁴⁹ S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate* (reprint edn., New York, 1965), 3: 97.
- ⁵⁰ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, p. 78.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 98.
- ⁵³ On Lilburne's lack of confidence see his letter to Cromwell on 20th December 1653. "I hope a happy conclusion with the Dutch will putt an end to these unhappy peoples distempers, and that things may come to a settlement againe, though being jealous of my owne weakenes [I] am doubtful soe great affaires as are here to be managed may suffer for the want of one more fitt to wrastle with them." Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp. 302-3.
- ⁵⁴ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, p. 78.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 80 ff.
- ⁵⁶ Cf. his letter to Monck 21 January 1654. Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp. 20-1.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82. It is perhaps significant that it was to Lambert that he addressed this disillusioned comment.
- ⁵⁸ On Monck's scheme of pacification see Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, chap. 6 and M. Ashley, *General Monck* (London, 1977), chap. 9.
- ⁵⁹ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, p. 79.

⁶⁰ The phrase is from Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, 3: 97.

⁶¹ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp. 107, 300 n. 35.

⁶² Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp. 139, 141-2, 154-5.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 287-8; Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, p. 22. On the assessment see Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp. 109 ff.

⁶⁵ Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp. 19, 21, 44.

⁶⁶ Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp. 267, 289, 295-6.

⁶⁷ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp. 99 ff. contains a useful discussion of Lilburne and the Scottish church.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁶⁹ Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p. 161.

⁷⁰ Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland*, p. 103.

⁷¹ Firth, *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p. 259; T. Birch, ed., *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe* (London, 1742), 2: 221.

⁷² *Thurloe State Papers*, 2: 18.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 3: 226-7.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2: 359-60.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: 587.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 4: 294.

⁷⁷ On the nature of the rule of the major generals see D. W. Rannie, "Cromwell's Major-Generals", *EHR*, vol. 10 (1895), pp. 471-506 and I. Roots, "Swordsmen and Decimators: Cromwell's Major-Generals" in R. H. Parry, ed., *The English Civil War and After* (London, 1970), pp. 78-92.

⁷⁸ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1655, pp. 77-8.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁸² *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1655-6, p. 56.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 387; *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1656-7, p. 4.

⁸⁴ *Thurloe State Papers*, 4: 614.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 5: 33.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 4: 321.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 4: 541.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 4: 364.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 4: 468.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4: 397.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 5: 229.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 4: 643.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 5: 296.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4: 541.

⁹⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1655-6, p. 325.

⁹⁶ *Thurloe State Papers*, 4: 442.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5: 296.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4: 229, 234.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5: 296.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 5: 317.

¹⁰¹ This judgement is based on the minimal trace of his speaking recorded in Burton's diary. J. T. Rutt, ed., *Diary of Thomas Burton* (reprint edn., New York, 1974).

¹⁰² On Cromwell and the crown see Sir Charles Firth, "Cromwell and the Crown." *EHR*, vol. 17 (1902), pp. 429-42 and vol. 18 (1903), pp. 52-80.

¹⁰³ *Thurloe State Papers*, 6: 292.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 7: 85.

¹⁰⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1659-60, p. 295.

¹⁰⁶ Sir Richard Baker, *A Chronicle of the Kings of England* (London, 1670), pp. 688-9, 699, 700. Cf. F. J. Routledge, ed., *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers*, vol. IV (1657-60) (Oxford, 1932), pp. 338, 455, 459, 501 for royalist reports on these events.

¹⁰⁷ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1660-1, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁰⁹ *An Exact and Most Impartial Account of the Indictment, Arraignment, Trial and Judgment . . . of Nine and Twenty Regicides* (London, 1660), p. 253.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1660-1, p. 318.

¹¹³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1661-2, p. 130.

¹¹⁴ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1660-1, p. 8.

¹¹⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1664-5, pp. 235, 236, 271.

¹¹⁶ *A Declaration Concerning Colonel Martin*, p. i.



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