

ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH HISTORY.

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
(Continued from page 358.)

SUCCESSIONS TO THE ENGLISH THRONE.

It is remarkable that both the royal families of Tudor and Stuart ascended the English throne in violation of statute law.

The Tudors claimed by their descent from John of Gaunt and Catherine Swynford. This person was his mistress ; but on his subsequent marriage with her, their children were made legitimate by an Act of Parliament of Richard II., in which, however, their succession to the throne was expressly barred. Henry VII. was born of Margaret Beaufort, great-grand-daughter of John of Gaunt and this Catherine Swynford.

The following is their genealogy :—




It was, however, agreed between the chiefs of the White and Red Rose parties, during the usurpation of Richard III., that Henry Tudor, son of Edmund, should, if he succeeded in deposing Richard III., ascend the throne, and marry Elizabeth of York, the daughter of Edward IV., and consequently the heiress of the crown.

In spite, therefore, of the Act of Richard II., expressly barring the succession against the descendants of John of Gaunt and Catherine Swynford, their great-great-grandson succeeded to the throne in the person of Henry VII. With the view of strengthening the posi-

tion of Henry VII. on the throne, an important Act of Parliament was passed by him, to which frequent reference has been made in subsequent times. This Act was to the effect that no one obeying a *de facto* King of England should be liable to punishment for treason, in the event of that King's deposition by another claimant of the Crown. This has always been regarded as a very wise enactment, and with good reason. The succession of James I. to the throne of England was also in direct contrariety to the law. Henry VIII. was empowered by Act of Parliament to determine (or, as lawyers say, to limit) the succession to the throne by any deed which he might execute, as by a will signed by his hand. In the exercise of this power he made a will settling the succession, first upon his own children, and next, failing their issue, upon the heirs of his younger sister, Mary, Duchess of Suffolk, instead of the heirs of his elder sister, Margaret, wife of James IV., King of Scotland. Notwithstanding, however, this statutable limitation of the crown by Henry's will, James VI. of Scotland (who was great-grandson of the aforesaid Margaret, Queen of Scotland) succeeded to the English throne by the general consent of the nation. Thus the authority of Parliament was, in this instance, violated. A quibble was indeed raised by the lawyers at the time of James's accession, to the effect that Henry's will was not duly signed; but it was a mere quibble, unworthy of notice.

The relationship of Elizabeth to James I. was as thus:—



Thus Elizabeth was first cousin, twice removed, to James I.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION SEEN IN
THE REBELLION.

An eminent author observes: "The freedom of religious opinion inculcated by the Reformation, was calculated inevitably to extend itself also to State affairs."

This remark is a *key-note* in the history of modern Europe since the Reformation. Hume speaks of an universal fermentation of mind about the beginning of the seventeenth century." Of this intellectual activity the Reformation was a principal cause. To it was, in great measure, owing the movement in favour of *civil* liberty under the Stuarts, which ended in the Revolution of 1688. The habit of discussing opinions, and of calling authority into question in religious matters, would invariably extend itself to civil and political affairs.

The truth of this remark is confirmed by the fact that those countries in which the Reformation took root, such as Holland and England, became the seats of civil liberty, while, on the contrary, those countries where Romanism has prevailed, such as Spain, Italy, and France, have been noted for the despotic character of their Governments.

CONNECTION OF EVENTS IN THE REBELLION.

The Long Parliament met November 3, 1640, and the King raised his standard August 23, 1642; so that the conduct of the Parliament drove the King, *in a year and ten months*, to take up arms against it.

During this year and ten months a great number of important events took place, of which the principal were as follows, viz.—

The execution of Lord Strafford, May 12, 1641.

The passing the Act declaring that Parliament shall not be dissolved except by its own consent, which is regarded as the overthrow of royal authority, May 10, 1641.

Acts abolishing the Star Chamber and the High Commission, July, 1641.

There were other minor Acts passed this year, tending to the removal of grievances and the diminution of regal power, some being directed against the Established

Church. In fact, in the course of this year 1641, Charles I. conceded all the demands of the Commons, satisfied the more moderate part of the nation, and began to turn in his favour the tide of popularity. Moreover, by his journey into Scotland in August of this year, and the satisfaction he gave the malcontents there, he appears to have brought that nation into tranquillity under his government.

On his return to London in November of this year (1641) he was received with signs of affection, and everything seemed to promise a settlement of the disputes between the King and his people. It was evidently on account of the good understanding now beginning to spring up again in the nation, and with the purpose of resuscitating popular distrust and ill-will towards the King, that Pym and those who followed him (for at this moment Pym was undoubtedly "master of the situation") brought forward, passed, presented to the King, and, before he could reply to it, published to the nation, the famous Grand Remonstrance and Petition, December 1, 1641.

It was a most offensive manifesto, totally uncalled-for by Charles's recent conduct, a manifesto which could not fail to irritate in the highest degree a sensitive and high-tempered King, and which was exactly calculated to revive feelings of resentment and alienation among the people. It consisted of no less than 206 Articles, bitterly recounting every harsh or illegal act that had been done by the Government since the King's accession.

It had exactly the effects which it was calculated to produce—it set the mobs of London insulting the Bishops and assembling in a tumultuous manner about the Palace of Whitehall, where the King was then residing; while the conflicts which daily took place between this threatening multitude and the King's body-guard, who were posted for the defence of the palace, tended still more to raise ill-blood among the people. On the other hand, it evidently drove the King and his advisers into extreme measures, for only a *month* afterwards he made that fatal attempt to seize the five members in the House of Commons, January 4, 1642.

This proceeding, very much coloured in the accounts which the House published concerning it, and exaggerated

and misrepresented in report, set everything in a flame, and it soon became clear that a civil war must be the result. Henceforth, till the King raised his standard, *Aug. 22nd* in that year, the time was passed on the part of the Commons in making exorbitant demands upon the King, especially for the command of the *militia*, and by both parties in preparations for war, which were hardly disguised. The Commons seized the Tower of London with all its ammunition, and kept the King out of the fortified town of Hull, which he had attempted to secure. They passed a Bill giving themselves the control of the militia, and when the King had refused his assent to it, they nevertheless directed that it should be carried into effect, thus usurping an undoubted prerogative of the Crown in the most flagrant manner (*May 5th, 1642*).

Hereupon it is to be observed that Hyde, Falkland, and other moderate members go over to the King.

The Parliament follow up their aggression by voting that an army be raised, appointing the Earl of Essex Captain General.

This was on the *2nd of August*, and on the *22nd* the King, now forced to appeal openly to arms, raised his standard at Nottingham.

The first engagement took place at Edge Hill, in Warwickshire, on the *23rd Oct.*, 1642, but was indecisive in its results. Next year, *Sept. 20th*, 1643, the first Battle of Newbury was fought, without much effect on either side, but with the loss of Lord Falkland to the King's army and counsels. In the following year, 1644 (*July 2nd*), took place the Battle of Marston Moor near York, in which, chiefly through the aid now given by the Scots to the Parliamentarian army, Prince Rupert and the Royalists were totally defeated. This battle lost York to the King.

On the *27th Oct.* in the same year (1644) occurred the *second battle of Newbury*, which was at the time indecisive, but which led to the most important result in the NEW MODELLING of the army of the Parliament. This *new modelling* of the army, being quite a crisis in the war, deserves particular attention.

The history of it is as thus:—Cromwell and some leading men of his party who were engaged in the battle, considered that the Earl of Manchester who commanded

and the other generals of his party (the Presbyterian) did not push their advantages as they might have done, and they suspected that they were not desirous of hastening the conclusion of the war by routing the King's army. They therefore determined to take the command of the Parliamentary forces from Manchester, Essex, and the officers who acted with them, and lodge it in their own hands. We shall soon see how they effected their purpose. Meantime, in January 30th, 1645, three months after the second battle of Newbury, negotiations were opened at *Uxbridge* for a treaty of peace between the King and Parliament; but as the demands of the Parliament required nothing less than the abolition of Episcopacy, to which Charles was conscientiously attached, the suppression of the Liturgy, and the absolute control of the army and navy, the negotiations, after lasting about three weeks, were broken off without any result. About six weeks after this (April 3rd) Cromwell and his party carried out their plan of superseding the Earls of Manchester and Essex, by the celebrated "SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE," which ordained that no Member of Parliament should in future hold any military office or command. This ordinance effectually deprived Essex and his colleagues of their military posts, while Cromwell himself and a few officers of his own party, who like him were Members of Parliament, and *whom he wished to retain in the Army*, were specially excepted from the operations of the ordinance. Hence by this manœuvre he contrived, while excluding the principal officers of the other party, to keep himself and his friends in their military command. The army, now commanded by Fairfax, with Cromwell, the really leading spirit, immediately under him, was otherwise remodelled, so as to be composed chiefly of Independents, men animated by the sternest fanaticism, and prepared to go all lengths in hostilities against the King. The Cavaliers called this formidable host, in derision, the "*new Noddle*," instead of the "*new Model*," but they soon found that their witticism was misplaced. For up to this time the Royalist forces had maintained almost an equality with their opponents, and had balanced their loss at Marston Moor and elsewhere by several important successes, especially in the *West*. But a little *more than two months* after the "Self-

denying Ordinance" and the "New Model of the Army," occurred (June 14th, 1645), the battle of Naseby, so fatal to the Royalist fortunes. This was Charles I.'s last pitched battle; and the remainder of the war was nothing but the successive capture of all the Royal garrisoned forts and towns in the West, North, and South of England; *the surrender of Bristol*, Sept. 10th, 1645, by Prince Rupert, after a feeble defence, being the most considerable of those final blows to the King's power.

Finding his affairs desperate, Charles, in the next year, left Oxford (which had been his principal headquarters during the war), and surrendered himself to the Scotch army, near Newark, May 5th, 1646, *about a year after Naseby*. The Scots used all their endeavours to induce the King to take the covenant, as the condition on which they would stand by him and support his cause; but failing, after many efforts, to extract this concession from him, and having received from the English Parliament one half of the £400,000 which they claimed for their assistance, the Scots delivered up the King to the Commissioners of the Parliament, January 30th, 1647, that is, a little more than half a year after he had placed himself in their hands. Charles was now sent by the Parliament to Holdenby House, in Northamptonshire. Whilst he was there, great disputes broke out between the Parliament, which was almost wholly Presbyterian, and the army, which was as decidedly Independent. These disputes chiefly arose from the determination of the Parliament, (1st) to require every officer in the army to accept the Presbyterian Church polity; (2nd) to disband a great part of the army; and (3rd) to send the remainder, officered by Presbyterian commanders, to Ireland, which had been in rebellion since 1641. With the view of gaining their point against the army, the leading party in the Parliament proposed to secure the authority of the King's name in their favour; and in order that they might conveniently come to an agreement with him, they resolved to bring him up from Holdenby to some place near London.

Hereupon the army party, of which, as you know, Fairfax and Cromwell were the two chiefs, took the bold step of seizing the King's person, and thus preventing the Presbyterian majority in Parliament from securing

him on their side. A party of horse, under Cornet Joyce, suddenly presented themselves at Holdenby, June 4th, 1647 (about half a year after the King had been delivered by the Scotch to the Parliament), and took possession of his person. This act of the army-party leaders is to be noticed as the most decided instance that had yet occurred of the rupture between the army and the Parliament, and of the supremacy which the former was beginning to obtain over the latter. In a few weeks the army-leaders lodged the King at Hampton Court; and here took place the remarkable attempt of Cromwell and his friends to bring him to terms with them independently of the Presbyterian or Parliamentary party.

Charles entertained their proposals and negotiated with them, but at the same time carried on a correspondence with their rivals the Parliamentary chiefs. He unfortunately had such confidence in the strength of his own position, as being courted by both parties, and in his own diplomatic skill, as to suppose that he could play off the one party against the other, and induce each party to compete with the other in offering terms to secure his adhesion. The detection of these dealings on the part of the King decided the army party to break off all negotiations with him, and so threatening became the conduct and language of the soldiers around him, that Charles resolved on making his escape from Hampton Court. He fled towards the south, but was captured by Colonel Hammond, and placed in Carisbrook Castle on November 14th, 1647, *i.e.*, about half a year after he had been seized by the army at Holdenby. From his imprisonment at Carisbrook to his execution at Whitehall (January 30th, 1649), there intervened about a year and two months.

The most remarkable incident during his captivity at Carisbrook was the *Treaty of Newport*, between the *Parliament* and the King, which was opened September 18th, 1648, and ended November 27th following. The state of affairs which attended the beginning, continuance, and failure of this treaty must be considered, in order that we may understand the significance of the occurrence itself. By this time the army had greatly overborne the Parliament, which had become very desirous of throwing off the yoke of the military powers. To effect this purpose, the

Parliament proposed to make peace with the King, so that they might have him on their side against the army.

Cromwell, with many of the military leaders and a considerable portion of the army, being now absent from London, and engaged in crushing a Royalist-Presbyterian insurrection of Scots under Duke Hamilton (who, by the way, was defeated at the Battle of Preston), the Parliament, regarding the opportunity as favourable for opening negotiations again with King Charles, set on foot the treaty.* Charles, after much debating of the points submitted to him, agreed to most of the terms demanded by the Parliament. He consented—1st, to leave the militia to its disposal; 2nd, to commit to their hands the reduction of Ireland (which had been in rebellion and confusion since 1641); 3rd, to pass an Act of Oblivion; and 4th, to allow for a limited time the Presbyterian system to be established in England—though he did not entirely accept their proposals about religion.

On December 5, the Parliament votes “that the King’s concessions were sufficient grounds for a settlement.” Thus everything seemed to bid fair for a pacification. But here the army, which had by this time returned from its expedition, openly interfered with the strong hand to prevent the accomplishment of the treaty; and on the next day after the above-mentioned vote (December 6th, 1648), a Colonel Pride, acting under the orders of the army chiefs, came with a body of soldiers to the House, took into custody forty-seven of the members as they were entering, and excluded ninety-seven others, all who were thus treated being the most favourable to a reconciliation with the King. This notable proceeding received the name of “*Pride’s Purge*.” The House thus reduced, and now known as the “Rump” Parliament, being quite under the dictation of the army, quickly reversed all the recent proceedings in favour of treating with the King, voting on December 13th that the late treaty (of Newport) was “dishonourable and dangerous,” and on the 23rd of that month, that the King should be brought to trial as guilty of treason towards the people. Next month, January, 1649, they appoint the Court of

* On this occasion Charles again committed the error of spinning out the negotiations, when despatch was indispensable to his interests.

Justice to try him, with Bradshaw for its president. The King is brought three times before it (January 20th, 22nd, and 23rd), but refuses to acknowledge its jurisdiction. He is condemned, January 27th, to be put to death, and the sentence is carried into effect January 30th, 1649.

NOTES ON THE REBELLION.

The three more *immediate* causes of the Rebellion against Charles I. were: (1) the religious opposition of the Puritans; (2) the conspiracy among the adherents of the King in the year 1641, for bringing up the army to overawe the Parliament, the plan of which the King was known to have countersigned; and (3) the arrest of the five members.

There are a few leading points to be attended to in this history which will help to explain its events.

(1.) We observe that, as usually happens in the progress of revolutions, the more moderate party that opposed the Court were, at each successive crisis, overborne by the more violent. Thus, early in the Rebellion, the extreme party, headed by Pym, Hampden, Cromwell, and Ireton, urged on in Parliament the measures which drove the King to take up arms, and prevailed over the more moderate opponents of the Court, such as Falkland, Hyde, and a few who went with them. These latter wished that opposition to the King should cease after that he had conceded the demands originally made upon him; but now that the passions of men had been thoroughly heated, the majority were indisposed to follow temperate counsels.

When the war had begun, the more violent men, such as Cromwell, Ireton, and Vane, ultimately gained the ascendancy over the more moderate, such as the Earl of Essex, the Earl of Manchester, and others, carried the war to extremities, and prevented all the numerous attempts at a reconciliation, such as the Treaty of Uxbridge, from being successful. Again, when the King was in captivity, the more violent party broke off the Treaty of Newport, which had nearly been concluded with him by the more moderate party; and, finally, the

party that were determined upon his death, triumphed, as we know, over those who wished to treat him with more lenity. The same repeated predominance of violence over moderation is to be observed in the different stages of the great French Revolution.

(2.) In religious matters the Presbyterians were at first the dominant party; but afterwards, the Independents, who were more turbulent and fanatical, and who had greater influence upon the army, gained the ascendancy.

(3.) We may observe that in the course of the rebellion, the army gained the entire ascendancy over the Parliament.

In revolutions it usually happens that the power of the sword ultimately predominates. Such was the case in the civil wars of Rome, and in the French Revolution. Observe that the magnates of the army in our rebellion twice coerced the Parliament by open force, by "purging" it, as they said—that is, by violently ejecting from it all who were their opponents. At last Cromwell, whose ascendancy was immediately owing to his success in the field, having with the concurrence of the principal officers forcibly dissolved the remainder of the House of Commons, proceeded to establish a military dictatorship in his own person.

(4.) The violence of the measures of the Rebellion, and in particular the murder of the King, led to the wonderful reaction which took place in favour of the monarchy. The ardent loyalty of the Convention Parliament which restored the King, and still more, the enthusiastic obsequiousness of the next Parliament, form a striking proof of the force of this reaction.

(5.) The extravagance of the religious sectaries, and the constant controversies which were carried on, wearied and disgusted the nation, and disposed it to the restoration of the Church of England.

Thus both in civil and ecclesiastical revolutions extreme violence defeats itself, and often ends in a return to the original status of things.

NOTES ON THE LATTER PART OF CHARLES THE FIRST'S HISTORY.

The history of the time between the King's surrender of himself to the Scots, May 5th, 1646, and his execution, January 30th, 1649—a period of little more than two years and a half—is very important, as showing the state and the conflict of parties, and the causes which led to the death of the King, and the establishment of the Commonwealth. So complicated a passage of our history can only be understood by a study of its details.

With regard to the causes which brought the King to the scaffold, the able author of the "Pictorial History" says: "The pen of an industrious writer might fall from his hand in despair if he undertook to detail at length the numerous subsidiary causes which brought about the tragical catastrophe."

One of the chief of these causes was the prevalence in the army of the violent party called "the Levellers," who first came into prominent notice during the King's stay at Hampton Court, in the autumn of 1647. His party gave much trouble even to Cromwell, who appears to have felt himself compelled to fall into their designs against the King, in order that he might preserve his own ascendancy.

These "Levellers" were advocates of the wildest kind of republic, looked upon the King as a serious obstacle to their plans, spoke of him as "Ahab;" and so early as during the stay at Hampton Court, openly demanded his blood. This party was, without doubt, mainly instrumental in bringing the King to the scaffold.

Another main and original cause of the King's death, was, it must be admitted, his own want of good faith and straightforwardness of conduct, which prevented each party from trusting him. The want of confidence felt in the conduct he would probably pursue, if restored to the exercise of regal authority, induced the different parties who, at various times negotiated with him, to demand terms so high, that he would not grant them. It was his detected duplicity in holding correspondence with the Parliament and the Scotch Presbyterians, at the very time he was in treaty with Cromwell and the officers at Hampton Court, that led the latter to renounce all ideas

of holding further dealings with him. And the King himself helped to thwart the success of his negotiations with Cromwell and his party, by the delays which he interposed in treating with them, and by the higher tone which he assumed towards them, when he began to feel confidence that he should bring to a successful issue his negotiations with the English Parliament and the Scotch Presbyterians.

Afterwards, while the Presbyterian Parliament were endeavouring to make terms with him at Newport in the autumn of 1648, Charles still resorted to his inveterate practice of spinning out negotiations, and haggling about conditions, in the hope that he should be able to profit by the divisions existing between his adversaries, and so escape from some of the required concessions. The consequence of this conduct was that, when at last he had come to an agreement with the Parliamentarians at the Treaty of Newport, and had satisfied their demands, it was too late! The army had now returned from the expeditions it had been making in the North of England, in Scotland, and in Wales, and prevented the treaty from being carried into effect; and, lest he should succeed in gaining his throne by any future compact with the Presbyterian party, or by any reaction of the national feeling in his favour, determined, without delay, to get rid of him by a violent death.

The unfortunate king never seems to have contemplated the possibility that either party of his adversaries would have recourse to this method of solving the difficulty of its position. He believed, and even avowed his belief, that neither party could do without him.

The first flagrant instance of duplicity on the part of Charles, and which was ever afterwards remembered against him as a reason for distrusting him, and constantly employed as a justification of the conduct of his adversaries, occurred early in the time of the Long Parliament, so early as April, 1641. It was the sanction which, in spite of his concessions and conciliating language towards the Parliament, he was discovered to have given to a secret plan of several of his officers for bringing the army from the North to overawe that assembly. The insincerity of his negotiations with the different parties during his captivity, seems to have sealed his fate. The

dominant party felt that they could not come to terms with him, feared that he would make terms with their adversaries, and endanger their own interests and perhaps their persons also, and accordingly determined to remove him out of the way.

CHARACTER OF CHARLES I.

Charles I. had virtues and abilities, but not enough of the former to make him venerated or beloved, nor of the latter to make him feared. He was not wise enough to discern the temper of the times, or the necessities of his position, but cherished the false supposition that his lofty notions of regal power were practicable in that age. Accordingly, in the exercise of that power, he went to lengths upon which the Tudors themselves had not ventured, and thus irritated the temper and exhausted the patience of his subjects.

He had no confidence in his own judgment under emergencies, and consequently was perpetually changing his line of policy at the suggestion of different advisers. Unfortunately for his interests, he had a proud and irritable temper, which prompted him to his greatest mistakes, the abrupt dissolution of his Parliaments, and the enterprise of arresting the five members. He was greatly wanting in moral courage; witness his consent to the decapitation of Strafford.

Perhaps his most fatal fault was the want of sincerity, which deterred his opponents from placing confidence in his promises. His manners in his prosperous days were too lofty and distant to encourage much affection from those who surrounded him; hence we find him much betrayed and deserted, when the clouds of adversity began to gather around him.

His public character was chiefly of a negative kind. He was not cruel, he was not rapacious, he was not prodigal, he was not careless of the welfare of his subjects; but he was not distinguished by the opposite of any one of these vices. His administration is signalized by no wise laws, or great or useful institutions, and he was injudicious in the choice of advisers.

Altogether there was a poverty of character in

Charles I., regarded as a king, which disqualified him from being master of the difficult situations in which, through the bitterness of his opponents, and the spirit of the times, he was placed.

He was far better suited for an inferior or private station than for a throne; and, as I have heard it well observed, would have made "an excellent country gentleman." His virtues were those of private life; he was a good husband and a kind father; with all his imperfections, a good Christian, and a high-minded and accomplished gentleman.

Favouritism was one of the causes of the ruin of Charles I., as of many other weak and amiable princes, such as Edward II. and Richard II. before him. It was a strange infatuation by which he attached himself to his father's unworthy favourite, Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, an elegant but arrogant and insolent courtier, profligate and dissolute, and devoid even of the recommendation of superior abilities. Charles's partiality for this man greatly injured him in the estimation of his people, especially of the Puritans, and contributed to the unpopularity of his Government.

Charles I.'s encouragement of the fine arts, in which none of his predecessors shone, was the part of his conduct as King, for which he is entitled to unmingled praise. Architecture, painting, and sculpture flourished in England, under his fostering hand.

Like many others, Charles I.'s character shone more in adversity than in his prosperous days. He endured his reverses and sufferings with dignity and patience, seeking support and consolation in the exercises of religion. Indeed, his conduct in his latter days won the esteem of many of his enemies.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH.

It is remarkable with how consummate a combination of boldness and skill the leading Republican and Independent members of the Long Parliament (for though the Independents were Republicans, the Republicans were not all Independents) played their game against the King, and afterwards against the Presbyterians. They

seem never to have made a false move, to have neglected a point, or to have omitted a favourable opportunity. Nothing, on the other hand, could easily be more ill-advised than the conduct which the King pursued from the first meeting of the Long Parliament; now entering upon a course of coercion which he could not sustain, and uttering threats which he failed to carry out, and which only irritated and forewarned his opponents, now making concessions which deprived him of power, and by their weakness encouraged instead of conciliating his opponents. In the war, making frequent and fatal blunders, and after it precluding, by delays, by double-dealing, and by stipulations exorbitant in his fallen condition, all possibility of a pacific arrangement with any party.

On the other hand, the Presbyterians, though certainly better advised than the King, lost by a succession of political blunders that "mastery of the situation" which they had once gained in the contest with the King. Their hesitating management of the war lost them much of their control over the army, and the ill-timed imperiousness with which, under their direction, the Parliament attempted to keep down the army, after it had triumphed in the field, provoked the army to assert its independence of Parliament.

But the sagacity and dexterity of the leaders of the Republican and Independent party in the House seldom seemed to desert them in contending with the King, or afterwards with their Presbyterian opponents.

The leading members of this party were, besides Cromwell and Ireton, Sir Harry Vane, St. John, Harry Martin, Ludlow, and perhaps one or two others, cool, astute, and daring politicians, who kept their object always in view, and never faltered in their determinations, or hesitated at the measures, however violent, which appeared necessary to secure their ends.

THE TYRANNY OF DEMOCRACY EXEMPLIFIED IN ENGLAND.

After the execution of Charles I., the Rump Parliament, losing sight of the principles of liberty which they professed, took some of the worst leaves out of the book of despotism. They made it treason to affirm, in speech

or writing, that the Commonwealth was unlawful, usurped, or tyrannical; treason to deny the supremacy of Parliament; treason for any, not being of the army (of the army they were afraid), to stir up mutiny or insubordination therein. The press was put under as severe restraint as it had undergone in the time of the monarchy. The use of the Liturgy was forbidden under penalties.

The hand of democratic tyranny is usually heavier than that of despotism. The despot is in some degree restrained by the fear of personal consequences, and sometimes also by the sense of shame. The individual members of a democracy think, by their numbers, to escape human punishment, and they keep each other in countenance by their joint participation in wrongful and oppressive proceedings.

THE ACT OF UNIFORMITY OF 1662.

In the year 1862, being the bicentenary of the year in which the Act of Uniformity was passed and modern Dissent chiefly took its rise, much attention was called to the history of this enactment, which caused the expulsion of two thousand ministers from their livings in the Church of England.

To understand this historical event, it will be necessary to go back to the period of the Rebellion. At the earlier part of that period a large number of the clergy of the Established Church were cast forth from their benefices by the Roundheads. The number of clergymen who were then deprived of their stations in the Church is variously stated. Writers friendly to the cause of the Church of England put the number as high as seven thousand; adverse authorities put it at about two or three thousand.

Possibly it was between the two estimates, and certainly I am inclined to think it must have been higher than the latter estimate represents it. The charges on which these clergymen were expelled were various, such as immoral conduct, negligence in the discharge of their duties, unfitness for their positions, or false doctrine, as the ruling authorities regarded it, which in many cases was none else than the doctrine of the Established

Church. In fact, the Puritans, who now had the upper hand, turned out, to a very great extent, those clergymen whose tenets disagreed with their own. I would here mention, by the way, that the expulsion of the clergy for adhesion to their own Church and its doctrine was not universal; for we find, by their extant biographies, that some eminent divines, noted for their attachment to the Established Church, were permitted to retain their livings, and from their case we may safely infer that some others of like sentiments escaped the deprivation of their benefices.

It may also be noted that those clergy, who were deprived for their opinions, were by an ordinance of the Parliament pensioned with a *fifth* of the proceeds of their former livings. I would also here observe, as throwing light upon the treatment which the established clergy received from the dominant powers, that the public use of the Liturgy of the Church of England *was prohibited under severe penalties* by an ordinance of Parliament.*

Returning to the history of the doings of the Puritan authorities with respect to the benefices of the Church, I proceed to mention that the livings, which had been held by the deprived clergy, were chiefly supplied by ministers of the Presbyterian persuasion, although, no doubt, in some cases Independents, Baptists, and other sectaries were appointed. When the King was restored, all the *surviving* clergy, who had been deprived, were *restored* to the livings which they had originally occupied; but, as would necessarily happen in a period of eighteen years, a large number of the clergy of the Church of England, who had previously held benefices, had died. Their places had been, of course, filled by Presbyterian and other ministers. Hence when the restoration had taken place, there would be a very considerable number of livings in the possession of these ministers, livings of which there were no other lawful claimants.

It is well known that towards the end of the Commonwealth the Presbyterian party joined with the Cavalier

* N.B. As the King's assent was of course not obtained, the Parliament called its measures "Ordinances" not "Acts" of Parliament. In Plantagenet times there were "Ordinances" as well as "Acts" of Parliament, yet they had the royal assent.

party in promoting the Restoration of the King. The members of this party had many of them been in correspondence with the exiled King, who was then in Holland; the royalist rising of Sir George Booth, in Cheshire, which took place the year before the Restoration, was actively favoured and aided by the Presbyterians; and the majority of the Parliament which Monk called, and which restored the King, was composed of Presbyterians. Thus we see how much that party were concerned in the Restoration.

I proceed to mention that the Presbyterian ministers, occupying livings, the original incumbents of which had died, were willing to make a compromise with the Episcopalian or Church party, such as that the affairs of the Church should be governed by the bishops, conjointly with synods of the presbyters (*i.e.*, the clergy of the second order), and they were willing to accept the Prayer-book with a few alterations.

By the "Healing Declaration," as it was called, which Charles II. issued in 1660, as well in other ways, hopes were held out that these terms of the Presbyterian party would be accepted. The Healing Declaration promised, among other things which accorded with the views of the Presbyterians, that the bishops should not ordain or employ the censures of the church without the advice and assistance of the *presbyters*, that there should be in every diocese a council of presbyters, chosen by all the presbyters of the diocese, which together with the cathedral chapter should always advise and assist the bishop in the discharge of his more important functions, that the King should appoint an equal number of divines of the Church party and of the Presbyterians to revise the Liturgy, and (here I quote the exact words as they are important), "We shall leave all decisions of that kind (*i.e.*, about the Liturgy) to the advice of a *National Synod*, which shall be duly called." In the meantime (that is until this national synod should be called) a number of ceremonies, distasteful to the Presbyterians, together with subscription to the Prayer-book and the Thirty-nine Articles, were not to be insisted upon, nor was anyone to suffer in any way for refusing them. These were large concessions apparently. The Presbyterians gladly accepted them, and built upon them strong hopes that matters would be so accommodated as to enable that party

conscientiously to conform to the Established Church. But they were doomed to bitter disappointment. The Prayer-book was revised indeed, but by the Church party alone, and rendered even more offensive than before to the religious convictions of the Presbyterians. While all the ceremonies to which they felt objection were retained and enforced, the expressions in the Prayer-book to which they objected were also retained, other expressions equally offensive were added, and, as if to give them gratuitous cause of offence, some of the most questionable parts of the Apocrypha, a book against which they entertained strong objections, were added to the daily lessons of the Church. And to crown the whole work, and to render the position of the Presbyterian holders of benefices untenable, the *Act of Uniformity of 1662* was passed, ordaining that no one either then or afterwards should hold a benefice without making the following unqualified declaration of adherence to the Prayer-book: "I, A. B., do hereby declare my unfeigned assent and consent to *all and everything* contained and prescribed in and by the Book entitled the Book of Common Prayer and administration of the Sacraments and other rites and ceremonies of the Church, according to the use of the Church of England, together with the psalter or psalms of David, pointed as they are to be sung or said in churches, and the form or manner of making, ordaining and consecrating of Bishops, priests, and deacons."

All the then holders of livings were, by this Act, required, on pain of losing their livings, to make this declaration openly in church, before the Feast of St. Bartholomew, 1662. Of course this declaration was an obstacle which the conscientious Presbyterians could not surmount. Accordingly after St. Bartholomew's Day, 1662, they were ejected to the number of two thousand. Among them were some men eminent for piety, learning, ability, and zeal.

Of these, Richard Baxter, and Edward Calamy, were the most conspicuous. Baxter was offered a bishopric; but this, of course, he could not accept.* The ejected ministers were called "*Nonconformists*," and this name

* But query, was this offer made to him before or after the passing of the Act of Uniformity?

came to be given in common to *all* the Protestant sectaries besides, such as the Independents and Baptists: just as before the rebellion all Protestants who dissented from doctrines or rites of the Church of England were classed under the name of "Puritans." At the present day, all these denominations are designated by the title of "Dissenters," though occasionally the name "Non-conformist" is heard. The two thousand, and upwards, ejected Presbyterian ministers, were followed by a considerable number of laity; and from this secession modern dissent, in a great measure, took its origin. The ejected ministers, in the great proportion of instances, gathered severally around them congregations to whom they ministered, and, together with their hearers, suffered much persecution in the reign of Charles II., under the "Conventicle Act," and the "Five Mile Act," which prohibited their religious assemblies, imposing upon those persons who attended them stringent penalties of fine and imprisonment, and still more stringent penalties of the same kind upon the ministers themselves.

CAUSES OF THE EXPULSION OF JAMES II.

I. The appointment of an Ecclesiastical High Commission in violation of the Act of Charles I., abolishing all such Commissions.

II. The assertion of the King's power to *dispense* with the penal Laws against Romanists and Dissenters, and his conduct in accordance with that claim.

III. The seizure and alteration of the Charters of various corporations.

IV. The forcing the Popish members upon colleges at Oxford, upon Magdalene College in particular.

V. The prosecution of the seven Bishops for refusing to order the clergy of their dioceses to read in churches the King's illegal declaration of Liberty of Conscience.

THE SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE AFTER 1688.

At the Revolution, and by the *Bill of Rights*, the crown was settled on William and Mary, and on the survivor of

them ; then on any children of Mary ; then on Anne and her heirs ; then on any children William might have by a second marriage.

Mary died in 1694, before William, leaving no children. Thereupon was passed the *Act of Settlement*, ordaining that the crown should pass (if neither Anne nor William III. left any heirs), to Sophia, the Electress of Hanover, and her descendants. This Sophia was daughter of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, daughter of James I. It was also provided that whoever, after the death of Anne or William, without issue, should come to the throne, should "join in communion with the Church of England."

It had, before, been enacted (in the Bill of Rights), that no Papist should either succeed to the throne, or retain it, and no one marrying a Papist.

THE LEGITIMIST AND PARLIAMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION.

There have appeared at various intervals in our history two conflicting principles of succession to the throne—the Legitimist principle, and the principle of Parliamentary choice ; and we may observe that each of these principles of succession had triumphed in its turn. Thus the title of the House of Lancaster* was founded on the Parliamentary authority—that of the House of York on the Legitimist principle. In the succession of Henry VII. we see the triumph of a quasi-Legitimist principle, and the violation of Parliamentary authority ; for by that authority the descendants of Catherine Swynford and John of Gaunt had been expressly debarred from succeeding to the throne.

Again, in James I.'s accession to the English throne, we see the triumph of the Legitimist principle of succession *versus* that of Parliamentary authority ; for Henry VIII. had by a will, executed under authority of Parliament, excluded the descendants of the elder or Scottish branch of his family, and settled the crown on the descendants of the younger branch.

* The principle of hereditary succession had not obtained till Henry III.'s time.

On the other hand, in the exclusion of the male line of the Stuarts, we observe the claims of birth superseded by the right founded on Parliamentary enactments.

NOTES ON ENGLISH HISTORY, FROM THE PEACE OF UTRECHT
TO THE TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

The period which elapsed between the peace of Utrecht and that of Aix-la-Chapelle is perhaps the most uninteresting of any in our history since the Reformation. It was an age of corrupt politics, of sordid money-hunting, of lax opinions, lax morals, and slumberous indolence—an age in which literature and the arts sank into torpor under the influence of the two first Hanoverian kings.

The history of this period is rather difficult to follow, from the intricacy of the negotiations and treaties into which England entered with foreign powers. I propose to refer, in the first instance, to the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, as these terms enter largely into the subsequent polity of England. The articles of the shameful Treaty of Utrecht (1713) were mainly as follows:—

I. Louis XIV. recognized the House of Hanover, and renounced the cause of the Stuarts.

II. He agreed that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united.

III. The fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk to be destroyed.

IV. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Island of St. Christopher to be ceded to England.

V. and VI. Not worth naming.

VII. England to retain Gibraltar and Minorca, taken from Spain during the war. (N.B. The above were *all* the articles directly regarding the interests of Great Britain.)

VIII. Naples, Milan, Sardinia, and Belgium to be ceded by Spain to the Emperor.

IX. Sicily to go to the Duke of Savoy, and the eventual succession to the crown of Spain, in default of issue of the Bourbon King of Spain, Philip V., to be vested in the House of Savoy.

X. In addition to other places possessed by the

Dutch in Belgium, to strengthen their frontier against the French, there were assigned these four fortified places—Luxembourg, Namur, Charleroi, and Newport, as a perpetual barrier according to the stipulations of what was called the “Barrier Treaty,” which had been signed by England and Holland at the beginning of the year in which the peace of Utrecht was made.

At the same time that we made this treaty with France, we also concluded a treaty with Spain, which contained similar provisions against the union of the crowns of France and Spain. The only other condition of that treaty which need be particularized is the “Assiento,” as it was termed, which is worthy of notice as having afterwards entered into the notorious South Sea scheme, and into a subsequent treaty with Spain—the treaty of Seville (1729), a treaty which has been described by an historian of credit as “celebrated and advantageous to England.” This “Assiento” (the word means agreement, like assent) was an agreement on the part of Spain to give some country (it was *England*, by this Treaty of Utrecht) the exclusive right of importing negroes from Africa to the South American dominions of Spain. This monopoly had been held by a French company, but was now transferred to the English. I may observe, in passing, the great change of feeling on this subject, which must have taken place in England after about seventy years, when that traffic, which was a coveted prize to this nation, became an object of its abhorrence, and when we determined not only to give up the slave trade ourselves, but to use all our power to prevent others from carrying it on, as it is at this our day. The “lame and impotent conclusion” of the great war of the Spanish Succession, with all the exploits of Marlborough, was very much caused by the disgust of the English people at the length and the costly and sanguinary character of the war.

It was also the result of the party views of Harley and St. John, who saw in the war the means by which Marlborough and the Whigs aggrandised themselves. These Tory leaders, and especially St. John, were aiming at the restoration of the Stuarts, which could not be effected during a war with Louis XIV., the great patron of the Stuarts, and whose aid would probably be neces-

sary to their restoration; and, besides, the popularity which these Tory ministers of Anne would gain by ending the war would greatly aid the realization of their views.

The secret history of the last four years of Queen Anne's reign, which has only come out of late years, shows that these statesmen seriously contemplated the restoration of the Stuarts after the death of the Queen; and it is clear that Anne herself was favourable to the measure. We may, therefore, suppose that, but for her death at a critical time (1714), that family might again have ascended the British throne.

The strength of the Jacobite party lay chiefly among the landed gentry; while the *corporate towns*, with the *monied interest*, were decidedly on the Hanoverian side.

The Jacobites were all either Churchmen or Romanists; while the Dissenters, almost to a man, were attached to the Hanoverians. Hence it may be seen that England was nearly equally divided between the two parties, though the preponderance, on the whole, was with the House of Hanover, as the quiet, the indifferent, and the timid part of the community would naturally be disinclined to commotion and change.

The personal unpopularity of George I. and of George II. tended much to weaken the Hanoverian interest. It is generally believed that, but for the enormous bribery and corruption employed for strengthening the Government by Sir Robert Walpole, the astute Prime Minister of George I. and of his successor, the restoration of the Stuarts might probably have taken place. The clearest proofs of the strength of the Jacobite interest in the earlier years of George I. is supplied by the conduct of the Whig Government in passing the Septennial Act (1716).*

This Act ordained that the Parliament then sitting, and that all future Parliaments, should be continued for *seven* instead of *three* years, unless dissolved by the Crown. The Septennial Act was prompted by the fear lest, in the existing state of popular feeling towards the House of Stuart, a majority, or at least a large minority, of Jacobite members might be elected by the consti-

* The Triennial Act, then repealed, had been passed in 1694 (William III.).

tuencies. This, with other facts, explains the hopes entertained by the Stuart party, and accounts for the insurrections made for placing the Pretender on the throne.

Townshend, and General (afterwards Lord) Stanhope, with Walpole, were at first the principal advisers of George I.

Townshend may be considered as the Prime Minister, but the institution of Prime Minister (which is not even now recognised by the Constitution any more than is the Cabinet Council) had not then been fully established. One would say that Sir R. Walpole, who afterwards rose to supreme power, was the first of our modern Prime Ministers. In two years after George I.'s accession, Townshend and Walpole quarrelled with Stanhope, and the two former went out of office, leaving Stanhope Prime Minister. Stanhope died in 1721, suddenly, from the excitement caused by an attack made in the House of Lords upon the Government, in relation to their conduct about the notorious *South Sea Scheme*, by a certain Duke Wharton. After the death of Stanhope, the Earl of Sunderland, a clever, scheming man, who had been in the Government of Stanhope, was for a short time Premier. He, however, quickly resigned the post on account of his unpopularity in regard to the South Sea scheme, and was succeeded by *Sir R. Walpole*, who ruled almost as a dictator for nineteen years (1721—1742), the longest period that any Prime Minister, excepting Pitt, has ever held office.

The grand object of the Whig ministers, who came into power with the accession of George I., was (as regards foreign politics) to make the best of the shameful treaty of Utrecht, and to confirm its provisions against the union of the Crowns of France and Spain, to prevent which union had been the very object of the war of the Spanish Succession. The Whigs, under Anne, had originated and carried on that war, and were enraged that it should have been ended by so futile a treaty as that of Utrecht, which, as regards the succession, obtained no more effectual security against the dreaded union of the two Crowns than the engagement of Louis XIV. and his grandson Philip, King of Spain, that the Crowns should never be united; as if, even though both of the Kings

should keep faith, they could control the actions of their descendants. The immediate object of this war had been to guard against the union in the most effectual way, by placing an Austrian prince upon the throne of Spain, instead of Louis XIV.'s grandson, Philip. The other objects of George I.'s Whig ministers were to punish their predecessors, the Tory ministers of Queen Anne, for their French partialities and Jacobite intrigues, and to reverse all the policy which they had pursued.

I would here mention that under Townshend's administration the *Triple Alliance* was formed between the Regent of *France, England, and Holland* (1717).

The chief point of the Triple Alliance was the exclusion of Philip V., the Bourbon King of Spain, from the Succession to the Throne of France. This precautionary means was taken under the apprehension that Louis XV., then a sickly boy, might die, without leaving any children, in which case it was notorious that Philip V. of Spain, who was next to him in blood, would, in direct contravention of the Treaty of Utrecht, claim the Crown of France, and thus unite the two Crowns. The Regent of France, the Duke of Orleans, joined the alliance, because, if Philip of Spain were excluded, he would himself become King of France, in the event of Louis XV. dying at that time. It will be seen that this Triple Alliance was made in support of one of the chief provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht; but in the sequel there was no occasion to enforce its stipulations, as Louis XV. grew up after all to manhood, and had children.

Next year (1718) the Emperor joined this alliance of England, France, and Holland, and it became the *Quadruple Alliance*. Fresh terms were introduced, the principal of which was a modification of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which treaty Sicily, which had belonged to the Spanish Crown, was given to the Duke of Savoy, and Sardinia to the Emperor. By the Quadruple Alliance it was agreed that this arrangement should be reversed; and after a short war with Spain, called the war of Sicily (1718, 1719, 1720), in which our navy, under Admiral Byng (afterwards Lord Torrington), played a conspicuous and brilliant part, this object of the Quadruple Alliance was accomplished, Sicily was secured to the Emperor, and Sardinia to the Duke of Savoy, who

became King of Sardinia, and whose family, at the present day, rule over that island.

This war of Sicily occurred under Lord Stanhope's administration. It may be worth while to mention, in reference to *home* politics, that while Stanhope was Premier, and in the year 1718, two Acts of Parliament were passed for the relief of the Dissenters, one an Act to repeal the *Schism Act*, the other repealing the *Occasional Conformity Act*. A third Act, which pressed severely upon the Dissenters, the Test and Corporation Act, remained unrepealed; and it was not until the Duke of Wellington's administration in 1828, that the Test and Corporation Act was finally rescinded. I may mention, in passing, that even at the present day, the Dissenters are not wholly without restriction, though of a lenient kind. They cannot legally open a place for public worship without first registering it at the Court of Quarter Sessions, or in the Registry of the Bishop of the Diocese. Otherwise they would be liable to punishment as forming a *conventicle*.

Returning, however, to the history of George I.'s times, I notice little else in this reign worthy of particular mention. The South Sea Scheme, to which I have alluded, and which was legalized by Act of Parliament in 1720, is sufficiently explained in the common histories. It was a case of fraud deluding folly, and, by exciting to the highest pitch the passion of cupidity, producing a sort of national madness. Law's Mississippi Scheme, in France, which happened just at the same time, was a similar delusion. In our own day we had a like exhibition of public frenzy in the pursuit of gain—the "Railway Mania" of 1845. In this last instance, as in the South Sea Scheme of 1720, an immense amount of misery and beggary was produced when the bubble burst.

We see in the foreign policy pursued under George I. one evil consequence to England resulting from the accession of a foreign sovereign to the British throne. Our interest and our national policy were made to bend to the interests of Hanover. We were mixed up in constant negotiations and intricate treaties, exposed (in 1716) to the danger of an invasion from Charles XII. of Sweden, and subjected to heavy expense in keeping up

armaments, and maintaining, for two or three years, a fleet in the Baltic, merely on account of George I.'s Hanoverian predilections, and in particular because he desired to secure to his Electorate of Hanover two obscure districts called Bremen and Verden, which he had torn away from Sweden. His line of conduct, of course, involved the Government and person of George I. in much unpopularity. Thus, for instance, the Ministry of Lord Stanhope, which was thought to favour the King's Hanoverian projects, was designated by the invidious appellation of the "*German Ministry*."

In order to thread the labyrinth of a series of intricate negotiations and treaties, it is necessary to have, as our clue, a knowledge of the objects for which the different parties were contending. In the diplomatic intercourse among the contracting powers in the present case we find their respective views to have been as follows :—

George I. wished, as I said, to secure Verden and Bremen for Hanover. The Emperor was opposed to this view of George's, and for himself desired to obtain the countenance of the other powers to an ordinance of his own, called the "*Pragmatic Sanction*," by which his daughter Maria Theresa should succeed him, as he had no son. He also desired that the *reversion of the Crown of Spain* should be secured to his family. Spain sought to recover the Italian possessions of the Spanish crown, which had been dismembered from her by the Treaty of Utrecht, and was very anxious to recover Gibraltar and Minorca, which England had secured to herself by the same treaty. France, after the Regent's death, and during the pacific administration of Cardinal Fleury, wished to be on good terms with England, and to avoid a European war.

It should be added that questions of commerce entered largely into these negotiations; for those were days of restricted trade and exclusive privileges, when the true principles of international traffic were almost totally ignored. Among the commercial subjects of contending diplomacy were these: England desired for her merchants, especially those of the West Indies, certain liberties of trafficking with the South American Colonies of Spain, which the action of the Spanish Government

frequently impeded, and the rights of the *Assiento*, as settled at Utrecht. England, too, and Holland also, were opposed to the existence of the "*Ostend East India Company*," which the Emperor (to whom Belgium, in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht, now belonged) had established as the Belgian seaport of that name, and which those two great commercial powers regarded with jealousy as a rival to their own East India companies.

Such then, in George I.'s time, were the views and objects of the different powers in their constant negotiations and treaties with each other.

Of these dealings the principal shall now be mentioned. After the War of Sicily, waged by England and the Emperor against Spain, a treaty was made at Madrid (1721) between England and Spain, and on the same day was signed a treaty of defensive alliance between England, France, and Spain, the principal articles of which were, (1) that England was not to oppose the views of Spain in Italy, from which she had been excluded by the Utrecht treaty, and (2) that France and Spain guaranteed to Hanover, Bremen and Verden, which the Emperor had refused to do. Here we notice that a distinct departure from the *Treaty of Utrecht* was made in the interest of George I. as Elector of Hanover; and recognize a flagrant instance of the pernicious influence upon the policy of England resulting from the German predilections of George I. So much for the treaty of Madrid (1721). In 1725 another treaty took place, much in *contravention* of the last treaty. This of 1725, called the Treaty of Vienna, was between the King of Spain and the Emperor, and resulted from a quarrel between the King of Spain and the French Government, and from the refusal of England to side with Spain in that quarrel.

According to this Treaty of Vienna, the King of Spain was to sanction the Emperor's *Ostend East India Company*, to recognize the Emperor's right to *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and the Netherlands, all the territories which by the *Treaty of Utrecht* had been *dismembered from the Spanish Monarchy*, and to guarantee the "*Pragmatic Sanction*" aforesaid. On the other hand the Emperor agreed (1) to remove his claim to the Spanish

throne; (2) to demand back from England *Gibraltar and Minorca*, the loss of which in the Succession War greatly annoyed the Spanish King; and (3), if England refused the surrender of these places, to join with Spain in aiding the *Pretender* to regain the throne of Great Britain! These two contracting powers (Spain and the Emperor) looking round for some ally to assist them in realizing their bold projects, could find none but the Czarina of Russia, who readily fell into their plans, and also accordingly began to fit out a fleet to co-operate with them against England, and aid in restoring the Pretender.

England, on the other hand, made a treaty of alliance with France, Prussia, Denmark, and Holland, in counteraction of the aforesaid Treaty of Vienna, made between Spain and the Emperor, fitted out with great promptitude a fleet to cruise in the Baltic and intercept the Russian fleet in any attempts to approach our shores, and sent a fleet to harass the Spanish colonies, and, if possible, capture some of the galleons bringing home to Spain the precious metals from their South American mines. All this vigour displayed by the English Government under Walpole, well seconded by money votes in Parliament, brought the Emperor and Spain, with their Russian ally, to a more pacific state of mind, and that with little effusion of blood, and accordingly, in four years after this absurd Treaty of Vienna, came the Treaty of Seville between England and Spain (1729), and with it a defensive alliance between England, Spain, France, and Holland, the articles of which, as regards English interests, were that the Assiento was confirmed, and the trade between our West Indian Colonies, and Spanish South America was somewhat facilitated. Thus peace was restored to England and to Europe. The Treaty of Seville (1729) has been characterized as celebrated and advantageous to England. The ten years between 1729 and 1739 were a period of peace for England; and during it the trade and resources of the country greatly increased under the Government of Walpole, whose greatness as a minister lay chiefly in finance. Excepting in this matter he did, or attempted to do, little in the way of internal improvements, for he was averse to change and, in so unsettled a state of men's minds, with

good reason. “*Quieta ne movere,*” was his favourite maxim—“Let well alone;” though he is thought to have carried this maxim too far on several occasions, in forbearing to bring forward measures for the correction of various crying abuses which then existed.

END OF THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH HISTORY.
