

## VIII

# Responses in Newcastle upon Tyne to the Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 and 1745

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### SUMMARY

**J**acobitism in Newcastle was a far from negligible force in the early years of the reign of George I. But the new King's supporters managed to seize the initiative and win over waverers during the crisis of the Fifteen. Thirty years later, the city was far more united in its responses against the Forty Five. This article shows that, in this important northern city, attitudes towards the Jacobite rebellions were far from apathetic, as is sometimes implied.

### INTRODUCTION

Newcastle played an important role in the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, though this has often been sidelined. In histories of Newcastle and Northumberland there is usually some reference to the impact of the rebellion as part of the general narrative story of the city or county.<sup>1</sup> Historians of Jacobitism also spend some time in discussing Newcastle's role within the framework of the rebellion, but they usually concentrate on the rebels themselves and activity *within* Newcastle is thus very much of secondary importance. This is the case, for example, in Gooch's *The Desperate Faction*?<sup>2</sup> whilst McLynn's article about Newcastle during the Forty Five is also disappointing and somewhat limited, since there is no reference to any sources from the Newcastle or Northumberland Record Offices.<sup>3</sup>

Yet Jacobitism in Newcastle has not been entirely overlooked by historians; it has however elicited some contradictory conclusions. According to Wilson, loyalties in Newcastle

were varied. Stuart sympathies were common throughout society in the early years of George I's reign, though the corporation supported the government when the crisis came.<sup>4</sup> Gooch concentrates on the role played by the Whig coal merchant William Cotesworth of Gateshead (c. 1668–1725) and his confederates in the defence of the town, gathering intelligence, raising the militia and receiving regular troops.<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to note that despite his extensive coverage of Northumberland Jacobites, Gooch does not discuss those within Newcastle, though it is known that the rebels counted on support from within the town.<sup>6</sup> In contrast, according to Wilson, the later rebellion brought about a united response against it.<sup>7</sup> Gooch discusses the alarm in the town after news of Prestonpans had reached the citizenry and the steps taken to allay these.<sup>8</sup> However, McLynn claims that this loyalty towards the Hanoverians was probably due to the presence of the army in and around Newcastle and that Jacobite sympathisers were merely underground.<sup>9</sup>

This article does not examine the activity of the rebels before, during or after the rebellion, except where it concerns Newcastle. In any case, these have been amply covered by Gooch. Rather it examines the actions of those within the walls of Newcastle itself; the magistracy, clergy, soldiers, the merchants and common people, both Whigs, Tories and Jacobites. Some of the sources used for this article have been employed before; others have not. There are, of course, the State Papers Domestic, particularly for 1745–6, together with the newspapers, both those based in London and Newcastle; hitherto the press seems to have been under utilised in studies of this episode. Sources for the Fifteen

are rather more scattered; from the well known contemporary *History* by Patten to the less known Cotesworth and Johnson letters deposited in Hertfordshire Record Office. Together these can be pieced together to present a more substantial image of these episodes in Newcastle's history.

Newcastle was a potential goal for the rebels during both major rebellions and so was also a place which the government and its supporters had to hold. It was one of the most important cities in North East England, being of great commercial significance because of the coal trade, which according to Defoe, supplied the whole of the south of England.<sup>10</sup> Viscount Townshend, one of the two Secretaries of State, referred to Newcastle in 1715 as 'a town of so much importance'.<sup>11</sup> Yet the challenges during the two rebellions were very different. In 1715, the Northumberland rebels counted on their supporters within the walls greeting them with open arms. The alternative scenario which they envisaged was to surprise the town. Thirty years later, neither of these options was entertained by the rebels; their aim was to seize the town by force, fighting the British army encamped around and inside it.

### THE 1715 REBELLION

England was in an unsettled state in 1715. The Hanoverian dynasty had only been installed in the previous year, a major war had just ended and the ruling Tory party had been ousted from power by a mixture of both royal favour and a general election. James Francis, the Old Pretender, thwarted at not being made King after Anne's death in 1714, was determined to regain his inheritance. Given political discontent in Britain, he had many possible adherents.<sup>12</sup>

It seems that there was a deep laid Jacobite conspiracy in July 1715 to launch a rebellion/invasion in Northumberland. Two of the leading Jacobite noblemen in exile, the Earls of Mar and Bolingbroke, had certainly been discussing a plan to seize Newcastle and Holy Island. This scheme would allow sympathisers in the north, which, it was thought, were many, to rally to

their fellows and also enable aid from abroad to be disembarked. The capture of so important a place as Newcastle would also discourage the government and its supporters and cut off the supply of coal to the capital.<sup>13</sup> However, in the event, the overseas plotters eventually decided to concentrate their efforts in the South West.<sup>14</sup>

The government became aware of such conspiracies soon after they had been hatched in July 1715 and two months later, on 22 September, decided to nip them in the bud by sending warrants to arrest the alleged conspirators in the north of England (and elsewhere). These men included the Catholic Earl of Derwentwater and Thomas Forster, a High Church squire and a Tory MP for Northumberland,<sup>15</sup> On the same day, Henry Liddell of London, a business contact and political ally, asked his friend William Cotesworth, to send (in secret) information about the situation in the north.<sup>16</sup>

Derwentwater and Forster escaped arrest. However, their plans had been disrupted and they had to rise immediately, rather than at a later and more convenient time for their schemes. The rebels gathered in arms at Greenrig on 6 October and marched northwards (and so away from Newcastle) to Rothbury. On the following day, they went even further northwards, to the small coastal town of Warkworth, perhaps in the hope of help from abroad. Though about fifty miles away, they nevertheless were to pose a potential threat to Newcastle for the next two weeks.<sup>17</sup> Yet they were effectively blind as to what was happening in the town, since Robert Lisle, whom they sent there, was arrested on entering Newcastle by orders of John Johnson, county sheriff, and Alderman Matthew White.<sup>18</sup>

There was much concern about disaffection in Newcastle. This was not surprising. There had been little celebration in Newcastle over George I's arrival in England in 1714. Loyal Whigs had decided to let the common people know of this happy event and sent for tar barrels to make bonfires and for hogsheads of ale for them to drink loyal toasts, which were subsequently drunk. This maddened the mayor's brother who shouted 'a rump a rump'.

He came into the street 'among ye mob and yn cryed a Blackett a Wrightson [Newcastle's two Tory MPs], no rump, no rump and endeavoured to put out the bonfire and threw up ye firesticks against ye windows wch were illuminated in the room where we were rejoicing'.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Sir William Blackett left Newcastle to deliver the town's loyal address to the new King.<sup>20</sup>

Whig fears about the political loyalty of the corporation were longstanding. Newcastle, after all, had a large and popular electorate who returned Tory candidates, and Whigs often equated Toryism with Jacobitism, not always wrongly.<sup>21</sup> Leading Tories, such as Ormonde and Bolingbroke had even gone over to the Pretender's court at St. Germain's in the early summer of 1715. In any case, it suited Whig interests to label their enemies as traitors. In January 1715, Liddell was concerned about the distribution in Newcastle of a certain pamphlet, probably *English Advice to the English Freeholders*. He told Cotesworth 'I presume your magistracy don't think it worth their while to take notice off the dispensers or publishers'.<sup>22</sup> During the rebellion, Liddell's fears about the loyalty of the corporation surface frequently in his correspondence to Cotesworth. He was concerned that men or arms might be conveyed into the town under loads of hay or straw and that, when arms were sent to Newcastle, the corporation should not be given the responsibility for distributing them.<sup>23</sup>

Others shared Liddell's concerns. As early as 6 October 1715, Townshend referred to 'the informations His Majesty has received of the disaffection of the magistracy and inhabitants of that place'. He told the Earl of Scarborough, Northumberland's Lord Lieutenant, that he must 'take the best precautions you can to secure it against the attempts, which its probable, may be made upon it'.<sup>24</sup> Cotesworth informed Liddell that he believed the High Church would rise with the rebels 'and no doubt there was but a good disposition in some people to it but the zeal that has by some hands been shown on this occasion has changed the posture of our affairs'.<sup>25</sup> In similar vein Thomas Yorke, a London Whig, claimed the effect of

the uncertain loyalty of the town had meant that action had not been taken against the rebellion until relatively late in the day: 'its better to repent late than never but their understandings must have been strangely clouded when they made so little of ye danger till ye very day it came'.<sup>26</sup>

It is difficult to know how far these Whig fears were grounded in reality. According to the Rev. Robert Patten, who joined the rebels but later turned King's Evidence: 'It is certain that they [the rebels] had a great many Friends there'.<sup>27</sup> Prominent among these was Blackett, who was thought to be sympathetic towards the rebellion. He had a large workforce in and around the town and he had been stockpiling arms in recent times. Patten wrote: 'If all that was said of this Gentleman's Conduct was true, they [the rebels] were not in the wrong to have some Dependence upon his Assistance: but whether or not he was actually engaged remains a Secret; for he managed so well as to keep out of the way'.<sup>28</sup> In late October, however, one Jacobite claimed, when questioned, that 'Some Traytors in Newcastle, and particularly an alderman there, design'd to have betrayed one of the gates of that town to the rebels'.<sup>29</sup>

There was particular concern over the behaviour of the keelmen. Liddell asked Cotesworth on 10 October 'Pray how stand your keelmen affected?'<sup>30</sup> Seventeen days later he asked in a like vein 'Do you really think the keelmen right and tight and may be depended upon?'<sup>31</sup> This was not mere 'standard establishment terror of the mob'.<sup>32</sup> The keelmen had gone on strike as recently as 1710 and clearly coal owners did not trust them. Such fears did seem to be justified when Patten led a handful of keelmen to join the rebels at Wooler on 19 October.<sup>33</sup> Apart from these rebellious keelmen, another six Newcastle plebeians also joined the rebels.<sup>34</sup>

Throughout 1715–7 there was a large degree of Jacobitism on the streets of Newcastle and not all of this was the work of the common people. Between October 1714 and April 1717, for example, 67 people, including 43 yeomen and five gentlemen, were brought before the Newcastle magistrates for Jacobite related activity. This was often for treasonable words

or for riotous assembly. These treasonable words mostly consisted of insulting references to King George.<sup>35</sup> Collectively, in February 1716, a mob 'went abt the streets of ye city crying an Ormond and high ch. forever'.<sup>36</sup> On both 29 May (the anniversary of Charles II's birthday) and on 10 June (the birthday of his nephew, the Old Pretender) there were more open celebrations of Jacobitism in the streets. According to *The Flying Post*: 'Since the defeat of our Jacobite party in delivering up this Town. . . they have behaved themselves like people animated with Despair and Disappointment'. Oak boughs, symbolic of the Stuart Restoration, were worn in peoples' hats.<sup>37</sup> General Wills found four merchants drinking and uttering seditious oaths in 1717.<sup>38</sup> In April 1718 there was 'a parcel of fellows about the street singing songs and reflecting on the government and calling out James Stewart'.<sup>39</sup> There was, therefore, a strong undercurrent of Jacobite sympathy among many in Newcastle, and among all ranks of people. Yet this was chiefly at a verbal level: words were not transformed into action.

Actual displays of Jacobitism during the period of the rebellion were uncommon (of those 67 referred to above, only three were recorded in the crucial month of October 1715). John Johnson, County Sheriff, wrote on 9 October 'most people in town being better inclined than thought of'.<sup>40</sup> Cotesworth referred to 'a great number of disaffected people in ye town which are kept under by the vigorous resolutions yt we take'.<sup>41</sup> But he also wrote, four days earlier that 'many in the town that seemed not well pleased with the government are become very zealous when they do it, no more Whig and Tory but papist and Protestant'.<sup>42</sup> Thomas Yorke wrote: 'I doubt not but their resolution to maintain ye town under ye present establishment will be a disappointment to ye rebels who might have grounds from ye former behaviour of ye magistrates yt they would deliver up ye town up to them'.<sup>43</sup> As Patten noted: 'Indeed, the magistrates shew'd a very commendable zeal in the interest of the King, and the service of the town, and no less

courage in their Application to the Defence of the place'.<sup>44</sup>

Yet if the corporation and townspeople were not wholly Jacobite, there was still the danger from those who were. Forster's rebels soon numbered 300 armed horsemen. After staying at Warkworth for a few days, they rode southwards to Morpeth and were thus within striking range of Newcastle. According to Patten, they hoped to surprise Newcastle at this stage and amused themselves by 'promising themselves great things at Newcastle'. Indeed, they 'prepared to march to Newcastle'.<sup>45</sup> However, it was here 'that they receiv'd their first Disappointment in the affair of Newcastle, which they expected should open its gates to them, but finding some Delay in it, they promised themselves to have it in a few days' and marched westwards towards Hexham, thus keeping within striking range of the town.<sup>46</sup>

Such difficulties as the rebels encountered seem to have been largely organised by two men. Johnson and Cotesworth made strenuous efforts to have the county militia raised in order to defend the town. Scarborough who, as Lord Lieutenant, should have done this, was being too slow, in their opinion, making the order on 1 October, but giving the men two weeks to muster. Johnson, as Sheriff, ordered the posse to be raised on 9 October<sup>47</sup> and on 11 October, Colonel George Liddell (Henry's brother) mustered 1200 of the county militia, both horse and Foot, on Shield Field.<sup>48</sup>

Both Cotesworth and Johnson feared Newcastle was in the utmost danger from the rebels and, as we have seen, were right to do so. Johnson told Liddell that he had to raise the posse to 'prevent their further strowling into this county' and that they were 'expecting a great many friends at their entrance' into Newcastle.<sup>49</sup> Likewise, Cotesworth wrote that 'while the sight of the town being surprised was upon them I could not be allowed any rest at all'. As he later commented: 'If they had seen us in an indolent state. . .' <sup>50</sup>

Newcastle's defenders were now given an enormous fillip, both moral and physical. Sir Charles Hotham's battalion of infantry had been ordered to march to Berwick from York

and halted at Newcastle *en route*. Johnson hoped that it might remain there 'thro' ye insinuations of Lord Scarborough', and this turned out to be the case.<sup>51</sup> The advance guard of the battalion marched into Newcastle on the evening on 9 October.<sup>52</sup> This certainly helped improve morale. As a letter of the following day quoted in *The Daily Courant* observed: 'We still continued on our watch, and were not sometimes without fear, but now we are perfectly easy, there being yesterday 200 of Hotham's regiment of Foot, and this day, 3 or 4 companies more and every day more is expected'.<sup>53</sup> Once the militia and regular forces were defending Newcastle, confidence returned. Cotesworth wrote 'We got the town of Newcastle put into a state of holding out against 2000 men if they come without a train [of artillery]'.<sup>54</sup>

General George Carpenter was appointed to command the forces in the north east of England, whose task it was to confront the rebels in the field. He departed from London on 15 October arriving in Newcastle three days later, and then marched northwards on 25 October with Hotham's Foot and Cobham's dragoons, to be followed shortly by another two regiments of dragoons (Molesworth's and Churchill's).<sup>55</sup> The arrival of these troops set the seal on Newcastle's security. It is probable that one reason behind the rebels' decision to abandon Hexham and march northwards to Kelso was because of this military threat to their existence.

The Corporation, though it did not send a loyal address to the government in this critical period, was active in its defence. On 10 October, noting that a rebellion had begun in the county, it desired the town be made defensible; the sum of £100 was directed to be paid out for such measures.<sup>56</sup> Companies of militia were formed.<sup>57</sup> Other costs had later to be reimbursed; William Heslop was given £3 for damage to his shop when used as a guard house, ferry boatmen received £10 for being unable to ply their craft during the rebellion and Thomas Armstrong lost out due to being unable to collect tolls.<sup>58</sup> Eventually, the Corporation spent £850 on matters pertaining to the rebellion.<sup>59</sup> However, it found itself unable to pay

several debts it owed due in part to 'the expense of the rebellion'.<sup>60</sup> Catholics, rich and poor, were arrested.<sup>61</sup> All gates in the city were barricaded by being walled up with lime and stone by 9 October, save Pandon gate. Cannon were mounted.<sup>62</sup> Even the suspicious Liddell was impressed. He observed on 10 October: 'The zeal of the magistracy, iff unfeigned is beyond whatever could have bin expected'.<sup>63</sup>

Although the keelmen were suspected as being Jacobite sympathisers, the reverse was in fact the case for the vast majority. Thomas Sabourne, a dissenting tailor of Newcastle, on Scarborough's orders, 'did by ye interest he personally had with ye keelmen and their ministers, procure a promise to ye Rise for ye Diffence of ye Prest govt'. This resulted in the keelmen assisting in the town's defence, while Sabourne paid their expenses; after the rebellion, his enemies attempted his financial ruin.<sup>64</sup> The keelmen, 700 strong, who were dissenters, signed a loyal association and provided men to patrol the streets at night.<sup>65</sup> Arms for the militia, though, were very much wanted. Joseph Crisap, a smith of North Shields, hired three men who, with himself 'wrought very hard both night an day for a whole week, to fit up and clean, and put the said arms into good order'.<sup>66</sup>

The principal Jacobite was thought to be Blckett. Yet he was no menace. Instead, he was the model of caution, fleeing to his uncle's house in Wallington, and then travelling to the court in order to protest his loyalty to King George. As Liddell observed: 'I was pump'd by severall to know my opinion how farr he was engaged; my answer was that gentleman was in the possession of too plentifull a fortune'.<sup>67</sup>

Newcastle was also a base for intelligence about the rebellion to be sent to London. Mr Carr, clerk of the peace, sent information to Townshend and was thanked for his 'account of the motions of the rebellion in Northumberland'.<sup>68</sup> Even before the rebellion began, Cotesworth was already acting as intelligence gatherer and was also thanked by Townshend: 'you need make no apology in showing his zeal for His Majesty'. In fact, Cotesworth was the centre of an intelligence web which spread as far as Edinburgh and Berwick.<sup>69</sup>

As said, the corporation did not send a loyal address to the court on the onset of the rebellion. This is possibly an indication of their initial lukewarm loyalty to the government as suggested by Liddell and Yorke. Yet they did see fit to do so on 1 December, sending it in January 1716. It stated their detestation of the rebellion and their concern that the town might have been surprised 'and forced to submit to the heavy yoke intended to be imposed upon the kingdom'. They also boasted of their own 'cheerful concurrence and hearty zeal' and 'grudg'd no expense to effectually secure this place' and finished by assuring the King of their loyalty.<sup>70</sup>

Townshend wrote to thank Henry Dalston, the mayor, for the loyal address but reminded him to 'continue to have a watchful eye upon all such persons as you shall judge to be disaffected'.<sup>71</sup> Another opportunity for Dalston to display the corporation's new-found zeal in public came on 5 March 1716, when the Duke of Argyll, victor of the battle of Dunblane against the rebels on 13 November 1715, arrived in Newcastle. The bells rang and Dalston and the aldermen waited on him, congratulating him on his safe arrival.<sup>72</sup>

The official day appointed nationally for the celebration of the defeat of the rebellion was 7 June. This was marked enthusiastically at Newcastle by the ringing of bells, a loyal sermon, the discharging of volleys by Hotham's men, a sumptuous entertainment and a ball for the gentlemen and ladies. Loyal healths were drunk and there were 'demonstrations of joy and thankfulness'. The day was finished by fireworks, bonfires, dancing and bells again being rung.<sup>73</sup>

In summary, therefore, Newcastle was in danger from the rebels because there were active rebels in the county and because some of its inhabitants were sympathetic to their cause. The Whigs however took the initiative in making defensive preparations. Regular soldiers arrived on 9 October and, perhaps not coincidentally, on the following day the corporation moved to the Whig way of thinking and acted accordingly. Others, seeing how the political land was lying, decided to swing behind them

or to lie low and not display their true colours. As it transpired, the rebels never even glimpsed Newcastle. But had Cotesworth, Johnson and others not been active, and had Forster been aware of this apathy and inaction, an attempt on the town might have been made, perhaps in conjunction with a coup by the Jacobites within its walls. However, they would have had to acted quickly, as regular forces arrived in Newcastle by the evening of 9 October, and since Forster had already marched away from the town on 6 October, Newcastle Jacobites could not have expected any help from him in any internal insurrection. In any case, the sixty horsemen which initially gathered at Greenrig on 6 October would hardly have made much impression in Newcastle. Instead the Newcastle Jacobites had to content themselves with verbal protest, mostly after the rebellion was over.

### THE 1745 REBELLION

Thirty years later, the Young Pretender made his attempt for the throne of his father. Arriving in Scotland at the end of July, he gathered support in the Scottish Highlands. The British forces in Scotland under Sir John Cope marched to confront the rebellion, while George II and troops from the Continent rushed home.

Concern about the growth of the rebellion was first expressed in Newcastle in late August, but did not become widespread until the following month. One of the first to voice such sentiments was one William Stoddart, writing on 27 August: 'The confusion in this place occasioned from daily reports from Scotland and propagated and improved by many disaffected people here'.<sup>74</sup> Several days later, loyal Hanoverian sentiments were expressed in public as the bells were rung to celebrate the King's return from Hanover.<sup>75</sup> Yet, initially, the Corporation did nothing about the threat; at a meeting held on 11 September, for example, no reference was made to the rebellion.<sup>76</sup> On the 18 September however, John Wesley arrived and noted: 'We found the generality of the inhabitants in the utmost consternation; news being just arrived,

that, the morning before, at two o'clock, the Pretender had entered Edinburgh'.<sup>77</sup>

When Newcastle citizens seem to have become most aware of the danger was immediately after Cope's army had been all but destroyed at Prestonpans on 21 September. According to *The London Evening Post*: 'We are here in great confusion. . . carts and carriages crowding the streets, to carry off the effects of those who think it safer to remove'.<sup>78</sup> Although Wesley spoke of defensive preparations being made by the citizenry, he also spoke of the panic, too. 'Meanwhile our poor neighbours on either hand were busy in removing their goods: and most of the best houses in our street were left without either furniture or inhabitants. Those within the walls were almost equally busy in carrying away their goods and money; and more and more of the gentry every hour rode southward as fast as they could'.<sup>79</sup> Dr John Brown, later Vicar of St. Nicholas' wrote about 'this dastard spirit of Effeminacy . . . destroyed the national spirit of defence . . . those of every rank above a constable . . . fled before the rebels . . . so general was their cowardly and effeminate spirit'.<sup>80</sup> In a more restrained fashion, John Simpson, merchant of Newcastle, described his fears to Richard Sykes of Hull thus 'We are daily expecting to hear of theirs coming this way'.<sup>81</sup>

As in 1715, Newcastle was seen as a key place to hold. Henry Vane wrote on 27 September that 'if such a rich and populous town should . . . fall into the enemy's hands, it would be of vast disservice to His Majesty's cause and encourage the disaffected to declare themselves openly'.<sup>82</sup> The Duke of Newcastle, the premier Secretary of State, was quick to point out the significance of Newcastle, too, when writing to Bishop Gibson on 28 September that 'the security of the town of Newcastle is an object of the greatest importance'.<sup>83</sup> Therefore the Dutch troops which had been stationed at Berwick were to be sent to Newcastle, marching there on 29 September.<sup>84</sup> Gibson thought that Newcastle was of such importance that the artillery from Berwick should also be placed there and all forces in the region should concentrate at Newcastle at this juncture.<sup>85</sup>

Yet there was no immediate rebel attack upon Newcastle. There had been some talk in the rebel camp of immediately following up their victory after Prestonpans and marching into England – at least to the extent of taking Berwick. However, as Murray of Broughton, secretary to the Young Pretender, pointed out, this was not a realistic option. Only 1500 men could have been gathered together and might have been destroyed by the troops in Newcastle.<sup>86</sup> Yet John Hickson, a Perth vintner, was sent to Newcastle with a message from the Pretender to 'notifie my friends and particularly those in the north and north west' that they help the rebels with both supplies of money and men'.<sup>87</sup>

The Corporation, despite its initial inaction, was swift to respond to this sudden emergency. Unlike the case thirty years earlier, the town of Newcastle had sent a loyal address to the King at the onset of the rebellion. It claimed that the present government helped protect liberty, trade, property and the Protestant religion. The address also attacked Catholicism and was full of loyal and dutiful sentiments.<sup>88</sup> Another dissimilarity with the response to the earlier rebellion was that no one is known to have cast aspersions on the Corporation's loyalty or suspected them of Jacobitism.

More than loyal words were required, however. Matthew Ridley, mayor of Newcastle at the onset of the rebellion, was resolved to defend the town. Since he had no powers to raise any militia or trained bands, he ordered the sheriff to raise the posse and then had the men enter into a voluntary association, each promising to provide one armed man to defend Newcastle. At a meeting of the householders at the town hall on 19 September, several thousand promised to do so, and eight companies of infantry were formed. This amounted to about 500 men (Major General John Huske later put the number at 300, Simpson at 600).<sup>89</sup> Yet if more arms could be provided, Ridley did not doubt that this force could be larger, since 'the body of the people being hearty and zealous for His Majesty'.<sup>90</sup> Ridley's own zeal was commented upon by Wesley: 'I reverence you for your office sake and much more for your

zeal in the execution of it. I would to God every Magistrate in the land would copy after such an example!<sup>91</sup>

Ridley had sent a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, assuring him of the town's loyalty. The Secretary of State was very pleased, replying on 23 September that 'the King . . . shewed the greatest satisfaction in the zeal which you and the other magistrates in Newcastle have shewed for His Majesty's service . . . and in the loyalty and good affections which appear on this occasion, in so wealthy and considerable a town as that of Newcastle'. More practically, he sent the King's warrant authorising the mayor to form the townsmen into troops or companies for the town's defence in case the rebels should attack. Ridley was given the authority to grant commissions to men he thought would make good officers. Arms and ammunition were also to be sent to Newcastle.<sup>92</sup>

The militia was composed of a number of companies. Each was commanded by a captain who was to have 40s per day for expenses. Each corporal was to be paid 15s per day. Presumably these men had to pay the wages of their men.<sup>93</sup> There was also a company of gentlemen volunteers who drilled and wore pink and red cockades in their hats.<sup>94</sup> These volunteer companies stood guard on the gates from 20 September, being doubled the following day.<sup>95</sup> They were also allotted stations on the walls, to which they would assemble upon the ringing of the fire bell.<sup>96</sup> Other defences included the erection of sentry boxes at intervals on the walls whilst sandbags were hung over the walls and palisades fixed near to them. Parts of the river were also to be palisaded to prevent the town being reached at low water.<sup>97</sup> The morale and loyalty of the townsmen was thought to be high but, if they were attacked, 'I am persuaded that they neither will nor can resist unless supported by a good body of regular troops'.<sup>98</sup> The value of the militia was also doubted by Henry Liddell (1708–84), a Whig MP for Morpeth, who thought that they would be 'as much service as irregular men can be'.<sup>99</sup>

Ridley and his colleagues were certainly busy in their work. He wrote to the Earl of Malton, Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding, on 25

September: 'We are doing all that the situation of the place will admit of to make it tenable having got a number of ship guns planted on our gates and in the gateways when they are built up, and have placed other cannons in stations upon the walls by the direction of the officers in His Majesty now in this place'.<sup>100</sup> One observer thought 'the town is tolerably well fortified'.<sup>101</sup>

Orders were given on 17 September for the gates to be walled up, except for Sandgate and Newgate. The building committee also gave directions for the repair of those parts of the walls which were ruinous. A clear field of fire from the walls was being created by the destruction of property adjoining the walls and the cutting down of trees and hedges within musket shot of the walls. Seamen from Sunderland were manning the cannon on the walls (said to be 200).<sup>102</sup> There was, however, a great shortage of ammunition.<sup>103</sup>

There was one identifiable weak spot. Clifford's Fort lay at the mouth of the harbour and was not thought to be defensible if the rebels attacked from the landward side (it was designed to defend against seaborne enemies). It possessed 40 guns and Ridley was concerned that, if these fell into the rebels' hands, they would be able to batter the walls of Newcastle. He therefore thought they should either be removed from there or be nailed up.<sup>104</sup> General Huske agreed, and he had the guns and ammunition removed to Newcastle for use of the defenders there.<sup>105</sup>

A mayoral proclamation on 18 October announced further precautions. Citizens living outside the walls were to deliver their ladders, arms, picks and shovels to the town's yard, behind the hospital. Guns were not to be fired, nor cannon to be approached during the hours of darkness, on pain of imprisonment. The October fair was also cancelled.<sup>106</sup>

Such defensive measures came at a cost. The farmers of the great toll suffered heavy financial losses due to the gates being blocked. On 18 December 1746 they were allowed the sum of £140. There were also a number of petitioners who claimed for redress as their property had been demolished. Provided that they removed

all the rubble belonging to these properties which was still strewn in the streets as late as September 1747, they were to be reimbursed to the sum of £300 5s in total.<sup>107</sup> The Corporation had to pay out a number of other sums. £600 was loaned to the colonel of one of the Dutch regiments who did not have any money to pay his men. Smith had had to entertain Wade and his officers, so was allowed £350 to defray his costs. George Cuthbertson, the town clerk, had been particularly active. According to Cuthbert Smith, who succeeded Ridley as mayor in October 1745, 'by means of his office [he] has had an extraordinary trouble for some months past on account of the late troubles, and has acquitted himself when doing every act in his power for the publick service'.<sup>108</sup> He received 100 guineas for his 'extraordinary trouble' and his clerks received 25 guineas.<sup>109</sup>

Ridley ceased to be mayor on 5 October. Yet he had laid solid foundations for Smith to follow. Ridley's efforts were immortalised by a statue of him being erected after his death in St. Nicholas church. The inscription read: 'he rendered essential service to his Country, averting, by his prudence and Activity, the attack Mediated against this Town by the enemies of Brunswick'.<sup>110</sup> This was hardly true since, as we have seen, the decision not to march against Newcastle had not been taken because of the town's defences, of which the rebels were quite ignorant. Yet on 27 September Henry Vane wrote of Ridley's efforts: 'I cant help telling and believing the conduct of the mayor of this town [Newcastle] who I assure you has acted ... [with] vigilance ... sparing no pains'.<sup>111</sup>

After the panic in September 1745, and since there was no immediate attack, confidence began to be restored. Simpson was convinced that the town would be able to hold out; with the assistance of Colonel Fraser's ten companies of regulars 'we hope to be able to make a stand here'.<sup>112</sup> One reason why fears dissipated was the realisation that the keelmen were not going to rise.<sup>113</sup> Loyalist celebrations may also have helped raise morale. On 11 October, the anniversary of the King's coronation, 'the Morning was ushered in with the ringing of

bells'. The militia companies drilled until noon. The British and Dutch troops in the town fired into the air on Sandhill. There were 'loud huzzas from the populace' and ship's guns in the harbour were fired. At night there were bonfires in the streets.<sup>114</sup> Huske commented that 'the great zeal of the magistrates for His majesty and the publick good is beyond what I can express, and by their prudent conduct I make no doubt but the people here will follow their good example'.<sup>115</sup>

Little did the inhabitants of Newcastle know, but their future was being decided elsewhere. The rebels held a council of war on 30 October, which had to decide by which route they were to invade England. The option preferred by the Pretender was to march on the east road to Newcastle and give battle to Field Marshal George Wade, whose army had arrived in and around Newcastle by the end of October. The reasons were as follows: Wade's men would be exhausted after their long march; morale would be poor after Cope's defeat; the rebels would not be greatly outnumbered; a march westwards would give the impression of avoiding Wade; and lastly the capture of Newcastle would make the rebels master of the north of England and cause distress in London. But in the event that option was rejected; Lord George Murray, the senior officer among the rebels, argued to the contrary, and thus, the rebels marched westwards, towards Carlisle.<sup>116</sup>

Apart from the rebels without, there were fears, as in 1715, of the enemy within Newcastle. As ever, there was some concern expressed about the keelmen, who had been as industrially militant as ever, with strikes and other action in 1740 and 1744. Apparently 'it was lately given out by the faction that now disturbs our repose, that those keelmen would join their party whenever the enemy should draw near'.<sup>117</sup> They numbered 1500 and many were Scottish; moreover, they lived just outside one of the city gates, which was thought to be one of the weakest parts of the town. Huske wrote 'they are the people much suspected'. The magistrates suggested that these men could be paid to lay up their boats, recompensing them for their lost time, to the tune of £80 per

day, in the event of the rebels approaching the town. This might 'prevent them from taking a wrong turn'. However, there was no money for such a contingency, so Huske enquired about what the government's position on this issue.<sup>118</sup> This proposal was never put to the test, but the keelmen did enter into an association for the defence of the King, being armed at the expense of one Mr Crawley and others.<sup>119</sup>

Ridley thought that 'if there be any here not well affected . . . the number is small and the persons of little consequence'.<sup>120</sup> This assessment seems to have been borne out by the evidence. There were a handful of Newcastle men who joined the Pretender, three in number; one of whom was a Catholic schoolmaster, and there was also a Newcastle woman arrested with the rebels.<sup>121</sup> Two Newcastle men were charged with unspecified seditious practices before the city's quarter sessions.<sup>122</sup> Three others, including a teacher and an innkeeper, were accused of seditious language at the assizes.<sup>123</sup> Compared however to the numbers charged in 1715–6, this represents a low level of support for Jacobitism – nine, compared to sixty seven. McLynn has argued that Newcastle Jacobitism would have been stronger had it not been for the soldiers encamped in and around the city in 1745–6. Yet it should be noted that in 1715–6 Newcastle had similarly been garrisoned, but this did not prevent outbreaks of Jacobitism and so this argument is merely speculation. We should also remember that York, too, was thought to be a hotbed of Jacobitism, yet its ungarrisoned state did not result in mass displays of Jacobitism there.<sup>124</sup>

However, there was one alleged plot, discovered in April 1746, to seize Newcastle. Apparently a number of Catholic gentlemen of Northumberland, aided by keelmen, were to have armed themselves and taken the town for the Pretender. One keelman was arrested.<sup>125</sup> Yet the evidence, based on the words of an informer, James Wilson, did not lead to any concrete discovery.<sup>126</sup>

Though local rebels were few in number, there were a number of prisoners from elsewhere who were held in Newcastle throughout 1745–46. The Pretender's emissary, Hickson,

had been arrested shortly after his arrival into Newcastle. The Duke of Newcastle informed Ridley that Hickson should be brought to London, and that two King's Messengers would be despatched to collect him from custody;<sup>127</sup> He suggested that Huske and Ridley should meet to discuss the best way of conveying such an important prisoner.<sup>128</sup> Once Smith replaced Ridley as mayor, he, too, had to deal with prisoners. There was, for example, a Frenchman and the captain of an Irish vessel, which had recently sailed from Dunkirk. Newcastle was particularly eager that Smith should question the latter about any preparations at Dunkirk for a French invasion of Britain.<sup>129</sup>

There were also another 18 prisoners in Newcastle, ten held on suspicion of treasonable practices and eight being men taken in actual rebellion.<sup>130</sup> Smith was unhappy about their presence, remarking on 4 January that 'it is with great difficulty they are settled. I hope your Grace will as soon as you conveniently can dispose of them'.<sup>131</sup> There was an escape attempt in the following month, but this was foiled and the prisoners chained to the walls.<sup>132</sup> It was not until August that most of these prisoners, whose numbers had swelled, were disposed of. Eighteen were removed to Carlisle, where rebel prisoners were being tried for high treason. Another twelve were discharged through want of evidence; one was bailed and two remained.<sup>133</sup>

It was originally envisaged that trials of the prisoners taken in rebellion would take place in Newcastle. Yet Liddell told the Duke of Newcastle that 'there is no strong place at Newcastle for keeping safely such a considerable number of prisoners' which Cumberland was about to despatch from Inverness. Instead these men were shipped to London, though the transports briefly halted in sight of the town.<sup>134</sup>

Throughout the rebellion Newcastle was the destination of a large number of troops, initially envisaged as marching northwards to attack the rebels in Scotland. Reactions to the arrival of these forces varied. The advent of the volunteer troop, the Royal Hunters from Yorkshire, on 25 October was marked by 'the Ringing of Bells and other Demonstrations of

Joy'.<sup>135</sup> There was similar rejoicing when regular troops marched into the town on 1 November. General Wentworth wrote, after entering the city on 1 November that 'the inhabitants seemed very well pleased at our arrival; the streets were very much crowded with them to see us pass by'.<sup>136</sup>

The numbers of troops in and around Newcastle varied. At the beginning of September, the few troops in Newcastle were commanded by Colonel Fraser.<sup>137</sup> Huske 'an officer of great experience and merit' was subsequently despatched to Newcastle on 24 September. He was to take command of those troops either near to or arriving at, Newcastle.<sup>138</sup> Initially these forces were to consist of ten companies of Colonel Fraser's together with forces from Berwick, La Roque's Dutch battalion and the two regiments of dragoons, Gardiner's and Hamilton's. With these he was to defend the town and to assist the magistracy in forming volunteer companies.<sup>139</sup> By 28 September, however, it was decided that the dragoons would stay in Berwick.<sup>140</sup> The arrival of such forces would be a great fillip to the morale of the townsmen, thought Ridley.<sup>141</sup> On 1 November, Simpson wrote: 'We have now a fine army incamped here which will march northwards'.<sup>142</sup>

Huske was judged to have carried out valuable work in the few weeks he was in command of the troops in Newcastle. According to Albemarle, writing on 31 October, 'Huske is very well, very much beloved in this town and I believe has been extremely useful in the King's interest in these parts'.<sup>143</sup> Richmond wrote to Newcastle that he was 'glad that my property at Newcastle is to be guarded by Huske . . . I hope nobody of a superior rank to Huske may be sent to Newcastle'.<sup>144</sup> The importance of these troops was that they provided a strong argument as to why the rebels should not march towards Newcastle.

The major military effort on the government's part against the rebels, however, was to be led by Marshal Wade. A camp was being formed at Doncaster in early October and the troops were to march to Newcastle. This was

an offensive plan; since once gathered at Newcastle, the army was to advance north to Scotland and defeat the rebels there.<sup>145</sup> Once these forces began to arrive in Newcastle in late October, Huske had to organise their quartering in and about the town in order that they might be assembled together in a few hours should the circumstances require it. Some arrived there directly from Flanders.<sup>146</sup> Wade's command was a considerable one; consisting of 11,300 infantry and 1,380 cavalry, plus artillery.<sup>147</sup>

As troops began to arrive at Newcastle in increasing numbers, the difficulties faced by the magistrates loomed the higher. Smith pointed out that some soldiers had been billeted on householders, but this did not provide sufficient accommodation. Cuthbertson had refused to billet them on several households, such as Mr Ord's house, but on 27 October was asked again. Smith wrote 'you know our request to be founded upon necessity and that what we ask is for the publick service'.<sup>148</sup>

Although Wade had been told to march against the rebels, his army stayed in Newcastle for some time. This was because he was unsure about the whereabouts and intended movements of the rebels. On 31 October he wrote that 'the intelligence from Scotland is generally precarious, uncertain and often contradictory . . . their councils are various and fluctuating'.<sup>149</sup> He was told not to let the rebels enter England if he could prevent it and as soon as he knew their route, to advance upon them.<sup>150</sup> Wade therefore posted dragoons at Wooler and other places to try and discover where the rebels were marching; Kilmarnock's order to the magistrates of Wooler, demanding billets for 5000 men suggested to Wade that the rebels were moving towards him. He therefore halted his march towards Berwick and awaited further news.<sup>151</sup>

As we have seen, the rebels in fact marched towards Carlisle, though this was not known to Wade until 15 November. When he did learn about their intentions, he called a council of war, resulting in his army marching towards Carlisle.<sup>152</sup> This proved abortive; the army only reached Hexham before turning back due to

bad weather. The men were exhausted and half starved, suffering from the effects of cold. The Newcastle townspeople treated them compassionately. Wade recorded that 'it moved the compassion of the magistrates and gentlemen of this town to admit the whole body of Foot to march into it and take shelter in the publick halls, glass house, malt houses and other empty buildings as also in many of the private houses of the town'.<sup>153</sup> Five days later, the troops marched away, in an attempt to intercept the rebels, this time leaving the artillery behind.<sup>154</sup>

The army did not manage to make contact with the rebels before they reached Derby. After the retreat from Derby, Wade's council of war, fearing for the safety of Newcastle, decided on 11 December, to march to Newcastle via Leeds and Wetherby 'in order to secure and protect that place'.<sup>155</sup> However, on arrival, they found that the townspeople's attitudes towards them had changed. Billeting troops was often difficult. When Smith was told he had to find billets for Wade's army on 19 December, he said that 'the people of the place have so great an abhorrence of the Dutch that I do not believe any private person will be prevailed on to receive any of them – an English battalion might be quartered there easily as the private houses would be willing to receive them'. He could not order men be billeted without the householders' consent or he would face prosecution.<sup>156</sup> When Wade's army arrived at Newcastle two days later therefore, he found that the 'inhabitants have absolutely refused to receive them in their private houses and the magistrates say they will not venture to billet them according to law'. Instead men were put in churches, glass houses and public halls. Wade observed 'the zeal of this part of the country for the accommodation of troops, increases or diminishes in proportion to their apprehensions of danger from the approach, or security from the retreat of the rebels'. The reason which he was given, though, was that many of the soldiers were sick and therefore might cause an epidemic in the town.<sup>157</sup> The troops had begun to march for Edinburgh by 4 January.<sup>158</sup>

Smith was involved in assisting the army in this next move. He had helped arrange the

conveyance of soldiers' baggage, which meant finding 50 horses. He was asked to do this only four or five hours before they were needed; Since warrants had to be signed before horses could be acquired, all this took rather longer than five hours.<sup>159</sup>

The presence of troops continued to be irksome even, perhaps especially, after the rebellion was over. Ridley complained about the presence of the soldiers of Granby's regiment in Newcastle in June 1746. He was concerned that the men were almost out of control and might, in conjunction with other 'disorderly people in our districts' commit crimes. He wished that more reliable troops could be brought to the town to assist the civil magistrates if needed.<sup>160</sup>

There was agreement, however, that Newcastle should be properly garrisoned,<sup>161</sup> General Wentworth was told to remain at Newcastle until the Dutch troops had been evacuated back to Holland.<sup>162</sup> The Dutch, though, remained for some time, still being at Newcastle on 25 January.<sup>163</sup> It was only at the end of February 1746 that transports were on their way to take the men home. As soon as this had been done, and the ships were on their way to Williamstadt, George II promised Wentworth the leave he so craved.<sup>164</sup> By March, Wentworth was supervising their embarkation,<sup>165</sup> though it was not until the end of May that the sick Dutch soldiers were despatched.<sup>166</sup> General Hawley meanwhile was complaining about his lack of gunners, so Wentworth had 'as many gunners and mattresses as could be spared for conducting the train' on 16 January.<sup>167</sup>

Despite their ambiguous treatment of the soldiery, the people of Newcastle do seem to have been loyal to the Hanoverian dynasty. Newcastle was the only provincial town to have three newspapers, all weekly, and these took to printing anti-Jacobite propaganda, often in the form of verses. On the King's return in 1745, *The Newcastle Courant* printed an ode beginning 'Now George returns, our Faith's defender/We fear not Old or Young Pretender'.<sup>168</sup> It also printed the first two verses of the National Anthem in an October issue and

in November, the Yorkshire Royal Hunters' ballad was printed.<sup>169</sup> More followed in November, including lines such as 'Go trusty Wade, the war important wage/ And execute the nation's virtuous Rage' and 'Tell Proud Versailles, that Force and Fraud are vain/Lest volleys of Wade's Thunder Blast ye all'.<sup>170</sup> Other local newspapers followed this example. One was entitled 'To the Highlanders'; it referred to the rebels as 'O race of vipers' and warned Cumberland 'Beware Sweet William! Princely Flower!'.<sup>171</sup>

There was also printed 'An Address to the Common People' in a February edition of 1746. It showered compliments on the industrious poor and warned them against the seductive lure of Jacobitism by reminding them of their blessings 'Could any people wish for a greater share of spiritual or temporal Felicity?'<sup>172</sup> A successful rebellion would result in their loss of these many privileges. Trade, liberty and religion would disappear and 'instead of three meals a day, the Englishman's birthright, you won't have one in a week, unless you should be lucky as to find a dead horse'.<sup>173</sup>

The following month there appeared another piece of propaganda, this time in verse form, and with a proto-feminist tinge. It was 'An Epilogue, Designed to be spoken by Mrs Woffington, in the character of a volunteer'.<sup>174</sup> It blasted cowardly men, fleeing before the rebels and advocated that women must take up arms or be forced by successful rebellion to enter nunneries.<sup>175</sup>

The only known published sermon in Newcastle in this period was one by the Rev. Thomas Turnor, of the church of St. Nicholas, preached on 18 December 1745. It was on the occasion of a public fast day and was later published at the behest of the Corporation. It called for sinners to repent on account of the fall of Carlisle and the 'harassing of our armies and oppressing our country'. Turnor called for an end to sins and for prayers for deliverance to be offered. However, he praised Cumberland in preventing, as Turnor thought, the rebels arriving in London, but reminded his congregation that a triumph could hardly be decreed before the rebels had been defeated. He called for

justice against the rebels for the damage they had caused and urged his congregation to 'go forth in the strength of the Lord'.<sup>176</sup>

There was a political club in Newcastle, which met on 28 October and discussed the rebellion. One speaker stated that the rebellion was 'a most notable and apparent injury to the publick'. An enquiry into its origin should not be made until after it had been vanquished. George II's government was stated to be just and mild. Even Catholics and non jurors enjoyed its benefits and would be wicked to rebel against the government which bestowed them.<sup>177</sup>

Reference has already been made to the loyalist celebrations in Newcastle. More were to follow. On hearing news of the recapture of Carlisle by Cumberland's forces, bells were ordered to be rung during the whole evening and 'our inhabitants shewing their entire approbation of the same, declaring that as His Royal Highness had so gloriously ended the old year, it was a happy omen of the peace and tranquillity of the new one'.<sup>178</sup>

On 28 January, Cumberland spent six hours at Newcastle on his way to Edinburgh to take charge of the army. Apparently he was 'received here with the greatest Demonstrations of Joy and Loyalty imaginable'. Windows were illuminated. His hand was kissed. He was officially received by Smith at the Guildhall. The mob decided to destroy a Catholic chapel as part of this show of loyalty.<sup>179</sup> The corporation took a dim view of this and offered a £50 reward for information about the perpetrators of this 'wanton deed'.<sup>180</sup> The news of Culloden was similarly greeted in Newcastle with great joy. Smith attested, on 21 April, to 'universal joy here . . . my brothers and myself with other friends are to demonstrate our joy on this occasion'.<sup>181</sup> According to *The Newcastle Journal*,

The transporting news of this glorious Action . . . run thro' this town like a torrent, and in a few minutes was spread to every corner in it, all business was immediately suspended, and every man hasten'd to congratulate his neighbour and his friend . . . so that the streets were quickly crowded and echoed with repeated shouts and acclamations the bells at the same

time rung their peels from all the churches and the guns incessantly thundered from the ships and around the walls.

The magistrates, gentlemen and officers drank loyal toasts and gave drinks to the soldiers so that they might do likewise. In the evening there were bonfires in the streets and buildings were lit up.<sup>182</sup>

The Merchant Adventurers' Company of Newcastle expressed their joy to Ridley and asked him to forward their loyal address to the King.<sup>183</sup> Another Newcastle company, Trinity House, gave Cumberland the freedom of their house in a gold box costing £40–50 'as a token of their high esteem for his many princely and true heroick virtues . . . in defence of the laws and liberties of Great Britain'.<sup>184</sup> Cumberland was given the freedom of the City by Smith, but when the unfortunate Hawley (who had been defeated at Falkirk) passed through Newcastle, he was 'hissed as he passed through the streets by the justly incensed populace'.<sup>185</sup> In contrast the Prince of Hesse, who commanded his German mercenaries against the rebels, was officially greeted by Smith and his colleagues in May.<sup>186</sup>

As with much of England and Scotland, Newcastle therefore seems to have been far more pro-Hanoverian in 1745–6 than it had been thirty years earlier. Perhaps the Hanoverian dynasty seemed less foreign and less threatening, and the Stuarts more remote, with the passage of time. The Corporation, the press, the people and the clergy all displayed their aversion towards the rebellion. The stand made by Ridley in September probably encouraged waverers and boosted loyalist morale, both in Newcastle and London. As in 1715, the physical defences were strengthened and the militia called out. No one appears to have doubted their loyalty, which had not been the case in 1715. The number of Newcastle Jacobites was far smaller, too. Yet the townsmen also acted out of self interest; initially cheering the arrival of the soldiers as protectors, but later acting less charitably when it came to the provision of accommodation. Newcastle had been potentially on the front line of the rebellion against the main rebel army and the arrival of Wade's

army at the town was important in influencing the rebels to march in another direction. This reduced the practical value of all the trouble the Corporation and others had taken in their preparations for defence. Yet this is to be wise after the event, for until mid-November, the rebels' itinerary was unknown.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> J. Brand, *The History and Antiquities of Northumberland*, Newcastle (1798), 510–11; S. Middlebrook, *Newcastle upon Tyne, its Growth and Achievement*, Newcastle (1950), 94–8.

<sup>2</sup> L. Gooch, *The Desperate Faction? The Jacobites of North East England, 1688–1745*, Hull (1995).

<sup>3</sup> F. J. McLynn, 'Newcastle and the Jacobite Rising of 1745', *Journal of Local Studies*, 2/1 (1982), 58–66.

<sup>4</sup> K. Wilson, *A Sense of the People*, Cambridge (1995), 319–20.

<sup>5</sup> Gooch, 44–5, 69–71.

<sup>6</sup> Gooch, 51–68.

<sup>7</sup> Wilson, 333–4.

<sup>8</sup> Gooch, 161–3.

<sup>9</sup> McLynn, 66.

<sup>10</sup> Daniel Defoe, *A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain*, ed. P.N. Furbank, W.R. Owens and A.J. Coulson, Yale (1991), 281–2.

<sup>11</sup> Public Record Office, State Papers, SP44/118, 334.

<sup>12</sup> W. Speck, *Stability and Strife, England, 1714–1760*, London (1977), 169–78.

<sup>13</sup> *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Stuart Papers*, I, (1902), 521–7.

<sup>14</sup> *HMC Stuart I*, 534–5.

<sup>15</sup> PRO, SP44/79a, 29.

<sup>16</sup> J. Ellis, ed., *Letters of Liddell-Cotesworth* [Surtees Society, 197] Durham (1985), 179.

<sup>17</sup> R. Patten, *History of the Rebellion*, London (1717), 26–8.

<sup>18</sup> Hertfordshire Record Office, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell, 9 Oct. 1715.

<sup>19</sup> E. Hughes, ed., 'Some Clavering correspondence', *AA*<sup>4</sup>, 34 (1956), 21.

<sup>20</sup> Hughes, 'Some Clavering correspondence', 21.

<sup>21</sup> R. Sedgwick, *History of Parliament: The Commons, 1714–1754*, I, London (1970), 289.

<sup>22</sup> Ellis, 159.

<sup>23</sup> Ellis, 183, 187.

<sup>24</sup> PRO, SP44/118, 334.

<sup>25</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Cotesworth-Liddell, 11 Oct. 1715.

- <sup>26</sup> Durham University Library Archives and Special Collections, Yorke-Clavering, 13 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>27</sup> Patten, 32.
- <sup>28</sup> Patten, 32–3.
- <sup>29</sup> *The Flying Post*, 3713, 20–2 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>30</sup> Ellis, 183.
- <sup>31</sup> Ellis, 192.
- <sup>32</sup> M. Pittock, *Jacobitism*, Aberdeen (1998), 43.
- <sup>33</sup> Patten, 38.
- <sup>34</sup> Gooch, 187.
- <sup>35</sup> TWAS, QS/NC/1/3.
- <sup>36</sup> Northumberland Record Office, ZAL39/1/1.
- <sup>37</sup> *The Flying Post*, 3815, 14–16 June 1716.
- <sup>38</sup> PRO, SP35/8, f. 249r.
- <sup>39</sup> E. Hughes, *North Country Life in Eighteenth Century Newcastle, 1700–1750*, London (1952), 22.
- <sup>40</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell 9 Oct. 1715
- <sup>41</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Cotesworth-Liddell, 11 Oct. 1715
- <sup>42</sup> NRO, ZCE 10/2.
- <sup>43</sup> DULASC, Yorke to Clavering, 13 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>44</sup> Patten, 34.
- <sup>45</sup> Patten, 30–1.
- <sup>46</sup> Patten, 32.
- <sup>47</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell, 9 Oct. 1715, 15 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>48</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Cotesworth-Liddell, 11 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>49</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell, 9 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>50</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Cotesworth-Liddell, 11 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>51</sup> PRO, WO5/20, 163; HRO, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell, 9 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>52</sup> *The Daily Courant*, 4359, 13 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>53</sup> *The Daily Courant*, 4361, 15 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>54</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Cotesworth-Liddell, 11 Oct. 1715.
- <sup>55</sup> Patten, 36; *The British Mercury*, 540, 26 Oct.–1 Nov. 1715.
- <sup>56</sup> TWAS, 589/12, 356.
- <sup>57</sup> TWAS, 589/12, 361.
- <sup>58</sup> TWAS, 589/12, 364–70.
- <sup>59</sup> Brand, 511n.
- <sup>60</sup> TWAS, 589/6, 267.
- <sup>61</sup> *The Daily Courant*, 4359, 13 Oct. 1715
- <sup>62</sup> *The Evening Post*, 955, 11–13 Oct. 1715; HRO, D/EP F195, Johnson-Liddell, 9 Oct. 1715; Patten, 36.
- <sup>63</sup> Ellis, 183.
- <sup>64</sup> HRO, D/EP F195, Liddell-Cowper, 19 Sept. 1716.
- <sup>65</sup> *The Daily Courant*, 4361, 15 Oct. 1715; Patten, 35–6.
- <sup>66</sup> PRO, SP35/5, f. 179r.
- <sup>67</sup> S. Margerison, ed., *Memorandum Book of Sir Walter Calverley, Bart.*, [SS, 77] Durham (1886), 141; Ellis, 212.
- <sup>68</sup> PRO, SP44/118, 340.
- <sup>69</sup> PRO, SP44/118, 67; Ellis, 179–82; W.K. Dickson, ed., 'Warrender Letters of 1715', *Scottish Historical Society*<sup>3</sup>, 25 (1935), 98–9.
- <sup>70</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 704, 28–30 Jan. 1716.
- <sup>71</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 709, 8–11 Feb. 1716.
- <sup>72</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 719, 3–5 March 1716.
- <sup>73</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 1075, 23–6 June 1715.
- <sup>74</sup> PRO, SP36/67, f. 106r.
- <sup>75</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2698, 31 August–7 September 1745.
- <sup>76</sup> TWAS, 1589/14, 39.
- <sup>77</sup> F.W. MacDonald, ed., *John Wesley's Journal*, I, London (1906), p. 523.
- <sup>78</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2791, 26 Sept. 1745.
- <sup>79</sup> MacDonald, 524.
- <sup>80</sup> J. Brown, *An Estimation of the Manners and Principles of the Times*, London (1757), 91.
- <sup>81</sup> Hull University Library Special Collections, DDSY (3)1/2.
- <sup>82</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 146v.
- <sup>83</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 210r.
- <sup>84</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 255r.
- <sup>85</sup> PRO, SP36/68, f. 269r.
- <sup>86</sup> R.F. Bell, ed., 'Memorials of Murray of Broughton', *Scottish Historical Society*<sup>1</sup>, 27 (1897), 211–3.
- <sup>87</sup> PRO, SP44/133, 159.
- <sup>88</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2701, 21–8 Sept. 1745.
- <sup>89</sup> PRO, SP36/68, ff. 186r–188v, 70, f. 111r; Hull, DDSY(3)1/2.
- <sup>90</sup> PRO, SP36/68, ff. 186r–8v.
- <sup>91</sup> MacDonald, 523–4.
- <sup>92</sup> SP36/68, ff. 294r–5v.
- <sup>93</sup> TWAS, 589/14, 45–6.
- <sup>94</sup> *The Newcastle Courant* 2703, 5–12 October 1745.
- <sup>95</sup> MacDonald, 523; PRO, SP36/70, f. 111r.
- <sup>96</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2796, 5–8 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>97</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2800, 15–8 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>98</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 146r.
- <sup>99</sup> NRO, ZAN/M12/C39/29.
- <sup>100</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 75v.
- <sup>101</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 146v.
- <sup>102</sup> TWAS, 589/14, 40, PRO, SP36/70, f. 111r.
- <sup>103</sup> PRO, SP36/70, f. 111r.
- <sup>104</sup> PRO, SP36/68, f. 187r.
- <sup>105</sup> PRO, SP36/70, f. 110r.
- <sup>106</sup> Sheffield Archives, WWM1/314–15.
- <sup>107</sup> TWAS, 589/12, 71, 86–7.
- <sup>108</sup> PRO, SP36/85, f. 250r.
- <sup>109</sup> TWAS, 589/14, 49, 50, 61.

- <sup>110</sup> E. Mackenzie, *History of Newcastle upon Tyne*, Newcastle (1827), 259.
- <sup>111</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 145r.
- <sup>112</sup> Hull, DDSY (3) 1/2.
- <sup>113</sup> *The London Evening Post* 3397, 28 Sept. 1745.
- <sup>114</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 3414, 17 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>115</sup> PRO, SP36/70, f. 110r.
- <sup>116</sup> Murray, 231–2.
- <sup>117</sup> *The London Evening Post* 2802, 19–22 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>118</sup> PRO, SP36/70, ff. 111v–111r.
- <sup>119</sup> The London Evening Post 2802, 19–22 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>120</sup> PRO, SP36/68, f. 188v.
- <sup>121</sup> PRO, SP36/79, ff. 35r–38r, 84, ff. 11r, 86, f. 15r, 91, f. 55r.
- <sup>122</sup> TWAS, QS/NC/1/7.
- <sup>123</sup> PRO, ASS144/62, 45/23/2; *The General Advertiser*, 3682, 14 Aug. 1746.
- <sup>124</sup> McLynn, 66; J. D. Oates, ‘The Yorkshire Jacobites’, *Yorkshire Archaeological Journal*, 74 (2002), 205–17.
- <sup>125</sup> PRO, SP44/133, 128–9.
- <sup>126</sup> PRO, SP36/85, f. 37r.
- <sup>127</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 281r.
- <sup>128</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 283r.
- <sup>129</sup> PRO, SP36/71, ff. 283r–4v.
- <sup>130</sup> PRO, SP36/80, f. 132r.
- <sup>131</sup> PRO, SP36/80, f. 132r.
- <sup>132</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2837, 25–7 Feb. 1746.
- <sup>133</sup> PRO, SP36/86, f. 147r.
- <sup>134</sup> PRO, SP36/85, ff. 7r–8v; SP44/134, 155–7.
- <sup>135</sup> *The General Advertiser*, 3444, 31 Oct. 1745.
- <sup>136</sup> *HMC Var. Coll.* VIII, 116.
- <sup>137</sup> *The London Evening Post* 2786, 14 Sept. 1745.
- <sup>138</sup> PRO, SP36/68, f. 297v.
- <sup>139</sup> PRO, SP36/69, ff. 25r–6v.
- <sup>140</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 206r.
- <sup>141</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 75v.
- <sup>142</sup> Hull, DDSY (3) 1/17.
- <sup>143</sup> PRO, SP36/72, f. 380v.
- <sup>144</sup> T.J. McCann, ed., ‘Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle, 1724–1750’, *Sussex Record Society*, 73 (1982), 184.
- <sup>145</sup> PRO, SP36/69, f. 37r.
- <sup>146</sup> PRO, SP36/71, ff. 118v, 123v.
- <sup>147</sup> PRO, SP36/70, f. 215r.
- <sup>148</sup> NRO, F2/38, 27/10.
- <sup>149</sup> PRO, SP36/72, f. 382r.
- <sup>150</sup> PRO, SP36/73, ff. 134r, 190r.
- <sup>151</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f. 85r.
- <sup>152</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f. 49r.
- <sup>153</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f. 207r.
- <sup>154</sup> PRO, SP36/75, f. 97v.
- <sup>155</sup> PRO, SP36/76, f. 335r.
- <sup>156</sup> PRO, SP36/77, f. 389r.
- <sup>157</sup> PRO, SP36/77, f. 390r.
- <sup>158</sup> PRO, SP36/80, f. 116r.
- <sup>159</sup> PRO SP36/80, f. 393r.
- <sup>160</sup> PRO, SP36/84, f. 168r.
- <sup>161</sup> PRO, SP45/5, 178.
- <sup>162</sup> PRO, SP36/80, f. 98r.
- <sup>163</sup> PRO, SP36/80, f. 427r.
- <sup>164</sup> PRO, SP36/82, ff. 82r–3v.
- <sup>165</sup> PRO, SP36/82, f. 35r.
- <sup>166</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2899, 3–5 June 1746.
- <sup>167</sup> PRO SP36/80, f. 302r.
- <sup>168</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2697, 24 Aug.–1 Sept. 1745.
- <sup>169</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2708, 9–16 Nov.; 2706, 26 Oct.–2 Nov. 1745.
- <sup>170</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2707, 2–9 Nov. 1745.
- <sup>171</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette* 85, 29 Jan. 1746.
- <sup>172</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2721, 8–15 Feb. 1746.
- <sup>173</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2721, 8–15 Feb. 1746.
- <sup>174</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2725, 8–15 March 1746.
- <sup>175</sup> *The Newcastle Courant*, 2725, 8–15 March 1746.
- <sup>176</sup> T. Turnor, *Sermon at St. Nicholas’ Church, Newcastle upon Tyne on 18 December, 1745 on the occasion of the Publick Fast Day*, Newcastle (1746), 8–9, 16–19.
- <sup>177</sup> *The Newcastle Gentleman’s Magazine*, Newcastle, (1747), 33–6.
- <sup>178</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette*, 81, 1 Jan. 1746.
- <sup>179</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette*, 85, 29 Jan. 1746, *The London Evening Post*, 2845, 30 Jan.–1 Feb. 1746.
- <sup>180</sup> Mackenzie, 55.
- <sup>181</sup> PRO, SP36/83, f. 146v.
- <sup>182</sup> *The Newcastle Journal*, 368, 26 April 1746.
- <sup>183</sup> PRO, SP36/83, f. 387r.
- <sup>184</sup> TWAS, Gu /TH/6/2.
- <sup>185</sup> *The London Evening Post*, 2926, 5–7 August 1746.
- <sup>186</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette*, 102, 28 May 1746.