

## IX

## Carlisle, the '45 and the March to Hexham

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## SUMMARY

*In November 1745, Field Marshal Wade's army advanced westwards from Newcastle to fight the Jacobite rebels thought to be laying siege to Carlisle. It was a disaster and the army only reached as far as Hexham before turning back. This article explores the military situation before the march, why it was undertaken, the disastrous march itself, and the reasons for returning to Newcastle.*

At the end of October 1745, the Jacobite rebels, having remained in Scotland for over a month after routing Sir John Cope's forces at Prestonpans on 21 September, discussed their next course of action. The council of war of Charles Stuart, the Young Pretender, having narrowly voted in favour of an invasion of England in order to regain the throne for the exiled Stuarts, had to decide which invasion route to take. Charles thought that marching on the economically significant city of Newcastle, where Field Marshal George Wade's army was stationed, was the best step in order to bring about a military decision. Wade, however, was an elderly and ill veteran, aged 72 in 1745, and was not best suited for such an energetic campaign. One of Charles' lieutenant generals, Lord George Murray, thought that to take Carlisle might be a better policy and the council agreed with him.<sup>1</sup> In order to confuse their opponents in England, three columns left Edinburgh by different routes, uniting at Carlisle on 9 November and proceeding to besiege the town and castle which were held for the government.<sup>2</sup>

Carlisle was but weakly defended by a garrison of two companies of invalids, the county militia and volunteers drawn from the townsmen.<sup>3</sup> On 9 November, Dr John Waugh, Chancellor of Carlisle, reported that a messenger had been despatched towards Wade, asking for assistance.<sup>4</sup> This was an express, sent 'to acquaint him with the rebels' approach to Carlisle'.<sup>5</sup> Yet Wade replied unhelpfully. On 10 November, the same day that he had received the plea for help, he observed that he did not think the rebels would try and take Carlisle, but that they would bypass it. He concluded 'I wish you all imaginable success'. His reply reached Carlisle three days later. As might be imagined, when the militia officers in Carlisle saw the letter, they were disheartened.<sup>6</sup> The postmaster of Penrith gave an accurate diagnosis of the scenario when he reported on 14 November, 'I am afraid Carlisle will not hold out a great while, as there are such crowds of the rebels ... and especially as the city expects no relief from Marshall Wade'.<sup>7</sup>

Although Carlisle was in a vulnerable state, the same could not be said for the whole of the kingdom. Regular troops had been recalled from the Continent throughout September and one of the two major formations of them gathered around Newcastle. It was certainly a formidable array, at least on paper, numbering ten battalions of British infantry and, under the command of Count Maurice of Nassau, a Dutchman, eight battalions of Dutch and Swiss. There were also three regiments of cavalry, plus artillery to the tune of 24 light guns and 10 cohorn mortars. The total number of men was about 8,000, with 400 in each battalion and 800 horsemen.<sup>8</sup>

## WADE'S DILEMMA

Wade's orders were apparently simple. The Duke of Newcastle, the leading Secretary of State, told him on 7 November 'you will equally take care not to let the rebels escape you and get into England, if you can prevent it'.<sup>9</sup> Two days later came the instruction 'as soon as you shall know which route the Rebels shall have taken you will make the best Disposition to come up with them'.<sup>10</sup> Eventually, on 15 November, in light of the uncertain and ever changing situation, Newcastle told Wade to act as he thought fit.<sup>11</sup>

Nowhere outside Carlisle was any importance attached to the town itself; Wade's orders never refer to it being a town to be protected. It is important to recall the strategic importance of the overall campaign. Despite the opinions of a legion of essentially parochial historians writing about Carlisle, the town itself was of minor importance; it was neither rich nor populous; and its strategic value was more a relic of centuries past.<sup>12</sup> Wade's main task was to find and defeat the rebels; Carlisle, was, from the perspective of both himself and the government, of minimal consequence, except perhaps psychologically.

Wade's problem was that he did not know where his enemy was, nor its intentions. On the 5th, he was aware that three columns had left Edinburgh, one moving towards Carlisle and another, possibly, towards Newcastle.<sup>13</sup> On the 7th, Wade heard that all the rebels were probably marching on Carlisle. A council of war held by Wade and his senior officers discussed whether action should be taken, but decided to wait for further information and so settled down to inaction. The reason why they needed to be certain about the rebels' whereabouts was that the state of the roads and supply conditions were so poor; in consequence, marching should not be undertaken unless there was certain intelligence of the rebels' actions. As Wade remarked 'We must continue here until we know with more certainty what their designs are'.<sup>14</sup>

As has been noted, he was disinclined to come to the aid of Carlisle on 10 November.

This was for good reasons. Two days later he had been told by the postmaster of Penrith that the rebels were in the vicinity of Carlisle, but also that they had marched past the town, being expected at Appleby.<sup>15</sup> The latter piece of intelligence seems to have been uppermost in his mind. Instead of considering Carlisle, the council of war discussed whether the army should march south, turning westwards through Yorkshire by a 'practicable' road and where supplies might be found, in order to confront the rebels as they marched southwards through Lancashire. Yet there was concern that such a march would leave the vital city of Newcastle at risk from the rebels. Once again, concerns about supplies and the uncertainty over the rebels' movements helped Wade and his colleagues conclude that a waiting game was the best policy.<sup>16</sup>

If Wade's intelligence was variable, so was that of the rebels. Ironically, the rebels believed that Wade's troops were approaching them. Just as they began to besiege Carlisle, there came 'intelligence that G[enera]ll Wade was marching, or ready to march, from Newcastle'.<sup>17</sup> This supposition could have been because they imagined a message had been sent by the city to Wade and that the latter was responding or that Wade had learnt of the rebels' presence by other means and was marching towards them. Accordingly, they gathered at Brampton, several miles to the east of Carlisle, which was thought to be the most suitable battleground for their style of fighting. Apparently the men were eager to fight – as with their opponents, the desire to seek a decisive battle was uppermost in their minds. However, after two days' stay there, it was realised that Wade was not approaching, and so they resumed the siege of Carlisle, which surrendered on 15 November.<sup>18</sup>

Those not privy to the discussions at Newcastle wondered why Wade had been inactive. A young Jacobite officer, the Chevalier de Johnstone, could not understand why Wade had not arrived at Brampton. He reasoned that Wade had double his opponents' troops and was himself 'the best general officer in the service of England'. He thought that he feared

defeat or that disease might be brought on by the winter campaign, or that his orders were not to leave Newcastle lest (rather fantastically) the colliers there rose in revolt.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Hardwicke, wrote to the Duke of Newcastle on 17 November, after hearing of the fall of Carlisle: 'It is surprising that we hear nothing from Marshal Wade. Should not an express be sent to him to know what measures he intends to take and perhaps something may be suggested to him'.<sup>20</sup> As we have seen, there was some truth in Johnstone's theories.

#### THE DECISION TO MARCH IS TAKEN

In fact it was only when Wade heard that the rebels had returned from Brampton to besiege Carlisle, that he decided to act.<sup>21</sup> This was on 15 November, and a council of war was held in order to decide whether to march towards the rebels.<sup>22</sup> A colleague, General Wentworth, rightly noted 'Our affairs are now come very near to a crisis'.<sup>23</sup> Wade's assumption was, presumably, that the defenders of Carlisle would be able to hold out long enough for him to reach them, which is indicative of either his optimism or his ignorance as to the state of those defenders. Perhaps he was recalling the instance of Edinburgh. That city had fallen to the rebels without much struggle, it was true, but the castle had held out, and presumably it was the latter on which he was relying. In any case, he may, like his colleagues throughout the campaign, have consistently underestimated the capability of the rebels, preferring to view them as mere rabble.

Wade acted then – five days after he knew that Carlisle was being threatened by the rebels. This was probably because it was only then that he knew that the rebels were willing to remain geographically immobile and so would be in a fixed location for a period of time. Wade probably also reasoned that the defenders of Carlisle would be able to keep the rebels in play for a few days, giving him enough time to reach them. The dangers of marching without clear knowledge of the rebels'

whereabouts were immense, and should not be attempted unless his enemies' location was clear. Possibly he should have made more effort to garner intelligence. There were dragoons posted at Wooler and Whittingham.<sup>24</sup> The volunteer cavalry from Yorkshire, known as the Royal Hunters, were reported in *The Daily Post* on 12 November, to have been employed to watch the movements of the rebels, but it was not stated where they were scouting.<sup>25</sup> The same newspaper stated that on 12 November, the army was in readiness to march wherever it was ordered.<sup>26</sup>

The only other option available to Wade, apart from remaining immobile at Newcastle, would have been to march southwards and then across Yorkshire to intercept the rebels in Lancashire. This, in hindsight, would have been the best policy. Yet it would have been a remarkably daring move as it potentially lay Newcastle open to the enemy, should he have marched eastwards. Wade was not bold, and nor were his associates.

We now arrive at Wade's single biggest difficulty – the weather. Winter campaigns are notoriously beset with difficulties if the weather is poor. The winter in England in 1745 seems to have been exceptionally bad and both contemporaries and historians have remarked upon it. Arthur Jessop (1683–1751), a Yorkshire apothecary, observed, on 15 November, 'Frost & snow last night. There is a snow this morning'. Two days later he noted 'Sharp frost extremely cold wind great Storms of snow and a good deal of snow fallen. ... Sharp frost, snow & sleet this morning. A great Snow'. There was rain and snow on the following day, too.<sup>27</sup> James Clegg (1679–1755), a Dissenting minister and apothecary of Derbyshire, reported likewise. On 15 November he wrote 'we had hard frost and a bad way' and two days later there was 'cold a keen frost and showers of snow'. The next day's weather was also poor.<sup>28</sup> Duffy points out that a cold and strong east wind, together with snow, served to block the Tyne gap through which Wade would need to cross; some drifts were twelve feet deep.<sup>29</sup>

To turn to specifics: Andrew Henderson, a schoolmaster and contemporary Scottish

historian, thought that Wade's delay was due to 'the Rigour of the Season, their late forced marches, and a kind of Flux among the Troops'.<sup>30</sup> According to Lieutenant Robinson, one of Wade's ADCs, 'We have had every variety of bad weather'.<sup>31</sup>

Then there were other difficulties. Although Wentworth considered that once they reached Hexham 'I believe we shall find no difficulty in subsisting conveniently', he was concerned about the question of supply on the route from there to Carlisle. This was because 'the country between that place and Carlisle is quite ruined'.<sup>32</sup> The horses, he thought would suffer from the lack of forage and straw. As for the men, things were a little better, 'bread we shall carry with us, & I hope, black cattle, but difficultys are to be expected'.<sup>33</sup> Wade thought that the civilian suppliers might not be very efficient, writing, 'I hope we shall be able to take with us 8 or 10 days' provisions, if the county don't disappoint us of our carriages, which they have often done'.<sup>34</sup> In the county's defence, it is only fair to add that the Northumberland JPs had advertised in the Newcastle press for transport to be supplied to the army.<sup>35</sup> However, we do not know for sure how far they met Wade's expectations.

Unfortunately, the condition of the troops and the weather was unpromising. Wade wrote 'in this severe season of the year, the numbers of our sick increase daily', and 600–700 men were deemed unfit to leave Newcastle.<sup>36</sup> Wentworth noted that the ground was covered with snow and that there was a high frost, which would mean 'but cold lodging'. Apparently General Tyrawley suggested to Wade that an extra allowance of beef and brandy would hearten the men, but this suggestion was turned down.<sup>37</sup> Tyrawley said that the men had had to lie on wet straw to the west of Newcastle in the most miserable of conditions and so many became ill.<sup>38</sup>

The way towards Carlisle was governed by the geography of Northumberland. The route to Hexham lay along the Tyne valley and was on relatively low ground – all under 200 feet. Both the north and south sides of the valley were moorland, rising to 600 feet – poor

terrain for marching soldiers unused to such. The route was not straight either, because it wound around the valley.<sup>39</sup> It was about 22 miles from Newcastle to Hexham and about 60 to Carlisle; in ordinary conditions a regular army should have been able to march there in six days.

Wentworth was cautiously optimistic. Writing on the 15th, he estimated that the march to Hexham should take two days.<sup>40</sup> Unaware of the circumstances, the Duke of Newcastle was even more hopeful. He wrote to Wade on 19 November 'His Majesty was extremely glad to find; that you had taken that Resolution, and concludes that you will be arrived at Carlisle, and come up with the rebels before, or very soon after, you shall have received this letter'.<sup>41</sup>

#### THE MARCH TO HEXHAM

Wade's forces left Newcastle at 10 a.m. on Saturday 16 November. They would, apparently have set off earlier had it not been for the fact that the Swiss troops in the vanguard refused to move until then.<sup>42</sup> They were to march first to Hexham, via Ovington, which was about mid point between the two places. Ovington was reached at 8pm.<sup>43</sup> It was reported that the men's morale was high, that the army 'advances with great alacrity, Danger serving only to enhance the Prize of serving their King and Country'. Major Generals Howard and Oglethorpe, and brigadiers Cholmondeley and Mordaunt marched at the head of the infantry, presumably to keep up the men's spirits.<sup>44</sup> There was concern that the rear column might disintegrate due to the effects of excessive fatigue, and so Oglethorpe and Major General Huske employed countrymen with carts and lights to bring up the stragglers, a task they were engaged in until nine o'clock on the following day.<sup>45</sup>

The march was made worse than it otherwise would have been for several reasons. Firstly, there was 'the great severity of the weather'.<sup>46</sup> On the eve of the march, an officer wrote 'It is excessive cold, our canvas

habitations badly guard us from the inclemencies of the weather'.<sup>47</sup> Murray refers to 'the fall of Snow so great'.<sup>48</sup> The Earl of Malton observed on 18 November, 'as it is terrible snowy weather I think it impracticable the Marshal should get up in the time proposed'.<sup>49</sup> The best account came from a man who was there. Wentworth wrote on 19 November, 'We marched from Newcastle to this place [Hexham] in 2 days, in the worst weather I have ever felt, excessively cold, and the second day accompanied with violent storms of snow and hail'.<sup>50</sup>

The next problem was the dire state of the roads. A historian of topography, made the following general observation of the roads in the county: 'By the early eighteenth century the Northumberland road system was so bad that there was probably less wheeled traffic than at any time since the thirteenth century'.<sup>51</sup> It would have been of no comfort to Wade and his men to have known that in 1749 a new road survey was to be carried out, nor to learn that by 1753 a good road had been constructed from Newcastle to Carlisle, partly because of Wade's experience in 1745.<sup>52</sup> In 1745, the roads were in poor condition. They were certainly not turnpiked and it is probable that little work was ever carried out upon them. Regrettably neither those two well known travel writers, Celia Fiennes nor Daniel Defoe made any comment upon them. One contemporary declared Wade's delays were due to 'the badness of the roads'.<sup>53</sup> According to one newspaper, 'the roads being impassable'.<sup>54</sup> The falls of snow had made the roads, such as they were, almost impassable.

There were also difficulties caused by the lack of supplies and poor accommodation; these were exacerbated by the terrible weather conditions. The ground was so hard that the men could not pitch their tents. Horses suffered as Wentworth had predicted by the lack of straw and forage. Yet the morale of the common soldier was thought to be high, Wentworth reporting 'notwithstanding, our men went thro' it with surprising chearfulness'.<sup>55</sup> Robinson thought similarly, that they 'behaved

with the greatest patience'.<sup>56</sup> Herdman, Wade's secretary, reported,

There is no describing the misery of either. The first [the troops] are pinched with cold, no time to dress victuals, no money to afford themselves comfortable drink to support and cheer up their spirits, but fatigued and with an empty belly except what a bitt of bread can do, have little straw to rest upon and a thin canvas to screen them from the hard weather, the others [horses] . . . melt away like snow in the sun on their standing on picket and laying on wet ground.<sup>57</sup>

Cholmondeley reported that on neither day could the men find food, and that some froze to death. He gave six pences to the men, but knew that 'this is some relief, although but a mite considering our numbers'. He was uncertain as to whose fault this was 'I shall make no observations nor pretend to give reasons how this happens'.<sup>58</sup> Robinson claimed, too, that the men lacked straw, fire and meat, due to the 'bad conduct of our commissary'.<sup>59</sup> The fault was not Wade's, according to Herdman, who in any case, was doing all he could to keep the men supplied. Rather, he lay the blame on the fact that in such unconventional winter campaigning, the price of necessities rose and the soldiers' pay (six pence a day for a private) was insufficient to buy food and drink over and above that with which he was supplied. A measure of wine or a pint of beer cost two pence and even bad bread was dearer than good bread which was sold in London. Beef and mutton cost two pence, too.<sup>60</sup> He compared the lot of the soldier in the field with 'those useless men to whom they allow twelve pence a day to do nothing and upon occasion would fly before the rebels'.<sup>61</sup> This was a derisory reference to the volunteer troops raised in the counties during the rebellion.

Assistance was garnered from the civilians at Hexham. Petty constables there procured horses, carriages and straw in order to help with transportation. Coal, candles and straw were provided for light and warmth. For food, a butcher was hired to kill sheep and a mason made an oven in order that food might be cooked.<sup>62</sup>

### HEXHAM IS REACHED

The vanguard of the army arrived at Hexham at 4 pm on the 17th November; the rearguard did not do so until midnight. By this stage, the 'Army was almost spent with fatigue'.<sup>63</sup> Whilst at Hexham, on the morning of the 19 November, news arrived that Carlisle had fallen. Wade thought that this was 'very Scandalous' and 'shameful', being convinced that they could have held out a few days longer in order for him to relieve them. He was clearly unaware of the state of morale among the vastly outnumbered civilian defenders there. Clearly he had counted on a more sustained defence. It was also learnt that the rebels were marching southwards, towards Penrith, for there was no reason for them to remain around Carlisle any longer, except to leave a small garrison.<sup>64</sup>

There was also, allegedly, dissension among Wade's officers. One Thomas Sharp of Durham reported to his son on 22 November that 'M[arshal]. Wade w[oul]d have march'd towards Carlisle. But Nassau objected that his men were almost starv'd with hunger & cold & absolutely refus'd to go any further'.<sup>65</sup> Robinson reported, in a similar vein, after complimenting the stoicism of the English soldiers, 'I wish I could say so much for our associates, the Dutch. The dogs not only grumble, but plunder'.<sup>66</sup> That faults were not all on one side, is indicated by a comment of Robert Trevor, British Plenipotentiary at the Hague, 'The States [General] received at the same time from Count Maurice the Result of the Council of War held near Hexham; from whence many melancholy, and some disadvantageous Reflections are drawn'.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, there was, allegedly, the fear that the rebels might try and ambush the army as it marched westwards.<sup>68</sup>

To carry on towards Carlisle was now pointless. Furthermore, it would have reduced numbers by sickness even more.<sup>69</sup> Although it could have been retaken, Wade's principal orders were to locate the rebels and to defeat them in battle; Carlisle was only important in that that was where Wade's enemies were; and after their departure its strategic importance as a means of pinning down the rebels vanished.

A further advance would have been impracticable for geographical and meteorological reasons.<sup>70</sup> Hexham was only about a third of the distance from Newcastle to Carlisle; to have continued, assuming it would have been at the same speed as hitherto, might have taken another four days at least, and probably more due to the weather and by that time, the rebels might be as far south as Lancashire. Furthermore, the terrain westwards from Hexham worsened, as the Tyne valley ended and gradients became steeper.<sup>71</sup>

Even when the force was at Hexham, the weather did not let up. Wentworth noted that 'since our arrival ... a very heavy snow is follow'd by a quick thaw which has occasion'd great sickness amongst officers & soldiers'.<sup>72</sup> Herdman observed that due to the bad weather and the state of the roads, horses and men had suffered 'beyond expression' and such conditions 'will destroy the best part of it in a few days more'.<sup>73</sup> Robinson claimed the 'severity of the weather [was] sufficient to have put an end to the army itself as well as the scheme it was engaged in. It is impossible to give you a detail of our distress'.<sup>74</sup>

The news that the rebels were marching southwards, towards Penrith was probably decisive.<sup>75</sup> It is likely that Wade and his colleagues believed that the best course of action was to return to their base, before marching southwards on the eastern side of the Pennines in order to come up with the rebels in the Midlands or south of England and to do battle with them there. As noted, they had concluded that a march from Newcastle through Yorkshire, via Boroughbridge would have been the best way to intercept the rebels. Because of all these reasons, it was decided, by a council of war, held on 19 November, to return to Newcastle. Wade informed London of the decision on the following day.<sup>76</sup>

### RETURN FROM HEXHAM

The troops returned to Newcastle on 22 November. Wade told the Duke of Newcastle that they were 'very much fatigued and half

starved with the cold'. The men had had to sleep on the ground in 'tempestuous weather'.<sup>77</sup> Fortunately, the magistrates and inhabitants of the city were generous, allowing the men to shelter not only in public buildings, but also in private dwellings.<sup>78</sup>

Wade's march to Hexham had achieved nothing except to increase the level of sickness among his men. It is difficult to know how many had been affected by the march, though 600–700 had been unwell before then. It is also unknown how many were ill after the march from Newcastle. According to Wade, by 11 December, the Dutch had been reduced to 2500 effectives and on 5 December, of 6701 British infantry, 1220 were ill.<sup>79</sup> He, and they, were fortunate that, at least, the residents of Newcastle provided them with rather better shelter than they had had hitherto. Some men died. The burial registers for Hexham record eight soldiers and one soldier's wife being buried there between 26 November – 1 December, a Dutch soldier was recorded as being buried at Ovingham on 27 November and in November and December, 43 soldiers were buried at All Saints, Newcastle.<sup>80</sup> These totals may not, of course, record all deaths due to campaigning in poor weather.

### CONCLUSION

Wade was in a difficult position because his enemy had both the initiative and greater mobility. Because he had to rely on conflicting and out of date intelligence, his decisions were relatively slow to be taken and to be implemented. It was only on 15 November that his council decided to march towards the enemy at Carlisle. Ironically (and unknown to Wade), that was on the same day that the place capitulated. Even before the march began, it was pointless, as the rebels were not to tarry there, as they had rather larger fish to fry. Once having made that decision, the weather, already bad, took a turn for the worse. This exacerbated the army's supply problems from the outset and by the time Hexham had been reached, the men had endured much from the

elements. To go on was an even worse possibility, as the roads were deemed impassable. But then news arrived that Carlisle had fallen and, more pertinently, the rebels were marching south. The army then returned to whence it had come, in order to meet the rebels by taking another route. The whole march to Hexham had been, with hindsight, a red herring. Round one of the campaign in England had certainly gone to the invaders.

### NOTES

#### Abbreviations:

HRO Hertfordshire Record Office  
NeC Newcastle Collection [the papers of Thomas Holles-Pelham, Duke of Newcastle, at Nottingham University Library]  
PRO Public Record Office

<sup>1</sup> R. F. Bell, ed., 'Murray of Broughton's Memorials, 1740–1747', *Scottish Historical Society*<sup>1</sup>, 27 (1898), 231–234.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 234–5, 238–9.

<sup>3</sup> *The General Evening Post*, 1894, 14–16 November 1745.

<sup>4</sup> PRO, State Papers 36/73, f.207r.

<sup>5</sup> G. C. Mounsey, *Carlisle in 1745*, Carlisle (1846), 75.

<sup>6</sup> Mounsey, 65.

<sup>7</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.360r.

<sup>8</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette*, 74, 13 November 1745; PRO, SP36/73, f. 370v, 389r.

<sup>9</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.134r.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, f.190r.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, f.366v.

<sup>12</sup> Mounsey; J. A. Wheatley, *Bonnie Prince Charlie in Cumberland*, Carlisle (1903); D. J. Beattie, *Prince Charles and the Borderland*, Carlisle (1928).

<sup>13</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.85v.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, f.130r, 132v.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, f.294v, 295r.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, f.294v, 295r–296v.

<sup>17</sup> Bell, 240.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 240–242.

<sup>19</sup> B. Rawson, *The Chevalier de Johnstone: a Memoir of the '45*, London (1972) 51–2.

<sup>20</sup> P. C. Yorke, ed., *The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke*, I, Cambridge (1913), 466.

<sup>21</sup> *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 15 (1745), 604.

<sup>22</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.369r.

- <sup>23</sup> NeC 1679.
- <sup>24</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.86v.
- <sup>25</sup> *The Daily Post*, 8178, 16 November 1745.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 8179, 18 November 1745.
- <sup>27</sup> C. E. Whiting, ed., 'Two Yorkshire Diaries', *Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series*, 117 (1952), 107, 108.
- <sup>28</sup> V. S. Doe, ed., 'The Diary of James Clegg, 1708–55', II, *Derbyshire Record Society*, III (1979), 557.
- <sup>29</sup> C. Duffy, *The Forty Five*, London (2003) 384
- <sup>30</sup> A. Henderson, *The History of the Rebellion*, Edinburgh (c. 1748), 84.
- <sup>31</sup> Yorke, 467.
- <sup>32</sup> NeC 1679.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.369r.
- <sup>35</sup> *The Newcastle Journal*, 342, 26 October 1745.
- <sup>36</sup> PRO, SP36/73, f.370v.
- <sup>37</sup> NeC 1679.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 1702/2.
- <sup>39</sup> R. Newton, *The Northumberland Landscape*, London (1972), 24, 26.
- <sup>40</sup> NeC 1679.
- <sup>41</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.49r.
- <sup>42</sup> Henderson, 84.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>46</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.216r.
- <sup>47</sup> *The General Advertiser*, 5350, 19 November 1745.
- <sup>48</sup> Bell, 240.
- <sup>49</sup> Northampton Record Office, Malton to Fitzwilliam, 18 /11/45.
- <sup>50</sup> NeC 1680.
- <sup>51</sup> Newton, 223.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>53</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.216r.
- <sup>54</sup> *The Newcastle Gazette*, 75, 20 Nov. 1745.
- <sup>55</sup> NeC 1680.
- <sup>56</sup> Yorke, 467.
- <sup>57</sup> HRO, MIL3/68.
- <sup>58</sup> Cheshire Record Office, DCH/X/9A/11.
- <sup>59</sup> Yorke, 467.
- <sup>60</sup> HRO, MIL3/68.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>62</sup> R. C. Jarvis, *The Jacobite Risings of 1715 and 1745*, Carlisle (1954), 31n.
- <sup>63</sup> Henderson, 85.
- <sup>64</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.54r, 55v.
- <sup>65</sup> Gloucester Record Office, D3549/9/1/1.
- <sup>66</sup> Yorke, 467.
- <sup>67</sup> Buckinghamshire Record Office, Trevor Papers, Bundle 53, December 1745.
- <sup>68</sup> *The Daily Post*, 8182, 21 November 1745.
- <sup>69</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.55v.
- <sup>70</sup> *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 15 (1745), 605; NeC 1680.
- <sup>71</sup> Newton, 24, 26.
- <sup>72</sup> NeC 1680.
- <sup>73</sup> HRO, MIL3/68.
- <sup>74</sup> Yorke, 467.
- <sup>75</sup> *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 15 (1745), 605.
- <sup>76</sup> NeC 1681.
- <sup>77</sup> PRO, SP36/74, f.208v.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 76, f. 166r, f.336r.
- <sup>80</sup> Society of Genealogists' Library, K. Mitchell, *Hexham Registers, Burials, 1579–1753* (1989); H. R. Leighton, *Ovingham Parish Registers* (1913); Newcastle All Saints Parish Registers, 1745 (Microfilm).