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ENCLOSING *LONDINIUM:* THE ROMAN LANDWARD AND RIVERSIDE WALLS

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Introduction

Though it is easy to assume that the reason for enclosing the cities of the Roman Empire with stone walls was to provide them with defences against their enemies, this explanation is not always accepted, particularly during the more peaceful conditions of the 1st and much of the 2nd century AD. Other motives for their construction have been put forward, including monumental demonstrations of civic pride or status, even the munificence of individual emperors (Esmonde Cleary 2003, 73). These alternatives are often emphasised in the case of communities of Roman citizens, particularly cities identified as *coloniae* or *municipia*, in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, perhaps equipped with walls at the time of their foundation or promotion, usually from the late 1st century BC to the early 2nd century AD. Only the later walling of citadels, restricted central areas of cities, as in Gaul at the end of the 3rd century, that might be erected subsequent to disasters and incorporate materials from earlier buildings, might be considered unambiguous enough to be accepted as defensive measures.

In Britain, only three cities provide reasonably clear evidence for early stone walled circuits: the *coloniae* of *Camulodunum* (with walls of perhaps *c.*AD 65, soon after the Boudiccan insurrection), *Glevum* and *Lindum* (perhaps both walled at the time of their foundation *c.*AD 100).

Most other circuits in Britain, for example Chichester, Silchester and *Verulamium*, are usually considered to be much later, perhaps mid-3rd century. They do, however, also appear to have been built unhurriedly, made use of newly quarried materials and cover extensive areas. The towns or cities they enclose are often seen as civic institutions, central places for the administration of regional localities that had perhaps mostly originated as tribal territories.

Londinium's landward walls, those on its northern, eastern and western sides, were also built of new stone and — with the Thames to the south — enclosed some 130ha (330 acres), an urban area larger than elsewhere in Britain. Most recent writers suggest that they were built close to AD 200 and thus were intermediate between the circuits of the early *coloniae* and those of the rest of the major towns or cities in lowland Britain (Esmonde Cleary 2003). However some archaeological evidence could place *Londinium*'s walls as late as *c.*AD 230 or beyond (Sankey & Stephenson 1991, 122), perhaps not far removed in time from the latter circuits.

Also, in contrast to these other urban places in Britain, whether *Londinium* was, constitutionally, a civic institution governing a local territory is unclear, at least until the early 4th century. Available literary source material and the later title, *Londinium Augusta*, might suggest that it had more of an imperial than a local role, perhaps a place of central importance in ensuring that Britain was effectively controlled and administered. The decision therefore to provide *Londinium* with walls might have related more to its provincial than its local functions.

In the discussion of *Londinium*'s walls that follows, I have assumed that they were built primarily for purposes of protection. I have also separated *Londinium*'s Landward Walls, from what is now usually termed the Riverside Wall, bordering the Thames on the south. I have done so because they are often treated as separate and assumed to be distinct, particularly in terms of their construction dates (Merrifield 1983, 216; Fulford 1998, 108–9; Lyon 2007, 37 and 47) — a point I shall return to subsequently.

The Landward Walls describe what is usually regarded as a unitary defensive boundary built on the eastern, northern and western edges of *Londinium*. Beyond the wall, to the east, relatively flat gravel terraces continued for some two miles, towards the margins of the river Lea. To the north lay wetter, boggier terrain, the 'moor fields' where branches of the Walbrook entered the Roman city. To the west, the dominant feature was the nearby valley of the Fleet. On these landward sides, enough of these walls remained, in Roman, medieval or later guise, to be recognised, recorded and incorporated in later panoramas and maps. Fortunately, substantial portions still survive as monuments today.

Proving the existence of the Riverside Wall, bordering the Thames from where Baynards Castle was later to be sited in the south-west, to where the Tower now stands in the south-east, has been much more problematic. This wall, it now seems reasonably clear, was destroyed by erosions of the Thames, more or less as Fitz Stephen suggested in the late 12th century, as the river 'washed against the walls, loosened and overthrew them' (Merrifield 1983, 218). Until excavations at Baynards Castle in 1975 unequivocally demonstrated its existence (Hill *et al* 1980), belief in the Riverside Wall fluctuated and it was even reasoned that the Thames was defence enough against any sea-borne problem that *Londinium* may have faced. Indeed, as we shall see, dating and characterising the Riverside Wall still poses problems.

Roach Smith and the Landward Wall at Trinity Place

What has survived of the Landward Walls has not been achieved without a struggle. The founding fathers of our Society established it in the mid-19th century to combat what they referred to as the 'vandal brutality' and 'utilitarian ignorance' that was consigning the remains of early London to 'the abyss of oblivion' (Hugo 1860, 28–9). Today, at Trinity Place, just south of Tower Hill station, an impressive and important stretch of the wall can be viewed. On the internal side, the dressed ragstone blocks that provided the wall face are visible and the tile courses that ran through the wall, probably as building platforms, can also be seen. That this monument can be visited, enjoyed and studied today is largely due to the efforts of Charles Roach Smith, the greatest of our 19th-century antiquarian fire-brands — an inveterate observer, chronicler and collector of London's Roman past. Roach Smith, a city chemist by trade, described London's governing body as the 'Destroyers of the City', a body collectively 'more un-intellectual and un-educated than anywhere else in England' (Sheppard 1991, 14).

In 1843, trading from Liverpool Street, after his Lothbury premises had been pulled down for a road-widening scheme, an event he attributed to the 'terrible revenge' of the City authorities for his opposition to them (Sheppard 1991, 12), Roach Smith discovered that they intended to pull this length of wall at Trinity Place down. The land was to be cleared, preparatory to transferring it to the Church of England, in exchange for other real estate close to Saint Paul's. Roach Smith managed to secure enough support in Parliament to get this particular act of mid-19th-century 'vandalism' stopped.

Whilst discussing the wall at Trinity Place, it is appropriate to mention another of Roach Smith's achievements, a discovery on

the external side of the wall. It concerns one of the 20 or more bastions, external towers attached to the wall, jutting out beyond the circuit. The bastions are conventionally numbered along the wall from south-east to north-west. During 1852, probably in constructing a stable, it appears that Bastion 2 was encountered and dug into (Wheeler 1928, 99). Perhaps as many as 125 Roman sculpted stones that had been incorporated in the bastion were found, probably largely derived from tomb monuments that had stood in the extensive Roman cemeteries to the east. One of the stones provided an inscription, which Roach Smith suggested was from a memorial to Julius Classicianus. This imperial official, we know from the writings of Tacitus, was sent to Britain as Procurator of the Province in the aftermath of the Boudican insurrection in *c.*AD 60. Though Roach Smith's interpretation was not unchallenged by epigraphists, it was eventually proved correct. In 1935 what had survived of the bastion was again dug into and more fragments were found and examined by Frank Cottrill, one of a series of observers appointed by the Society of Antiquaries of London between the Wars in the hope that they could observe and record discoveries made in City developments. These later discoveries demonstrated that the sculpted and inscribed stones, reused in the bastion, were indeed from a funerary memorial to Classicianus, set up by his grieving wife, Julia Pacata (Bell *et al* 1937, 32–4).

The significance of the find is considerable. If an imperial procurator, serving as early as *c.*AD 60, was buried in *Londinium*, then his office was likely to be established there, a pointer to the importance of the place, even within a decade and a half of the Claudian invasion. What a debt we owe to Roach Smith. If the Corporation had got its way in 1843, the Wall would not have survived and there would presumably have been nothing left to find of the monument to Classicianus in 1852 and 1935: vital evidence pointing to *Londinium*'s early prominence would have been lost. The incorporation of Roman material in the bastion though does not necessarily indicate the date of the bastion itself, a point that was clear to Roach Smith, who considered Bastion 2 to be medieval (Wheeler 1928, 99).

And of course not all the Wall, even at Trinity Place, did survive. Just north of the bastion, a fine stretch was uncovered — and destroyed — in 1882, during the construction of the Inner Circle railway. It was memorably photographed by Philip Norman, perhaps London's most prominent archaeological recorder and illustrator in the late 19th and early 20th century. His photo shows the external face of the Wall: the ground-level sandstone plinth is prominent, as well as a triple band of tiles, with four courses of Kentish ragstone below and six courses above (Wheeler 1928, pl 25).

The character of the Landward Walls

Mortimer Wheeler, in his extensive and invaluable survey of Roman London, published in 1928, made use of the surviving segments of the Wall in discussing its scale, physical character and date. When he wrote, 10 of the 13 Roman period 'structural relics … still visible' in London were related to its Walls (Wheeler 1928, xii). They included another informative length in the south-east of the City, found in 1864 at Coopers Row, not far north of Trinity Place. Here a range of Roman features was visible, including tile courses, facing stones, offsets and the external ground level plinth. Medieval defensive additions were also evident (Wheeler 1928, pl 23).

Another major segment that remained lay on *Londinium*'s northern boundary, in St Alphage churchyard. The Wall, its survival proudly commemorated by a now rather decayed 19th-century plaque, was originally the Cripplegate fort's northern wall (a fort not identified until after World War 2), that was later incorporated into *Londinium*'s defences. Additions to the wall, visible here, include 15th-century brick crenellations. These, one might imagine, could have been pressed into service in 1642, if Prince Rupert and his cavaliers had got beyond the London 'trained bands' at Turnham Green. Wheeler was also able to include in his discussion findings from the pioneering Edwardian observations and excavations carried out by Reader, together with Frank Norman, near Newgate, on the western side of the City defences. These had resulted in the preservation of a bastion (Bastion 19), as well as a stretch of the Wall (Lyon 2007, 42).

By the time Ralph Merrifield, Roman London's foremost post-War scholar, produced his two outstanding surveys (Merrifield 1965; 1983), archaeological research on redevelopment sites in the City had become more widespread. New information was available about the Landward Walls and Merrifield concluded that they were a unified creation, with a length of about 3km (2 miles) enclosing about 130ha (330 acres) of land (Merrifield 1983, 154).

Above a bedding of ragstone, clay and flints, the body of the Wall was ragstone, set in lime mortar with a facing of blocks of the same material, separated by tile courses running through the core. A chamfered sandstone plinth lay at ground level on the exterior and a mound, about 2m high, perhaps formed from material dug from the ditch beyond the Wall, lay against the Wall's interior face. In places, the Wall had survived as high as the fourth level of tiles, indicating that it rose to at least 4.4m (14.5ft) before reaching a parapet platform. Above this patrol surface, it was envisaged, protection was provided by crenellated battlements, suggesting an overall height of at least 6.4m (21ft). The oolitic limestone coping stones that topped the battlements and which survive only in secondary positions, especially within the bastions, were probably quarried in the Cotswolds. The majority of the material, the ragstone for the wall and the sandstone for the ground level plinth, appear Kentish in origin (Merrifield 1965, 154).

Merrifield envisaged that some 85,000 tons of ragstone were needed for the wall core, as well as a million dressed stones of the same material for the facing. Other finished stones required would have included 4,000 blocks of sandstone for the plinth and a similar number of limestone coping stones for the battlement capping. The logistics of the project are considerable, involving quarrying, then shipping the materials, the majority presumably down the Medway and up the Thames, engineering and building on a grand scale.

It is hard to envisage any organisation other than the Roman army being capable of organising and executing this task. Philip Crummy, examining *Camulodunum*'s 2,800m long circuit, calculated that it might have taken the cohorts of a legion, divided into numerous labouring gangs, an annual building season to construct the city's wall (Crummy 2003, 51). If, for the sake of argument, the length of the riverside wall is added, the London circuit would measure just over 5km. Applying Crummy's figures to *Londinium*, it might be envisaged that a military building force of *c.*6,000 men could complete the circuit in two years.

The Landward Walls included internal turrets, presumably intended to provide higher observation and signalling stations. They are likely to have been conceived as a feature integral to the wall. They were probably regularly spaced, though only four are known, including one on the western side of *Londinium*, close to the Old Bailey, investigated by Peter Marsden in 1962. The interior of this turret included coins and coin moulds that may have been deposited in the early decades of the 3rd century (Marsden 1980, 126; Merrifield 1983, 160–3), a point which leads us to the tricky question of establishing the date of the construction of the Landward Walls.

Dating the Landward Walls

The dating evidence available and the lack of precision inherent in it pose the essential problem. There is, as yet, no epigraphic material, no inscriptions like those on Hadrian's Wall, helpfully recording construction under a named governor for a known emperor. Arguments have either relied on assumptions about building 'style' or the difficulties inherent in assigning dates to fragments of pottery, perhaps caught up in the construction process, or the dating of the deposition of coins, such as the earlier 3rd-century ones — copied or 'forged' coins at that — within the turret at the Old Bailey mentioned above.

Opinion as to the date of the Landward Walls has moved backwards and forwards over the past century. Haverfield, the doyenne of Roman archaeologists in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras, suggested that they were built in the 3rd century, perhaps towards 'the end rather than the beginning' (Wheeler 1928, 1974), or even during the 4th century (Haverfield & Macdonald 1924, 182 n 2). Wheeler, in 1928, concluded that their architectural character pointed to their

construction in the later 1st century (Wheeler 1928, 79). In 1937, R G Collingwood stated firmly that they 'were certainly not built later than the first half of the 2nd century' (Collingwood & Myers 1937, 195).

By 1965, Ralph Merrifield was able to draw on a body of archaeological evidence not available to his predecessors that pointed to construction within a decade either side of AD 200. A review of the classical literature led him to cautiously suggest that they might have been constructed for security in the mid-190s by Clodius Albinus, governor of Britain, prior to his challenging Septimius Severus for the imperial title (Merrifield 1965, 50–2).

Though Brian Hartley argued that the Landward Walls were unlikely to be earlier than the mid-3rd century (Hartley 1975, 59), most archaeologists writing about Roman London in the last three decades accept the *c.*AD 200 date. I suspect that Haverfield and Hartley are more likely to be correct, a point I shall return to after looking at two other aspects of the Landward Walls: the bastions, attached to the exterior, and the gates, providing entry and exit points.

The bastions

Twenty or more bastions, conventionally numbered from the south-east to the north-west, are either known or suspected to have once existed. They are more numerous facing the eastern and western approaches to *Londinium*, from the south-east corner, where the Tower now stands, northwards to the edge of the Walbrook valley, then from Cripplegate in the north-west, south towards Newgate and the Thames. Bastion 14, visible from the high walk just outside the Museum of London, is one of the 'hollow bastions', characteristic of the western series, which are now usually considered as medieval in origin. The 'solid bastions', common on the eastern side, are generally regarded as late Roman defensive additions. Such towers, projecting beyond city and fort walls, are not uncommon military features of the later Roman period, providing defenders with a better field of fire when under attack: 'solid' bastions might also provide a platform for heavy artillery.

I referred to Bastion 2 earlier when discussing Roach Smith and the Classicianus monument. LAMAS, in its earlier days, played a large part in ensuring that another bastion (10, at Camomile Street, east of Bishopsgate) was investigated when destruction became imminent in 1876. J E Price, a Cowcross Street businessman who had enjoyed a happier relationship with the Corporation of London than Roach Smith, persuaded LAMAS to pay for his investigation of the site and the Corporation to cover the other costs, including the subsequent LAMAS publication (Sheppard 1991, 25–6). More than 50 fragments of sculpted stone were recovered, including columns and cornices. Two singularly important pieces were a larger than life limestone head and a sculpted military tombstone. Jocelyn Toynbee suggested that the head might be that of a mid-3rd-century emperor, perhaps Philip I or Trajan Decius (Merrifield 1983, 176): it also appears to be well weathered and may well have stood outdoors for a considerable time before being incorporated in the bastion's construction. The military figure, possibly a junior officer in a century, appears to clutch a bunch of writing tablets. Perhaps he had been seconded to the governor's administrative staff and housed in the Cripplegate fort.

The belief that the 'solid bastions', such as the one at Camomile Street, were late Roman additions to the Landward Walls is, perhaps, almost as solid as the bastions themselves. However, the reuse of Roman material is, in itself, no proof of the actual construction date and perhaps, in the absence of other convincing archaeological evidence, some caution is needed before accepting them as Roman. Perhaps Roach Smith, who regarded Bastion 2 as medieval, will, as he was with Classicianus, eventually be proved right again!

The gates

Where major lines of communications entered and exited *Londinium*, gates to allow passage through would be expected. These include Aldgate, on the route to Colchester, Bishopsgate, on the road to Lincoln, York and beyond, and Newgate, where the highways to *Verulamium* and the north-west, as well as to Silchester and the west, leave *Londinium*. The wall appears to shift alignment at both Aldgate and Bishopsgate, as though it were

intentionally joining and incorporating pre-existing structures. These perhaps had originally been monumental arches on *Londinium*'s boundaries, standing astride the highways, channelling and controlling access. Only Newgate has provided archaeological information. Norman and Reader's investigations in the late 19th and early 20th century suggested that the gate consisted of two guard-houses, flanking a double carriageway. The construction materials used in the gate-houses differed from those in the adjoining wall and the latter's alignment on Newgate was slightly at variance as it approached from the north and the south. Though Wheeler argued that Newgate was a later insertion into the Wall, more recent interpretations suggest that it too may have originally been a free-standing structure on the highway subsequently incorporated into the defences (Marsden 1980, 124; Lyon 2007, 42).

The Cripplegate fort

It was not until after World War 2 that the significance of the right-angled corner to the Wall at the north-western corner of the circuit, at Cripplegate, was explained. Professor Grimes's work in the area, investigating bomb damaged sites on behalf of the London Roman and Medieval Archaeological Excavation Council, succeeded in locating an extensive stone-walled fort, probably constructed in the early 2nd century. The fort's northern and western defences had subsequently been incorporated into *Londinium*'s wall. The relations between the fort and the Landward Wall can be seen in Noble Street, just south of the Museum. The curving south-west corner of the fort and the base of an internal turret can be viewed, as can the interior 'thickening' of the fort wall, probably to bring it up to the standard width of the Landward Walls. Also visible, at the fort's south-west corner is the attached city wall, heading away to the south-west.

Roman fort layouts were often standard and, though knowledge of the interior of the Cripplegate fort is limited (Merrifield 1983, 82), barracks, stores, workshops, stables and more imposing headquarters and residential buildings might be envisaged. The discovery of the stone fort caused much surprise. It was extensive, more than 5ha (*c.*13 acres), about four times the size of a typical 2nd-century fort and a quarter the size of a legionary fortress. The most likely explanation for its presence in *Londinium* was as a base to house the governor's staff and guard, men drawn from the legions and auxiliary regiments stationed in Britain (Hassall 1973, 231–7). A dominant feature on Ludgate Hill, *Londinium*'s western high ground, the fort can be related directly to the Landward Walls, through the later incorporation of its northern and western defences within them.

The Riverside Wall

Archaeological indications of a wall bordering the Thames were obtained in the mid-19th century. Once again it was Roach Smith who made the discovery, this time observing a series of sewer trenches in the south-west of the City, beneath Upper Thames Street (Merrifield 1965, 109–11). Whether the long stretches of an east–west wall that he recorded were part of a Riverside Wall was questioned in the early 1960s. The investigation then of substantial north–south walls north of Roach Smith's east–west one, led to the suggestion that what he had observed was more likely to be related to the frontages of properties bordering the river than a defensive Thames-side wall.

However, in 1975, excavations at nearby Baynards Castle strengthened immeasurably the case for the existence of a Riverside Wall (Hill *et al* 1980, 68). Here two lengths of an east–west wall were uncovered: they were assumed to be contemporary, though of markedly different construction. The first and longer stretch (some 40m) to the east of the site was erected above a foundation of timber piles, capped by a platform of chalk with the stone courses of the wall above (Merrifield 1983, 218).

Though the wall had been badly damaged by river erosion, its structure, which included ragstone blocks, with tiles at intervals and a rubble core, was not dissimilar to that of the Landward Walls. Similarly, it was backed by an internal bank, about 2m high (Merrifield 1983, 219). The presence of timber piles might be explained by the need to provide a stable foundation in the wet conditions of the foreshore. As with the Landward Walls, all the building material appeared to be new

and no pottery described as 'later than the late 2nd century' was found in contexts predating its construction (Hill *et al* 1980, 29).

Anaerobic conditions allowed the timbers to survive and thus provide dendrochronological evidence, though, in the mid-1970s 'real-time', calendar dating for Roman Britain could not be provided through the study of tree-rings. However by the early 1980s it could — and by then archaeologists had uncovered similar stretches of the wall at other riverside sites, including within the Tower of London, in the south-east corner of *Londinium*.

Analysis of the timbers from Baynards Castle suggested that the Riverside Wall was erected in the period AD 255–275 or shortly after (Sheldon & Tyers 1983, 361). It is possible that the dendrochronology, as well as indicating the period of the Riverside Wall's construction, provides the clue as to the date of the whole of the circuit, a point I shall return to after discussing the second length of wall found at Baynards Castle. The character of this second wall was different: it had no internal bank, most of the building material was reused and substantial fragments from two large monuments — an arch and a 'screen of gods' — had been incorporated. It also included inscribed altars, at least one referring to a temple of Isis. Officials, including a previously unknown governor of Britain, Martianus Pulcher, as well as imperial freedmen were named as dedicants (Merrifield 1983, 177).

Architectural historians and epigraphists argued that these monuments and inscriptions were likely to have been produced up to the mid-3rd century. Allowing them — or the structures to which they belonged — a 'life' before they were dismantled and incorporated in the Riverside Wall, and the assumption that both lengths of wall were contemporary, explains why a very late Roman date was — and sometimes still is — assigned for its construction.

However, it may well be that when the original Riverside Wall was built, gaps were left along its length, perhaps for docks, including one at the west, at Baynards Castle. Subsequently, at a time when such gaps in the defences were no longer considered appropriate, they might have been filled in, making use of building material available from nearby. As with the bastions, the reuse of Roman material does not necessarily imply that the work took place prior to AD 410: it may have been considerably later.

Conclusion

This review of the Roman Landward and Riverside Walls leads me to suggest that they were integral to each other, built as parts of a unitary defensive circuit, not, as is usually argued, separately and at different times. Though most pottery fragments found in deposits that either pre-date the Landward Walls, or come from features associated with their construction, are taken to indicate that building took place *c.*AD 200, there are assemblages that could move the date on to *c.*AD 230 or even later (Sankey & Stephenson 1991, 122). Structural similarities between the Landward Walls and the Riverside Wall, above the latter's chalk and timber foundation, might suggest the two were contemporary. Logic might also indicate that, in *Londinium* as elsewhere in Britain, walls were built to enclose a circuit completely, rather than partially. That would not preclude gaps along the riverside, to provide for inlets, wharves, or docks, that later, when circumstances changed, were blocked.

In the absence of relevant inscriptions relating to building, it seems likely that the dendrochronological evidence is the clearest pointer to the construction date being between AD 255 and 275, or perhaps shortly after. What might explain the decision to build the circuit and how might the date be refined further?

The dendrochronological dates lie well within the half century between the death of Severus Alexander and the accession of Diocletian, AD 235–284, a period of considerable crisis for Rome, leading almost to the Empire's disintegration (see, for example, Grant 1999). It was marked by incursions and insecurity on and through the Roman frontiers from the Rhine to the Euphrates which led to an imperative need to restore effective defences on the imperial boundaries.

Insular Britain, on the north-west flank of the Rhine frontier, may well have had important resources to contribute to this struggle for survival. (Parallels with similar situations, in the mid-4th century, where literary evidence survives, suggest that supplies — and perhaps

military manpower — sent from Britain to the Rhine, could have been important for these later endeavours to succeed.) It might also provide a context where building a circuit of defences around *Londinium*, a place likely to house many of the offices of governance in Britain, might have been considered a necessary security precaution.

Decisions to build *Londinium*'s walls could perhaps have been made and subsequently implemented by Gallienus (emperor in the West AD 253–68) up to AD 260, or subsequently by Postumus (AD 260–268), or his successors. Postumus was the commander of the Rhine armies who revolted in AD 260 incorporating Britain in his breakaway 'Gallic Empire' (AD 260–274), an entity primarily focused on achieving regional security and stability through control of the Rhine, in opposition to barbarians and the legitimate authorities alike.

It is perhaps more likely to have been achievable, at the later end of our dendrochronological range, under the stronger 'emperor-warriors' who succeeded in achieving military victories, strengthening the imperial defences and reuniting the Empire. Though Aurelian (AD 270–275) defeated the 'Gallic Empire' in AD 274, he was killed soon after and Probus (AD 276–282) is a stronger candidate. An emperor who settled defeated Vandals and Burgundians in Britain, Probus was noted for making use of the army in major engineering and labouring infrastructure projects, a factor which may have contributed to his downfall (Grant 1999, 33). And of course, though I am not suggesting parallels, it was Aurelian who began constructing the circuit of walls around Rome and Probus who completed them.

So far, of course, the dendrochronological evidence relates only to the wall bordering the Thames. Should timbers be recovered from under the Landward Walls, as they might, especially in wet terrain on the north, where the Walbrook streams enter *Londinium*, then evidence might be gained which will provide information as to whether or not the case for a unitary defensive circuit, one built *c.* AD 255–275 or soon after, remains tenable.

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LONDONERS AT ARMS: FROM THE VIKING WARS TO THE WARS OF THE ROSES

John Clark

In about 1580 an anonymous author wrote 'An Apologie of the Cittie of London', which a few years later John Stow incorporated as an appendix to his *Survey of London* (Stow 1908, 2: 195–217; it is not included in the popular Everyman edition). Among other things the author of the 'Apologie' praised Londoners for their military prowess: 'It were too much to recite particularly the Martial services that this city hath done from time to time … only for a taste as it were, I will note these few following.' He then listed seven instances, from the time when 'a huge armie of the Danes (whereof king *Sweyne* was the leader) besieged king *Etheldred* in London…' to the attack by '*Thomas Neuell*, commonly called the bastard of *Fauconbridge*', who 'was repulsed by the Citizens, and chased as farre as Stratford…' (*ibid*, 202–4). This paper will similarly give a 'taste' of the role of Londoners in their kings' wars and in the defence of their city during the Middle Ages.

London and the Vikings

The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* records two major attacks by Vikings on London in the 9th century: in AD 842, when there was 'great slaughter', and in AD 851, when a fleet of 350 ships entered the Thames and stormed Canterbury and London, putting to flight the Mercian king Beorhtwulf and his army (the royal *fyrd*) — who had perhaps attempted to defend London (Plummer 1952, 1, 64–5; Garmonsway 1954, 64–5). At about this time the Saxon trading town of *Lundenwic*, on the Strand, previously unfortified, acquired fortifications — a defensive ditch set with stakes (Malcolm *et al* 2003, 118–20) — but in the longer term the solution was to reoccupy the area of the Roman walled city.

The timing and circumstances of this process are still debated (see most recently the contribution by Haslam 2009), but it seems to have been formally recognised in AD 886, when King Alfred 'gesette Lunden burh' (Plummer 1952, 1, 80–1; Garmonsway 1954, 80–1). Henceforth 'Lundenburh', close to the River Lea border of the 'Danelaw' agreed by Alfred and the Dane Guthrum, was to contribute to the defence in depth of the English kingdom. A network of fortified towns, *burhs*, was established, to be defended, like London, by their own townsfolk, the *burhwaru*. The royal *fyrd*, the army made up of levies from the shires, formed a mobile expeditionary force (Powicke 1962, 9).

Yet on occasion the *burhwaru* would march out in support of the royal army. Thus, in AD 893 the Danes had established strongholds at Appledore and Milton in Kent, and across the Thames at Benfleet in Essex. Alfred, facing a Danish force at Exeter, detached part of his army and sent them east to London, where they joined 'mid thaem burg warum' — with the townsmen of London — to mount a successful attack on Benfleet, returning to London with captured ships and the Danes' wives and children as prisoners (Plummer 1952, 1, 86; Garmonsway 1954, 86). In AD 895 a similar joint force was less successful, being driven off with heavy losses by the defenders of a Danish fort on the Lea about 20 miles from London (Plummer 1952, 1, 89; Garmonsway 1954, 89).

As Alfred and his successors gradually regained control of the Danelaw, the immediate threat to London was averted for some 100 years. Then began a series of concerted attacks from Scandinavia, supported by the settlers in the Danelaw, of which the aim was conquest, not plunder. London became the major prize, and clearly its townsmen could put up a sturdy defence, as the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* records:

> 994: In this year came Anlaf and Swein on the Nativity of St Mary [8 September] to London with 94 ships. And they kept up an unceasing attack on the *burh*, and they intended to set it on fire. And there they suffered more harm and evil than

> they ever thought possible any townsmen [*burhwaru*] would inflict on them. (Plummer 1952, 1, 127–8; Garmonsway 1954, 127–9)
>
> 1009: … And they often attacked the *burh* of London. But praise be to God, she still stands safe and sound, and they always fared badly there. (Plummer 1952, 1, 139; Garmonsway 1954, 139)

The latter date may have been the occasion for the famous exploit of Olaf Haraldsson, later St Olaf of Norway, in pulling down London Bridge with its fortifications and defenders. The Icelandic historian Snorri Sturluson, writing 200 years later, believed that this happened when Olaf was fighting for the English king Ethelred, after 1014, and that the bridge was held by Danish Vikings (Ashdown 1930, 154–9; and see Hagland & Watson 2005). However, it is implied by the Old Norse skaldic poems that he quotes that Olaf was fighting against the English, presumably earlier, perhaps with the 'immense raiding army' of the Dane Thorkel. Sighvat the Skald's *Olafsdrapa*, for example, makes London Bridge Olaf's sixth battle (the first five were not in England), preceding those of Ringmere Heath (1010) and Canterbury (possibly 1011), and portrays the English as the enemy in each case (Ashdown 1930, 159–61; Whitelock 1955, 305–6). Thus in pictures of this event, by Peter Jackson and others, we must see not Vikings but the London *burhwaru* falling into the river with the collapsing bridge! This was not the last time that Londoners would have to defend their bridge against attack.

'A formidable and numerous army of Londoners'

Just as they had in the days of King Alfred, in October 1066 the men of London marched with the king's army to meet a foreign invader — William of Normandy. Even after his victory at Hastings, William approached London cautiously. William of Poitiers comments that '[London] abounds in a large population famous for their military qualities' (William of Poitiers 1998, 146–7).

The few contemporary authors differ in their accounts of the circumstances of London's surrender to the Normans. According to William of Poitiers (*ibid*) there was fighting in Southwark, which the knights of the Norman vanguard burnt; according to William of Jumièges (1914, 136) there was a last-ditch battle in the streets (on which see also Mills 1996). Yet eventually the city and the kingdom capitulated.

Even then William maintained his healthy respect for the fighting abilities of Londoners. William of Poitiers says that, soon after his coronation at Westminster, William 'spent a few days in the nearby place of Barking, while fortifications were being completed in the city as a defence against the inconsistency of the numerous and hostile inhabitants [*contra mobilitatem ingentis ac feri populi*]. For he saw that it was of the first importance to constrain the Londoners strictly' (William of Poitiers 1998, 60–3). Presumably these fortifications were the originals not only of the Tower of London, but of the city's two western castles, Baynard's Castle and the Tower of Montfichet (see also Impey 2008, 18–19). But the 'numerous and hostile inhabitants' were to play a part in many future wars.

In 1141, King Stephen, in dispute for the throne with his cousin the Empress Matilda, was a prisoner in Bristol. Matilda, having originally won the support of the Londoners, was at Westminster preparing for her coronation. But she had not granted London the privileges its people had expected, and when a royal army, led by Stephen's queen (also) Matilda, approached the city, Londoners quickly changed their allegiance.

> The whole city flew to arms at the ringing of the bells, which was the signal for war, and all with one accord rose upon the countess [the Empress Matilda] and her adherents, as swarms of wasps issue from their hives. The countess was just sitting down to dinner … Putting their horses to a gallop, they had scarcely left behind them the houses of the suburbs, when a countless mob of the townsfolk burst into the quarters they had quitted, and pillaged everything which their unpremeditated departure had left in them. (Potter 1976, 124–5)

Later 'an undefeated force of Londoners' ('*invicta Londonensium caterva*') joined the queen's men in an attack on Matilda's army

besieging Winchester Castle — and went on to sack Winchester town (*ibid*, 128–37). And in 1145, with Stephen restored to the throne, the king himself led 'a formidable and numerous army of Londoners' ('*terribilem et numerosum exercitum*') to attack a castle being built at Faringdon (Berks) by Earl Robert of Gloucester, one of the Empress's supporters; 'and by their Herculean efforts they took it with considerable bloodshed' (Henry of Huntingdon 1879, 278; 2002, 84).

But just how 'numerous' was the expeditionary force of Londoners that played such an important part in the wars of Stephen's reign? Looking back on the events from 30 years later, the Londoner William FitzStephen claimed that London had fielded no less than 20,000 armed horsemen and 60,000 foot soldiers (Stenton 1934, 33 & 50) — surely an exaggeration, exceeding as it does any estimate of London's total population in the 12th century!

Yet, whatever its numbers, it was a formidable fighting force, and 12th-century kings continued to respect it. At the time FitzStephen was writing, King Henry II was facing civil war with supporters of his own son, the 'Young King' Henry, and the Anglo-Norman poet Jordan de Fantosme pictured the king asking the Bishop of Winchester for news of London:

> *'Comment funt mes baruns de Lundres ma cité?'*
> 'How fare my barons of my city of London?'

The Bishop replies:

> 'There is no one in the town who is of age
> to bear arms, who is not well armed.
> You would wrongly believe any evil of them.
> But, sire, of one thing now be informed:
> Gilbert de Munfichet has fortified his castle,
> and says that the Clares [of Baynard's Castle] are allied with him.'

With two of London's castles in rebel hands, it is not surprising that the king exclaims:

> *'E Deus! … ore en pernez pitié,*
> *guardez mes baruns de Lundres ma cité.'*
> 'God have pity and protect my barons of my city of London.' (Jordan de Fantosme 1886, 338–9)

By '*mes baruns*' Jordan may have intended to convey no more than the Norman French meaning of this word: 'brave men'. But it is difficult not to suspect a reference to the Latin term '*barones*', being adopted by Londoners at this time (and soon appearing on the City's first Common Seal) apparently to refer to the City's leading citizens, responsible only to the king, the aldermanic class who led in war just as they did in peace.

This aldermanic role is reflected in a London document dating to King John's reign, which included instructions for the protection of the City in time of war (Bateson 1902, 726–8). Each alderman was to gather all men aged over 15 in his ward, and see to their arms. The arms that most ordinary Londoners might have were no doubt those required by Henry II's Assize of Arms of 1181: 'all burgesses and the whole community of freemen shall have a gambeson [padded jacket], an iron cap and a lance' — men with more wealth had to come better equipped (Stubbs 1913, 183). The London document insists that as many as possible should have horses. Names of those with insufficient arms were to be registered. Every parish was to have a pennon (*penuncellum*); every alderman a banner (*baneria*).

The same document identifies the lord of Baynard's Castle as the city's *signifer*, its standard bearer (Bateson 1902, 485), and Robert Fitzwalter, descendant of that family, was to claim the privilege a hundred years later: in time of war he should come, leading 19 other fully armed knights on horseback, to the west door of St Paul's, to receive from the mayor the City's standard of St Paul (Riley 1860, 147–51; 554–61). A marshal should be chosen for the 'host', and the 'common bell' rung to summon the citizens to arms.

This claim was an anachronism when Robert Fitzwalter made it in 1303 — it may have referred to practice in the time of his ancestor and namesake Robert, a prominent member of the baronial party against King John. In 1217 the first Robert Fitzwalter had been among the leaders of an army of 600 knights and 20,000 men-at-arms that had set out from London in support of Prince

Louis of France against the new young king Henry III, first to try to raise the siege of Mountsorrel Castle in Leicestershire and then to suffer defeat at Lincoln (Paris 1876, 16); although including French and baronial troops, this army no doubt involved a large contingent of Londoners, for London had backed the barons in their support of Louis.

The 13th century was to see the final appearances of the mass 'army of Londoners', during the baronial wars of Henry III's reign, when London supported Simon de Montfort and the barons against the king. Thus, in 1263, the appointment of a marshal and the ringing of the bell are clear reminders of the Fitzwalter claim:

> The Londoners appointed one of their number, Thomas de Piwelesdone by name, to be their Constable, and as Marshal, Stephen Buckerel, at whose summons, upon hearing the great bell of Saint Paul's, all the people of the City were to sally forth, and not otherwise; being prepared as well by night as by day, [and] well armed, to follow the standards of the said Constable and Marshal wheresoever they might think proper to lead them. After this, Hugh le Despenser, the Justiciar, who then had charge of the Tower, with a countless multitude of Londoners, went forth from the City, following the standards of the aforesaid Constable and Marshal; none of them knowing whither they were going, or what they were to do. Being led however as far as Isleworth, they there laid waste and ravaged with fire the manor of the King of Almaine [Richard Earl of Cornwall, brother of Henry III]. (Riley 1863, 65)

The Londoners also made a rather ignominious showing in support of the barons at the Battle of Lewes the following year:

> On the ninth day after that day, which fell on a Wednesday [14 May 1264], very early in the morning, the contending parties met without the town of Lewes; and at the first onset, the greater part of the Londoners, horse and foot, as well as certain knights and Barons, took to flight towards London. (*ibid*, 66)

Londoners in the king's service

Thereafter we hear of no more mass excursions by 'formidable and numerous' armies of Londoners. Instead, kings call upon London to supply contingents of fighting men for service outside the city. Already in 1224, early in the reign of Henry III, London had sent a troop of 20 crossbowmen (arbalesters) to the siege of Bedford Castle. They were paid three shillings each by the king for their service (Hardy 1833, 608). Led by William le Barbur, they included a tailor and a smith (these were not professional full-time soldiers), and men from Stepney and Bermondsey. London also sent a team of carpenters to build siege engines (Amt 2002, 112–13).

In 1296 London provided, though apparently with some reluctance, a force of 40 horsemen and 60 crossbowmen, as well as foot-soldiers, to help guard the Kentish coast against expected attacks from France (Riley 1868, 31–3). Similar reluctance was seen in 1314, when Edward II sought 300 arbalesters, 'men powerful for defence', for the garrison of Berwick against the Scots — 'or as many as you may find' (*ibid*, 114–15). After some delay London sent 120.

Nor did the mayor and aldermen want such provision of troops to be treated by kings as a matter of course. In 1321 Edward II confirmed that the services of men sent from London to the siege of Leeds Castle in Kent 'and also aid of like armed men now going with [the king] through divers parts of the realm for divers causes' were not to be regarded as precedents (Birch 1887, 51). And the City authorities managed to have a short clause included in the first charter they received from Edward III in 1327: 'And that the said citizens from henceforth shall not be compelled to go or send to war out of the city' (*ibid*, 55).

And yet, 50 years later, they found it necessary to send a petition for relief to the king and his council. They complained not only that over £137,000 in loans made to the king for war purposes had not been repaid, but that 'they had been at greater charges than others of the Commons in respect of the King's expeditions to Scotland, Gascony, Brabant, Flanders, Brittany, and France, as well as the siege of Calais, and against the

Spaniards in providing men-at-arms, archers and ships in aid of the war' (Sharpe 1905, 85).

Who were these men-at-arms and archers, and how were they selected? Sometimes a special commission was set up to choose the contingent from the whole city, but usually it was left to the aldermen to provide a number of men from each ward (Powicke 1962, 62–3, 250–4; Konieczny 2005, 245–6). Thus in April 1345, the City, called on to supply 160 archers for France (and having negotiated a reduction to 80 men), delegated to the aldermen the task of selecting and equipping a quota from each of their wards (Thomas 1926, 221–2):

Western Wards:	**Eastern Wards:**
Colman Street 3	Walbrook 3
Cordwainer Street 6	Cornhill 2
Cripplegate Within 3	Candlewick Street 2
Cripplegate Without 1	Bishopsgate 2
Bassieshaw 2	Aldgate 1
Vintry 5	Portsoken 1
Bread Street 4	Broad Street 2
Farringdon Within 4	Tower 6
Farringdon Without 2	Billingsgate 3
Cheap 6	Bridge 6
Queenhithe 4	Dowgate 5
Aldersgate 2	Langbourn 2
Castle Baynard 2	Lime Street 1

When, after various delays, the archers marched out towards Sandwich on 11 June, led by the Common Serjeant, Nicholas de Abyndon, they must have looked very smart in the uniform of coats, jackets and red-and-white striped hoods provided by the City.

These City contingents were usually organised in groups of twenty men (*vintains*), each twenty including a leader, the *vintainer*; five *vintains* made up a *centain* — the leader of the first *vintain* serving also as *centainer*. Surviving muster rolls list men under their *vintainers*' names. Thus, a contingent of 200 men was sent to Gascony in August 1337 (disappointed in the physique of 500 men-at-arms originally offered, the king had instead demanded 200 archers 'from among the strongest and healthiest men of the City') (Sharpe 1904, 10–14). The second *vintain* was led by Roger de Caxtone *vintainer*, and comprised:

> John Burgeoys de Horsham, William Knyght, John de Waltone, John Reulebon, Richard de Parys, Thomas Priour, Henry Galeys, William de Redham, Thomas de Donstaple, John de Somersete, John de Maydenstan, John de Ebor', physician, John Priour, butcher, John de Blounham, John Robert, Robert Devenisshe, Bartholomew de Okham, William de Redyng, and John de Shrouesbury, tailor.

Alongside the physician, butcher and tailor listed here, in other *vintains* of this contingent were to be found a second tailor, two farriers, a digger, a pelterer, a skinner, a bowyer, a clerk, an armourer, a carpenter, a coppersmith, and a baker. These were not the dregs of society. Nor were they professional soldiers, although most of them had had experience of war — 195 of them had served in previous campaigns (Konieczny 2005, 249). In a recent paper, Peter Konieczny has studied seven London muster lists dating between 1327 and 1350. Of 842 men listed, 208 served more than once (*ibid*, 248–9). One man, John Peverel, served in five campaigns as an archer, light horseman or man-at-arms.

We know a little more about the military career and fate of another man. John Tany, an armourer from Holborn, served as archer in 1327 and 1338; he was later crippled in action near Calais in 1347, and retired back to London on 2d per day crown pension. He died in 1349, perhaps of the Black Death (*ibid*, 250–1).

Tany was clearly not the only Londoner to be severely injured in battle. One of the skeletons from the East Smithfield Black Death cemetery, excavated in the 1980s, was that of a man, aged between 36 and 45, with an iron point, presumably from a weapon, embedded in one of his vertebrae — he had lived long enough for the bone to heal with the point still in position, but must have been in constant pain (Sargent 2008, 16 & 63, pl II). Other skeletons from this and from other medieval London cemeteries show healed head wounds, which seem likely to have been received in battle. (I am

grateful to my colleague Jelena Bekvalac for information on these and discussion of their significance.)

Even without the severe loss of manpower caused by the Black Death itself, the constant calls on London to provide capable troops were an increasing burden. In 1360 the mayor and sheriffs were authorised to commit men to Newgate for resisting the call-up (*Calendar of Patent Rolls* 1911, 411), while in 1363 the king issued a writ to the sheriffs of the counties to encourage the practice of archery by banning (on pain of imprisonment) the playing of 'handball, football or stickball, shinty or cockfighting, or other such vain pursuits' (Rymer & Sanderson 1816–69, 3.2: 704).

Increasingly the City provided not men but money for the king's wars, although even in the 15th century contingents were raised on several occasions for the defence of English Calais (Barron 2004, 17–18).

Defending the City

But as in the days of the Viking attacks, the chief role of London's citizen army was to defend the City. When invasion threatened and at times of political uncertainty London was put on alert. Thus in June 1377, following the death of Edward III, instructions were issued for each alderman to put the men of his ward into array under his pennon. He was to report the number of men who were fully armed and those who could provide themselves with weapons by 24 June; those who could pay a weekly sum towards the City's defence; and those who could provide merely their labour for one day (Sharpe 1907, 64–6).

And the labour of the poorest Londoners was certainly needed. The City gates were to be protected with portcullises and with 'barbykanes' (bulwarks) erected on the outside; the vulnerable wharves between London Bridge and the Tower of London were to be fitted with 'bretasches' (timber barricades). The aldermen of the riverside wards were to take responsibility for guarding against attack from the river; the alderman of Bridge Ward in particular was to ensure that there was appropriate 'ordnance, with stone and shot' mounted on London Bridge. Aldermen of the outer wards were each designated City gates and stretches of the City wall to guard, while those of Cheap, Cordwainer, Bread Street and Cornhill wards were to gather with their pennons and their men in array at the Standard in Cheapside, ready to reinforce any threatened position. The sheriffs were to have six mounted serjeants to act as messengers.

These measures were not needed in 1377, and apparently no such precautions were in place when four years later commoners from Kent and Essex marched on London — although a message sent to the Kentish rebels claimed 'the cite wasse armed agaynes ham' (Marx 2003, 6). London was not notable for its resistance to the Peasants' Revolt, and the London chroniclers are reticent about events. But one account, in the City's Letter-Book, of the final confrontation between the king and the rebels in Smithfield on 15 June, reports that after the death of Wat Tyler, Mayor William Walworth hurried back to the City and 'in the space of half an hour sent and led forth therefrom so great a force of citizen warriors in aid of his Lord the King that the whole multitude of madmen was surrounded and hemmed in; and not one of them would have escaped, if our Lord the King had not given orders to allow them to depart' (Sharpe 1907, 166; Riley 1868, 449–51).

Again in 1450 armed uprisings took place in Kent and Essex, after years of heavy taxation to fund the war with France. Though in this way it paralleled the events of 1381, this was no revolt of peasants. The rebels included yeoman farmers, prosperous villagers and townsfolk, and even some of the lesser gentry. On 1 or 2 July Jack Cade, 'captain' of the Kentish rebels, led them from Blackheath into Southwark, where he made his headquarters at the White Hart inn. On the late afternoon of Friday 3 July Cade and his followers crossed London Bridge into the City. There may have been some resistance at the Bridge, but Cade's men cut the ropes of the drawbridge so that it could not be raised against them. Many Londoners clearly supported the rebels' campaign against Henry VI's corrupt government. Cade made proclamations against looting and violence, and at first his followers seem to have obeyed. The rebels returned to Southwark for the night.

The next day, Saturday 4 July, things turned

violent. The unpopular royal treasurer Lord Saye was killed and his naked body dragged around the City; the home of the alderman Philip Malpas was ransacked. On Sunday 5 July, the mayor and aldermen decided to make a stand. London Bridge must be held to prevent further incursions from the rebel base in Southwark.

The fullest account of what followed appears in the *New Chronicles* attributed to Robert Fabyan (Fabyan 1811, 625). After the rebels had once more returned to Southwark for the night, a mixed force of Londoners and of king's men from the Tower led by Lord Scales and the Welshman Mathew Gough occupied the Bridge. A fierce battle broke out and lasted through the night, until the rebels fired the drawbridge, and a truce was finally agreed. According to one estimate, 200 of Cade's men and 40 Londoners died in the fighting or fell from the Bridge and drowned (Benet 1972, 201); among the dead the only names recorded are those of Mathew Gough, the goldsmith John Sutton, alderman of Aldersgate Ward, and one Roger Heysant, citizen and draper.

The last battle

In May 1471, a month after the Battle of Barnet, a turning point in the war between Edward IV and supporters of the deposed Henry VI, London once more came under attack. Thomas Neville, known as 'the Bastard of Fauconberg', had landed in Kent with an army and fleet to back Henry. Joined by men from Kent, he marched on London and demanded passage through the City. His fleet gave him easy access across the Thames to communicate with supporters in Essex — for in the tradition of 1381 and 1450, Essex had also risen to the occasion. Although a London chronicler was scathing about the Essex contingent — 'the ffaynt husbandys cast from theym theyr sharp Sythys and armyd them with theyr wyvis smokkis, chese clothis and old shetis, and wepwnyd theym with heavy & grete Clubbys and long pycchfforkis and asshyn stavys, and soo In all haast sped theym toward london' (Thomas & Thornley 1938, 218) — they were to prove formidable fighters around Aldgate.

The City refused Neville's demands, having 'Garnysshid every place of the Cyte where any peryll shuld be, wyth Gunnys & othir deffencis of warre, and made […] strong bulwerkis at every Gate' (*ibid*, 219). The preparations seem to have followed the pattern of those in 1377. The wharves from Castle Baynard to the Tower were barricaded against Neville's fleet, and guarded with 'men-at-arms, bombards and other instruments of war' (Sharpe 1894–5, 3: 391). Special measures were taken to guard London Bridge, whose defence was in the hands of the alderman of Bridge Ward, Thomas Stalbroke, together with George Irlond of Cordwainer Ward — both of them later knighted for their services (Welch 1894, 112–13; Sharpe 1894–5, 3: 392). Guns were brought from Guildhall to the Bridge, manned by four gunners. Woolsacks full of stones were stacked on the Bridge to form a rampart, and sheets of canvas soaked in vinegar hung to protect the drawbridge against 'wildefire' hurled by the rebels.

On Sunday 12 May Neville attacked the Bridge and was repulsed — while the Essex men set fire to some beer-houses near St Katherine's Hospital (Sharpe 1894–5, 3: 391). On 14 May Neville's men mounted a concerted attack on the Bridge and on the gates at Aldgate and Bishopsgate — where, according to the account in the City's Letter-Book L, 5,000 rebels were concentrated (*ibid*, 392) — and bombarded the City waterfront from the south bank with guns taken from their ships (Bruce 1838, 36). Aldgate bore the brunt of the attack north of the river. Houses outside the gate were burnt, the rebels took the bulwark, and before the portcullis could be dropped a handful managed to get through the gate, only to be killed inside. The *Great Chronicle* continues the story:

> Then was migthy shott of hand Gunnys & sharp shott of arowis which did more scathe to the portcolyous and to the stoon werk of the Gate then to any Enemyes on eythir syde, Then the aldyrman of that ward [Aldgate] beyng In a blak Jak or dobelet of ffens namyd Robard Basset and wyth hym the Recorder of the Cyte callyd M^{r} [Thomas] Ursewyk lykewyse apparaylid Commandid In the name of God & Seynt George the portculious to be upp drawyn, The which was shortly doon, and theruppon Issuyd owth wyth theyr people, and w^{t} sharp shott and

> ffyers ffygth putt theyr Enemyes bakk as fferre as Seynt Botulphis Chirch. (Thomas & Thornley 1938, 219)

A royal force, issuing from the Tower through a postern gate, now attacked the rebels in the rear. News had already reached the mayor of the battle at the gate, and City reinforcements were sent, led by Ralph Jocelyn, alderman of Cornhill Ward. Finding the Essex rebels by now in flight — Basset and Ursewyk and their men were to chase them as far as Stratford — Jocelyn turned south, pursuing those who were trying to cross the Thames or join Neville's fleet. Some were drowned attempting to get on boats at Blackwall (Sharpe 1894–5, 3: 392); others were taken prisoner to be ransomed 'as [if] they had been Frenchmen' (Fabyan 1811, 662). Estimates of the total number of rebels killed ranged from 300 to 700 (Sharpe 1894–5, 3: 392; Bruce 1838, 37). That night Neville's fleet sailed from the Thames, and London was safe. The 'Battle of Aldgate' was to be the last direct assault on London's medieval wall and gates.

In 1477 Ralph Jocelyn, who had distinguished himself in pursuit of the rebels, became mayor. And it was surely the experience of 1471 that led him to devote his year in office, and considerable expenditure, to the refurbishment of the City wall and ditch (Fabyan 1811, 665; Stow 1908, 1: 10). The brick crenellations constructed at this time can still be seen surmounting the stretch of City wall surviving in the former churchyard of St Alphage's church, London Wall (Smith 2004) — they may serve as a lasting memorial to the Londoners who had fought to defend their City against foreign and domestic enemies during some 600 years since those first Viking raids in the 9th century.

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REVIVAL, DIVISION AND RESTORATION: THE ARTILLERY COMPANY OF LONDON, 1611–1660

Ismini Pells

In their history of London, Joseph Clinton Robertson and Thomas Byerley, writing under the pseudonyms of Sholto and Reuben Percy, observed that:

> Historians, who think that institutions are good in proportion to their antiquity, often labour hard to trace the subject of their research back to the most remote period. An old writer on the Duello, or single combat, commences with the death of Cain, which he says was the result of the first duel. A parliamentary historian goes still further, and assures us, that the first parliament was held in heaven, when the expulsion of Lucifer was agreed upon. A similar love of antiquity has prompted the historian of the Honourable Artillery Company to derive its origin previous to the Norman invasion, although he gives no other proof of its existence for five centuries afterwards, than that in the reign of Henry VIII, the city archers and trained bands exercised in a walled enclosure, in the manor of Finsbury, which was then called the Artillery Ground, or Artillery Garden.[1]

Ludicrous though it may be to try and date the existence of the Honourable Artillery Company prior to the reign of Henry VIII, when in 1537 he incorporated by royal charter a group of conscientious citizens practising archery into a Fraternity or Guild of Artillery (and this paper will certainly make no attempt to do so), what is without doubt is that the Company was established in the long tradition of volunteer citizen militias assembled in defence of the City of London, the history of which is practically as old as that of the capital itself. Indeed, it is even difficult to pin the exact foundation date of the modern regiment to 1537, as the Company has appeared in many manifestations throughout the centuries, as this study of the Company in the 17th century will show. However, the role of its members in training and leading their fellow citizens

in military practice remained the constant characteristic throughout the continual cycle of formation, activity, inactivity and re-formation, and is crucial to understanding the Company's 17th-century incarnation.

It is thus the aim of this paper to demonstrate how the Artillery Company that was established in 1611 looked back to the Guild of Artillery of 1537 and the subsequent Captains of the Artillery Garden of the 1580s as their spiritual ancestors. They looked to their example of religious, patriotic and civic duty in training London's citizens in the art of military discipline, which aimed to promote Protestantism by defending England against potential European Catholic invasion and maintaining moral discipline through encouraging martial practices. It was these religious and moral attitudes established in the Artillery Company prior to the outbreak of civil war, in combination with the Company's access to the City's wealth and proximity to central government that had given them a higher standard of training than elsewhere in the country, which enabled the officers of the Artillery Company to make the London Trained Bands under their command an extraordinary and successful fighting unit amongst Civil War armies. Moreover, although the Artillery Company's activities lapsed with the settlement brought about by the end of civil war, the religious and political support they had demonstrated for the parliamentarian cause enabled them, once this settlement became threatened, to present themselves as the natural leaders in maintaining peace in the capital and restored the Company to their place at the heart of the City's and the nation's politics.

Like all good legends, the ancient lineage of the Honourable Artillery Company has its basis in some degree of fact. True, one must not get as carried away as Anthony Highmore, who in discussing the origins of the Honourable Artillery Company, turned to the London men who marched with King Alfred in AD 883 to remove the Danes from Hertford and the citizens who volunteered to protect life and property in London during the reign of William II and declared that: 'The great similarity between that Association and the Company is too obvious to require the assertion of its remote antiquity'.[2] Such claims prompted one witty member of the Company to write, in the style of Sellar and Yeatman's timeless classic *1066 and All That*, that:

> Before 1537 nothing is much known of the history of the Company. There is not very much doubt about its actual existence, however, although definite proofs are not to hand to establish any *certain* existence before this date. References have been made but they are mostly rather ambiguous, although pointing very strongly in favour of activities of the Company many years before the granting of the Charter.[3]

Nevertheless, it is without doubt that there have been many voluntary groups of citizens assembled in defence of London throughout history and it was in this tradition that the Honourable Artillery Company was established. The Anglo-Saxon '*fyrd*' system imposed military obligations on able-bodied men against Norse raiders, which continued well into the Norman period, when the Assize of Arms in 1181 fused older English traditions and newer feudal obligations. This underwent a series of revisions until the Statute of Westminster in 1285 endeavoured to rationalise the system.[4] According to this Statute, every man, excepting the nobility and clergy, was obliged to acquire weapons suitable for someone of his economic standing, attend general musters in his county and fight against invaders or rebels within his county.[5] Henry VIII, in his quest to emulate his medieval forbears, especially his namesake Henry V, realised that their success abroad had relied upon the practice of military skills at home and he reaffirmed many of the statutes encouraging domestic military practice.[6]

Moreover, on 25 August 1537, he granted a charter of incorporation to Sir Christopher Morris, Cornelius Johnson, Anthony Antony and Henry John to found 'a certeyne P*er*petuall Fraternitie of Saint George' and admit 'honest p*er*sons' of their chosing to form a 'Fraternitie or Guylde of Artillary of Longbowes, Crosbowes and Handegonnes'.[7] As Justine Taylor has surmised, the 1537 charter suggests that the Fraternity of St George was intended to be a guild specifically dedicated to light artillery (that is, hand-

held missiles like longbows, crossbows and handguns) as a subsidiary of an already existing guild, also called the Guild of St George, which Morris, as Master of the Ordnance, had established for instruction in heavy artillery (that is, ordnance used on navy ships).[8] In 1538, the Prior of the New Hospital of our Blessed Lady Without Bishopgate leased the 'grounde called the Tesell grounde wyth thappartennces adioynyng to the sayde hospytall and lying within the precyncte of the sayde hospitall' to the Fraternity for 20 shillings a year — a mere snip for what is now prime City estate![9] This plot was not on the site of the present Artillery Garden (which the Company did not acquire until 1641) but in an area known as 'Tassell close', so-called for the tassels (teasels) that used to be planted there for the use of cloth-workers.[10] It is from this charter of 1537 that the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) dates its foundation.

Yet, whilst it is likely that the Fraternity of St George was 'not a direct ancestor of the HAC, but certainly a forerunner', through the use of the Artillery Garden for military training and as a meeting place for a society who took on the responsibility for the military training of their fellow citizens, it is possible to trace the 17th-century Artillery Company's spiritual descent from the Fraternity of St George.[11] By the mid-16th century the Fraternity of St George had disappeared, perhaps because the ban on religious guilds at the Reformation would have made a 'Fraternity of St George' politically inappropriate and no doubt because four of the six founders had died by 1549 and the other two by 1563.[12] However, in 1573, in response to Alva's arrival in the Low Countries, the government ordered that all subjects aged 16 and upwards able to bear arms were to be mustered and from these the most able men selected, armed and trained. These became known as the 'Trained Bands'.[13] The scheme was first tested in London in 1572 and over the selected citizens 'were appointed divers captaines, who to traine then vp in warlike feats, mustered them thrice euery weeke, sometime in the artillery yard, teaching the gunners to handle their peeces, sometime at the miles end, & in Saint Georges field teaching them to skirmish'.[14] Moreover, according to the chronicler John Stow, in the Artillery Garden in 1586, 'certaine Marchants and other gallant active Citizens at their owne proper charges onely for the countries service & defence, practised weekely divers feats of Armes, and by orderly course euery man bare aldegrees of officers from the corporall to the captaine'. When they had achieved a high enough standard, 'then they trained the common souldiers of the Citye'.[15] Consequently, by the time of the Armada, the majority of the London Trained Bands' officers were selected from this society practising arms in the Artillery Garden, who were generally called 'Captains of the Artillery Garden', and these men commanded the London Trained Bands at the camp at Tilbury.[16]

It was therefore natural that when 'certaine worthie Cittizens of London' petitioned the Privy Council in 1612 to be 'pmitted to exercise Armes And be instructed in Millitary discipline in the Artillery garden' that they turned to the precedent of the Captains of the Artillery Garden of the preceding reign.[17] James I had made peace with Spain in 1604 and the system of training the Trained Bands had been replaced by informal inspections.[18] However, from 1610 onwards, fearing Spanish invasion after Spinola's successes in Cleves and Juliers, the Privy Council wrote to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen ordering them to revive the practice of general musters of the Trained Bands.[19] Once more men were needed to train and command the London Trained Bands and so in 1611 'by means of Philip Hudson, Lieutenant of the said [Artillery] Company, Tho. Laverrock, Rob. Hughs, Sam. Arthois, Rob. Greenhurst, and divers other Gentlemen and Citizens of London, this brave Exercise was renewed and set on foot again'.[20] To prevent 'Misconstructions of their honest Intent and Actions' they petitioned the Privy Council the following year for a warrant for their military training, which was granted in July.[21] The Artillery Company next applied to the Armourers' Company to use their hall for holding courts, general assemblies and feasts, promising to provide brass, pewter, spits, linen, plate and other necessaries in replacement of those that they might spoil or deface — it would appear that regimental dinners had a reputation even in the 17th century![22] By the time of the general muster

in September 1614, when the number of the London Trained Bands was increased from 3,000 to 6,000 men, those of the 20 captains appointed to lead them not already members of the Artillery Company were then admitted.[23] One of their number, Sir Martin Bond, had even been a captain of the London Trained Bands at Tilbury, providing a tidy link with the revived Artillery Company's 16th-century counterpart.[24] Moreover, at the building of the new armoury in 1622, a poem written by Henry Petowe, Marshall of the Artillery Company, demonstrates that the Company looked to the Fraternity of St George as their forerunners when he wrote that the Prior of St Mary Spittle:

> Did passé it [the ground] by Indeuture bearing date,
> Ianuaries third day, in Henry's time,
> The eigth of that name, the Convent did conjoyne.
>
> Vnto the Guyle of all Artillery,
> Crosse-bowes, Hand-guns, and of Archery.[25]

The Fraternity of St George, Captains of the Artillery Garden and Artillery Company were all connected by a clear succession of conscientious men with patriotic motivations providing military training for their fellow London citizens on the same ground. The choice of St George as the Fraternity's patron saint stemmed from his religious, soldierly, patriotic and chivalric connotations.[26] The religious and patriotic motivations for defending England against Catholic Spain's Armada are obvious. Amongst the members of the 17th-century Artillery Company, the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 meant that the practice of arms became both a God-given and a patriotic duty. Like many others in England, they demonstrated an acute awareness of the Protestant cause on the Continent. In the numerous sermons preached before the Company, clerics exhorted members to not 'bee insensible of what our neighbouring Nations do beare and groane vnder'.[27] The large number of members with Huguenot and Dutch origins would almost certainly have sympathised with their forebears' cause.[28] Furthermore, Christians had always viewed the Church as the spiritual Israel but English Calvinists went further and believed that they were the 'chosen' Israel, that is Judah, the kingdom comprised of the two tribes of Israel that remained faithful.[29] They did not view the other tribes of Israel as corrupt but just that the English were especially dear to God, which gave them responsibilities as well as privileges.[30] This led to a patriotic obligation for England to aid other Calvinist nations with troops or money.[31]

Very few members of the Artillery Company actually served in the English armies that volunteered for the Protestant cause on the Continent, but this was because that was not their intended role. Being God's 'chosen Israel' did not exempt England from punishment. As the Artillery Company were reminded in their sermons, war was God's punishment for sin.[32] God had dealt much more favourably with England than her Continental neighbours by blessing her with many years of peace.[33] Yet, as Thomas Dekker complained, peace was intended as a blessing but Englishmen had begun to take it for granted and had slipped into all manner of vices, becoming 'panders, harlots, buffoons, knaves'.[34] Moreover, in an era when having experienced battle was 'as much a criterion for full masculinity as having had sex', for Richard Niccols, the neglect of the practice of arms in these times of peace had led young men to 'Put on the habit, looks, lockes, pace and face/ Of tender women, to their beards disgrace'.[35] Therefore, the poems of Dekker and Niccols and the sermons preached to the Company praised them for practising arms, even though it was peacetime, for it was not known when God might punish England for her vices with an invasion by the Catholic armies of Europe.[36] Indeed, this was the ethos summed up by the Artillery Company's motto, 'Arma Pacis Fulcra' — 'Armed Strength for Peace', which appears at the bottom of the Company's coat of arms. These were almost certainly granted to the Company at the time of its revival in the 1610s but bear many similarities to the arms used by the Fraternity of St George.[37]

Additionally, while Christians had never been in any doubt that 'The LORD is a man of warre' and the preachers to the Artillery Company demonstrated close familiarity with just war theory, there had been a shift in the late Elizabethan and early Stuart era

from the perception of war as a justifiable necessity to the vindication of soldiering as a worthy profession.[38] For example, Lewis Roberts, admitted to the Company in 1627, declared that 'The Art Military is of its selfe so Excellent, that it is fit for the knowledge of all Noble Personadges, and a quality most especially necessary for Kings and Princes'.[39] However, although honour was generally associated with the aristocracy, all popular chivalric romances took the stance that honour was achieved through virtuous deeds, rather than passively acquired through birth.[40] It was believed that many of the aristocracy at the court of James I and especially of Charles I had betrayed their honour by conspiring with papists, misleading the king and wasting their inheritances on idle pastimes.[41] Instead, those of lower birth could achieve 'true nobility' if they demonstrated good character.[42] Therefore, military author and Company member John Cruso claimed that noble birth did not constitute sufficient claim on military office and cleric Thomas Adams blasted 'carpet-Knights'.[43] Dekker praised the Artillery Company for fulfilling the gap in honourable and chivalric values left by the nobility.[44] That said, not all contemporaries were convinced. George Parfitt demonstrated that Ben Jonson, in his *A Speech according to Horace*, was not, as historians like Lyndsay Boynton have thought, eulogising the Artillery Company, but the poem in fact 'reveals that a gap formed when the gentle-born abandoned the field and abrogated their function, thus creating a dangerous vacuum. That vacuum was filled by men whom Jonson could not believe were capable of fulfilling the roles they were playing'.[45] The comparisons between the siege of Breda and the Company's training and between Tilly and Hugh Hammersly (President of the Company) are 'sly comic balancing of essentially different codes and roles'.[46]

Yet, as Boynton argued, 'To treat Elizabethan, or Jacobean, drama as a major source for writing military history, however, is as unreasonable as it would be to write the social and economic history of the 1930s from drawing-room comedies, or of the 1950s from "kitchen sink" plays'.[47] This is not to say that such sources are not useful but just that they must be put in context. The 'self-conscious professionalism' of soldiers in England in the 17th century has often been under-estimated, as Barbara Donogan highlighted, 'in part because so many came from and returned to civilian life'.[48] Modern mindset equates military professionalism with standing armies but contemporaries took a Tacitean and Machiavellian approach that praised citizen armies and warned against standing armies, which they inextricably linked with political absolutism.[49] Charles I's plans for a 'perfect militia' that encouraged the Trained Bands to drill more regularly and achieve higher standards between 1629 and 1634 had already aroused fears of royal tyranny.[50] Military critics often exaggerated their opinions in order to justify their point of view and many of the failings of Elizabethan and Jacobean armies were shared by foreign contemporary armies.[51] Furthermore, Keith Roberts demonstrated how the location of the Artillery Company within the City of London meant that the wealth of the City was invaluable in financing a higher standard of military training than in the shires and the close proximity to central government meant that their compliance with official standards was more likely to be met.[52] Much of the Artillery Company's funding came from the members' own pockets, which as men 'of the best sorte and men of good meanes' they could well afford.[53] Preachers urged citizens unable to serve in the Company themselves to help fund their training and the Court of Aldermen gave regular financial support.[54] As officers of the London Trained Bands, Company members were financed on a much more generous scale than their counterparts in the shires — colonels received £50 for expenses and captains were given £20 to pay for colours, drums and scarves and £5 to pay junior officers at each muster, whilst in Essex captains and junior officers had to meet their own expenses.[55] The Artillery Garden was often used as the testing ground for new initiatives, such as trials to ascertain the optimum amount of gunpowder necessary to discharge a musket and for a new weapon combining a longbow and pike.[56] Moreover, when the Company's training of the London Trained Bands fell below par, their close proximity to central government meant that they could not ignore demands for improvement, as an exchange between the

Privy Council and City government in 1616 shows.[57]

This is not to say the Artillery Company men were perfect. Niccols noted in 1615 that they were 'more rash and turbulent, then discreet and wel advised & lesse instructed & trained then well furnished and appointed'.[58] In short, they had all the gear and no idea. However, in comparison to their counterparts in the shires, they were streets ahead. A succession of men who had served in the English armies on the Continent, such as Edward Panton, John Bingham and Philip Skippon, were appointed to the position of Captain-Leader to train the Company in the new Continental methods of warfare.[59] Their work was aided by the huge increase in military textbooks being produced, many of which were by Company members, such as Cruso's translations of Continental authors (at least one of which was written at Skippon's request), William Bariffe's observations' made during training in the Artillery Garden and Bingham's *Tactiks of Aelian*, the second part of which was written as a parting gift to the Company.[60] By the outbreak of civil war in England, even hostile observers like the royalist author of *A letter from Mercvrivs Civicvs to Mercurius Rusticus* noted the improvement in the Company's drill in modern tactics and manoeuvres.

Like many other social groups, civil war in England divided the Artillery Company, although the majority of the Company sided with Parliament and their vehement religious and political commitment to the cause suggests a strong connection between pre-war military idealism and subsequent dedicated political partisanship. The only Artillery Company men appointed to command the London Trained Bands in May 1642 who deserted to the King were Marmaduke Rawdon, Edmund Foster and Richard Hackett.[61] The regiment of foot raised by Rawdon became known as 'The London Regiment' because nearly all the officers were from London but only Robert Peake, Robert Amery and Isaac Rowlett were Artillery Company members.[62] Crypto-royalist James Bunce resigned his commission in the Trained Bands but remained in London, maintaining his position as alderman.[63] Nicholas Crispe also remained in London to organise money, intelligence and support for Charles I, disguising himself as either a fisherman or a butterwoman, but fled to Oxford when the House of Commons intercepted a letter claiming that £3,700 was owed to him 'for secrett service done for his Majesty'.[64] The Artillery Company men who sided with Parliament were much more numerous. Following Charles' bungled attempt to arrest the five Members of Parliament in January 1642, Skippon was appointed Sergeant-Major-General of the City forces and on 29 March the Militia Committee was established, which increased the Trained Bands from 6,000 to 8,000 men organised into 40 companies within six regiments, instead of four.[65] 40 new officers were appointed, the majority being men of long service in the Artillery Company.[66] In May, in front of members of both Houses of Parliament and prominent citizens of the City, the first parade of the re-formed Trained Bands took place.[67] The event was intended to demonstrate the City's support for Parliament's cause and encourage other counties to follow suit.[68] No expense was spared and the event was regarded a resounding success.[69] The only tarnish on the day was to Alderman Thomas Atkins' underpants, when he was surprised by sudden musket fire — an incident for which he had shreds torn mercilessly off him by royalist balladeers.[70]

Whilst in reality the reasons why so many of the Artillery Company fought for Parliament may have been many, complex and at times inexplicable, the defence of 'true' religion was the reason repeatedly stated, thus connecting back to the Artillery Company's pre-war religious and patriotic beliefs. This is not to say that the Artillery Company's concern for the plight of fellow-Calvinists on the Continent and desire to champion Protestantism at home automatically led them to prepare for religious war in England. Royalist propaganda like the pamphlet *Persecutio Undecima* may have tried to allege this but as Conrad Russell maintained, the majority in England in 1642 did not want civil war and so both sides portrayed themselves as the moderate side and blamed the other for being the extremists who started the war in order to justify their subsequent actions.[71] Yet once civil war had broken out, pre-existing religious zealousness provided a convenient justification to overcome the stigma of rebelling against an anointed sovereign. For

example, according to Bulstrode Whitelocke, Artillery Company member Rowland Wilson felt obliged by his conscience to 'undertake this Journey, as persuaded that the honour of God, and the flourishing of the Gospel of Christ, and the true Protestant Religion might in some measure be promoted by this service'.[72] Whilst this information is from a sympathetic source (Whitelocke was to marry Wilson's wife after his death), it would be wrong to become hoodwinked by royalist propagandists, such as William Winstanley, who argued that for men like another Company member John Venn, religion was merely 'the Stalking Horse in those Times for them who meant to ride in the Chair of Preferment'.[73] These were sincerely held beliefs. It is unsurprising that in a society like 17th-century England, where religion was so bound up with the everyday life that politics sought to govern, that parliamentarians turned to religion to justify their political actions. Indeed, there is little evidence that the Artillery Company members' attitudes were unique to themselves or to parliamentarians in general.

However, although the Artillery Company members' beliefs may not have been unique, Barbara Donagan has shown how the actions and capabilities of Civil War armies were shaped by the pre-existing mental and moral formation of soldiers and it was the Artillery Company's ability to draw upon a long tradition of religious and moral vindication of military endeavours that enabled them to make the London Trained Bands an effective fighting unit.[74] The London Trained Bands rank and file throughout the Civil Wars were conscripts and as a result their commitment to the parliamentarian cause was uncertain and desertion common.[75] Yet, by convincing them that they fought for God's cause and would receive divine assistance, the Artillery Company officers achieved the seemingly impossible and persuaded the Trained Bands to stand firm and fight. Chaplains, who were ideologically committed to the cause and had links to London parishes, were employed to preach before the troops.[76] The Artillery Company officers' colours heralded the divine assistance that accompanied the parliamentarian cause.[77] Colours were very important in a time of few uniforms and were the rallying point in the heat of battle, so the rank and file cannot have failed to notice the message and as colours were a matter of pride to be protected at all costs, soldiers would have gradually adopted the symbolism as their own.[78] Above all, the Artillery Company officers had at their disposal books of devotion for use in the field aimed at common soldiers, written by their Captain-leader, Philip Skippon. *A Salve for Every Sore* promoted a practical faith that illustrated God's promises to never abandon his own in their plight, for their sufferings were in his cause.[79] Skippon followed this with the publication of *True Treasure, or, Thirty Holy Vows*, which provided soldiers with 30 simple catechisms to guide their moral lives.[80] Moral codes helped maintain discipline, essential for military effectiveness. Furthermore, the Cavalier ethos was one of social superiority that gave royalists self-confidence in battle, but by insisting on a high standard of morality amongst his soldiers, Skippon gave them a sense of self-righteousness that boosted their own self-confidence against the royalists, who had a reputation of being able to 'out swear the French, out-drink the Dutch, and out paramour the Turk'.[81]

The success of the Artillery Company officers' persuasions is apparent in the actions of the London Trained Bands' soldiers. According to the royalist newsbook *Mercurius Aulicus*, the 'regular' parliamentarian army was 'not pleased for with the zealous company of the new Auxilliaries, and … there were great differences and distractions raysed amongst them from the time of their first comming to the Army'.[82] Whilst *Mercurius Aulicus* desired to maximise discord within the parliamentarian camp, it is noticeable that it was the Trained Bands' zealousness, presumably referring to their religious and moral attitudes and belief in the parliamentarian cause, which the newsbook picked up on as the cause of the discord. At the First Battle of Newbury on 20 September 1643, which was the London Trained Bands first major pitched battle, Sergeant Henry Foster, of the Red Regiment of the London Trained Bands, noted that it was the 'courage and valour God gave unto them this day' that made them stand 'like so many stakes against the shot of the Cannon, quitting themselves like men of undaunted spirits, even our enemies themselves being judges'.[83] Indeed,

the royalist Earl of Clarendon's testimony can counter any claims of bias on Foster's part, when the earl proclaimed that 'the London train-bands and auxiliary regiments (of whose inexperience of danger or any kind of service beyond the easy practice of the postures in the Artillery Garden, Men had tell then too cheap an estimation) behaved themselves to wonder; and were in truth the preservation of that Army that day'.[84] Similarly, whilst Foster's account, which was written for a public audience, may have had religious clichés added to show how God was on the parliamentarians' side, the Red Regiment's resolve to give thanks to God every 20 September at St Botolph's Aldgate for their 'victory' at Newbury shows that the belief that their cause was God's cause was persistent amongst the London Trained Bands.[85] The belief that God would take sides in earthly battles was not unique to the Artillery Company but it was precisely because this was a common belief that their ideals resonated with the Trained Bandsmen and provided a useful tool for the Artillery Company officers to work with. Historians must guard against the patronising and disrespectful assumption held by those like Charles Carlton that religious motivations and concepts of honour were the preserve of the officers and that soldiers simply fought for pay and plunder.[86]

This is not to say that the London Trained Bands were either invincible or impeccably behaved but that their officers' leadership skills were crucial in determining their effectiveness. For example, it was Sir William Waller's failure to respect the London men under his command that made his situation at Cropredy Bridge in June 1644 hopeless and contributed towards a hopeless situation for the London men under the Earl of Essex at Lostwithiel. The demoralisation of defeat at Cropredy Bridge on 29 June caused the London men to cry for home but instead of trying to address their concerns, Waller merely complained and consequently they deserted.[87] Furthermore, his previous poor treatment of Artillery Company officers meant that they were unwilling to bring him reinforcements.[88] Waller's success with the London Trained Bands earlier that year at Cheriton had largely been due to the leadership of Company member Richard Browne.[89] Although the meticulous training of the Artillery Company for elaborate displays in the Artillery Garden made them much more adept for set-piece battles than for the sieges, small actions and surprisals being waged by Waller, as Roberts argued, 'The crux of Waller's problem was a difference in perspective. He saw the trained bands as a contingent under his direct command and they did not'.[90] Despite their auxiliary status, the London men were proud men. As the force of the City of London, their allegiance was to the City authorities, whom they likened to 'the fam'd Senators of ancient Rome', and were jealous of their privileges and semi-autonomous government.[91] They saw themselves as Roman conquerors who trained in the *campus martius* of the Artillery Garden, the original site of which stood on a military training ground belonging to the Romans themselves.[92] Whilst Waller was left immobilised at Cropredy Bridge, Essex viewed the cause lost at Lostwithiel and fled to safety at Plymouth, leaving Skippon to clear up the mess. Fortunately, Skippon 'gained better conditions from the Enemie, then was expected' and his utilisation of the Artillery Company's Christopher Whichcote, sergeant-major-general of the London brigade, in the negotiations shows that he had not alienated their support.[93] In the arduous march back to London, Skippon endeavoured to maintain morale and pleaded for fresh supplies of arms and clothes for his men.[94] In fact, Waller and Essex's mistreatment of their officers and disrespect for their soldiers ultimately led to the dissolution of their commands at the New Model Army's formation, whilst Skippon's popularity and commitment to the parliamentarian cause meant that his place within the new military regime was assured.

The formation of the New Model Army in 1645 signalled a welcome end to military campaigning for the London Trained Bands but the religious and political commitment of many of the Artillery Company Officers to the parliamentarian cause meant that they played an integral role in the political developments that followed. They continued to exercise the London Trained Bands, who were used for policing duties in the City of London, such as escorting royalist prisoners from the Battle of Naseby through London.[95] Like the outbreak of civil war in

1642, the debates over proposed settlements with the defeated king divided the Artillery Company as it divided the rest of the country. However, the most forward supporters of the parliamentarian cause in 1642 were, by and large, the most fervent supporters of the developments that led to the establishment of the Commonwealth, again suggesting a link between pre-war military idealism and subsequent dedicated political partisanship. For example, Randall Mainwaring, who had raised a regiment of foot in 1642, assisted in the suppression of royalist tumults in the City throughout the 'Second Civil War'.[96] Thomas Pride, who had joined the army raised by Parliament under the Earl of Warwick in 1642, conducted his famous purge of Parliament and Skippon himself carried out a similar purge of the Common Council to enable the trial of Charles I.[97] Skippon, Pride, Thomas Atkins, Rowland Wilson, Robert Tichborne, Owen Rowe, Edmund Harvey and John Venn were all appointed commissioners for Charles' trial.[98] Skippon, Atkins and Wilson refrained from attending, for reasons that are uncertain given their compliance in the measures that facilitated the trial and their subsequent involvement in the Commonwealth government, although it may be presumed this was due to political caution.[99] However, Pride, Tichborne, Rowe, Harvey and Venn all attended and Pride, Tichborne, Rowe and Venn signed the death warrant.[100]

With the settlement established by the Commonwealth, the London Trained Bands were ordered to disband and thus the Artillery Company's activities ceased, but their previous religious and political commitment to the parliamentarian cause meant that once peace became threatened, their power was immediately revived.[101] In 1654, Cromwell discovered a royalist plot in the City and so revived the London Trained Bands under Skippon's command.[102] On 29 March the following year, the Lord Mayor and Trained Bands Captains applied to Cromwell to revive the Artillery Company to better discipline the citizen soldiers. They promised to only admit those well-affected to himself and recommended Skippon to resume his post as Captain-leader, which Cromwell duly approved.[103] The presence of three regicides, John Barkstead, David Axtell and John Hewson, amongst the new entrants shows that indeed only those well-affected to Cromwell were admitted.[104] Moreover, the Company's continued commitment to their religious and patriotic ideals is shown by the revived custom of the annual sermon that preceded the annual feast, which was presumably the reward for sitting through the 50 minutes or more of the sermon![105] Such political partisanship, which may have excluded previous members, led some to argue that the re-formed Artillery Company was not the same body as the one that had existed prior to the Civil Wars. For example, William Manby, who had previously been treasurer, refused to deliver up the Company's valuables that he had been entrusted with during the Civil Wars for reasons that are unclear, except the slight hint that he did not regard the Company as the legal successor to the one to which he had previously been treasurer.[106] Whilst it is not entirely unlikely that the real reason for Manby's refusal was because he in fact no longer possessed the valuables (indeed, some of the older members of the HAC will tell you that his wife had sold them and spent the money …), Manby could not have pleaded this excuse if such cynicism over the newly re-formed Company had not existed. Nevertheless, the Artillery Company's partisanship to the Commonwealth regime practically died with the Protector, in whose funeral procession they marched.[107] The City government, which had always harboured royalist sympathies despite London's parliamentarian reputation, proved very co-operative of the regime that restored the Rump Parliament and ultimately the monarch.[108] They put the London Trained Bands in a state of readiness to prevent tumults that might have arisen in those uncertain times, dismissed Skippon as Commander-in-Chief and replaced him with General Monck, as well as sending Robert Tichborne and John Ireton (the Company's President and Vice-President respectively) to the Tower.[109] The Artillery Company were required to lead the London Trained Bands in participating in Charles II's triumphant re-entry into London and the rest, as they say, is history.[110]

In conclusion, whilst the existence of the Honourable Artillery Company is not 'time out of mind', the 17th-century Artillery Company certainly looked back to the 16th-

century Captains of the Artillery Garden and Fraternity of St George as their forerunners, which were founded in the long tradition of volunteer citizen militias in the City of London.[111] With these the Artillery Company also shared a tradition of training and commanding their fellow London citizens. They turned for their inspiration to the religious and patriotic ideal of fulfilling England's role as God's 'chosen Israel' by preparing against God's wrath when England had failed to meet her own religious and moral standards. These ideas were not unique to the Artillery Company and 'puritan' enthusiasm alone was not enough to fuel dedicated military training. The wealth of the City funded regular training and the watchful eye of nearby central government ensured that this training was up to scratch. The standards achieved by regular, well resourced training meant that by the outbreak of civil war in England the Artillery Company was able to ensure a higher level of discipline amongst the men of the London Trained Bands when, 'the trained bands of the counties were anything but trained'.[112] On campaign, 'experience was to show that, while the London trained bands had their shortcomings, including a consistent dislike among their members of the hardships of campaigning, the large numbers of infantry which they were able to provide and their ability to fight in set-piece battles made them a major military factor in the campaigns in southern England'.[113] Moreover it was the Artillery Company's ability to draw upon a long tradition of religious and moral vindication of military endeavours that enabled them to convince the London Trained Bands that they fought for God's cause and would receive divine assistance, which kept the Trained Bands fighting throughout the hardships of campaigning and created a dedicated parliamentarianism that was to continue well into the 1650s. Thus, 'Under their "Captains of the Artillery Garden", these [the London Trained Bands] were the most efficient and dedicated body of foot soldiers in England. Not a large claim perhaps, given the military state of the realm. But everything is relative, especially in war. Without the relatively effective Trained Bands, there could have been no civil war, let alone an eventual Parliamentary victory'.[114]

Notes

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[16] J Strype *A Survey of the Cities Of London and Westminster* (1720), vol 5, 457; *Acts of the Privy Council* 1588, p 172.

[17] Raikes *op cit* (note 7), 58–9.

[18] L Boynton *The Elizabethan Militia 1558–1638* (1967), 210.

[19] *Acts of the Privy Council* 1613–14, p 559; Boynton *op cit* (note 18), 212; Strype *op cit* (note 16), vol 5, 457.

[20] Strype *op cit* (note 16), vol 5, 457.

[21] *ibid.*, vol 5, 457; Raikes *op cit* (note 7), 58–9.

[22] G A Raikes *The History of the Honourable Artillery Company* (1878), vol 1, 40–1.

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[24] Goold Walker *op cit* (note 6), 21.

[25] J Stow & A Munday *The survey of London containing the original, increase, modern estate and government of that city, methodically set down … begun first by the pains and industry of John Stow, in the year 1598; afterwards inlarged by the care and diligence of A.M. in the year 1618; and now compleatly finished by the study & labour of A.M., H.D. and others, this present year 1633* (1633), 765.

[26] Taylor *op cit* (note 11), 111–13.

[27] J Leech *The trayne souldier A sermon preached before the worthy societie of the captaynes and gentle men that exercise armes in the artillery garden. At Saint Andrew-vndershaft in London. Aprill 20. 1619* (1619), 18.

[28] G Goold Walker 'Huguenots in the trained bands of London and the Honourable Artillery Company' *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London* 15:2 (1935), 300–16, at 303; O P Grell *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London: the Dutch Church in Austin Friars, 1603–1642* (1989), 144.

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[32] T Adams *The souldiers honour Wherein by diuers inferences and gradations it is euinced, that the profession is iust, necessarie, and honourable: to be practised of some men, praised of all men* (1617), 3; A Gibson *Christiana-Polemica, or A preparatiue to warre Shewing the lawfull vse thereof. The iust causes that may moue thereunto. The necessitie of preparation for it. The duties of those that wage it. Together with diuers instructions concerning it. A sermon preached at Wooll-Church in London, before the captaines and gentlemen that exercise in the artillerie-garden vpon occasion of their solemne and generall meeting. Aprill 14. 1618* (1619), 2; T Sutton *The good fight of faith A sermon preached at Saint Mary-Acts in London, vnto the gentlemen of the Artillery Garden, the 19. of Iune, 1623* (1624), 416–17; J Davenport *A royall edict for military exercises published in a sermon preached to the captaines, and gentlemen that exercise armes in the artillery garden at their generall meeting. In Saint Andrewes vndershaft, in London, Iune 23. 1629* (1629), 11–12.

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[35] C Carlton *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638–51* (1992), 5; R Niccols *Londons Artillery briefly containing the noble practise of that worthie societie: with the moderne and ancient martiall exercises, natures of armes, vertue of magistrates, antiquitie, glorie and chronography of this honourable cittie* (1616), 8.

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[38] Adams *op cit* (note 32), i and 21; Sutton *op cit* (note 32), 407 and 417–18; Gouge *op cit* (note 36), i; Gibson *op cit* (note 32), 22–3; Trim *op cit* (note 29), 1031.

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[41] *ibid*, 205–6.
[42] *ibid*, 208.
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[44] T Dekker *VVarres, vvarre[s,] vvarres* (1628), 11.
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[46] *ibid*, 90.
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[49] R B Manning *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (2003), 11.
[50] M C Fissel *English Warfare, 1511–1642* (2001), 79; R B Manning *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702* (2006), 155.
[51] Hammer *op cit* (note 13), 7–8.
[52] K Roberts 'Citizen soldiers: the military power of the City of London' in S Porter (ed) *London and the Civil War* (1996), 89–116, at 91.
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[54] Leech *op cit* (note 27), 65; Davenport *op cit* (note 32), 15–16; London Metropolitan Archives, Repertories of the Court of Aldermen, vol 39, fol 566.
[55] Boynton *op cit* (note 18), 263.
[56] *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, 1638–39, pp 18–19; W Neade *The double-armed man, by the new inuention briefly shewing some famous exploits atchieued by our Brittish bowmen: with seuerall portraitures proper for the pike and bow* (1625), 5.
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[58] Niccols *op cit* (note 35), 104.
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[60] J Cruso *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie* (1632), viii; J Cruso *A short method for the easie resolving of any militarie question propounded* (1639), iii; J Cruso *Castrametation, or, The Measuring Out of the Quarters for the Encamping of an Army* (1642), iv; W Barriffe *Military discipline: or, the yong artillery man* (1635), vii; J Bingham *The Art of Embattailing an Army, or the Second Part of Aelian's Tacticks* (1631), iv.
[61] City of London. Committee for the Militia, *The Names, Dignities and Places of all the Collonells, Lieutenant-Collonels, Serjant Majors, Captaines, Quarter-Masters, Lieutenants and Ensignes of the City of London vvith the Captaines Names according to their Seniority and Places* (1642); Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fols 14b, 44b and 77b; R Davies (ed) *The Life of Marmaduke Rawdon of York* (1863), xix; K Roberts *London and Liberty: Ensigns of the London Trained Bands* (1987), 36.
[62] S Reid *Officers and Regiments of the Royalist Army* (1985–87), vol 4, 149; Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fols 37, 65 and 70.
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[67] E Hyde *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, to which is added an Historical View of the Affairs of Ireland* (1819), vol 1 pt II, 720; Journal of Common Council, vol 40, fol 3.
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[70] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fol 45b; A Brome *Rump, or, An exact collection of the choycest poems and songs relating to the late times by the most eminent wits from anno 1639 to anno 1661* (1662), 136.

[71] R Chestlin *Persecutio undecima. The Churches eleventh persecution. Or, a briefe of the Puritan persecution of the Protestant clergy of the Church of England: more particularly within the city of London. Begun in Parliament, Ann. Dom. 1641* (1648), 56; C S R Russell 'Why did people choose sides in the English Civil War?' *The Historian* 63 (1999), 4–10, at 4.

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[73] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fol 23; W Winstanley *The loyall martyrology, or, Brief catalogues and characters of the most eminent persons who suffered for their conscience during the late times of rebellion either by death, imprisonment, banishment, or sequestration together with those who were slain in the King's service* (1665), 130.

[74] B Donagan *War in England 1642–1649* (2008), 10–11; Donagan *op cit* (note 48), 367.

[75] Firth & Rait *op cit* (note 65), vol 1, 241–2; Goold Walker *op cit* (note 6), 26.

[76] *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, Addenda, p 664; *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol 4, 38; A Laurence *Parliamentary Army Chaplains, 1642–1651* (1990), 10 and 87.

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[78] Carlton *op cit* (note 35), 83.

[79] P Skippon *A salve for every sore, or, A collection of promises out of the whole book of God, and is the Christian centurion's infallible ground of confidence* (1643), 91.

[80] P Skippon *True treasure, or thirty holy vows, containing a brief sum of all that concerns the Christian centurion's conscionable walking with God* (1644), iii–vi.

[81] Carlton *op cit* (note 35), 53 and 59.

[82] *Mercurius Aulicus*, no. 35 (27 August–2 September 1643), 480.

[83] H Foster *A true and exact relation of the marchings of the two regiments of the trained-bands of the city of London being the red & blevv regiments, as also of the three regiments of the auxiliary forces the blew, red, and orange who marched forth for the reliefe of the city of Glocester from August by Henry Foster* (1643), 13 and 14.

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[85] *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, 1658–59, 138.

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[87] *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, 1644, 324.

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[92] Dekker *op cit* (note 34), 17; Niccols *op cit* (note 35), v, viii and 10; Milward *op cit* (note 36), 25; J Stow *A suruay of London Contayning the originall, antiquity, increase, moderne estate, and description of that citie, written in the yeare 1598* (1598), 129.

[93] England and Wales Army *The copie of a letter from the Lord Generall his quarters. Certifying, how the Lord Generals horse brake through the Kings army; and how Major Generall Skippon fought like a lion, and gained better conditions from the enemy then was expected; the Kings fortes [sic] having before intended to put all our foot to the sword* (1644), 5; British Library, Sloane MS 1983B fol 14 — treaty between the royalist and parliamentarian forces at Lostwithiel, 2 September 1644; Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fol 66.

[94] G. S. *A True relation of the sad passages between the two armies in the west shewing the perfidious breach of articles by the Kings partie* (1644), 8 and 12; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, 1644, 503.

[95] Raikes *op cit* (note 22), vol 1, 142; Manning *op cit* (note 50), 228.

[96] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fol 23; City of London, Committee for the Militia, *At the committee of the militia of London the 3d. of Iune, 1648* (1648).

[97] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fol 72; Nagel *op cit* (note 5), 67; *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol 6, 93, 95 and 99; D E Underdown *Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution* (1971), 143; R L Greaves & R Zaller (eds) *Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century* (1984), vol 3, 181.

[98] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fols 37, 65 and 78b; Firth and Rait *op cit* (note 65), vol 1, 1253–4.
[99] Whitelocke *op cit* (note 72), 363; C E L Phillips *Cromwell's Captains* (1938), 155. Beaven *op cit* (note 63), vol 2, 180.
[100] M Noble *The Lives of the English Regicides* (1798), vol 2, 132, 150, 272 and 283.
[101] Raikes *op cit* (note 22), vol 1, 143.
[102] Highmore *op cit* (note 2), 78–9.
[103] Raikes *op cit* (note 22), vol 1, 157.
[104] Honourable Artillery Company Archives, Ancient Vellum Book, fols 91, 92b and 98.
[105] Goold Walker *op cit* (note 6), 75.
[106] *ibid*, 65–6.
[107] *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, 1658–59, 187.
[108] See I Roy '"This Proud Unthankefull City": a Cavalier view of London in the Civil War' in Porter *op cit* (note 52), 149–74 and R Ashton 'Insurgency, counter-insurgency and inaction: three phases in the role of the City in the Great Rebellion' in Porter *op cit* (note 52), 45–64; Journal of the Common Council, vol 21, fol 206.
[109] G Goold Walker 'The Trained Bands of London' *Journal of the Honourable Artillery Company* (August 1939), 359–64, at 359; Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts* (1876), 167.
[110] Raikes *op cit* (note 22), vol 1, 166.
[111] Blackwell *op cit* (note 37), i.
[112] A Woolrych *Battles of the Civil War* (1961), 36.
[113] Roberts *op cit* (note 52), 90.
[114] Hunt *op cit* (note 12), 231.

LONDON'S CITIZEN SOLDIERS, 1757–1908

Peter B Boyden

Introduction

The 'citizen soldiers' of the title are the men who while not fulltime or regular soldiers, served (mostly as foot soldiers) during crises to help protect the country from invasion and maintain pubic order. The unpopularity of the standing army in the years immediately after the Civil Wars made it preferable to maintain a small regular, or standing, army and to augment it when required — be that for campaigning overseas or for aiding the civil power at home.

It was possible to place a heavy reliance on part-time soldiers for home defence duties because in the strategic thinking of the years covered by this paper the Royal Navy was the first line of defence against an invader, and so long as the Navy ruled the waves the chances of a successful invasion were low. The regular army constituted the second line, with the auxiliaries the third. As there has been no successful foreign invasion of the British Isles since 1066, the effectiveness of its auxiliaries in the home defence role was never tested and is difficult to evaluate.

London represents a special case in any consideration of the defence of the country in this period. It was the seat of government, the economic and communication centre of the country and its largest conurbation. It is also at a particular disadvantage from a defensive point of view given its proximity to the coast and the Continent, while the navigable Thames Estuary, a prime reason for London's successful development, was also a major threat to its security. Given its constitutional and ceremonial status, Household troops and the Honourable Artillery Company were often to be seen in the streets of London, and except in wartime there was a greater concentration of soldiers in London than any other British town before the development of Aldershot and other garrisons during the second half of the 19th century.

Reorganisation of the militia 1757–92

On the outbreak of the Seven Years War in 1756, a worldwide conflict between Britain and France, the size of the regular army rose from 34,000 to 50,000 men. After an unsuccessful attempt to establish a militia, or home defence force, 62,000-strong, in 1757 an Act of Parliament was passed establishing a 32,000-strong militia raised by ballot. This was copied from the Prussian model and comprised men aged between 18 and 45 with a minimum height of 5ft 4in, who served for three years, undergoing training for 28 days annually. Those who did not wish to serve could pay £10 to provide a substitute. Militiamen received a guinea when they were called out for full-time (or embodied) service

in the event of an invasion or other crisis and were paid at the same rates as regulars. The City of London was excluded from this legislation and its Trained Bands, a similar organisation, remained in being until 1794.

The militia was embodied when there were fears of invasion during the Seven Years War (1756–63), and between 1778 and 1793 in the American War of Independence after the French had joined the colonists' side. So, in 1778 the 1st West Middlesex Militia was encamped at Coxheath, near Maidstone in Kent, the 2nd East Middlesex at Dover Castle, and the Westminster Militia on Southsea Common, ready to engage any French invaders who might land on the south coast. The Middlesex Militia was also embodied in December 1792 for the suppression of 'London Insurrection' and then maintained in fulltime service until 1802.

Wars of the French Revolution, 1793–1802

Following the abolition in 1794 of the Trained Bands, the East and West London Militia were raised, which, with the East and West Middlesex and Westminster Militia, constituted the militia regiments of what for the purposes of this paper defined the London area. The embodied militia was expected to fight with regiments of the regular army and to come under the command of its senior officers. In addition, regiments of Volunteers were raised as the last line of defence, and particularly to engage any invaders who eluded the regular troops or militia, as well as giving aid to the civil power in the event of unrest or rebellion. Most Volunteers were from the higher strata of society as many of them had to pay for their uniform and weapons. They might serve as infantry, cavalry or artillery, and membership of a Volunteer regiment guaranteed exemption from the militia ballot or, should it have been introduced, conscription into the regular army. For these and patriotic reasons service in the Volunteers was popular, as can be seen from the fact that in July 1801 the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, reviewed a total of 4,738 men from some 42 London infantry Volunteer corps in Hyde Park.

Napoleonic Wars, 1803–15

The militia ballot was suspended at times between 1806 and 1813 and recruits were obtained by beat of drum, that is, through the use of recruiting parties, except in the City where the Militia Acts did not permit the recruitment of volunteers for the militia. In Middlesex during 1810, 273 recruits were obtained by beat of drum, 519 substitutes were added to the rolls but the county's militia was still 239 men short in November. An Act of 1806 allowed militia regiments to serve outside Great Britain provided the men voted to do so, and this explains the stations of the Middlesex Militia regiments in the years 1812–14: the East at Portsmouth in June 1812, moving to Bristol in April 1813, and Ireland in July, where it remained in May 1814; the West Middlesex was in Ireland in 1812, returning to Nottingham in July 1813, where it was still stationed in May 1814; the Westminster was also in Ireland in 1812, but between June 1813 and May 1814 was stationed at Peebles. The East and West London Militia regiments spent the months of January or February at Greenwich, but were otherwise based in the City, very much a local defence force of citizens defending their homes.

Many of the City's regiments of Volunteers listed in the 1804 *Volunteer List* were formed from among the staff at business houses and government offices: the Bank of England, Custom House, Excise Office, East India Company — three battalions of infantry plus artillery, Law Association, Cities of London & Westminster Cavalry, Loyal London — 11 battalions strong, and the London River Fencibles. In all there were 18 Volunteer corps in Westminster and 26 in the rest of Middlesex.

The in-letter book of the Inspecting Field Officer of Volunteer Cavalry and Infantry in London District between 1803 and 1809 highlights some aspects of Volunteer soldiering. In January 1804 the Commander-in-Chief was concerned whether the Volunteers were 'in a state fit for actual Service'; in December 1804 it was ordered that each volunteer was to have 74 rounds of ammunition for practice in March and September; in April 1805 the King began weekly reviews of Volunteers in Hyde Park,

reduced in November 1807 to four per year between March and November only; in August 1805 'in consequence of intelligence received by Government of the embarkation of large Bodies of Troops in Holland, of a Fleet of Men of War being ready to sail & of the increased preparation of the French at Boulogne & in the neighbourhood' all Volunteers were 'to suspend all Furloughs for working during the Harvest till further Orders'; in June 1806 in preparation for Nelson's funeral they were 'to wear a Crape on the left arm below the elbow' and muffle their drums; and in July 1809 the Life Guards, Foot Guards and Volunteer Corps that helped put out a fire at St James's Palace were thanked by the King.

In 1808 legislation allowed for the amalgamation of Volunteer infantry into battalions of Local Militia, although none were formed in London or Middlesex. Most of the Volunteers were disbanded in 1814, but some remained in being, and the London & Westminster Cavalry, Westminster Cavalry and Royal East India Volunteer Infantry were still training in 1820.

The numbers of men who served in the Royal Navy and the Army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were very large and the total killed was proportionately higher in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15) than in the First World War. In May 1804 in London and Middlesex 205,000 men were available for ballot, of whom 20,900 (or 10%) were serving in the forces. In April 1808, some 4,500 men were serving in the militia of London and Middlesex with a further 33,370 in Volunteer units. These ranged in size from the 34-strong Edmonton Cavalry to the Queen's Royal Infantry that numbered 1,122.

The Militia was reorganised in 1852 into a force 80,000 strong raised by voluntary enlistment. It was embodied during the Crimean War (1854–56) and the Indian 'Mutiny' (1857–59). If three quarters of the men serving agreed, a regiment could serve overseas, as the Royal Westminster Militia did during the Crimean War. By performing garrison duty in the Mediterranean it released regular troops for active service and was awarded Battle Honour 'Mediterranean'.

The Age of the Volunteers 1859–1908

In 1859 sabre-rattling by the Emperor Napoleon III led to fears of a French invasion of Britain and groups of citizens offered their services to the War Office under the terms of the 1804 Volunteer Act, which rendered them liable only to serve in their own locality. The 1st London Corps was formed that year and soon grew to 15 companies divided between two battalions. Three more corps were formed in 1861; and a fifth in 1862, but it did not last beyond the end of 1863. In Middlesex a total of 27 Rifle Volunteer Corps were formed, of which the 1st, which acquired that designation in 1859, was a continuation of the Duke of Cumberland's Sharpshooters, an earlier formation allowed to continue as a rifle club after the general disbandment of volunteers in 1814. In 1835 it had obtained permission to be styled The Royal Victoria Rifle Club and in 1853 was permitted to become a Volunteer Corps.

Most Corps were locally based — the 3rd Middlesex at Hampstead, the 13th at Hornsey, and the 14th at Highgate, for example. Some discrete units were also formed, such as the 15th Middlesex Corps, composed of Scots; the 20th from among employees of the London and North Western Railway with its headquarters in Euston Square; the 27th from staff of the Inland Revenue at Somerset House; the 49th from General Post Office employees at St Martin le Grand; and finally the 38th from among the painters, sculptors, musicians, actors and other artists within easy reach of its headquarters at Burlington House. In 1860 the rifle companies were absorbed into Administrative Battalions; in 1880 the battalions were consolidated into corps; and in 1881 became Volunteer Battalions of regular regiments — of the Royal Fusiliers, Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment), King's Royal Rifle Corps and Prince Consort's Own (Rifle Brigade).

A report of 1888 by the Assistant Adjutant General on 'The Defence of London' noted that 'London is the heart and soul of the British Empire' and suggested that its security from external attack could be improved by augmenting the Navy, increasing the military forces around the capital, and erecting fortifications. It was noted that

a regular soldier cost £60 pa, a militiaman £12, and a volunteer £4, while forts cost around £100,000 each. It was acknowledged in 1897 that in the event of an invasion, there was a need for the 'defensive forces, and particularly our Volunteers, to perform, under favourable conditions, their respective duties'. However, their abilities were never tested as no invasion ever occurred.

Volunteer soldiering was a popular middle class pastime as it increased an individual's standing in society without the danger of active service in the face of the enemy. Smoking concerts, parades and prize presentations were regularly reported in contemporary local newspapers, partly because the volunteers were regular readers of the local press who liked to see themselves mentioned in its pages. While some volunteers served (illegally) overseas during the 1860s in the American Civil War and with Garibaldi in Italy, legitimate overseas service was possible for men of the 24th Volunteer Battalion of the Rifle Brigade — the Post Office Rifles — who were enlisted as regulars for 12 months and became the Army Post Office Corps which provided postal services for troops on active service overseas. They first saw action during the 1882 expedition to Egypt. An appeal was made for two officers and 100 other ranks to volunteer for the campaign, but 350 men put their names forward and they all served. The following year a Telegraph Company formed and the Field Telegraph Corps enrolled on the reserve strength of Royal Engineers. In due course both of these Corps would become a permanent part of the Royal Engineers.

Boer War, 1899–1902

After the British reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso during the so-called 'Black Week' of December 1899, the Government agreed to let volunteers serve against the Boers. Battalions of Imperial Yeomanry were formed, Volunteer Service Companies raised by many infantry regiments, and most of these formations received big send-offs when they left for the front early in 1900. Probably the most high profile of these war-raised units was the City Imperial Volunteers which was formed on the initiative of the Lord Mayor of London, Alfred Newton. The cost of creating the CIV, some £115,000, was raised in the City. It numbered 1,550 strong and was composed chiefly of infantry, although it included, artillery and 400 mounted infantry. Men from the Honourable Artillery Company and various London volunteer battalions joined, and were enlisted as regular soldiers.

The CIV Mounted Infantry saw action at Jacobsdal on 15 February 1900 during French's advance to relieve Kimberley. The infantry marched from Cape Town to the Orange River, served in the advance to Bloemfontein, took part in the invasion of Transvaal, including the Battle of Doornkop, near Johannesburg, on 29 May. When the army reached Pretoria on 5 June Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, issued an order praising the CIV for marching 500 miles in 51 days and taking part in 26 engagements with the enemy. After the occupation of the Boer republics the CIV joined other troops in the unsuccessful hunt across the veldt for the Orange Free State commander General Christiaan de Wet. In its seven months at the front the CIV fought a total of 30 battles and skirmishes, lost six men killed in action, had 65 wounded, 37 died of disease and 130 invalided home. The remainder left Pretoria on 2 October to begin the journey back to London and a heroes' welcome.

Some militia regiments also served in the Boer War: the Royal East Middlesex left for South Africa on 19 February 1900 and the Royal Westminster on 4 June 1901.

The considerable outpouring of patriotic fervour seen during the early months of the Boer War, when many men abandoned their civilian careers to 'save South Africa for the Empire', was the result of the growing concept of a worldwide British Empire linking people who had emigrated to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the development of the 'cult' of the Queen Empress. By 1899 British society had become increasingly militarised — in 1877 6.36% of the male population aged between 15 and 35 was serving in the auxiliary forces; by 1898 22.42% of the UK's male population aged 17 to 40 had military experience, some of regular service but most as auxiliaries. More than 818,000 men passed through the Volunteers between 1859 and 1877, and a further 935,000 served in the militia between 1882 and 1904.

Post-Boer War reforms and legislation

The Boer War brought to public attention a number of deficiencies in the organisation, structure and command of the Army, and during the years after the peace of May 1902 a succession of reports into these problems was published and legislation introduced and administrative changes made to overcome them. Among the areas tackled was the organisation of the auxiliary forces, which were brought together into the Territorial Force with effect from 1 April 1908.

The Militia became Special Reserve Battalions of infantry regiments: for example, the Royal East Middlesex Militia (to use its 1804 title) had become the 4th Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment in 1881. Renumbered as the 6th in 1900, it transferred to the Special Reserve in June 1908 as the 6th (Extra Reserve) Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. Volunteer Battalions were redesignated as Territorial Battalions of regular infantry regiments, except in London where a wholly Territorial London Regiment was formed. So, the 38th Middlesex Rifle Volunteers became the 28th (County of London) Battalion The London Regiment (Artists Rifles). Territorial soldiers were only liable to serve overseas if they voted to do so, otherwise their obligations were limited to home defence.

Conclusion

This paper has outlined how for a century and a half London's citizen soldiers contributed to the defence of the capital and the country. In practice this had not meant fighting in the streets of London but of being ready to do so, of undertaking garrison duty elsewhere in the United Kingdom and overseas, and fighting the Queen's enemies in South Africa. Many of those in the Territorial Force in 1908 would have a chance to engage with her grandson's foes across the Channel during the First World War.